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On The Death Of Aamal Dasgupta, Ashok Dasgupta And Others v. Dwijendra Lal Dasgupta And Others

Calcutta High Court
Apr 21, 1992
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sunil Kumar Guin, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The testatrix Priyambada Dasgupta executed a will dated 15-7-65 (Ext. 3) that purportedly bequeathed her properties to her grandsons (the propounder and two brothers) to the exclusion of her sons, daughter and other grandsons. On 2-4-66 a registered deed of revocation (Ext. H) was executed purporting to revoke that will in its entirety. The testatrix died on 20-8-68.

On 18-11-76 the plaintiff (the propounder) filed a petition for grant of probate, claiming Ext. 3 as the last will appointing him sole executor. Defendant Amal Dasgupta (appellant) resisted probate on grounds including that the will was not duly executed/attested, that it had been revoked by the registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66, and that proceedings were not maintainable in the absence of special citation upon other legal heirs.

The learned Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipore, by judgment and decree dated 14-8-80 in Original Suit No. 7 of 1977, decreed the suit and directed grant of probate with a copy of the will annexed. Defendant Amal Dasgupta appealed against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the testatrix Priyambada Dasgupta revoked her will dated 15-7-65 (Ext. 3) by means of the registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66 (Ext. H).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant Amal Dasgupta) Arguments

  • The will in question had already been revoked by a registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66 (Ext. H), and therefore probate should not be granted.
  • The will was allegedly not duly executed by the testatrix and not legally attested by the witnesses (this contention was subsequently not pressed at the hearing — see concession below).
  • Proceedings for probate were contended to be not maintainable in the absence of special citation upon other legal heirs.
  • At the hearing, learned counsel for the appellant conceded that because the appellant approved the draft of the will and signed as an attesting witness, he would not challenge the trial Judge's finding that the will was duly executed and legally attested; the remaining contention pressed was revocation by Ext. H.

Respondent's (Propounder / Respondent No.1) Arguments

  • The learned trial Judge was justified in holding that the deed of revocation Ext. H was not executed by the testatrix.
  • Revocation of an unprivileged will must comply with the statutory requirements of S. 70 of the Indian Succession Act, and a deed of revocation must be executed in the same manner as an unprivileged will (reference to S. 63).
  • The revocation deed's execution was said to be shrouded with suspicious circumstances and required cogent explanation before it could be acted upon; reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur (AIR 1977 SC 74).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 74 Established that revocation of an unprivileged will is an act only a little less solemn than making the will and must comply with S. 70 of the Indian Succession Act. The court invoked this principle to emphasize that a deed of revocation must meet statutory formalities (S. 70 and S. 63) but found that the execution and attestation requirements were satisfied on the evidence in this case.
P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal, AIR 1972 SC 608 Holds that a party cannot later object to admissibility of a document that was admitted in evidence without objection; once admitted, contents are admitted though not conclusive. The court applied this authority to conclude that because the deed of revocation Ext. H was admitted in evidence without objection, the propounder could not later deny its execution on that ground; the admitted document therefore supported the case for revocation unless countervailing evidence undermined it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the decisive question narrowly: whether the testatrix had revoked her will dated 15-7-65 by the registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66. If revocation was established, probate could not be granted for the earlier will.

The court noted that although the will (Ext. 3) was not registered, the deed of revocation (Ext. H) was registered and had been placed in evidence and admitted without objection. Relying on the P.C. Purushothama Reddiar decision, the court observed that once admitted without objection it was not open to the propounder to challenge admissibility of Ext. H; its contents were therefore in evidence (though not necessarily conclusive).

Turning to the statutory requirements, the court identified that revocation by writing falls under S. 70 of the Indian Succession Act and must be executed in the manner required for an unprivileged will, as set out in S. 63. Those requirements include the testator's signature (or mark), the signature being placed to show intention to effect the will, and attestation by two or more witnesses (each signing in the testator's presence), though more than one witness need not be present at the same time.

The court further relied on Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, which mandates that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used in evidence until at least one attesting witness (if alive and available) has been called to prove its execution. The court found that the contesting defendant produced at least one attesting witness (D.W.1), who was also the scribe of the deed.

The evidence of D.W.1 was summarized by the court: he wrote the deed of revocation, read its contents to the executant, stated that witnesses (including himself) were present when the testatrix signed the deed, and that the attesting witnesses signed after the testatrix had signed. The court found this evidence credible and saw no reason to discard it. Thus, on the testimonial evidence, the deed of revocation was shown to have been executed and attested in accordance with the statutory formalities.

The respondent argued the deed's execution was tainted by suspicious circumstances (no relative present with the testatrix at the scribe, non-examination of the introducer Amaresh Das, only one attesting witness examined of four, and lack of proof of alleged ill-treatment). The court analyzed each point:

  • Age of the testatrix was noted, but there was no suggestion she was physically unfit or mentally incapable at execution, and absence of relatives did not automatically create suspicion.
  • Non-examination of Amaresh Das, who merely introduced the testatrix to the scribe, was held not to be a suspicious omission.
  • Statutory law requires calling at least one attesting witness; that requirement had been met by producing the scribe (D.W.1). Non-examination of the other attesting witnesses was therefore not fatal or necessarily suspicious.
  • The alleged ill-treatment was not proved by the contesting defendant; however, the deed itself recorded the testatrix's statement that she had executed the will not of her free will but being persuaded and influenced by the propounder and his brother, and that subsequent misbehaviour occurred — the court treated that statement in the deed as sufficient in the circumstances.

Beyond direct proof of execution, the court considered corroborative circumstances: timeline of documents (will dated 15-7-65; deed of revocation dated 2-4-66; death 20-8-68), the fact that the propounder retained custody of the will after the testatrix's death but filed for probate only eight years later (18-11-76), and letters written by the propounder after the testatrix's death that did not assert the will's contents or a claim under the will (e.g., letter dated 8-11-67, Ext. C; letter dated 1-8-72, Ext. E). The court regarded this unusual delay and the tenor of these letters as lending support to the contention that the will had been revoked.

Synthesizing the documentary admission, the testimony of the scribe-attesting witness, the lack of cogent suspicious circumstances, and the circumstantial evidence (delay in seeking probate and post-death correspondence), the court concluded that the deed of revocation Ext. H was executed by the testatrix and that the earlier will Ext. 3 had been revoked by that deed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The trial court's judgment and decree directing grant of probate in respect of the will dated 15-7-65 (Ext. 3) are set aside; Original Suit No. 7 of 1977 is dismissed. The court made no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to deny probate in respect of the disputed will on the ground that it had been validly revoked by a registered deed of revocation executed on 2-4-66. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying established authorities (including the cited Supreme Court decisions and statutory provisions) to the facts; it resolves the factual and evidential dispute in favour of the appellant by finding proof of valid revocation.

Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

Sunil Kumar Guin, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipore on 14-8-80 in Original Suit No. 7 of 1977 whereby he decreed the suit and directed grant of probate with a copy of the will annexed.

2. The short question that arises for determination in this appeal is that whether the testatrix Priyambada Dasgupta revoked her will dated 15-7-65 Ext. 3 by means of a registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66 Ext. H. If this question is answered in the affirmative then the appeal will succeed and grant of probate as has been made by the learned Addl. District Judge will be set aside, because there cannot be any grant of probate in respect of a will which had already been revoked by the testator or the testatrix. If the question is answered in the negative then there can be no manner of doubt that this appeal will fail as no other contention has been raised in this appeal on behalf of the appellants.

3. Priyambada Dasgupta the mother of the defendant No. 1 Niradendu Dasgupta and defendant No. 2 Amal Dasgupta and the grant-mother of the plaintiff and other defendants namely, Ajoy Dasgupta and Sanjoy Dasgupta made a will on 15-7-65 Ext. 3. By this will she appears to have given all her properties to the propounder and his two brothers namely, Ajoy Dasgupta and Sanjoy Dasgupta to the exclusion of her sons, daughter and other grand-sons. She also appears to have revoked the said will on 2-4-66 by a registered deed of revocation Ext. H and she died on 20-8-68. About eight years after the death of the testatrix i.e on 18-11-76 the present plaintiff filed the instant petition for grant of probate on the ground that the will in question was her last will under which he was appointed the sole executor. Defendant Amal Dasgupta who is the appellant here resisted grant of probate contending that the will in question was not duly executed by the testatrix and legally attested by the witnesses, that the will in question had already been revoked by the testatrix by means of a registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66 and that proceeding was not maintainable in absence of special citation upon the other legal heirs of the testatrix. The learned trial Judge by his judgment appealed against appears to have rejected all the contentions raised on behalf of the defendant Amal Dasgupta and found that the will in question was duly executed by the testatrix and was legally attested by the attesting witness and that deed of revocation was not executed by the testatrix Priyambada Dasgupta. With these findings, he decreed the suit and directed grant of probate with a copy of will annexed.

4. Being aggrieved defendant No. 2 Amal Dasgupta has preferred this appeal challenging the aforesaid finding of the learned trial Judge. But at the time of hearing Mr. S.P Roy Chaudhury, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has frankly conceded that since his client approved the draft of the will and signed the same as an attesting witness, he will not challenge the finding of the learned trial Judge that the will in question was duly executed by the testatrix and was legally attested by the attesting witnesses. He, however, has contended that as the testatrix had already revoked the will by means of registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66, the learned trial Judge was not at all justified in granting probate in respect of a will that has already been revoked and that the finding of the learned trial Judge that the deed of revocation was not executed by Priyambada Dasgupta is erroneous and should be set aside. Mr. Sumit Chawdhury learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1 has on the other hand, contended that the learned trial Judge was justified in holding that the deed of revocation Ext. H was not executed by the testatrix and that the learned trial Judge was justified in granting probate as he did in the instant case. He has also argued that the revocation of an unprivileged will is an act only a little less solemn than the making of the will itself and has to comply with the statutory requirements contained in S. 70 of the Indian Succession Act. He has further argued that the execution of the said deed of revocation is shrouded with some suspicious circumstances and that unless the party that sets up deed of revocation offers a cogent and convincing explanation of such suspicious circumstances, the said deed cannot and should not be relied and acted upon. In support of his contention he has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 74.

5. Though the will in question Ext. 3 executed by the testatrix was not registered, still the deed of revocation Ext. H was registered by the testatrix and she purported thereby to revoke the will in its entirety. The propounder appears to have contended before the trial Judge that the said deed of revocation was not duly executed by the testatrix. The learned trial Judge in his judgment has held that the said deed of revocation was not executed by the testatrix. The said deed of revocation Ext. H was placed before the learned trial Judge for consideration. From the record it appears that the said deed was admitted in evidence on admission and at least without any objection from the other side. In a case of P.C Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumalrespondent reported in AIR 1972 SC 608, the Supreme Court has held that it is not open to a party to object to the admissibility of the documents which are marked as Exhibits without any objection from such party and that once a document is properly admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence though those contents may not be conclusive evidence. So, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it does not lie in the mouth of the propounder to say that the document was not executed by the testatrix after the said document had been admitted in evidence without any objection from him. The said document goes to show that it was executed by the testatrix. However, the contents of the said documents are not a conclusive evidence. So let us see whether the propounder has adduced any other evidence to show that the said deed was not executed by the testatrix. Hardly there is any evidence on record to indicate that it was not executed by the testatrix. Evidence, on record, on the other hand, shows that the said deed was executed by the testatrix, it has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur (Supra), that the revocation of an unprivileged will is an act only a little less solemn than the making of the will itself and has to comply with statutory requirements contained in S. 70 of the Indian Succession Act. S. 70 inter alia provides that no unprivileged will shall be revoked otherwise than by marriage or by another will or codicil, or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same and executed in the manner in which an unprivileged will is required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing or otherwise destroying the same by the testator or by some persons in his presence or by his direction with the intention of revoking the same. In the instant case the testatrix purported to have revoked the will by executing a deed of revocation. As such, such deed is to be executed in the same manner as prescribed for execution of an unprivileged will under S. 63 of the Succession Act. Section 63 prescribes the following rules:

a) the testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the will, or it shall be signed by some other persons in his presence and by his direction.

b) The signature or the mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will.

c) The will shall be attested by two or more persons, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or of the signature of the such other persons; and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.

6. Thus it is clear that deed of revocation as contemplated in S. 70 is to be executed in the same manner as has been prescribed for execution of the will. It is the requirement of the law that such deed of revocation is to be attested by the attesting witnesses. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act enjoins that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. So to prove the execution of the deed of revocation, the contesting defendant was required to call at least one attesting witness for the purpose of proving the execution which was denied by the propounder. In our opinion that requirement has been fulfilled and the contesting defendant produced at least one attesting witness (D.W 1) who is also the scribe of the deed. Now let us see whether this witness has been able to prove execution and attestation of the deed of revocation Ext. H. He has deposed to the effect that he wrote out the deed of revocation and read over its contents to the executant who signed it. He has also said that witnesses including himself were present when Priyambada signed the deed, that attesting witnesses signed the deed after Priyambada had signed it and that she was present at that time. So evidence of this witness D.W 1 unmistakably shows that the deed of revocation was executed by Priyambada Dasgupta and was duly attested by the attesting witnesses. We see no reason to discard the evidence of this witness.

7. The learned advocate for the respondent has argued that the execution of the deed of revocation is shrouded with suspicious circumstances and that unless such suspicious circumstances are explained, the party who sets up the said deed cannot rely and act upon it and take advantage of such document, specially in view of the fact that revocation of an unprivileged will is an act only a little less solemn than the making of will itself. According to him suspicious circumstances are that no relation of the testatrix accompanied her to the scribe or was present at the time of execution of the deed, that Amaresh Das who introduced the testatrix to the scribe has not been examined, that though there were four attesting witnesses only one of them has been examined and that alleged ill-treatment or misbehaviour by the propounder towards the testatrix has not been proved. But having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the evidence on record we are of the opinion that those circumstances are not such as to excite suspicion about the execution of the deed of revocation Ext. H. It is true that at the time of execution of the deed of revocation the testatrix was very old. But it is nobody's case that she was not physically fit or mentally alert at the time of execution of the deed of revocation. So she did not think it necessary to take any relation with her for independent advice when she had been to the scribe or when she executed the deed. Evidence on record discloses that one Amaresh Das simply introduced her to the scribe. Non-examination of such a person who simply introduced the testatrix to the scribe cannot be looked down upon with suspicion. It is true that there were four attesting witnesses including the scribe. Law requires that execution of such deed can be proved by calling at least one attesting witness for the purpose of proving its execution if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. This requirement has been fulfilled and the scribe who is also the attesting witness in this case is D.W 1 and he has proved execution and attestation of the said deed of revocation. In such circumstances examination of the remaining attesting witness was not at all necessary and such non-examination of the remaining attesting witness, in our opinion, does not excite any suspicion about the execution of the deed. It is true that the contesting defendant did not adduce any evidence to prove the alleged ill-treatment or misbehaviour by the propounder and his brothers towards the testatrix. But that is not the only ground for revocation of the will. It has been specifically stated in the deed of revocation Ext. H that the testatrix did not execute the will out of her free will and that she executed it being persuaded and influenced by the propounder and his brother. It has, of course, been stated that after execution of the will the said grand-sons of the testatrix misbehaved with her. So for all these reasons and also to avoid future trouble the testatrix revoked the will in its entirety. The testatrix is no more in the land of living. Her statement as made in the deed of revocation in our opinion is sufficient for the purpose of the present case. We hold that the execution of the deed of revocation Ext. H is not shrouded with suspicious circumstances as has been contended by the learned advocate for the respondent.

8. There are other circumstances which would lend support to the appellant's case that the testatrix had already revoked her will Ext. 3. The will was executed on 15-7-65 and the deed of revocation was executed on 2-4-66. It is also not disputed that the testatrix died on 20-8-68. It has been admitted by the propounder that after execution of the will, it remained in his custody. Though the testatrix died on 20-8-68 still the propounder having the will in his custody remained silent over the will for about eight years and filed the instant petition for grant of probate only on 18-11-76. The propounder (P.W 3) has stated in his evidence that he had no reason as to why he did not file the petition for probate till 1976. So this unusual delay in filing the petition for probate in the facts and circumstances of the case lends support to the appellant's case that the will in question had already been revoked. As otherwise the propounder having the will in his custody would have filed the petition for probate soon after the death of the testatrix. The propounder appears to have written a letter on 8-11-67 to J.N Bhattacharjee and given a copy of the same to the contesting defendant. Copy of such letter has been marked as Ext., C wherein the propounder appears to have claimed that Priyambada took a loan of Rs. 4,500/- from him against the property and put him in possession thereof with an agreement to sell the same to him. There is no whisper in this letter that Priyambada executed a will in respect of the said property though the will was admittedly in his possession. This letter, therefore, undoubtedly lends support to the appellant's case that the testatrix had already revoked the will. In a letter dated 1-8-72 Ext. E written by the propounder to his father, admitted that he was a tenant in respect of the southern portion of the house at 13, Anjuman Ara Begum Road under the present appellant. By the disputed will Priyambada purported to bequeath this property in favour of the propounder and his brother. But in this letter written long after the death of the testatrix, the propounder did not claim that the said property was bequeathed to him by virtue of the will. So, this letter also lends support to the appellant's case of revocation of will. So having considered the evidnce and circumstances as discussed above, we hold in disagreement with the learned trial Judge that the disputed will had already been revoked by the testatrix by registered deed of revocation dated 2-4-66. As the said will had already been revoked the learned trial Judge was not justified in granting probate in respect of the same.

9. In the result, appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree whereby the learned trial Judge directed grant of probate are hereby set aside. The Original Suit No. 7 of 1977 is dismissed. We make no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.