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Hindusthan Gas And Industries Limited v. Adhish Chandra Sinha
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerned an eviction suit and subsequent execution proceedings. The plaintiff-respondent (landlord / decree-holder) filed a suit for eviction of the appellant-defendant (tenant / judgment-debtor) in respect of premises at 2/8B, Sarat Bose Road, Calcutta (ground floor and certain service rooms). The tenant had undertaken to vacate by 31 October 1975 but failed to do so. A notice to quit was thereafter served under section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, calling upon the tenant to vacate by 31 July 1980.
Litigation began in different fora: the tenant filed Suit No. 583 of 1980 in the Original Side of the High Court challenging the notice to quit, while the landlord instituted an ejectment suit in the District Court, Alipore (Title Suit No. 37 of 1980). There were multiple procedural steps including applications under section 10 CPC, orders staying the Alipore suit which were later set aside, and a dismissed Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court.
By 1987 the Alipore suit was transferred to the High Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent by consent of the parties. This Court decreed the eviction on 3 May 1992. The decree was affirmed on appeal (14 December 1992) and a Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court was dismissed. For recovery of possession an execution application was filed seeking appointment of a Receiver (and alternatively execution by the Sheriff). The trial Judge appointed joint Receivers with a direction to take possession and to use police force if resisted. The present appeal challenges the trial Judge’s order dated 14 January 1993 appointing Receivers for execution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the execution court has power to appoint a Receiver at the first instance to recover possession (with direction to use police if resisted) when executing an eviction decree.
- Whether the Court that received the suit on transfer under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent may execute the decree for property situated outside its ordinary territorial jurisdiction, or whether the decree must be sent to the original court having territorial jurisdiction (Alipore Court) for execution.
- What principles govern the exercise of the equitable power to appoint a Receiver under Order 40 Rule 1 read with section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and whether those principles were satisfied on the facts of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (judgment-debtor / tenant)
- The execution court had no power to appoint a Receiver as the first step for executing an eviction decree and ordering recovery of possession with police assistance; ordinary modes of execution provided in the Code of Civil Procedure should be followed.
- Because the property is situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court (originally in Alipore), the decree should be sent to the original court for execution; that court alone had territorial jurisdiction to execute the decree.
- Appointment of a Receiver is a drastic, exceptional power that should only be exercised when no other mode of execution is effective; reliance placed on section 51 and Order 40 Rule 1 CPC to show a special case must be made out.
- Receiver cannot be appointed merely on a prayer to circumvent ordinary eviction procedures; ordinary execution by court bailiff (with police assistance if necessary) is the appropriate route.
- Relied on Division Bench authority in Raja Pramath Nath Malia v. H.V Low & Co. (34 CWN 328) to show courts should be careful and sparing in appointing a Receiver, and that territorial courts should generally carry out sales/execution (subject to exceptions).
- Relied on Jugal Charan Mondal v. Pankajini Dasi (AIR 1961 Cal 183) for the proposition that a court which passed a decree does not thereby retain power to execute it beyond entertaining an execution application and transferring it to the proper court where territorial jurisdiction has been lost.
Respondent's Arguments (decree-holder / landlord)
- Section 51 CPC lists modes of execution and clause (d) (section text referenced in the opinion) permits execution by appointing a Receiver; the executing court has discretion to appoint a Receiver on a party's prayer.
- It is not necessary for the court to disclose, in exhaustive terms, reasons why execution is by Receiver rather than other modes; what matters is that special facts exist to justify equitable execution.
- Historical facts and protracted litigation (over 12 years), the tenant’s failure to vacate despite undertakings, and the decree-holder's disclosed ill-health (renal failure) make it necessary that the decree be executed effectively and without prolonged delay.
- Sections 38 and 39 CPC permit the court that passed a decree to execute it or send it for execution; because the suit was transferred under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent by consent, this Court assumed jurisdiction over the suit and is competent to execute the decree even though the property lies outside its ordinary territorial jurisdiction.
- If execution were sent back to the Alipore Court, enforcement would be delayed for months or years thereby nullifying the effectiveness of the decree; appointment of a Receiver was necessary and would not prejudice the judgment-debtor.
- Distinguished Jugal Charan Mondal on the ground that it dealt with loss of territorial jurisdiction occurring after decree, whereas here the suit was decided on transfer under Clause 13 by consent and this Court assumed jurisdiction over the subject-matter including execution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raja Pramath Nath Malia v. H.V Low & Company (34 CWN 328) | That the court on its original side may appoint a Receiver in respect of property outside its ordinary original jurisdiction, but should do so sparingly and only when a proper case is made out; territorial courts normally carry out sales/executions though exceptions exist. | The Court acknowledged the authority and applied its cautionary principle: a Receiver may be appointed but only when a proper case is established. The Court found such a case on the facts and did not treat appointment as routine. |
| Jugal Charan Mondal (Judgment-Debtor) v. Sm. Pankajini Dasi (Decree-Holder), AIR 1961 Calcutta 183 | That a court which has passed a decree does not lose jurisdiction to entertain an execution application merely by loss of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction; that 'jurisdiction to execute' may mean jurisdiction to entertain and transfer the execution to the proper court, but not to proceed further. | The Court distinguished this precedent: because the suit was transferred under Clause 13 by consent and this Court assumed jurisdiction for all practical purposes (including execution), Jugal Charan Mondal's restrictive rule did not apply in the same way. |
| Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works Ltd. v. Land Reforms Commissioner, AIR 1969 SC 897 | Consideration of section 51 CPC: the Supreme Court held that one mode of execution need not be strictly exhausted before adopting an alternative; the court has flexibility in choosing modes of execution as the nature of relief requires. | The Court relied on this to support the proposition that the court need not mechanically exhaust modes one by one and may adopt equitable execution (appointment of Receiver) where appropriate; this supported the view that Receiver appointment can be justified without first exhausting all other procedural steps where immediate execution is necessary. |
| Chinnamal v. P. Aruna Mugha, (1990) 1 SCC 613 | That the Code of Civil Procedure should be construed to facilitate justice and not as an instrument of punishment; procedural rules should enable justice wherever reasonably possible. | The Court invoked this principle to justify a pragmatic, justice-focused approach to execution — supporting the view that procedural technicalities should not defeat the decree-holder's right to obtain possession. |
| Owners and parties interested in M.V. "Vali Pero" v. Fernando Lopez, AIR 1989 SC 2206 | That rules of procedure should be construed pragmatically to advance justice rather than being applied so literally as to obstruct the delivery of justice. | The Court cited this to reinforce the pragmatic approach to execution and to support the exercise of discretion in appointing a Receiver under exceptional facts to prevent frustration of the decree. |
| Ambika Ranjan Majumdar (Division Bench) (referred to as "supra" in opinion) | That territorial jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court executing a decree (noted by the Court as a general principle). | The Court distinguished this decision on the facts: Ambika Ranjan Majumdar did not involve a suit decided on transfer; here the suit was transferred under Clause 13 by consent, and the Court found Ambika Ranjan Majumdar inapplicable to the present facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court engaged in a step-by-step legal analysis grounded on statutory provisions and the precedents cited in the proceedings:
- The Court began by identifying the relevant statutory framework: section 51 CPC (enumerating modes of execution, including appointment of a Receiver), Order 40 Rule 1 CPC (circumstances for appointment of a Receiver) and sections 38 and 39 CPC (powers of the court which passed the decree to execute or send the decree for execution).
- It accepted the established principle that appointment of a Receiver for execution is an equitable, exceptional remedy and cannot be made as a matter of course; a special case must be made out on the facts to justify such appointment. The Court noted its agreement with authorities that the power should be exercised sparingly and only where it is just and convenient.
- The Court considered the appellant's contention that territorial limitations barred this Court from executing the decree, relying on Jugal Charan Mondal and related authority. The Court distinguished that authority because here the suit had been transferred to this Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent by consent, and therefore the Court had assumed jurisdiction over the suit for practical purposes, including execution.
- The Court relied upon Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works (supra) to reject a rigid, sequential approach to modes of execution under section 51 CPC — the executing court need not mechanically exhaust one mode after another when the nature of relief and circumstances justify resort to equitable execution.
- The Court evaluated the facts: the tenant had undertaken to vacate in 1975 but did not; the landlord served notice and obtained an eviction decree after protracted litigation spanning roughly 12 years, including multiple proceedings and appeals up to the Supreme Court; the decree was final. The decree-holder's ill-health (renal failure) and the prolonged delay in enforcement were emphasized as practical considerations.
- Balancing these factors, the Court concluded that immediate and effective execution was necessary to prevent frustration of the decree and to render justice to the decree-holder. It held that the circumstances prescribed by Order 40 Rule 1 existed on the facts and that the appointment of a Receiver was justified notwithstanding the property being outside the Court's ordinary territorial jurisdiction because the suit had been transferred under Clause 13 by consent.
- Although the Court stated it did not agree with all of the reasons given by the learned trial Judge, it nevertheless found the trial Judge's order appointing Receivers to be substantively justified and therefore worthy of affirmation. To mitigate potential hardship to the judgment-debtor, a modification was made (see Holding).
Holding and Implications
Holding: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH MODIFICATION.
The Court affirmed the trial Judge's order appointing joint Receivers for the purpose of executing the eviction decree and authorized execution in the manner indicated by the trial Judge. However, to avoid undue hardship to the judgment-debtor, the Court modified the order by granting the judgment-debtor three months' time to vacate the premises; if the judgment-debtor fails to vacate within that period, the appointed Receiver will execute the decree and recover possession in the manner previously ordered.
Implications (direct and doctrinally described in the opinion):
- Direct effect on the parties: the decree-holder's right to possession is preserved and the Receiver appointment stands subject to the three-month vacate period; the Receiver is authorized to execute the decree thereafter.
- Jurisdictional implication drawn by the Court: where a suit has been transferred under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent by consent and the transferee court has assumed jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit, that court may also execute the decree in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, even if the suit property lies outside its ordinary territorial jurisdiction (the Court distinguished authorities to the contrary on those facts).
- On the use of equitable execution: the Court reaffirmed that appointment of a Receiver is an extraordinary equitable remedy and requires special facts; however, where execution by ordinary modes would be unduly delayed and would frustrate the decree, the court retains power to appoint a Receiver as just and convenient in the circumstances.
- The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities; it applied established principles (as reflected above) to the facts and affirmed the trial court’s equitable exercise of discretion.
Orderly implementation: the judgment records that the Receiver and all parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of the judgment and order on the usual undertaking. The modification (three months' vacate period) was made at the appellant's request and to avoid hardship.
JUDGMENT
Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J.:— This is an appeal against an order dated 14th January, 1993 passed by the learned trial Judge in Extraordinary Suit No. 20-A of 1987, on an application for execution of a decree for possession of the immovable property. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant-defendant who was a tenant in respect of the premises in question. The Ejectment Suit was originally filed in Alipore, 24-Parganas (before its bifurcation) being Title Suit No. 36 of 1981.
2. The case had a chequered career. The appellant was a tenant under the defendant-respondent in respect of the suit premises situated at 2/8B, Sarat Bose Road in respect of the ground floor with three service rooms on the first floor of the out-house of the premises No. 2/8B, Sarat Bose Road, Calcutta. The defendant-appellant undertook to vacate the premises by 31st October, 1975 and thereafter the appellant-tenant failed to vacate the suit premises. The plaintiff-respondent thereafter served a notice to quit under section 13(6) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 requiring the appellant to quit and vacate the premises also on the ground of reasonable requirement. The tenant appellant was; called upon to vacate the premises by 31st July, 1980. Notice was served as the respondent-landlord wanted to avail of additional ground for eviction. Immediately on receipt of the notice to quit the appellant-tenant filed a suit in the Original Side of this Court being Suit No. 583 of 1980 challenging the validity and/or legality of the Notice to quit dt. 13/14th June, 1980 and for a declaration that the appellant/tenant continued to be a monthly tenant. Thereafter on 7th August, 1980 the plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for ejectment before the District Court at Alipore being Title Suit No. 37 of 1980. An Application was taken out by the plaintiff-respondent for dismissal of the Suit No. 583 of 1980 filed in this court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and that by the order dated 25th March, 1981 the suit filed the appellant in this court was dismissed. The appellant thereafter preferred an appeal from the said order dt. 25th March, 1980. Thereafter the appellant filed an application for stay of the eviction suit at Alipore Court in Title Suit No. 37 of 1980 under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of the pendency of the suit filed by the appellant in the High Court. By the order dt. 19th November, 1983 an application under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was allowed by Alipore Court and the eviction suit against the appellant was stayed. The said order of stay under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was challenged by the respondent-plaintiff before this court which was set aside by this court on 14th July, 1984. The appellant being aggrieved by the said order dated 14th July, 1984 setting aside the order of stay under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure moved a Special leave Petition to the Supreme Court which was dismissed on 27th December, 1984. In 1987 the Alipore Suit was transferred to this Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent by consent of the parties. Ultimately, eviction suit was decreed by this court on 3rd May, 1992. The judgment-decree dt. 3rd May, 1992 passed in the said eviction suit by this court was challenged in appeal filed by appellant and the appeal court dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the decree for eviction on 14th December, 1992 in Appeal No. 224 of 1991. Special Leave Petition was filed before the Supreme Court against the judgment passed by the Appeal Court on 14th December, 1992 but the said Special Leave Petition was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. For the purpose of recovery of possession an application for execution of the decree was filed before the learned trial Judge with a prayer for appointment of Receiver over the suit premises for execution with direction to take over physical possession of the same from the appellant judgment-debtor and deliver vacant possession therefor to the respondent-decree holder by removing judgment debtor and/or Mr. R.L Bathwal, its agents, employees assignees or any other person claiming it or in occupation of the suit premises. An alternative prayer was also made for execution of the decree by directing the Sheriff to hand over either by hmself or through his agent the vacant possession of the suit premises. The said application for execution was duly contested by the judgment-debtor/appellant and the learned trial Judge after considering the rival contentions of the parties appointed Mr. Asbim Ghosh, Bar-at-Law and Mr. Samrat Sen, Advocate as Joint Receivers in respect of the suit premises which was directed to take over possession and in case of any resistance to use police force for the purpose of recovery of possession.
3. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that for the purpose of executing the eviction decree by dispossessing the judgement-debtor, the execution court has no power to appoint a Receiver at the first instance with a direction to recover possession and in case of resistance to take police help and recover possession. Mr. Mitra submitted that for the purpose of recovery of possession by executing the decree the ordinary modes of execution as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure has to be followed and that as the property is situated outside the jurisdiction of this court, the decree should be sent for execution to the original court in which the suit was first instituted and that court alone has got the territorial jurisdiction to execute the decree. It was next submitted by Mr. Mitra that the Receiver could only be appointed in a case when no other mode of execution was provided under the law. In this connection, Mr. Mitra referred the provision of section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides several modes of execution of a decree subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and that the provisions of section 51(d) of the Civil Procedure Code provides for execution of a decree by appinting a Receiver. But such a drastic power would not be exercised unless a case has made out for appointment of Receiver on the basis of the principles laid down in Order 40 rule 1 of the Code of. Civil Procedure. It was submitted that for the purpose of appointing Receiver a Special case has to be made out. It was further submitted that whenever Receiver is appointed such a Receiver has all the powers under Order 40 rule 1 and that Receiver could only be appointed where there is no effective remedy for execution in law. It was further submitted that no case had been made out in the application for appointment of Receiver. Receiver cannot be appointed merely by making a prayer for appointment of Receiver, circumventing ordinary and usual procedure for eviction of a decree. It was pointed out that ordinary mode of execution of a decree for eviction and recovery of possession is to execute the decree through the court Bailiff and in case of resistance, the court has power to order for police help on being satisfied with that the judgment-debtor had resisted the bailiff and because of resistance bailiff could not take possession. It was further submitted that appointment of Receiver and ‘taking over possession with police help is an extreme method which is a very harsh and should take recourse as a last resort. It was further submitted that a party can only be dispossed in accordance with procedure prescribed by law and that it is not the law to take possession by eviction through Receiver and that too with police help in case of resistance at the first instance. Reliance was placed to the decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Raja Pramath Nath Malia v. H.V Low and Company, reported in 34 CWN 328 wherein it has been held that this court, on its original side, has power to appoint at his own hand a Receiver by way of execution in respect of property situated outside its ordinary original jurisdiction and belonging to a defendant who resides outside such jurisdiction. But it should be careful and sparing in the exercise of this power and should exercise it only on a proper case being made out from sufficient materials that it is necessary or advantageous that a Receiver should be appointed by itself. It cannot make an appointment on the sole ground that this is the only form of execution open to itself one can be availed of to enforce its decree as a matter of course. It was further held that while there is no express provision to this effect, the course contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure for sale in execution of immovable property is that they should be carried out by courts having territorial jurisdiction over such property although there can be exception to his principles.
3a. Reliance was also placed to another decision of Division Bench Judgement of this Court in the case Jugal Charan Mondal…Judgment-Debtor v. Sm. Pankajini Dasi…Decree-Holder . reported in AIR 1961 Calcutta 183 wherein it was held that a court which has competently passed a decree, does not lose jurisdiction to execute it merely by reason of loss of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the meantime. But this “jurisdiction to execute” means merely jurisdiction to entertain the execution application and to transfer it to the proper Court for execution, and it does not extend beyond that and it does not entitle the said court, in such circumstances, to proceed further with the court, having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction in the matter, on appropriate transfer to it of the particular decree for execution, that is, for such purpose. It was contended by Mr. Mitra that in the instant case though the suit was transferred from Alipore Court to this court, under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, the decree could not be executed by this Court and in this case for the purpose of execution of the decree in question an execution has to be physically made by Alipore Court having territorial jurisdiction over the property in question or in other words, it was submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to execute the decree in respect of the property situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this court even if the suit was disposed of by this Court on transfer.
4. Mr. Sudipta Sarkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the decree-holder/respondent submitted that section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribed several modes of execution of a decree and Clause (d) of section 54 expressly confer power upon the court to execute a decree by appointing a Receiver and that it is at the discretion of the court to execute on the prayer being made by the parties to appoint Receiver. Mr. Sarkar submitted that it is not necessary for the executing-court to disclose reasons and grounds why the decree is to be executed by appointing a Receiver and not by other modes. Mr. Sarkar further submitted that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case it must be held that special facts and circumstances exist for which the decree had to be executed by appointing a Receiver and for that purpose Mr. Sarkar highlighted the history of the litigation and submitted that in the instant case the judgement-debtor undertook to vacate the premises in question in 1975 but failed to do so. Thereafter the decree-holder served a notice to quit also on the ground of reasonable requirement and that when decree for eviction was passed on all the grounds and when the litigation is pending for more than 12 years it would be nothing but travesty of justice if the decree is not executed within a reasonable time in an effective manner. The condition of health of the plaintiff opposite party has been disclosed and from this state of affairs as disclosed in this case, Mr. Sarkar submitted that it was a fit and proper case where the court has rightly exercised the power to execute the decree by appointing a Receiver. Mr. Sarkar submitted that section 38 of the Code expressly provided that the power upon the court which passed the decree is to execute the same and also competent to send decree in other courts for execution. It was further submitted that under section 39 of the Code, the Court which passed a decree made on the application of the decree-holder sent it for execution to another court and that accordingly it was submitted that the transfer of decree could only be made at the instance of the decree holder and not at the instance of judgement-debtor. Mr. Sarkar further submitted that when the suit was transferred to this court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent on consent of parties in that event the judgement-debtor was estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of this court to execute the decree on the ground that this court is not the competent court to execute the decree. It was further submitted that in a case like this as the property situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this court, the Sheriff or the officers of this court cannot straightway go and execute the decree and that the only mode for execution of such a decree is to appoint a Receiver for the purpose of executing the decree and the appointment of Receiver cannot cause any prejudice to any person. The appointment of Receiver was made by the learned trial Judge on notice and upon hearing the parties and as such no prejudice or hardship of any kind could have caused upon the judgement-debtor who was obliged to vacate the premises in question pursuant to the decree passed by this court. Mr. Sarkar further submitted that so far as the judgement-debtor is concerned the judgement-debtor has no right to technicalities. Execution must be done according to law, but the purpose of execution would be frustrated if the submission of the appellant is accepted that this court has no jurisdiction to execute the decree and that for the purpose of execution of the decree, the decree has to be sent Alipore Court and the said court should execute the decree in the ordinary course which would take months and years to get possession of the property and that course of action is followed in that event the very purpose of obtaining the decree would be completely nugaotry and frustrated. The principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Raja Pramath Nath Malia (supra) could not be disputed as this court in its original side has power to appoint a Receiver by way of execution in respect of the property situated outside the ordinary original jurisdiction of this court but it should be careful and sparing in the exercise of this power and should exercise it only in a proper case having made out on sufficient materials that it is necessary or advantageous that Receiver should be appointed by itself. It cannot make appointment of a Receiver on the sole ground for it is the only the form of execution open to the court and can be availed of to execute a decree as a matter of course. We respectfully agree with the view expressed by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Jugal Charan Mondal's case (supra) but the same is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case inasmuch as in that case the Division Bench of this Court considered the effect of loss of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction, subsequent to the passing of the decree and in that connection it was held that the court which had competently passed the decree does not lose jurisdiction to execute it merely by reasons of loss of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the meantime and it was held that the expression ‘jurisdiction to execute’ means merely jurisdiction to entertain the execution application and to transfer it to the proper court for execution. In this case admittedly, the court lost its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and that is why the court was competent to entertain execution application but could not execute the same and for the purpose of execution it has to be transferred to the competent court of which had been confered jurisdiction over the matter. In the instant case in the view of the provision of section 38 read with Clause 13 of the Letters Patent the learned trial Judge who had passed the decree had jurisdiction to execute the decree of this court also had jurisdiction to transfer it. We are of the view that when the suit has been transferred under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent and that too by consent and the Court has jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit the court has the jurisdiction to execute the decree in accordance with provision of the Code of Civil Procedure even though the suit property was beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. On transfer of the suit the court assumed the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit property for all practical purposes including execution. The Division Bench judgment of this court in Ambika Ranjan Majumdar (supra) it was held that territorial jurisdiction is condition precedent to a court executing a decree. That was not a case where the suit was decided on transfer. When the suit had been transferred under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent where the court in which the suit was transferred for disposal, assumed of the jurisdiction of the original court and can exercise territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Accordingly, ratio of the judgment in Ambika Ranjan Majumdar is wholly inapplicable in the instant case. Further in that case the question of selling of the properties in execution of a decree was considered. But in the instant case, the question of simple recovery of possession of the property pursuant to the decree of eviction which is in the possession of the judgment-debtor and no other parties are affected. In case of sale of property, the people of the locality is also entitled to know that a property is going to be sold so that the intending buyers who are interested may apply but if the sale is made by a court which is situated far away from the locality create difficulty, and inconveniences but in the instant case there is no such of any inconveniance to the judgment debtor or any other party inasmuch as the scope of the execution is very much limited.
5. It is important principle of law that rules of procedure are only handmaid of justice and ought not to be used for obstruction the course of justice. It is the duty of the court executing the decree to aid the decree holder in recovering possession of the premises after physically evicting the judgment debtor at an earliest possible time otherwise the very purpose of the decree will become nugatory. Section 51 of the Code enumerates in general terms, various modes in which the court may order execution for a decree according to the nature of the relief sought to be granted may require. Execution by appointment of a Receiver is known as equitable execution and is entirely within the discretion of the court and that decree holder may choose the mode of execution and the court has no power to refuse the order of execution in the mode asked for but equitable execution by appointment of a Receiver being an exceptional remedy a case has to be made out in support of it. The decree holder must show that immediate execution was necessary or that he may be prevented from getting the decree executed in usual and ordinary manner or for other good and sufficient reasons. It is also well settled that appointment of a Receiver for executing proceeding is form of equitable relief is generally granted on the ground that there was no effective remedy for execution by any other mode prescribed in this behalf. Section 51 of the Act has provided several modes. Supreme Court in the case of Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works Ltd. v. Land Reforms Commissioner, reported in AIR 1969 SC 897 held while considering the provisions of 286(2) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and the process prescribed by Clause (a) to (e) of section 279 of that Act. Section 279 of that Act sets out the procedure for recovery of arrears of land revenue and that 286(2) of that Act also provides the power exercisable by the collector in recovering arrears of income tax which are recoverable as arrears of land revenue are not restricted to the land revenue Code the Collector is entitled to exercise all the powers of the Civil Court for the purpose of recovery of amount due. In that connection the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the scope of section 51 of the Civil Procedure. In that case Supreme Court held that it is not the law that one particular mode has to be exhausted before the alternative course provided in Act for execution has to be adopted. The provision of sections 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be interpreted to mean that before the execution of a decree the court should adopt strictly the alternative mode one by one. Only when the mode prescribed by (a) to (d) falls in that event the court may fall back upon the residuary power by which the court was given liberty to adopt any other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require or in other words, this residuary clause could only be adhered to after exhausting alternative mode prescribed in (a) to, (d) of section 51 of the Act. We are of the view that appointment of a Receiver for execution is not a matter of course and for that purpose a special case has to be made out. Order 40 rule 1 of the Court provides the circumstances in which the court may appoint Receiver and whenever a Receiver is appointed under the Code that Receiver has to be appointed on the basis of the principles laid down in Order 40 r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court can appoint a Receiver in view of the fact that it is just and convenient to appoint a Receiver. The learned trial Judge has considered the aspect of the matter and accordingly we are of the view that for execution of the decree appointment of a Receiver is not the method of execution as a matter of course but some special case had to be made out but that not considered by the learned trial judge. On the facts disclosed in this case it is clearly evident that the decree-holder is suffering from renal failure and as a patient he requires reasonably for his own use and occupation. Further in the instant case, the judgment debtor undertook to vacate the premises by 31st October, 1979 which he had failed and neglected to do so. Decree was passed not only on the ground of failure to fulfil the undertaking but also on the ground of reasonable requirement. It is also on record that in order to forest all the eviction proceeding, a suit was filed by the judgement debtor in the year 1980 challenging validity of the notice of eviction and thereafter stalled the execution proceeding by obtaining an order for stay. The suit for eviction was filed in the year 1981 but the life of the litigation has not yet come to an end. So, clear 12 years have passed the decree for eviction which was passed by the learned trial Judge was affirmed on appeal by the Division Bench and the matter went up to Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition thereby the decree for eviction has reached its finality. When decree for eviction has reached its finality and that there was no other impediment in the way of executing the decree and that there was no lawful ground to resist the execution, the judgement-debtor cannot claim that he could only be evicted by the ordinary mode which may be time-consuming process when the judgement-debtor knows that he had to finally vacate on the basis of the decree of the court. There is no equity in his favour. No case has been made out why the decree could not be executed. In the instant case when the matter came up before the Division Bench even though there was no stay the judgement-debtor agreed not to execute the decree so that the appeal filed by the judgement-debtor may be disposed of. We are of the view that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case disclosed in this case the judgement debtor has been able to make out a strong and exceptional case for execution of a decree by appointment of a Receiver. Admittedly, this court has power to appoint a Receiver and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the circumstances prescribed in O. 40 r. 1 of the Code exists for which we are of the view that the order appointing Receiver for the purpose of executing decree was proper. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Chinnamal v. P. Aruna Mugha, reported, in (1990) 1 SCC 613, that Code of Civil Procedure designed to facilitate justice and it should not be treated as an enactment providing for punishment and penalties. The laws of procedure should be so construed as to render justice wherever reasonably possible. In the case of Owners and parties interested in M.V “Vali Pero” v. Fernandeo Lopez, reported AIR 1989 SC 2206 it was also held by the Supreme Court for rules of procedure not to construe literally but it should be construed pragmatically so as to advance the justice otherwise, rules of procedure will become the mistress instead of rewaiving the handmaid of justice, contrary to the role attributed to it in our legal system. Here it the case where the landlord had obtained a decree after filing the suit 12 years back. So many litigations were going on between the parties. The decree was finally affirmed by the Supreme Court and under such circumstances we are of the view that it is the duty of the court to execute the decree to aid the decree holder in recovering the possession of the premises after physically evicting the judgement debtor at the earliest possible time. In the facts and circumstances of the case the ordinary mode of execution through the court bailiff would create difficulty and which would consume several months or years. It would be inequitable and contrary to justice to delay execution in the instant case. A party against whom a decree for eviction has been passed cannot claim the decree has to be executed in such a manner so that he may be benefited by the procedural delay. We are of the view that the court retains its power to appoint a Receiver if the court finds that it was just and convenient mode for recovery of the property as the facts and circumstances may require.
6. In the instant case there is no scope for resisting or avoiding the execution and delay in the instant case would defeat the cause of justice. Even though we do not agree with the reasons given by the learned trial Judge, we affirm the decision of the learned trial Judge in appointing a Receiver for the purpose of executing the decree in the manner indicated by the learned trial Judge. In order to avoid any hardship to the judgement-debtor. The judgment-debtor is given three months time to vacate the premises and in case the judgement debtors fails to vacate the premises within the said period, the Receiver appointed by the learned trial Judge would execute the decree and recover possession in the manner indicated by the learned trial Judge. Three months time is granted as the appellant prayed for such time.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with this modification.
Receiver and all parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of this judgement and order on the usual undertaking.
A.K Bhattacharjee, J.:— I agree.
Appeal dismissed with modification.
K.P
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