- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Commissioner Of Police And Others v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Abadhuta .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Calcutta High Court)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Ananda Marga, founded by P.R. Sarkar (referred to as "Sri Ananda-murtiji"), is a religious denomination whose followers (Ananda Margis) regard Ananda Murtiji as their guru and follow his precepts. The Tandava Dance was allegedly introduced by Ananda Murtiji in 1966 to be performed publicly in processions on special occasions, though that introduction was not originally in writing. State authorities issued prohibitory orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C., banning such public performance. Representatives of Ananda Marga challenged the prohibitory orders by writ in 1982, and the Supreme Court disposed of that earlier matter in 1983 (Jagadishvarananda v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta). The Supreme Court in that earlier judgment held that Ananda Marga was a religious denomination within Hinduism but found that the Anandamargis had not established that public performance of the Tandava Dance was an essential part of their belief and thus could not claim protection under Articles 25 or 26 of the Constitution, noting that no literature had been produced to show the Tandava was to be performed in public.
In 1986 a revised edition of the Ananda Murtiji precepts (CARYA-CARYA) was published, which contains directions that the Tandava Dance is to be performed during certain festivals in procession in public. In May 1987 the Ananda Marga Pracaraka Sangha applied to the police for permission to hold a public procession with the Tandava Dance; permission was refused by police "in terms of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court." The present writ petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court after the Supreme Court (on an Art. 32 application) directed that the case be appropriately examined by the High Court "keeping in view" what the Supreme Court had said in the earlier judgment and gave the petitioners liberty to go before the High Court.
The Calcutta High Court (B.P. Banerjee, J.) held that the Tandava Dance as prescribed for the followers of Ananda Marga is an essential and integral part of that religious denomination and that they have a right to perform such a dance in public on prescribed occasions, subject to restrictions under Articles 25 and 26; the police have no jurisdiction to impose a ban. The State respondents appealed against this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the issues raised in the present writ proceedings were already finally determined by the Supreme Court in the earlier writ proceeding (i.e., whether the matter is res judicata or otherwise foreclosed by the earlier Supreme Court judgment).
- Whether Ananda Marga is a separate religion or a religious denomination and, relatedly, whether Ananda Margis are entitled to protection under Article 25 of the Constitution.
- Whether the Tandava Dance (particularly its public performance in procession) is a secular function or a "matter of religion" within the meaning of Article 26(b) of the Constitution and therefore entitled to protection.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (State) Arguments
- The issues were already finally determined by the Supreme Court in the earlier writ proceedings; the earlier Supreme Court judgment is final and the High Court cannot re-agitate or re-determine the same issue.
- Ananda Marga is not a separate religion and therefore is not entitled to protection under Article 25.
- The Tandava Dance is at best a secular function (particularly since the directive appears under "Social functions and festivals" in the CARYA-CARYA) and not a "matter of religion" under Article 26(b), so it is not entitled to constitutional protection as claimed.
Respondents' (Ananda Margis) Arguments
- The Supreme Court, when disposing of the Art. 32 application, directed that the High Court should examine the matter "keeping in view" the earlier judgment, and thus the matter was left open for High Court reconsideration.
- The police refusal to permit public performance of the Tandava Dance violated Articles 15, 19, 21, 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
- Submissions also argued that the Tandava Dance is part of the Ananda Marga religion: it has deep associations with Hindu tradition; directions from Ananda Murtiji are binding on followers; and the 1986 revision of CARYA-CARYA contains an express directive for public performance on certain festivals (a factual change since the earlier Supreme Court hearing).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jagadishvarananda v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta ((1983) 4 SCC 522 : AIR 1984 SC 51) | Earlier Supreme Court judgment holding Ananda Marga to be a religious denomination but that Tandava Dance had not been shown to be an essential part of belief; noted absence of literature showing public performance. | The High Court treated the earlier judgment as persuasive but not finally conclusive because the Supreme Court itself directed reconsideration by the High Court; the earlier finding must be "kept in view" while the High Court exercises jurisdiction. |
| Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (AIR 1987 SC 748) (National Anthem case) | Shows that peculiar practice of a particular religious denomination could be protected under Art. 25(1); the Supreme Court indicated a sentence in the earlier judgment was a slip and that the Court proceeded to consider the Ananda Marga claim under Art. 25(1). | Cited to support the proposition that the question whether Ananda Marga can claim the benefit of Art. 25(1) remains open and was not finally foreclosed by the earlier judgment. |
| Ashit Mukherjee v. Susmita Mukherjee ((1986) 1 Cal HN 515 : AIR 1967 Cal 153) | Interpretation of the phrase "having regard to" (and by analogy "keeping in view") as meaning "must take into consideration." | Relied upon to hold that the High Court has jurisdiction but must take the Supreme Court's earlier decision into consideration when deciding the matter. |
| The Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282) | Judicial definition of "religion" and Art. 25: freedom to entertain belief and to exhibit belief in outward acts; examples that rites, ceremonies and periodic practices can be parts of religion. | Used to define "religion" and to support the proposition that a practice need not be adopted by all members of a religion to be protected under Art. 25 and that sect-specific practices can constitute religion. |
| Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (AIR 1958 SC 255) | Examples of "matters of religion" (e.g., who is entitled to enter temples, where to stand, how worship is conducted) relevant to Art. 26(b). | Cited to show the scope of "matters of religion" under Art. 26(b) and to support the overlap between Art. 25 practices and Art. 26(b) organisational rights. |
| Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (AIR 1962 SC 853) | Article 26 guarantees denominations the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion; what are matters of religion varies according to tenets of the denomination. | Relied upon to affirm that Art. 26 protects denomination-specific determinations of what constitutes matters of religion. |
| Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (AIR 1961 SC 1402) | Observation that only practices regarded by the religion as essential and integral should be treated as part of religion for Art. 26; caution against treating merely secular or superstitious practices as religious. | Cited by the Advocate-General; the court observed this view runs counter to other authorities (Shirur Mutt) and placed emphasis on the sincerity and tenets of the denomination rather than a rigid historical criterion. |
| Ramanuja Jeevar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1972 SC 1586) | Holds that rituals and ceremonies of worshippers are part of religious faith and cannot be dismissed as irrational or superstitious. | Used to support the proposition that rituals, even if regarded by others as irrational, can be part of religion and thus protected. |
| Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witness Inc. v. The Commonwealth ((1943) 67 CLR 116) | Observation that many ordinary matters (clothing, food, ceremonies) may become elements of religious belief; courts should not disqualify beliefs as incapable of being religious. | Quoted to underline that courts should not a priori disqualify practices as non-religious; supports deference to sincerely held denominational practices. |
| Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commr (AIR 1978 SC 851) | Principle that reasons justifying an administrative order must appear in the order itself and cannot be modified or supplemented by affidavits in subsequent proceedings. | Cited to hold that police orders refusing permission should state reasons in the order itself and cannot be improved by later affidavits; here the orders merely cited the Supreme Court order and gave no independent grounds. |
| Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC 740) | Distinction between "law and order" and "public order": contravention of law affects order, but to affect public order it must affect the community or public at large. | Applied to conclude that alleged effects (carrying skulls/weapons) did not on the record amount to affecting public order; police orders did not show consideration of public order. |
| Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P (AIR 1981 SC 2198) | Police should, instead of prohibiting religious rites on facile grounds of imminent danger, take positive measures (e.g., require security) and prohibition is a last resort. | Relied upon to hold that police should adopt less restrictive measures and only prohibit as a last measure; the Ananda Margis had undertaken to maintain peace and discipline. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a series of legal and factual steps:
-
Jurisdiction and effect of the earlier Supreme Court judgment:
- The court examined whether the earlier Supreme Court decision finally concluded the issues. It concluded that the Supreme Court's language in disposing of the Art. 32 application indicated the matter was not finally closed, because the Supreme Court directed the petitioners to go before the High Court and to have the High Court reconsider the matter "keeping in view" the earlier judgment. This showed that reconsideration was intended.
- The court interpreted "keeping in view" (by analogy to "having regard to") as meaning the High Court "must take into consideration" the Supreme Court decision, citing Ashit Mukherjee.
- Accordingly, the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition, but it had to consider the earlier Supreme Court decision in disposing of the matter.
-
Interpretation of "religion" under Article 25 and denomination-specific practices:
- The court undertook a textual and authoritative analysis of "religion" in Article 25. It rejected the Advocate-General's contention that "religion" in Art. 25(1) means only a particular religion (i.e., that sects/denominations could not claim protection). The court reasoned that the Article's wording ("religion" without the article "a") contemplates religion in a general sense and that practices of denominations may fall within Article 25.
- The court relied on the Supreme Court's definition in Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282), which treats rites and ceremonies of sects as parts of religion, and on Bijoe Emmanuel to show that denomination-specific practices could be protected under Art. 25 even if not accepted by the entire religion.
- The court concluded that a practice need not be universally adopted by all members of a religion to be protected; it suffices that the practice is performed as an article of faith by a religious denomination.
-
Interpretation of "matters of religion" under Article 26(b):
- The court explained that Art. 26(b) confers organisational rights on religious denominations in matters of religion and that "matters of religion" should be understood as "pertaining to religion." The concept overlaps with what is protected under Art. 25.
- The court cited Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin to show that what constitutes matters of religion varies with the tenets of the denomination and that Art. 26 protects denomination-specific determinations.
-
Analysis of the earlier Supreme Court reasoning and the impact of subsequent factual change:
- The court closely examined paragraph 12 of the earlier Supreme Court judgment and noted that the Supreme Court had emphasized absence of literature showing that Tandava must be performed in public. The earlier court had also observed the practice was recent, but did not hold that recentness precluded a practice from being religious.
- Since 1986 a revised CARYA-CARYA was produced that expressly directed performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession on special occasions. The High Court concluded that this factual change (documentary evidence) could affect the earlier finding, and that the failure to produce such a writing before the Supreme Court might have led to a different outcome there.
-
Consideration of whether Tandava Dance is secular or religious:
- The court considered the Advocate-General's reliance on Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (which suggests protection should be confined to essential and integral practices), but concluded that that observation runs counter to other authorities and that sect-specific practices may be protected.
- The court accepted submissions that Tandava has deep ties to Hindu religious symbolism (e.g., the original Tandava of Siva) and that the CARYA-CARYA treats certain social-cum-spiritual functions as part of spiritual life; the placement in the CARYA-CARYA under "Social functions and festivals" did not convert the practice into purely secular activity.
- The court held that even if a practice may be performed for social or temporal purposes, performance with a view to propagating the religious concepts represented by the dance cannot be termed secular in the constitutional sense.
-
Procedural and public order analysis of police refusal:
- The court held the police had misread the earlier Supreme Court judgment: the Supreme Court had never directed the State authorities to refuse permission. Therefore, refusal "in terms of the Supreme Court Order" was incorrect.
- The orders refusing permission did not state reasons relating to public order or morality; instead they merely cited the Supreme Court order. The court held (citing Mohinder Singh Gill) that reasons justifying administrative refusal must appear in the order itself and cannot be supplemented by affidavit later.
- The court distinguished between "law and order" and "public order" (citing Ram Manohar Lohia) and found that the allegations in the State affidavit (carrying skulls, weapons, repugnance to public taste) did not on the record amount to affecting public order as understood by the authorities and relevant case law.
- The court noted prior practices of other religious denominations carrying weapons/processions and the constitutional protection for Sikhs carrying kirpans, concluding carrying of weapons per se did not demonstrate an effect on public order.
- The court cited Gulam Abbas to emphasise that prohibition should be a last resort and that authorities should take positive measures (e.g., require security/undertakings) where appropriate; the Ananda Margis had undertaken to maintain peace and discipline.
-
Conclusion of analysis:
- Taking into account the CARYA-CARYA (1986) directive, the disciplinary nature of directives from Ananda Murtiji as conceded in pleadings, and the authorities on religious freedom, the court found that public performance of the Tandava Dance in procession forms part of Ananda Marga religion and is a matter of religion under Articles 25 and 26.
- The court therefore upheld the High Court decision of B.P. Banerjee, J., and ordered the police to permit performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession on occasions listed in the petition, subject to the petitioners' undertaking to maintain peace and discipline.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL DISMISSED. The judgment and order of B.P. Banerjee, J. (holding that the Tandava Dance as prescribed for followers of Ananda Marga is an essential and integral part of their religion and that they have the right to perform it in public on prescribed occasions subject to constitutional restrictions) is upheld. The police authorities are directed to permit the Ananda Margis to perform the Tandava Dance in public procession on the occasions of their principal religious functions listed in the prayer (b) of the writ petition, subject to the Ananda Margis' undertaking to maintain peace and discipline. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
Implications (as reflected in the opinion):
- The High Court reaffirmed that denomination-specific practices may be protected under Articles 25 and 26 even if they are recent or not accepted by all members of the broader religion, so long as they are shown to be performed as articles of faith by the denomination.
- The opinion emphasises procedural correctness for administrative refusals: reasons for refusal must appear in the order itself and cannot be supplied later by affidavit (citing Mohinder Singh Gill).
- The decision underscores that prohibitions on religious rites are to be a last resort; authorities should consider less restrictive measures (citing Gulam Abbas) and must properly assess whether alleged conduct genuinely affects public order (distinguishing law and order from public order, citing Ram Manohar Lohia).
- The direct effect is that the Ananda Margis obtained the right, under Articles 25 and 26 as applied in the case, to perform the Tandava Dance publicly on their principal religious occasions subject to maintaining public order; the court did not order costs and did not further expand or overrule the earlier Supreme Court judgment but treated it as a precedent to be considered by the High Court while allowing reconsideration in light of new documentary material (CARYA-CARYA, 1986).
Disposition
Appeal dismissed; interim orders vacated; no order as to costs. The High Court ordered that the police authorities should permit the Tandava Dance in public procession on the principal religious occasions specified, subject to the petitioners' undertaking to maintain peace and discipline.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what the opinion states.
Mrs. Ruma Pal, J.:—The Ananda Marga was founded by one P.R Sarkar who was known to his followers and “Sri Ananda-murtiji”. The followers of Ananda Marga are known as Ananda Margis. For Ananda-margis Ananda Murtiji is their guru and his precepts are binding on them. It is contended by the Anandamargis that in 1966 the Tandava Dance was introduced by Ananda Murtiji to be performed publicity in processions on special occasions. This alleged introduction was not in writing. The performance of the Tandava Dance in a public procession was prohibited by the State Authorities under orders passed from time to time under S. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Representatives of the Anandamargis challenged the prohibitory orders issued under S. 144, Cr. P.C by way of writ proceedings in 1982. The matter was ultimately disposed of by the Supreme Court in 1983. The judgment (hereinafter referred to as the earlier judgment) has since been reported in Jagadishvarananda v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta, (1983) 4 SCC 522 : AIR 1984 SC 51. In disposing of the matter the Supreme Court held that the Ananda Marga was a religious denomination within Hinduism but was of the view that the Anandamargis had not been able to establish that the public performance of the Tandava Dance was an essential part of the their belief and as such they could not claim the protection of Art. 25 or 26 of the Constitution. In arriving at its finding the Supreme Court had observed that no literature had been produced by the Ananda Margis in support of their contention that it was essential to their belief that the Tandava Dance should be performed in public.
2. In 1986 a revised edition of the precepts of Ananda Murtiji was published. The precepts which are known as “CARYA-CARYA” contain directions that the Tandava Dance is to be performed during certain festivals in procession in public.
3. In May, 1987 an application was made by the Ananda Marga Pracaraka Sangha to the Police Authorities for permission to hold a “public procession with Tandava Dance”. This permission was refused by the Police “in terms of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court….. on the subject.” The present writ petitioner then filed an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court challenging such refusal.
4. The Supreme Court disposed of the application under Art. 32 directing that the case should be appropriately examined by the High Court keeping in view what has been said by the Supreme Court in the earlier judgment. The petitioners were given the liberty to go before the High Court. It is the writ petitioners' case that pursuant to such leave the present writ petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court.
5. The writ application was heard and disposed of by B.P Banerjee, J., who held that “the Tandava Dance as prescribed for the followers of Ananda Marga is an essential and integral part of the religion of the said religious denomination and they have a right to perform such a dance in public on the occasions prescribed in this behalf subject to the to the restrictions imposed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution and the Police Authorities have no jurisdiction to impose a ban on such dance”.
6. The State respondents have preferred this appeal from the judgment and order of B.P Banerjee, J. The appellants represented by the Advocate-General have challenged the order basically on three grounds namely—
1) That the issues involved in the present writ proceedings had already been determined by the Supreme Court in the earlier writ proceeding. The earlier judgment of the Supreme Court it is contended, is final and there was no scope for the same issue to be re-agitated or determined by this Court.
2) In any event the Ananda Marga was not a separate religion and was not entitled to the protection of Art. 25 of the Constitution.
3) The Tandava Dance was at best a secular function and not a “matter of religion” within the meaning of Art. 26(b) of the Constitution and as such, was not entitled to any protection as claimed.
7. The respondent writ petitioners represented by Mr. D. Ghosh have argued that:
i) the issue raised in the present writ petition had been raised by way of an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court; The Supreme Court having directed the High Court to dispose of the matter keeping in view the judgment of the Supreme Court, the matter is at large;
ii) the action of the appellants in refusing the Ananda Marga the right to perform the Tandava Dance was violative of Arts. 15, 19, 21, 25 and 26 of the Constitution;
8. The first question which needs to be decided goes to the very root of this Court's jurisdiction. If the issues raised before us have been finally resolved by the Supreme Court by it's earlier judgment, there is no question of this Court deciding the same matter.
9. It is clear from the language used by the Supreme Court in disposing of the application under Art. 32 that the Supreme Court itself was persuaded that the earlier judgment did not finally conclude the matter. That is why, it appear to us, the Supreme Court directed the petitioners to go before the High Court and directed the High Court to reconsider the matter. This would indicate that the Supreme Court thought that the matter needed reconsideration.
10. Furthermore, in the earlier judgment, the Supreme Court had observed Art. 25 did not apply to the Ananda Margis as Ananda Marga was not a separate religion. In the more recent decision of the of the Supreme Court i.e Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (reported in AIR 1987 SC 748) (hereinafter referred to as the National Anthem case), the Supreme Court has held (Para 23):—
“This sentence appears to have sought into the judgment by some slip. It is not a sequitur to the reasoning of the Court on any of the issues. In fact, in the subsequent paragraphs, the Court has expressly proceeded to consider the claim of the Ananda Marga to perform Tandava Dance in public streets pursuant to the right claimed by them under Art. 25(1).”
Therefore the question whether the Ananda Marga can claim the benefit of Art. 25(1) is still open.
11. Secondly, on an analysis of the earlier judgment, it appears that the Supreme Court had, in arriving at its finding that the Tandava Dance was not an essential part of Anandamarga religion, taken into consideration the fact that there was no document to show that the Tandava Dance was to be performed fin public. Whether it was a factor as contended by the Advocate-General appearing for the appellants or the factor as contended by Mr. Ghosh appering on behalf of the respondents, nevertheless, there has been a factual change in the situation since the earlier judgment. The question as to whether such factual chance would affect the issue before us at all, will have to be resolved.
12. Thirdly, although the phrase “keeping in view” does not apper to have been judicially defined, a synonymous phrase “having regard to” has been so defined.
13. In several cases courts have had occasion to consider the phrase “shall have regard to” or “having regard to” and other synonymous phrases. These have been noted and discussed by the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Ashit Mukherjee v. Susmita Mukherjee (reported in (1986) 1 Cal HN 515 : (AIR 1967 Cal 153)). The Division Bench held that the phrase means “must take into consideration”.
14. We, therefore, hold that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this writ proceeding but in disposing of the matter the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier judgment will have to be taken into consideration.
15. Before dealing with the second contention of the Advocate-General it is necessary to clarify certain expression used in Arts. 25 and 26. The first expression which needs such clarification is the word “religion”.
16. It is contended by the Advocate-General that the word religion in Art. 25(1) does not include a sect of a religion. It is contended that by the earlier judgment the Ananda Marga has been described as a religious denomination. According to the Advocate-General in order to obtain the protection of Art. 25, it must be shown that what is sought to be professed, practised or propagated, is a basic or integral part of a religion as opposed to a religious denomination. It is contended that the Anandamarga being within the Hindu religion, the Ananda Margis can only claim the protection of Art. 25 in respect of their right to profess or practise or propagate such tenet of Hindusim as is acceptable to the entire Hindu Community.
17. The argument of the Advocate-General is unacceptable. Semantically (sic) there appears to be some confusion. The wording of Art. 25 does not refer to a religion but to “religion” without any qualification. The use of the word “a” before the word “religion” would have meant a reference to a particular religion. The absence of the word “a” means that the reference in the Article is to religion in general.
18. To hold that “religion” means “a particular religion” would lead to startling results. No practice of Hinduism or other like unorganised religion would be protected as it is doubtful whether any particular practice is followed by all Hindus. Yet there are many such practices of Hindu sects which, though not accepted by all, would undoubtedly fall within the concept of religion.
19. The word “religion” has been judicially defined by the Supreme Court in the case of The Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (reported in AIR 1954 SC 282). The better known passage of the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt case has been quoted in the earlier judgment. However, an equally explicit definition of religion has been given in paragraphs 14 and 19 of the judgment which are—
“We now come to Art. 25 which, as its language indicates, secures to every person, subject to public order, health and morality, a freedom not only to entertain such religious belief, as may be approved of by his judgment and conscience, but also to exhibit his belief in such outward acts as he thinks proper and to propagate or disseminate his ideas for the edification of others.”
“If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular house of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire all these would be regarded as parts of religion.”
(Emphasis supplied).
20. In fact, in the decision of Supreme Court in the National Anthem case (AIR 1987 SC 748) (supra) the Supreme Court held that the peculiar practice of a particular religious denomination could be protected under Art. 25(1) even though the practice was not recognised and in fact disapproved of by other religious denominations of the same religion. In that case children belonging to a sect of Christianity i.e, Jehovah's witnesses had argued that according to the tenets of their religious denomination they could not show respect to any other concept or thing apart from Jehovah. As such it was argued that they were forbidden by the religious belief of their denomination from singing the National Anthem.
21. The Supreme Court held that Jehovah's witnesses were entitled to the protection of Art. 25 of the Constitution and could not be compelled to sign the National Anthem contrary to the belief of their religious denomination. In paragraph 3 the Supreme Court observed as follows:—
“That the petitioners truly and conscientiously believe what they say is not in doubt. They do not hold their beliefs idly and their conduct is not the outcome of any perversity.”
22. The Supreme Court further held that although the belief may appear strange or even bizzare but the sincerity of their beliefs was beyond question.
23. The word “religion” has been defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition as including (i) a state of life bound by monastic vows; the condition of one who is a member of a religious order; the religious life and (ii) a particular monastic or religious order or rule.
24. In our view what is religion within the meaning of Art. 25 must be understood in contradistinction to what is secular. On the basis of the authorities referred to above, we hold that a practice to be ‘religion’ within the meaning of Art. 25(1) need not be adopted by all members of a religion and cannot be denied if it is shown to be performed as an Article of faith by a religious denomination.
25. The third contention of the appellants as noted above deals with Art. 26(b). Art. 26(b) deals with rights of religious denominations. These may be termed as organisational rights as distinct from personal rights guaranteed under Art. 25. Unlike Art. 25 which is subject to the other j provisions of Part II of the Constitution, Art. 26 is only subject to public order, morality and health. Art. 26 is a special provision giving an additional right to organisations or denominations. This means that members of an organisation can have personal rights under Art. 25.
26. The language used in Art. 26(b) is “matter of religion”. Again the word used as “religion” simpliciter and not a religion. A ‘matter of religion’ would mean ‘pertaining to religion’. The concept of “matters of religion” in Art. 26(b) overlaps with the concept of professing, practising and propagating religion under Art. 25 of the Constitution.
27. Examples of what would be a “matter of religion” have been stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1958 SC 255 as follows (Para 18):—
“Thus, under the ceremonial law pertaining to temples, who are entitled to enter into them for worship and where they are entitled to stand and worship and how the worship is to be conducted are all matters of religion”.
(Emphasis supplied).
28. It cannot be, as is sought to be suggested by the Advocate-General, that a matter of religion would have to be matter accepted and practised by the entire religion of which the denomination may form a part. Apart from the language of Art. 26(b) this submission runs counter to the Supreme Court's observation in the Devaru case (supra) as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State Of Bombay ; (reported in AIR 1962 SC 853) in which the Supreme Court has categorically stated as follows (at p. 864):—
“Article 26 in no uncertain terms, has guaranteed the right to every religious denomination or a section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Now what are matters of religion and what are not is not an easy question to decide. It must vary in each individual case according to the tenets of the religious denomination concerned”.
(Emphasis supplied)
It may be mentioned that in that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of Dawoodi Bohras, a community of the Shia sect of the Muslim religion.
29. Finally in the Shirur Mutt case (AIR 1954 SC 282) (supra) the Supreme Court also held as follows (Para 22):—
“Under Art. 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.”
30. Therefore, in order to succeed the Ananda Margis will have to show that the performance of the Tandava Dance in a public procession is part of their “religion” or is a “matter of religion” thus warranting protection of their rights under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
31. Before considering the submissions of Mr. D. Ghosh appearing for the Ananda Margis in this respect, it is necessary to analyse the earlier judgment to find out the basis on which the Supreme Court negatived the Ananda Margis case that the performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession was part of their religion. The relevant paragraph of the earlier judgment is paragraph 12. This is set out in extenso as the ultimate decision in this case will depend upon a proper construction of the paragraph:—
“12. The question for consideration now, therefore is whether performance of Tandava Dance is a religious rite or practice essential to the tenets of the religious faith of the Ananda Margis. We have already indicated that Tandava Dance was not accepted as an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis when in 1955, the Ananda Marga order was first established. It is the specific case of the petitioner that Shri Ananda Murti introduced tandava as a part of religious rites of Ananda Margis later in 1966. Ananda Marga as a religious order is of recent origin and Tandava Dance as a part of religious rites of that order is still more recent. It is doubtful as to whether in such circumstances Tandava Dance can be taken as an essential religious rite of the Ananda Margis. Even conceding that it is so, it is difficult to accept Mr. Tarkunde's argument that taking out religious processions with Tandava Dance is an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis. In paragraph 17 of the writ petition the petitioner pleaded that “Tandava Dance lasts for a few minutes where two or three persons dance by lifting one leg to the level of the chest bringing it down and lifting the other.” In paragraph 18 it has been pleaded that “when the Ananda Margis greet their spiritual preceptor at the airport, etc. they arrange for a brief welcome dance of tandava wherein one or two persons use the skull and symbolic knife and dance for two or three minutes.” In paragraph 26 it has been pleaded that “Tandava is a custom among the sect members and it is a customary performance and its origin is over four thousand years old, hence it is not a new invention of Ananda Margis.” On the basis of the literature of the Ananda Marga denomination it has been contended that there is prescription of the performance of Tandava Dance by every follower of the Ananda Marga. Even conceding that Tandava Dance has been prescribed as a religious rite for every follower of the Ananda Marga it does not follow as a necessary corollary that Tandava Dance to be performed in the public is a matter of religious rite. In fact, there is no justification in any of the writings of Sri Ananda Murti that Tandava Dance must be performed in public. At least none could be shown to us by Mr. Tarkunde despite an enquiry by us in that behalf. We are, therefore, not in a position to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that performance of Tandava Dance in a procession at public places is an essential religious rite to be performed by every Ananda Margi.”
32. It appears to us that the Supreme Court took note of the fact that the practice was a recent one. No finding however was arrived at by the Supreme Court that by reason of the recentness of the practice the same could not from part of religion or be a matter of religion. It apears to us that the Supreme Court finally rested its finding on the fact that the Ananda Margis had not been able to show from any of their religious literature that the Tandava Dance was to be performed in public. In fact that the Supreme Court has also recorded that the counsel for the Ananda Margis had been asked by the Court to produce any literature in this regard but that this could not be done.
33. As far as the recentness of the practice is concerned it has been submitted by Mr. Ghosh as follows:—
(1) The Tandava Dance has been closely associated with Hinduism from time immemorial. In support of this argument Mr. Ghosh relied upon several authorities, i.e The Dance of India by Enakshi Bhavnani, Nataraj in Art. Thought and Literature by C. Sri-varamamurti, Nataraja by Rabindra Nath Tagore and Bharater Nritya Kala by Gayatri Chattopadhyay.
(2) The Hindus in general have always believed in dance as a form of worship: vide Nararaja in Art, Thought and Literature by C. Sivaramamurti (pg. 11).
(3) Ananda Murtiji was considered by the Ananda Margis as their religious preceptor or guru. Any direction given by him was a mandate which could not be disobeyed. Therefore the rites and rituals which would be prescribed by Ananda Murtiji would form an integral part of their religion. As Ananda Murtiji was alive till recently, necessarily such directives could continue to be given until his death.
34. We are of the view that there is substance in the contention of Mr. Ghosh. Although the specific introduction of Tandava Dance in public procession may have been recent, this does not detract from the fact that the Tandava Dance is part of the religion of the Ananda Margis. In any religion, practices may be introduced according to the decision of the spiritual head. If these practices are accepted by the followers of such spiritual head as a method of achieving their spiritual upliftment, the fact that such practice was recently introduced cannot make it anytheless a matter of religion.
35. The Advocate-General, however, submitted that the concept of the Tandava Dance was not a part of religion but a secular activity. In support of this submission, the Advocate-General relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali reported in AIR 1961 SC 1402. The particular passage relied upon by the Advocate-General is as follows (at p. 1415):—
“In order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion, they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 26. Similarly even practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and integral part of it and no other.”
36. This observation of the Supreme Court in our view runs counter to the observations Mukherjea, J. in the Shirut Mutt case (AIR 1954 SC 282) noted above. Furthermore in a subsequent decision, namely, Ramanuja Jeevar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1586) the Supreme Court has held that:—
“Worshippers lay great store by the rituals and whatever other people, not of the faith, may think about these rituals and ceremonies, they are a part of the Hindu Religious faith and cannot be dismissed as either irrational or superstitious.”
37. It was then pointed out by the Advocate-General that the directive regarding the performance of the Tandava Dance was contained in CARYA-CARYA under the heading “Social functions and festivals”. It is contended that therefore the performance of the Tandava Dance was a secular activity.
38. It is difficult for us to accept this contention. Firstly festivals referred to at which the Tandava Dance has to be performed are religious. Secondly it is stated in chapter 15 of the CARYA-CARYA. “Our social-cum-spiritual functions will be considered part of ourspiritual life”. Admittedly the original Tandava Dance of Siva forms part of the Hindu religion. It is said to represent the threefold processes of creation, preservation and destruction. The rhythm, postures, ornaments (including the skull) and the weapons used in the dance are said to be symbols of religious significance (vide the chapter entitled “The significance of Sivas dance from Natraja in Art. Thought and Literature by C. Sivaramamurthi). A although the Tandava Dance may be performed for social or other temporal purposes, its performance with a view to propagating the concepts represented by the dance cannot be termed as secular.
39. Lastly, it has been contended by the Advocate-General that for the practice to form an essential part of the religion there must be a decision taken by the Ananda Murtiji in the matter. According to the Advocate-General there was no such decision.
40. Assuming that such a decision is necessary, we are of the view that it is not open to the Advocate-General to raise this point in view of the pleadings. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition the writ petitioner have referred to the CARYA-CARYA as containing mandatory directions. This has not been refuted by the appellants. On the other hand it is admitted in paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-opposition of the State Authorities that “the directives of Ananda Murtiji as laid down in the CARYA-CARYA (4th Edn.), Part-I may be mandatory and binding upon the followers of Ananda Marga …..”
41. The views of Latham, C.J in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witness Inc. v. The Commonwealth (reported in (1943) 67 CLR 116) are apposite here:—
“….. almost any matter may become an element in religions belief or religious conduct. The wearing of particular clothes, the eating or the non-eating of meat or other foods, the observance of ceremonies not only in religious worship, but in the everyday life of the individual — all these may become part of religion. Once upon a time all the operations of agriculture were controlled by religious precepts. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that each person chooses the content of his own religion. It is not for a Court, upon some a prior basis, to disquality certain beliefs as incapable of being religious in character.”
42. The second aspect is the fact that since 1986 Ananda Murtiji has specifically directed the performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession on special occasions. This directive is contained in the revised version of the CARYA-CARYA. It cannot be gainsaid that if this writing had been produced before the Supreme Court during the hearing of the earlier writ proceedings, the Supreme Court might very well have accepted the case of the Ananda Margis.
43. In view of our finding as to the scope of the word “religion” as used in Art. 25 and the phrase “matter of religion” as used in Art. 26(b), we are of the view that the performance of Tandava Dance in public procession forms part of the Ananda Marga religion and is also a matter of religion within the meaning of those articles.
44. Thus the Anandamargis cannot be deprived of their right to practise their religion in the manner prescribed by their religious preceptor, except on the grounds of public order, morality and health. It is not the case of the appellants that the permission for the performance of the Tandava Dance in a public procession has been forbidden on the ground of health. According to the case made out in the affidavit of the State Authorities the permission has been refused on the ground of public order and morality.
45. However, in the orders by which permission has been refused, the Police authorities have refused permission for public performance the Tandava Dance “in terms of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the subject passed on October 20, 1983.”
46. The Police authorities appear to have misread the earlier judgment. The Supreme Court had never directed the State authorities not to acced to the performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession. Therefore, it was wrong for the State authorities to refuse permission purportedly “in terms of the Supreme Court Order.”
47. The orders refusing permission do not contain any reference to public order or morality. The case of the State Government cannot be improved by their affidavit. The reason justifying refusal of permission should have appeared in the order refusing permission itself. As stated above the only reason given was the Supreme Court order. The reasons cannot now be modified or supplemented by way of an affidavit in the proceeding (vide Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commr. reported in AIR 1978 SC 851).
48. In any event, we accept the contention of Mr. Ghosh that there is a difference between Law and Order and Public Order. This distinction has been recognised in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (reported in AIR 1966 SC 740). The Supreme Court stated that (Para 51):—
“The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large.”
It does not appear from the orders challenged in the writ petition that the authorities concerned had at all considered the question of public order.
49. In the affidavit in opposition however some grounds have been put forward by the State Authorities to show that the performance of the Tandava Dance was likely to affect Public order and morality.
50. Even if we consider the additional grounds put forward by the State Authorities in their affidavit justifying the refusal of permission to the Anandamargis, we are of the view that the allegations without more cannot reasonably raise a question of public order and morality. The allegations which are repeated throughout the affidavit are as follows:—
“Carrying of human skulls and indulging in dance with weapons like tridents, daggers and/or knife on public roads of Calcutta and its suburbs or anywhere are not only repulsive to public taste and morality but is bound to cause fear in the mind of people and will cause public annoyance as well.”
51. As far as public order is concerned, we do not think that the allegations even if true, would come within the concept of public order as laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Monohar Lohia's case (AIR 1966 SC 740). It has been pointed out to us by the writ petitioners that other religious denominations hold processions carrying weapons. These processionists have not been stopped. Furthermore the right of Sikhs to carry kirpans has been constitutionally protected, under Art. 25. Therefore, it cannot be said that the carrying of weapons per se would affect public order.
52. The human skull is not a new concept in the Hindu religion. We were shown diverse photographs of images of Siva in many temples in which Siva has been shown as carrying a skull (vide Chapter on Karanas presented in Siva's Tandava from Nataraja in Art. Thought and Literature by C. Siva-ramamurti). It is also not clear to us how the performance of Tandava could affect morality.
53. In the affidavit of the State Authorities it has again been reiterated that the refusal to allow Tandava Dance on public roads was in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Court. As we have already stated there was no such directive.
54. In the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P (reported in AIR 1981 SC 2198) the Police Authorities had sought to prohibit the performance of religious rites by the Shia community at the time of Muharrum on certain plots. The Supreme Court observed as follows (para 32):
“….instead of prohibiting or suspending the exercise of such rights on concerned occasions on the facile ground of the imminent danger to public peace and tranquillity of the locality the authorities (should) make a positive approach to the situation and if they are satisfied that the exercise of the rights is likely to create a riot or breach of peace it would be their duty to take from those from whom disturbance is apprehended security to keep the peace. It is only in an extremely extraordinary situation, when other measures are bound to fail, that a total prohibition or suspension of their rights may be resorted to as a last measure”.
55. It appears from the letters requesting permission that the representatives of the Anandamargis had undertaken to the Police Authorities on behalf of the Anandamargis to maintain peace and discipline on the occasions of the performance of the Tandava Dance. In the circumstances we uphold the decision of B.P Banerjee, J. The police authorities should permit the Anandamargis to perform the Tandava Dance in public procession on the occasion of their principal religious functions listed in prayer (b) of the writ petition subject to their undertaking to maintain peace and discipline on such occasions.
56. We refrain from dealing with the allegations of mala fides and unequal treatment made by the writ petitioners in view of our findings on Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In the result the appeal is dismissed and all interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
57. The point as involved in this application virtually disposes of the Appeal and as such the learned Advocate appearing before us agreed that the appeal may also be disposed of after treating the same as on the day's fist. We order accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
58. Let it be noted that paper Books have been filed.
M.N Roy, J.:—59. I agree.
Appeal dismissed.
Alert