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The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another v. Jana Seva Karjyalaya Ltd. And Another
Case Summary — Jana Sevak Karjyalaya Ltd. v. State of U.P. (B.P. Banerjee, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises from actions taken by the 'Janasevak Group of Newspapers' which publishes from Lucknow. The group was obliged under the "Bachawat Award" to pay salaries and wages to employees; inability to pay as per the Award could not be used as a ground for retrenchment. The employees and other newspaper groups challenged the Award in the Supreme Court, which passed an interim order directing implementation of the Award from 1 January 1990 and directed payment of 50% of arrears within three months, subject to adjustment depending on the final order. The Supreme Court's order included an injunction not to initiate proceedings until those cases were disposed of.
Despite the interim order, the writ petitioners (opposite parties) allegedly issued retrenchment orders affecting 92 journalists and other employees, purportedly on the ground of inability to pay wages. Notices under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and under Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were issued for the retrenchment of employees. It was alleged the notices violated Section 16A of the Working Journalists Act, 1955.
The Deputy Labour Commissioner (Authorised Officer) lodged a complaint for violation of the Working Journalists Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Lucknow, who took cognizance and issued summons to the writ petitioners at their Lucknow office with an appearance date. A prior show cause notice dated 6 July 1993 was also issued at the Lucknow office; the writ petitioners did not reply, prompting the complaint before the CJM. All these enforcement and criminal/penal proceedings were pending in the State of U.P and the relevant notices were served in U.P.: none were served on the Registrar's Office of the writ petitioners at Calcutta.
The learned trial Judge in C.O. (not yet numbered) entertained a writ application and granted an ex parte interim injunction against the appellants, with a direction upon the writ petitioners/opposite parties to serve a copy on the appellants. The appellants (the State of U.P. represented by counsel) appealed solely on the limited ground that the Calcutta High Court had no territorial jurisdiction because the cause of action arose entirely in U.P.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Calcutta High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain the writ petition and to pass an interim injunction when, as contended by the appellants, the cause of action arose wholly outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court (i.e., within the State of U.P.).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (State of U.P.)
- The learned trial Judge acted without jurisdiction and was wrong to pass the interim injunction because no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
- All the notices and proceedings (retrenches, show-cause, complaint to CJM, summons) originated in and were served in the State of U.P., and the CJM, Lucknow is seized of the matter.
- Reliance was placed on precedents (Bihar Coal Traders v. Union of India and Kajaria Exports Limited v. Union of India) which, in counsel's submission, support the proposition that mere existence of a head/registered office in Calcutta is insufficient to confer jurisdiction when the operative acts and service occur outside the State.
Writ Petitioners' Arguments (Opposite Parties)
- It was contended that this Court has jurisdiction because the effect of the proceedings initiated in U.P. was felt by the company at its head office in Calcutta; therefore a part of the cause of action arose at Calcutta.
- Reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision in Union of India v. Hindusthan Aluminium Corpn. Ltd. (AIR 1983 Cal 307) to support the proposition that where the head office suffers direct consequences, territorial jurisdiction may lie in the High Court where the head office is situated.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bihar Coal Traders v. Union of India, 96 CWN 911 (Division Bench) | Principle that where notices and orders are issued and intended to operate within one State, challenges to actions taken under those orders should be made where the order is served or action is taken; mere connection by office location elsewhere is not sufficient for jurisdiction. | The Court applied the principle to hold that since the notices and proceedings originated and were served in U.P., having a head office in Calcutta without more did not create territorial jurisdiction for the Calcutta High Court. |
| Kajaria Exports Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Cal 70 (Single Judge) | Held that mere fact of a registered office or correspondence in Calcutta is irrelevant to territorial jurisdiction unless notices/orders are served at that office or some material fact arises there. | The Court relied on this authority to reinforce that the mere existence of a head/registered office in Calcutta is insufficient to confer jurisdiction when no part of the cause of action arose there and no notices were served there. |
| Union of India v. Hindusthan Aluminium Corpn. Ltd., AIR 1983 Cal 307 (Division Bench) | Holds that territorial jurisdiction is to be assessed on the basis of allegations in the petition; where the head office suffers losses as a direct consequence of an order, part of the cause of action can be said to arise at the place where that head office is situated. | The Court considered this precedent but concluded it was inapplicable on the facts: in Hindusthan Aluminium the losses were actually suffered and felt at Calcutta due to an all-India control order. By contrast, in the present case the effect alleged to be felt at Calcutta was merely prospective/consequential and the operative proceedings and service were in U.P. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court confined itself to the single point of territorial jurisdiction and considered only the facts relevant to that question. It analyzed jurisdiction by reference to the legal meaning of "cause of action" and established the following points drawn from the opinion:
- Definition and scope of "cause of action": The court observed that cause of action includes every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the petitioner to prove in order to obtain judgment. It is not limited to the mere act of infringement but includes all material facts on which the claim is founded.
- Distinguishing precedents: The court compared the present facts with Hindusthan Aluminium, noting that in that case losses were actually suffered and felt at Calcutta arising from an all-India control order, thereby creating part of the cause of action in Calcutta. By contrast, the present case involved proceedings initiated and served entirely in U.P.; the claimed effect at the Calcutta head office was speculative or consequential rather than an actual operative fact within Calcutta.
- Territorial limits of supervisory power (Article 227): The court emphasized that the High Court's supervisory power under Article 227 extends only over courts and tribunals within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, the Calcutta High Court cannot exercise superintendence over proceedings pending in courts or tribunals in U.P.
- Application of prior authorities: Applying the principles in Bihar Coal Traders and Kajaria Exports, the court concluded that mere presence of a head office in Calcutta without any operative act or service there is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Where notices and proceedings were issued from and served in U.P. and the CJM, Lucknow, they constituted the locus of the cause of action for jurisdictional purposes.
- Conclusion drawn from facts: On the basis of the facts before it—that notices of retrenchment, show-cause and the complaint were issued and served in U.P., and criminal/judicial proceedings were pending in U.P.—the court was prima facie satisfied that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
The court expressly limited its consideration to jurisdictional questions and did not enter into the merits of the underlying dispute.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeal allowed; the writ petition is dismissed wholly on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
Implications and consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The interim ex parte injunction previously granted by the learned trial Judge is set aside by reason of lack of jurisdiction; the writ petition before the Calcutta High Court is dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction.
- Preservation of rights: The dismissal is without prejudice to the rights of the respondent writ petitioners to present a writ application before the appropriate High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the matters (for example, the High Court having jurisdiction in the State of U.P.).
- No decision on merits: The court made it clear that it has not considered or decided the substantive merits of the controversy; those questions remain open for determination by a competent court having jurisdiction.
- Costs and other orders: The appeal was allowed and there was no order as to costs. A xerox copy of the order was directed to be given to the parties on the usual undertakings.
N.K. Bhattacharya, J. concurred. Final entry in the record: "Appeal allowed."
B.P Banerjee, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of the learned trial Judge passed in C.O No. (not yet numbered) in Jana Sevak Karjyalaya Ltd. v. State of U.P. By the said order the learned trial Judge after entertaining the writ application passed an ex parte interim order of injunction against the appellants with a direction upon the writ petitioners opposite parties to serve copy of the appellants. In this appeal the only contention of the appellants before us is that the learned trial Judge acted without jurisdiction and was wrong in passing the interim order of injunction inasmuch as this High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said writ application inasmuch as the cause of action wholly had been arisen outside the jurisdiction of this court. The appeal is confined only to this limited point. In order to decide this question, the relevant facts for this purpose are only considered.
2. ‘Janasevak Group of Newspapers’ publishes their newspapers from Lucknow. The said newspaper group is obliged under the ‘Bachawat Award’ to make payment of salaries and wages to the employees. The inability on the part of the employer to make payment as per the Award could not be utilised for the purpose of retrenchment and/or dismissal of the employees. It is stated that the writ petitioners opposite parties along with some other group of newspapers moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court challenging the validity of the said Award. Upon such application the Supreme Court was pleased to pass an interim order directing the parties to implement the said Award with effect from 1st January 1990. With regard to arrears, however, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed to make payment of 50% of arrears within a period of three months subject to adjustment depending upon the final order. In view of that interim order there was an injunction upon the parties not to initiate any proceeding until the cases were disposed of by the Supreme Court. It is alleged that the writ petitioners opposite parties in contravention of law issued the order of retrenchment of 92 journalists and other newspapers employees serving in the said organisation on the plea of inability to make payment of wages in accordance with the ‘Bachwat Award’.
3. Notice under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was issued to retrench 49 working journalists on 17th June, 1993. Similar notice for retrenchment was issued by the writ petitioners/opposite parties in purported compliance of Section 6N of the UP. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
4. It is alleged that the notice issued by the respondent-writ petitioners was in total violation of Section 16 A of the Working Journalists Act, 1955. Accordingly the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Govt. of U.P being the Authorised Officer lodged a complaint for the violation of provisions of the said Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow on 19th July, 1993 and that the learned C.J.M issued summons the respondent/writ petitioners which was received by them in their Lucknow Office, fixing a date of appearance on 19th of August, 1993. As a matter of fact the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate is in seisin of the matter. Prior to filing of such complaint a show cause notice dt. 6th July, 1993 was issued to the respondent/writ petitioners at their office at 16, Rana Pratap Marg, Lucknow, U.P by the Dy. Labour Commissioner asking them to show cause why appropriate proceedings should not be taken up against them for violation of S. 16A of the Working Journalists Act. It is also alleged that the respondent/writ petitioners failed to reply to the said show cause notice which prompted the appropriate officer to lodge a complaint before the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate. It appears that the notice was issued by the Deputy Labour Commissioner for the benefit of the 92 retrenched working journalists and other newspaper employees but they have hot been made party in the present writ application though ultimately their rights are going to be effected by the adjudication of the writ application and the writ application was moved on the purported urgency that a prosecution under S. 18 of the Working Journalists Act, 1955 may be initiated against the writ petitioners. But the fact remains that the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate after having taken cognizance of the matters issued summons fixed 19th of August, 1993 for their appearance before the said Court.
5. From the above facts it is clear that the notices of retrenchment were issued by the authorities in the State of U.P and were served upon the retrenched employees in the State of U.P The government of U.P lodged a complaint for violation of the provisions of Section 16F of the Working Journalists Act, 1955 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow on 19th July, 1993 and that the said learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow issues summons to the respondents/writ petitioners and that the learned C.J.M is in seisin of the matter. All the proceedings are pending in the State of U.P None of the notices in support of those proceedings were served upon the Registrar's Office of the writ petitioner-opposite parties situated at Calcutta.
6. In this connection, it was submitted by Mr. A.P Sarkar, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant the State of U.P that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and accordingly, this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ application and pass any order in the matter. Mr. Arun Prakash Sarkar, referred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bihar Coal Traders v. Union of India, 96 CWN 911 in which the Division Bench held that “in the instant case no action has actually been taken against the appellant petitioner under the aforesaid Bihar Trade Order and further it does not appear that by operation of the said order which is limited in its operation for carrying on business within the State of Bihar the appellant petitioner's right to carry on business within the State of West Bengal has been affected by any means whatsoever. The said Bihar Trade Order extends to the whole of the State of Bihar and that in case of any action is taken by the authorities at Bihar under that order in that event the same may be challenged where the order is served or action is taken. In the instant case all the notices and orders on which reliance were placed were isssued from the State of Bihar and their application is intended within the State of Bihar. The appellant-petitioner's contention is that the appellant petitioner had taken out articles which are beyond the purview of the said order and the police authorities will harass and the vehicles may be seized could not be decided merely on the basis of hypothesis”. Reference was also made to a single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kajaria Exports Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Cal 70 wherein it was held by a single Judge Court that at page 73. “In my view the mere fact that the petitioner's Registered Office is at Calcutta and mere fact that the petitioner company made correspondence to foreign sellers and the foreign sellers also made correspodence with Calcutta Office in the matter and the price of the goods was paid from Calcutta Office are wholly irrelevant in the matter for the purpose of ascertaining the question of the jurisdiction ofthis Court in this case. These facts were not material facts for the purpose of ascertaining the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain writ petition…. Of course, having a Registered Office in Calcutta would have some relevance if any notice and/or order was served by the respondents at the Registered Office at Calcutta. Mere having an office at Calcutta without having anything more does not and cannot mean that this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition when all the respondents are situated outside the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and no part of the Cause of Action arose within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. The petitioner challenged the actions of the respondents whose offices are situated at Bombay. In view of the facts and circumstances stated above. I hold that this, Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and I uphold the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Roychowdhury and dismissed the writ petition on the preliminary ground”.
7. On behalf of the writ petitioner opposite parties, Mr. S.N Mukherjee, Ld. Counsel, appearing with Mr. P.K Ghosh, contended that this Court has jurisdiction as the effect of this proceedings initiated in the State of U.P and felt by the Company in its head office which is situated in Calcutta or in other words, it was submitted that when the head office is situated in Calcutta and the proceeding initiated by the company in any State, this court had jurisdiction relying upon Division Bench judgment of this Court in case of Union of India v. Hindusthan Aluminium Corpn. Ltd., AIR 1983 Cal 307, wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that the question whether the High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition has to be decided on the basis of the allegations made in the petition. The truth or otherwise of the allegations is immaterial at that stage and in that case, the order fixing the selling price and the retention price of the aluminium was fixed by the Central Government in Delhi. The factory of the company was located outside West Bengal. However, Head Office was situated at Calcutta and that in that case the petitioner company alleged that it had suffered losses in business at Calcutta as a direct consequences of the said orders. Under the circumstances, it was held by the said Division Bench a part of cause of action had arisen at Calcutta and therefore this Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
8. The ratio of the Division Bench judgment in the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd., has no manner of application in the instant case inasmuch as cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff/petitioner to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. In that case, the losses were actually suffered and felt in Calcutta but in the instant case the allegation is that if the proceedings are allowed to be continued in the State of U.P in that event the writ petitioners opposite parties will suffer losses. In the Hindusthan Aluminium Corpn. case (supra) no other proceeding was initiated except an all-India control order was the subject matter of challenge and the fact of the said control order was intended to have all-India effect and anybody being aggrieved by the said control order directly or indirectly, can challenge the validity of the said control order at any court within which his place of business is situate. The Union of India v. Hindusthan Aluminium Corpn. case (supra) has no manner of application in this case also in the ground that before the Division Bench, the effect of All-India control order by the head office which was situated in Calcutta was felt in Calcutta and the Division Bench held that the company suffered losses in business in Calcutta by the direct consequences of the said order and as such the Calcutta High Court has jurisdiction. But the present case is entirely different from the said case and as such, the principles laid down in that case are wholly inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. Art. 227 of the Constitution have given power of superintendence over all courts by High Court and that power of superintendence by High Court could only be exercised throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction or in other words, a High Court had no jurisdiction over courts and tribunals which were beyond the territories in relation to which such High Court exercises jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Calcutta High Court cannot have any power of superintendence over the courts and tribunal in the State of U.P In the instant case, judicial proceedings are pending in the State of U.P None of the notices were issued or served upon the head office. The cause of action had arisen wholly within the State of U.P and no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. This High Court while exercising power under Art. 226 must exercise jurisdiction when the High Court is satisfied prima facie as the court had territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case on the basis of the facts, it is clear to us that this court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Mereliaving the head office without anything more is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of exercise of jurisdiction. Accordingly applying the principles laid down in Bihar Coal Traders case (supra) and Kajaria Exports Ltd. case (supra) we are of the view that this Court had no jurisdiction to pass any order in respect of the disputes which are subject matter of the writ application. Accordingly, in our view, the Ld. trial Judge was wrong in entertaining the writ application and passing an ex parte interim order of injunction staying certain proceedings which were pending before the courts and tribunals in the State of U.P Accordingly, the appeal is also treated as on days list and is disposed of along with this application holding that this court had no jurisdiction and accordingly the writ petition could not be said to be maintainable before this court and the same accordingly stands dismissed. This order is, however, without prejudice to the rights of the respondent writ petitioners to move before the appropriate High Court having jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. We make it clear that this appeal is allowed and the writ petition is dismissed wholly on the ground of want of jurisdiction and we had not entered into the merits of the case which are left open to decide in case any writ application is presented before the High Court which had jurisdiction in the matter.
9. Appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
10. Let a xeroxed copy of the above order be given to the parties on the usual undertakings.
N.K Bhattacharya, J.:— 11. I agree.
Appeal allowed.
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