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Dilip Malik Accused/ v. State .

Calcutta High Court
Mar 29, 1990
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion records a revisional application filed in this Court in 1982 by an accused who had been convicted by the Courts below of offences under Sections 395, 397 and 412 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence under Sections 395 and 397, and further rigorous imprisonment for two years with a fine of Rs. 500 (in default 6 months R.I.) for the offence under Section 412; the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The accused had been found not guilty of charges under the Arms Act but was identified by eye-witnesses as participating directly in a dacoity and was found in possession of a weapon (a pipe gun and a sword). By the time this Court could hear the revisional application in 1989, the petitioner had already served out the seven-year sentence.

The Court recorded that it did not find justification to interfere with the orders of conviction and sentence under Sections 395 and 397 IPC. However, the Court examined whether conviction under Section 412 IPC could stand in addition to conviction for dacoity, and addressed related legal questions including the effect of delay in disposing of the revisional application and whether compensation could follow from such delay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court should exercise revisional jurisdiction to set aside the conviction and sentence under Sections 395 and 397 IPC (i.e., whether intervention in revision was justified).
  2. Whether an accused who has served imprisonment under an order of conviction that is later set aside on appeal or revision is entitled to compensation for the period of imprisonment caused by inordinate delay in disposal by the higher Court, and if so, by whom (including whether Section 250 CrPC or liability of the State applies).
  3. How to interpret the expression "uses any deadly weapon" in Section 397 IPC — whether mere possession of a deadly weapon at the time of committing dacoity/robbery suffices or whether active use (brandishing, causing hurt) is required.
  4. Whether simultaneous convictions under Sections 395 (dacoity) and 412 (receiving/possession of stolen property) IPC are permissible where the property found in the accused's possession was obtained in the course of the dacoity itself.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hussainara Khatoon (AIR 1979 SC 1360; (1980) 1 SCC 93) Speedy and reasonably expeditious trial (continuance of criminal prosecution at all stages) is an integral part of the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21; condemnation of excessive delay in disposal of criminal appeals/revisions. The Court relied on this authority to condemn the seven-year delay in disposing of the revisional application and to frame the question whether the accused was denied his fundamental right under Article 21 by the inordinate delay.
Rudul Sah (AIR 1983 SC 1086; (1983) 4 SCC 141) The Supreme Court mulcted the State in payment of compensation for illegal and prolonged detention even after acquittal following trial. The Court referred to Rudul Sah as an instance where the State was made liable for compensation for prolonged illegal detention, but concluded it could not award similar compensation in this case because the delay was due to judicial inaction rather than Executive/State action.
Naresh Sridhar Mirza (AIR 1967 SC 1) The majority nine-judge Bench decision that the Judiciary may not be regarded as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (bearing on imputability of judicial acts as State action). The Court noted that so long as this precedent stands, the Judiciary may not be treated as "State" for Article 12 purposes, complicating any attempt to treat judicial delay as actionable State action liable for compensation.
Shri Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1975 SC 905; (1975) 1 SCC 797) The Supreme Court held that if an accused carries a knife in his hand open to the view of victims at the time of committing robbery, such visible possession is sufficient to frighten or terrorise them and bring the offence within relevant penal provisions (interpreting "uses" to include possession/visible carriage). The Court applied this authority to resolve divergent High Court views, concluding that mere possession of a deadly weapon (pipe gun and sword) visible at the time of the offence justified conviction under Section 397 IPC even without active operation of the weapon.
Narendra Kumar v. State (AIR 1956 All 336; 1956 Cri LJ 662) Where an accused is convicted under Section 395 IPC for committing dacoity and the property found in his possession came to him in the course of that dacoity, the accused cannot be held guilty both under Sections 395 and 412 IPC. The Court relied on this view to hold that, because the property in the accused's possession was found in the course of the dacoity, concurrent conviction under Section 412 IPC was impermissible and had to be set aside.
Abdul Jabbar v. Emperor (45 Cr. LJ 468; AIR 1944 Calcutta 39) Held that it is meaningless to convict an accused both under Sections 395 and 412 IPC in circumstances where the property was taken in the course of dacoity. The Court cited this Division Bench decision in support of its conclusion that conviction under Section 412 could not stand alongside conviction under Section 395 where the possession of the property was in the course of the dacoity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct threads:

  1. On revisional intervention: The judges (A.M. Bhattacharjee, J. concurring with A.K. Nandi, J.) agreed there was nothing on record to justify interference with the orders of conviction and sentence under Sections 395 and 397 IPC. They expressed dismay that the revisional application, filed in 1982, was heard only in 1989 after the petitioner had served out the sentence.
  2. On compensation and delay: The Court considered whether the accused could be compensated for having to serve imprisonment during a period when the higher Court unreasonably delayed disposal of the revisional application. It noted:
    • Section 250 CrPC provides compensation in the case of a Magistrate discharging or acquitting an accused for accusation without reasonable cause, but that provision does not automatically address acquittals by higher courts or the present situation.
    • Even if Section 250 principles were extended, an acquittal on appeal or revision may be for reasons other than "no reasonable ground for making the accusation".
    • Hussainara Khatoon establishes the right to reasonably expeditious trial as part of Article 21; prolonged delay offends fundamental rights.
    The Court then noted Rudul Sah where the Supreme Court awarded compensation against the State for prolonged illegal detention after acquittal; however, because the delay in the present case resulted from judicial inaction rather than Executive action, and because of the Naresh Sridhar Mirzakar decision that the Judiciary is not regarded as "State" under Article 12, the Court observed it could not follow Rudul Sah here to award compensation from the State. The judge further directed that a copy of the judgments be placed before the Chief Justice so that appropriate administrative steps might be taken to prevent recurrence of such gross dereliction.
  3. On interpretation of Section 397 IPC ("uses any deadly weapon"): The Court reviewed conflicting High Court views and cited the Supreme Court's decision in Shri Phool Kumar, which held that visible carriage or possession of a weapon at the time of committing the offence suffices as "using" the weapon for purposes of the penal provision. The Court accepted this interpretation and applied it to the present fact that the accused was found in possession of a pipe gun and a sword; therefore conviction under Section 397 IPC was justified even though there was no evidence of the weapon having been actively operated.
  4. On conviction under Section 395 IPC: The Court found the identification evidence of eye-witnesses sufficient to uphold the conviction for dacoity under Section 395 IPC and saw no scope to disturb that finding.
  5. On conviction under Section 412 IPC (possession of booty): The Courts below had convicted the accused under Section 412 on the basis that when apprehended some articles of booty were recovered from his person. The revisional Court analysed whether simultaneous convictions under Sections 395 and 412 are permissible. It held that where the property found in possession came to the accused in the course of the dacoity, the act of reception or retention is not independent of the act of dacoity; therefore conviction under both Sections 395 and 412 is impermissible in those circumstances. The Court relied on earlier decisions (Narendra Kumar; Abdul Jabbar) to set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 412 IPC and ordered refund of the fine if it had been realized.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisional application is allowed only to the extent of setting aside the conviction and sentence under Section 412 IPC; in all other respects the revisional application fails.

Consequences and direct implications:

  • The convictions and sentences under Sections 395 and 397 IPC are affirmed by this Court.
  • The conviction and sentence under Section 412 IPC are set aside because the property found in the accused's possession was obtained in the course of the dacoity; if the fine of Rs. 500/- imposed under Section 412 has been realized from the convict, it must be refunded.
  • The Court expressed grave concern at the unreasonable delay in disposing of the revisional application and noted the constitutional dimension (Article 21) of speedy trial; it directed that a copy of the judgments be placed before the Chief Justice for such administrative steps as may be appropriate to prevent recurrence of such delay.

Broader legal implications:

The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent beyond applying and following existing authorities cited in the judgment. Its principal immediate effect is the partial allowance of the revision by quashing the Section 412 conviction and directing refund of any fine collected; it also records strong judicial admonition about delays in criminal appellate/revisional adjudication and the difficulty of awarding compensation where the delay is attributable to the judicial process rather than to the Executive or State.

End of summary. This summary reflects only the content and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

A.M Bhattacharjee, J.:— My learned brother Nandi, J. has held in his judgment to be delivered now that there is nothing on record to justify our intervention in revision in respect of the order of conviction passed against and the sentence imposed upon the accused-petitioner under Section 395/397 of the Penal Code condemning him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years. I agree with him and also share his sense of shock and dismay at the fact that by the time we could find time in 1989 to hear this Revisional application filed in this Court in 1982, the petitioner had to fully serve out the sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment.

2. But suppose we ruled otherwise arid held that the revision was to be allowed and the orders of conviction and the resultant sentence were to be quashed? Who was then to compensate the accused for all the agony and strain suffered by him under an unlawful order of conviction and sentence? It is true that under our Code of Procedure, an order of conviction and sentence are not automatically suspended during any appeal or revision against such order. It is also equally true that under our Code, setting aside of conviction and sentence by the higher Court does not, by itself, entitle the accused to any compensation. Section 250 of the Code only provides for some sort of compensation when a Magistrte discharges or acquits an accused in a case triable and tried by the Magistrate. But that is a compensation for accusation without reasonable cause. But I am on a different question, the question being when the accused had to suffer a long term imprisonment under an order of conviction, though subsequently set aside on appeal or revision, only because of the inordinate delay made by the higher Court in disposing of the proceeding pending before it, is he entitled to be compensated under the Code and, if so, by whom? Even if we can extend the principles of Section 250 to acquittal by the higher Courts in appeal or revision, such acquittal may very often be on the ground that the accusation is not proved or on some other ground, and not necessarily on a finding “that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation” as envisaged in Section 250.

3. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon, (1980) 1 SCC 93 : AIR 1979 SC 1360 at pp: 1364-65 : (1979 Cri LJ 1036 at pp. 1040-41), it is a crying shame, a sad reflection on our legal and Judicial system and our Institution that a criminal appeal or revision takes about seven years for disposal, when delay of even one year is bad enough. As pointed out therein further, and also in a series of later decisions, there can be no doubt that speedy, i.e reasonably expeditious trial, and here trial would obviously mean the continuance of a criminal prosecution in all the stages, before the first as well as all successive higher Courts, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution. Have we not in this case, by taking about seven years to hear and dispose of this Criminal Revision. For no fault of the accused, or even the prosecution, denied the accused this fundamental right?

4. In Rudul Sah, (1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086 : (1983 Cri LJ 1644), the Supreme Court came down with heavy hands and mulct the State in payment of compensation for detaining the petitioner illegally in the prison for a long number of years even after he was acquitted after a full-dressed trial. We could not do so in this case, even if we allowed the revision, as the delay has not been occasioned by the Executive Government, but is solely due to our unreasonable and unjustifiable inaction. True, so long the majority decision of the nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Naresh Sridhar Mirzakar (AIR 1967 SC 1 would stand, the Judiciary may not be regarded to be a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 in Part III of the Constitution. But notwithstanding this decision, can we escape condemnation if it is found that, though this Court takes pride in its role as the protector of the Fundamental Rights it can afford to deny the same with impunity and affect an accused's fundamental right to reasonably expeditious trial guaranteed under Article 21, by sheer inaction and unjustifiable inadvertence. I would accordingly direct that a copy of our judgments be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for such steps as his Lordship would deem fit to take to ensure such gross dereliction of our solemn duty would not occur or recur in future.

5. A.K Nandi, J.:— This revision has been preferred by a convict who has unfortunately served out sentence about more than 3 years back. We are left with a duty to decide his revisional application, the benefit of which he cannot possibly reap even if our finding goes to his favour. This is an example of exemplary delay in disposal of a Criminal Case while the convict is languishing in jail in expectation of a verdict from the Court.

6. The accused was charged under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act and under Sections 395, 397 and 412 I.P.C He has been found not guilty to the charges under the Arms Act. But both the Courts below have found him guilty under Sections 395, 397 and 412 of the Penal Code. He has been sentenced to suffer R.I for 7 years for the offence under Sections 395 and 397 I.P.C and further R.I for 2 years and to a fine of Rs. 500/- in default R.I for 6 months for the offence u/s 412 IPC The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

7. The Courts found the direct participation of the accused in dacoity. The accused has been indentified by the eye-witnesses to the occurence. It has further been found that the accused was in possession of a weapon. On these findings the Courts below convicted the accused under sections 395 & 397 I.P.C There is no evidence against this accused that he used the weapon in his possession either by way of brandishing the same or causing any hurt to any of the inmates of the house. The relevant part of Sec. 397 reads as follows:—

“if, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon”. In interpreting the word “Uses” different High Courts expressed divergent opinions. It was held by some that the mere fact of possession of a deadly weapon was sufficient to attract the penal provision of Sec. 397 I.P.C The other view was that the weapon must have been used either by way of brandishing, overawing or causing hurt. Maxwell in his “Interpretation of Statutes” has observed that if a man walks with a gun with intent to kill game, he uses the gun for the purpose without firing. The Supreme Court in Shri Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1975) 1 SCC 797 : AIR 1975 SC 905 : 1975 Cri LJ 778, quite in consonance with Maxwell, held that if an accused at the time of committing robbery carries in his hand a knife open to the view of the victims, it is sufficient to frighten or terrorise them and he can be convicted u/s. 307, Penal Code. Any other overt act such as brandishing of the knife or causing a grievous hurt with it is not necessary to bring the offender within the ambit of Sec. 397. This decision sets the controversy of the different High Courts at rest. Confusion possibly arose on account of user of two different expressions viz. “Uses any deadly weapon” in Sec. 397 and “is armed with any deadly weapon” in Sec. 398 Penal Code. Identical languages not having been used, some Courts found that possession simpliciter is not sufficient to bring the case within expression of “Uses” as used in Sec. 397. In Phool Kumar's case (supra) the Supreme Court further held that different words used by legislature in two different sections, viz. “Uses” in 397 and “is armed” in Sec. 398 bear identical meaning. The Supreme Court has found justification for the user of two different expressions in two different sections by the legislature.

8. In the instant case, the evidence against the accused is that he was in possession of a deadly weapon, viz. a pipe gun and a sword. Therefore, the Courts below was justified in convicting the accused u/s. 397 I.P.C despite the fact that the accused did not actively operate the weapon.

9. The conviction u/s. 395 I.P.C is warranted by the identification evidence of different eye-witnesses. We find no scope to disturb that finding also.

10. In awarding conviction u/S. 412, I.P.C the Courts found that the accused was apprehended at Gurup Railway Station and, on search of his person some articles of booty were recovered. In our opinion, simultaneous conviction under Ss. 395 and 412 of the I.P.C is unwarranted in the facts of the case. While the accused is convicted of having committed dacoity he cannot be further convicted u/S. 412, I.P.C for having in his possession a part of the booty received by means of dacoity. We do not propose to lay down a blanket proposition that in no circumstances an accused can be convicted both u/Ss. 395, I.P.C and 412, I.P.C The act of reception or retention of the booty of the dacoity must be an act independent of the act of dacoity in order to convict under both the Sections. We may say that a similar view has been correctly taken by a single Judge in Narendra Kumar v. State, AIR 1956 All 336 : 1956 Cri LJ 662. It has held that where an accused is convicted u/S. 395, I.P.C for committing a dacoity and it is in the course of that dacoity that the property which is found in his possession came to him, he cannot be held guilty both u/Ss. 395 and 412, I.P.C Ours is a similar case. The convict has been found guilty u/S. 395, I.P.C But as he was found in possession of the booty at Gurup Railway Station, he has further been convicted u/S. 412, I.P.C In our opinion, this is impermissible in law. A Division Bench of our High Court in Abdul Jabbar v. Emperor (45 Cr. LJ 468 : AIR 1944 Calcutta 39) also held that it is quite meaningless to convict the accused both u/Ss. 395 and 412, Penal Code. We, therefore, hold that the accused cannot be found guilty u/S. 412, I.P.C In that view of the matter we set aside the conviction and the sentence u/S. 412, I.P.C If the fine of Rs. 500/- on account of this offence has been realised from the convict, the same must be refunded to him. The revisional application is thus allowed only to this extent, but fails otherwise.

11. Order accordingly.