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Geeta Bose And Another v. Machine Tools Of India Ltd. .
Structured Summary of the Opinion — A.M. Bhattacharjee, J. (with concurring opinion of Amulya Kumar Nandi, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs acquired a house in 1981 and instituted the present suit in 1982 seeking eviction of the defendant on the grounds of unauthorised subletting and several other grounds. Because the suit was filed within three years of acquisition, the plaintiffs could not lawfully ground the suit on the landlord's reasonable requirement for own occupation, due to the prohibition in sub-section (3A) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. During the pendency of the suit the three-year period expired; the plaintiffs then moved to amend the plaint to include the ground of reasonable requirement but that amendment was refused. Thereafter the plaintiffs applied for leave to withdraw the suit with liberty to sue afresh (to include the newly matured ground of reasonable requirement). The trial court rejected that withdrawal application. This revision proceeds from the plaintiffs contesting that refusal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs should have been permitted to withdraw the present suit with liberty to sue afresh so as to institute a new suit including the ground of reasonable requirement that matured during the pendency of the first suit.
- Whether the prohibition in Section 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (which precludes instituting a suit based on reasonable requirement within three years of acquisition) prevents the plaintiffs from instituting a subsequent suit on that ground when the three-year period has expired during the pendency of the earlier suit.
- Whether the bar in Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (and its sub-rule (3)) prevents the plaintiffs from suing afresh on a ground that was not legally available at the time the first suit was instituted.
- How the expression “other sufficient grounds” in Clause (b) of Rule 1(3) of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be interpreted — whether narrowly (ejusdem generis with “formal defects”) or broadly to include maturations of cause of action during pendency of a prematurely instituted suit.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dhanapal Chettiar, AIR 1979 SC 1745 (Seven Judge Bench) | Principle that termination of contractual tenancy is not necessary for a suit for eviction under various Rent Control Acts unless the statute so provides. | Used to explain that under the 1956 Act a termination of tenancy is not a sine qua non and that causes of action for eviction are the statutory grounds in Section 13(1), not necessarily a prior termination of tenancy. |
| Mylavakapu Rangayya Naidu v. Basana Simon, AIR 1926 Madras 594 | Authority supporting withdrawal where cause of action was premature when suit was filed and matured during pendency such that withdrawal with liberty to sue afresh constituted “sufficient ground”. | Referred to in support of the proposition that a matured cause of action during pendency justifies withdrawal with liberty to sue afresh. |
| Ramrao Bhagwant v. Babu Appanna, AIR 1940 Bombay 121 (Bombay Full Bench) | Authority holding that “sufficient grounds” in Order 23 Rule 1(3)(b) should be construed ejusdem generis with “formal defect” in Clause (a). | Identified as an authority taking a restrictive view of “sufficient grounds”; the court noted it but did not accept that restrictive approach. |
| Abdul Ghafoor…Applicant; v. Abdul Rahman…Opposite Party, AIR 1951 All 845 (Allahabad Full Bench) | Another authority supporting a restrictive ejusdem generis construction of “sufficient grounds”. | Noted as part of the body of authority taking the narrower view; the court declined to be bound by that restrictive interpretation. |
| Union of India v. Manoranjan Banik, AIR 1956 Gauhati 1 | Authority taking a contrary view (i.e., broader meaning of “sufficient grounds”). | Noted as an example of contrary authority; the court aligned with the broader approach rather than the restrictive one. |
| Atul Krushna v. Ramkishore, AIR 1956 Orissa 77 | Orissa decision supporting broader construction of “sufficient grounds”. | Noted as contrary authority to the restrictive view; relied upon to show divergent judicial approaches. |
| Duryodhan v. Satyabadi, AIR 1986 Orissa 58 | Orissa decision representing the broader construction line of authority. | Noted among contrary authorities; part of the court's survey showing inconsistency of authorities on the point. |
| K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080 | Supreme Court authority advising that the rule of ejusdem generis be applied with care and caution. | Relied upon to support the proposition that ejusdem generis is not an inviolable rule and must be applied only when appropriate. |
| T.P. Nayyar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540 | Supreme Court authority on cautious application of ejusdem generis. | Referred to as part of a line of Supreme Court authorities cautioning against indiscriminate application of ejusdem generis. |
| Mangalore Electric Supply v. Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1978 SC 1272 | Supreme Court authority reinforcing the need for care in applying ejusdem generis. | Used to underline that ejusdem generis is a tool of interpretation, not an absolute rule. |
| Quazi v. Quazi, (1979) 3 All ER 897 (House of Lords) | Statement that rules like ejusdem generis are "useful servants but a bad master". | Quoted to illustrate judicial skepticism about mechanically applying the rule of ejusdem generis. |
| Jagadish Chandra v. Kajaria Traders, AIR 1964 SC 1882 | Authority stressing that ejusdem generis should not be applied if preceding words are not specifications of a genus. | Relied upon to show textual limits of applying ejusdem generis; used to argue against restricting “sufficient grounds”. |
| Sun Fire Office v. Hart, (1889) 14 App Cas 98 | Principle that the rule has no room if the antecedent clause describes a complete genus rather than specifying particulars. | Referred to (through Supreme Court approval) to support the conclusion that “formal defects” form a complete genus and should not restrict general words that follow. |
| Central Bank of India v. Hartford Fire Insurance, AIR 1965 SC 1288 | Supreme Court approval of the Sun Fire Office principle and guidance on ejusdem generis. | Referred to as supporting authority for not applying ejusdem generis where the antecedent clause denotes a complete genus. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds from the textual and temporal interaction between Section 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and the procedural rules governing withdrawal and fresh suits.
- Section 13(3A) precludes instituting a suit on the ground of landlord's reasonable requirement within three years of acquisition. Because the plaintiffs' suit was instituted within that three-year period, they could not validly include reasonable requirement as a ground when the suit began; an attempt to amend the plaint later to include that ground (even after the three-year period expired) would defeat the statutory prohibition and was rightly refused when judged as an amendment.
- The plaintiffs sought withdrawal with liberty to sue afresh so they could, if they chose, bring a new action including the now-matured ground of reasonable requirement. The trial court denied that relief without recorded reasons; the revisional court regarded that refusal as unsustainable.
-
The court rejected the view (attributed to the trial court) that Order 2, Rule 2 (and its sub-rule (3)) of the Code of Civil Procedure prevented a fresh suit, for two principal reasons stated in the opinion:
- The ground of reasonable requirement was not legally available at the time of instituting the present suit because of Section 13(3A). Consequently, the bar that prevents suing again on the same cause of action where relief was available in the earlier suit does not apply to a ground that was not then available; Order 2, Rule 2 cannot be used to perpetuate a statutory prohibition.
- Even on the assumption (which the court expressly rejects) that grounds of ejectment listed in Section 13(1) do not themselves constitute the cause of action, the court concluded that the cause(s) of action for unauthorised subletting and for reasonable requirement are different: the 1956 Act treats statutory grounds (Section 13(1) grounds) as the cause(s) of action for eviction and does not necessarily require prior termination of tenancy.
- The court explained that under the 1956 Act (and as clarified by the Supreme Court in Dhanapal Chettiar), a termination of tenancy is not a prerequisite to a suit for eviction unless the statute explicitly requires it. The notice required by Section 13(6) is a notice of the intended suit; the cause of action must precede that notice and would be one or more grounds mentioned in Section 13(1). Consequently, the cause of action for unauthorised subletting differs from that for reasonable requirement.
- Turning to Order 23, Rule 1(3)(b) (allowing withdrawal of a suit where there are “other sufficient grounds”), the court held that where a cause of action was premature at the time of instituting the suit but matured during its pendency, that maturation is a “sufficient ground” to permit withdrawal with liberty to sue afresh under Order 23, Rule 1(3)(b). The court emphasized that permitting withdrawal in such circumstances prevents multiplicity of suits (because a fresh suit could consolidate the matured ground with existing grounds) and that multiplicity avoidance is itself a valid “sufficient ground”.
- The opinion surveys conflicting authorities about whether “other sufficient grounds” must be read ejusdem generis with “formal defects” in Clause (a). While acknowledging authorities adopting a restrictive ejusdem generis construction, the court declined to adopt that limitation. Relying on a series of Supreme Court decisions and established principles, the court held that ejusdem generis is not to be applied as a universal rule and should be used with caution; there is no textual reason to restrict “other sufficient grounds” only to formal defects. The court therefore accepted a broader construction of Rule 1(3)(b).
- On these bases the revisional court concluded that the trial court exercised its jurisdiction illegally in denying withdrawal; the revisional court set aside the impugned order and permitted withdrawal with liberty to sue afresh subject to an order on costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Revision allowed; the impugned order of the court below is quashed; the plaintiffs are permitted to withdraw the present suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the original grounds and also on the ground of reasonable requirement (and any other grounds available under law).
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiffs may withdraw the 1982 suit and are at liberty to bring a fresh suit that includes the ground of reasonable requirement (which matured during the pendency of the earlier suit) together with the earlier grounds such as unauthorised subletting.
- The plaintiffs are ordered to pay Rs. 200 to the defendant as costs; no costs are awarded in the revisional court itself.
Broader implications (as articulated by the court in the opinion):
- The court adopts a broad interpretation of “other sufficient grounds” in Clause (b) of Rule 1(3) of Order 23, concluding that the maturation of a cause of action during pendency is a legitimate “sufficient ground” for withdrawal with liberty to sue afresh.
- The decision emphasizes that procedural provisions such as Order 2, Rule 2 should not be applied so as to defeat a substantive statutory prohibition (here, Section 13(3A)) that made a particular ground unavailable at the time of institution of the earlier suit.
- The court noted that allowing withdrawal in such circumstances helps to avoid multiplicity of suits and that such practical considerations fall within the ambit of “sufficient grounds” under Order 23, Rule 1(3)(b).
No statement in the opinion indicates that a binding new precedent was formally proclaimed beyond the court's interpretative conclusions; the opinion applies existing statutory text and precedent to the facts before it and sets aside the lower court's refusal in this case.
End of summary. The summary strictly reflects the content of the provided opinion and does not add information external to that opinion.
A.M Bhattacharjee, J.:— The application filed by the plaintiffs for leave to withdraw from the present suit with liberty to sue the defendant afresh ought to have been allowed and the impugned order, giving rise to this revision, rejecting the application, must be quashed.
2. The plaintiff-petitioners, after acquiring the house in 1981, have filed the present suit in 1982 for eviction of the defendant-respondent on the ground of unauthorised subletting and several other grounds. The suit having been filed within three years of the acquisition of the house by the plaintiffs, could not be, grounded on the reasonable requirements of the plaintiffs for own occupation, even if such a ground was then existing, in view of the provisions of sub-section (3A) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, countermanding institution of suit on that ground before the expiry of such period. The period of three years has however expired during the pendency of the suit and on such expiry the plaintiffs applied to amend the plaint to include the ground of reasonable requirement; but the application was rightly rejected as any such amendment, if allowed, would have rendered the mandate of Section 13(3A) almost infructous and the position in law on this point is now absolutely well settled. To allow the plaintiff to include the ground of reasonable requirement in a plaint in a pending suit, instituted before the expiry of three years after acquisition, even though the period of three years has expired when the amendment is applied for, would virtually enable him to do precisely what the law prohibits him from doing.
3. The plaintiffs then have applied for leave to withdraw from the present suit with liberty to sue the defendant afresh on the grounds sued upon as well as the ground of reasonable requirement. The Court below has rejected that application and has ruled that the plaintiffs cannot be granted that liberty. We do not know why.
4. The plaintiffs can obviously proceed with the present suit founded on the grounds of subletting etc. Even if the suit fails, there is nothing in law to prevent the plaintiffs to sue the defendant again for eviction on the ground reasonable requirement and the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot obviously stand in the way for more reasons than one. Firstly, the claim for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement was not legally available to the plaintiffs at the date when the present suit was instituted much within three years from the date of acquisition because of the prohibition contained in Section 13(3A). The view of the Court below, that the grounds of ejectment, specified in Section 13(1) of the Act do not constitute the cause of action for ejectment, but the cause of action is the determination of the tenancy is wholly erroneous and must be rejected. But even accepting the same arguendo, since the plaintiffs could not, in view of Section 13(3A), include the ground of reasonable requirement in the plaint when the present suit was instituted, the provisions of and the prohibition in Order 2, Rule 2 cannot obviously operate in respect of any subsequent suit for eviction on that ground. Secondly, sub-rule (3) of Rule 2, Order 2 disentitles a plaintiff from suing for a relief in a subsequent suit if the same was available to him in an earlier suit in respect of the same cause of action. But cause of action for a suit for eviction on the ground of unauthorised subletting and for a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement are not the same.
5. The position under the preceding Act of 1950 and that under the present Act of 1956 are quite different. Under the Act of 1950, the cause of action for a suit for eviction of a tenant was still the determination of the tenancy under the general law of landlord and tenant and all that the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act of 1950 provided was that no eviction could be decreed unless any of the conditions mentioned therein was also satisfied. But under the present Act of 1956, a determination of the tenancy is not at all a sine qua non and, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Seven Judge Bench decision in Dhanapal Chettiar, AIR 1979 SC 1745, a termination of the contractual tenancy is no longer necessary for a suit for eviction under the various Rent Control Acts operating different States, unless any of those Acts clearly provides for such termination. Under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956, the position must now be taken to be settled that a notice of termination of tenancy is no longer required and the notice required under Section 13(6) of the Act is a notice, not of termination of tenancy, but of the intended suit and the cause of action therefors which must obviously precede the notice of suit, is one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1), like unauthorised subletting by the tenant or the reasonable requirement by the landlord. Therefore, cause of action for a suit founded on the ground of unauthorised subletting by the tenant and that for a suit instituted on the ground of reasonable requirement by the landlord are not the same cause of action.
6. As already pointed out, even if the present suit for eviction on the ground of subletting etc. fails, nothing would prevent the landlord from suing the tenant afresh on the ground of reasonable requirement. The ground of requirement could not be included in the present suit, either initially or even by subsequent amendment, in view of the bar contained in Section 13(3A). The right to sue on the ground of reasonable requirement has in fact accrued in favour of the plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit. If a suit was premature when it was instituted, but the cause of action has matured during the pendency, that, in our view, should be treated as sufficient ground for allowing the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit filed prematurely and to permit him to sue afresh under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1(3)(b). The present suit on the ground of unauthorised subletting and other grounds may or may not succeed. A fresh suit on the ground of reasonable requirement also may or may not succeed. But there can be no reason, in logic or in law, not to allow the plaintiffs to withdraw the present suit and to permit them to sue afresh on the earlier grounds as well as the new ground now available, which, as already noted, could not be included in the present suit by way of amendment in view of Section 13(3A). Such a course would also go a long way to prevent multiplicity of suits and that alone must be regarded to be a “sufficient ground” within the meaning of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1(3)(b) for allowing the plaintiffs to withdraw from the present suit and to institute a new one on all the grounds now available including that of reasonable requirement by the plaintiffs. We are clearly of the view that there is sufficient ground within the meaning of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1(3)(b) to grant the prayer made by the plaintiffs and the Court below exercised its jurisdiction illegally in declining the prayer, thus warranting our intervention in revision. No citation should be necessary, but reference may still be made to a decision of the Madras High Court in Mylavakapu Rangayya Naidu v. Basana Simon, AIR 1926 Madras 594 in support of the proposition that if a cause of action was premature when the suit was filed and could not be included by subsequent amendment even when it has matured during the pendency of the suit, there was “sufficient ground” to allow withdrawal of the suit with liberty to sue afresh.
7. There are, however, authorities for the view that the expression “sufficient grounds” in Clause (b) of Rule 1(3) is to be construed ejusdem generis with the expression “formal defect” in Clause (a) and that, at any rate, the ground to be sufficient within the meaning of Clause (b) must be akin or at least analogous to “formal defects” and the Bombay Full Bench decision in Ramrao Bhagwant v. Babu Appanna, AIR 1940 Bombay 121 and the Allahabad Full Bench decision in Abdul Ghafoor…Applicant; v. Abdul Rahman…Opposite Party., AIR 1951 All 845 are, among others, such authorities. There are contrary authorities also as would appear from, among others, the Gauhati decision in Union of India v. Manoranjan Banik, AIR 1956 Gauhati 1 and the Orissa decisions in Atul Krushna v. Ramkishore, AIR 1956 Orissa 77 and in Duryodhan v. Satyabadi, AIR 1986 Orissa 58. If it were necessary for us to finally decide the question, we would have respectfully dissented from the former view and agreed with the latter as we find no justification to restrict the meaning of the expression “other sufficient grounds” in Clause (b) of Rule 1(3) of Order 23 only to formal defects as specified in Clause (a) or to grounds analogous thereto. The rule of ejusdem generis, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions, viz. K.K Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080 at P. 1103, T.P Nayyar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540 at P. 545, Mangalore Electric Supply v. Commr. of Income-tax, AIR 1978 SC 1272 at P. 1275, has to be applied with care and caution. It is never a universal, inviolable or invariable rule of law and to borrow from Lord Scarman in the House of Lords in Quazi v. Quazi, (1979) 3 All ER 897 at P. 916, “like many other rules of statutory interpretation, is a useful servant but a bad master”. The generality of the expressions used in the legislation is not to be cut down or circumscribed by the application of this rule as a matter of course, unless the legislation contains indications warranting its application and consequential circumscription. And then again, the rule is generally not to be applied, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Jagadish Chandra v. Kajaria Traders, AIR 1964 SC 1882 at P. 1885, if the preceding words do not constitute specifications of a genus, but constitute description of a complete genus. The principle enunciated by Lord Watson in the Judicial Committee in Sun Fire Office v. Hart, (1889) 14 App Cas 98 at P. 104 to the effect that there would be no room for the application of the Rule if the antecedent clause does not contain a specification of particulars, but the description of a complete genus, has also been referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Hartford Fire Insurance, AIR 1965 SC 1288 at P. 1291. We do not, in Clause (a) of Rule 1(3) of Order 23, find any specifications of the particulars of a genus in the words “the suit must fail by reason of some formal defects”, but “formal defects” leading to inevitable failure of the suit appear to constitute a complete genus. We therefore find no reason as to why the import and the amplitude of the general words “sufficient grounds” in Rule 1(3)(b) of Order 23 should suffer any unwarranted confinement.
8. The revision accordingly succeeds, the Rule is made absolute, the impugned order of the Court below is quashed and the plaintiffs-petitioners are granted the permission to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the ground on which the present suit is founded and also the ground of reasonable requirements and/or such other grounds as would be available to the plaintiffs under the law on condition that the plaintiffs-petitioners pay to the defendant-respondent a sum of Rs. 200/- as costs. No cost in this Court.
Amulya Kumar Nandi, J.:— 9. I agree.
Revision allowed.
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