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Statesman, Ltd. v. Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, And Others

Calcutta High Court
Nov 19, 1990
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking, inter alia, a writ of certiorari to require respondent No. 1 to transmit and certify the record of proceedings under Reference No. 2391 — I.R I R/131-17/86 dated 29 October 1986 and the Tribunal's Order No. 10 dated 13 November 1987, so that those proceedings/orders might be set aside or quashed. The petitioner also sought a writ of mandamus restraining enforcement of the impugned order.

The substantive dispute arises from respondent No. 2 (a workman employed as an electrician in the petitioner's Calcutta office) who was dismissed by the petitioner by an order dated 11 February 1985. After conciliation failed, the dispute was referred to the Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, under the order of reference dated 29 October 1986. The issue framed in the reference was:

“Whether the termination of service of Sri Akhil Kr. Tarafdar is justified? What relief, if any, is he entitled to?”

Parties filed written statements before the Tribunal. On or about 25 May 1987 respondent No. 2 applied to the Tribunal for interim relief under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as inserted by Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1980. The petitioner objected to the grant of interim relief on two grounds: (i) that respondent No. 2 was gainfully employed elsewhere; and (ii) that the State-introduced Section 15(2)(b) had been rendered inoperative by a later Central amendment (Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982) brought into force on 21 August 1984. The Tribunal allowed respondent No. 2's application. The present writ petition challenges that order (Order No. 10 dated 13 November 1987).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Tribunal erred in allowing respondent No. 2 interim relief under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as inserted by the West Bengal 1980 Act), and whether that order (Order No. 10 dated 13 November 1987) should be quashed.
  2. Whether respondent No. 2's alleged gainful employment elsewhere disqualified him from receiving interim relief under Section 15(2)(b).
  3. Whether Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as inserted by the West Bengal Act of 1980) was rendered inoperative by the subsequent Central Amendment (Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982) brought into force on 21 August 1984 — i.e., whether the State provision occupies the same field as the Central enactment such that Article 254 of the Constitution renders the State provision nugatory.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Tribunal should not have granted interim relief because respondent No. 2 was gainfully employed as an electrician with another company (Eagle Lithography Company (P) Ltd.) and also ran a workshop in partnership at his residence; therefore he was not in need of the interim relief provided by Section 15(2)(b).
  • Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act as inserted by the West Bengal legislature (Section 7 of the 1980 Act) has been rendered inoperative by the later Central amendment (Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982) which received presidential assent in 1982 and was notified on 21 August 1984; on this basis the State insertion should be treated as nugatory (argument invoked Article 254 and relied on the decision in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co.).

Respondent No. 2 (Workman) / Tribunal's Position

  • Respondent No. 2 applied for interim relief under Section 15(2)(b) (as inserted by the West Bengal Act of 1980). The Tribunal found, after appreciating evidence, that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent No. 2 was gainfully employed elsewhere.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Ltd. [1986 — I L.L.N 986] The court observed that where workmen may have taken alternative employment during the interim, it would be unfair to harass them by setting off amounts received from such employment against back-wages; a short intervening period may justify allowing workmen to retain such amounts as solatium. The judgment was relied on to support the proposition that even if respondent No. 2 had been in gainful employment for part of the period, that fact should not, by itself, prevent him from obtaining interim relief under Section 15(2)(b).
Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Industrial Co-operative Society, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal [91 C.W.N 480] Decision considered by the Tribunal in that case concerning interim relief under similar provisions (context prior to coming into force of the 1982 Central amendment). The court observed that the decision was given before the Central 1982 amendment came into force (the Tribunal's order there was dated 7 November 1983), and therefore it was not very material to the present controversy.
State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Company [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1284] Sets out the proposition under Article 254 that a State enactment may be rendered nugatory if both Central and State enactments intend to occupy and operate in the same field, even if no direct repugnancy exists. The petitioner relied on this principle to argue that the State insertion should be held inoperative; the court noted the decision but indicated it was not necessary to go into it in depth for the present case.
Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay [A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 278] Passage cited on statutory interpretation: penal or welfare statutes should be interpreted in a broad and liberal sense, avoiding hypertechnical readings that would trap honest persons; invoked to emphasize purposive and welfare-oriented interpretation for social legislation. The court invoked this passage to underscore the need to interpret the Industrial Disputes Act keeping in mind the welfare of workmen and to resist overly technical constructions that defeat the social purpose of the statute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court separated its analysis into two principal strands: the factual question whether respondent No. 2 was gainfully employed such as to disqualify interim relief, and the legal question whether the State-inserted Section 15(2)(b) was rendered inoperative by subsequent Central amendments.

On the factual question of gainful employment:

  • The Tribunal, after appreciating oral evidence, concluded that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent No. 2 was gainfully employed elsewhere. The court emphasized that a writ court is not a court of appeal and should not reappraise evidence or substitute its view for that of the Tribunal in the absence of an apparent error of law or palpable perversity.
  • Even on the hypothetical assumption that respondent No. 2 had been gainfully employed for part of the period, the court held that this alone should not prevent the grant of interim relief. The court relied on S.G. Chemicals to show that depriving workmen of interim relief due to temporary alternative employment would be inequitable; short periods of alternative employment may not result in sizeable earnings and, in fairness, an allowance by way of solatium may be justified.

On the statutory/constitutional question of whether the State provision is rendered inoperative by the Central amendment:

  1. The court set out the text and legislative history:
    • Section 15 as it stood before the 1980 State amendment.
    • Section 7 of the West Bengal Act, 1980, which renumbered and inserted Section 15(2) — including clause (b) requiring the Tribunal, after filing statements and taking evidence, to give day-to-day hearings and to determine, within 60 days (or such shorter period as specified), the quantum of interim relief (with a proviso tying the quantum to subsistence allowance under a State Act).
    • Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Central), which amended Section 15 to require that awards be submitted within the period specified in the order of reference (or extended as permitted) and which was brought into force by notification on 21 August 1984. Section 10(2-A) (inserted by Section 8 of Act 46 of 1982) specified that an order of reference must state the period within which the award should be submitted, with a proviso that for disputes connected with an individual workman no such period shall exceed three months, while also permitting extensions for reasons to be recorded in writing.
  2. The court considered the object of the Central amendments and the State insertion. It found the central amendments chiefly sought to limit and structure the time within which awards are to be submitted and to prevent proceedings from lapsing merely because a specified period expired, while providing for extensions in appropriate cases. The State insertion, by contrast, was aimed at providing interim sustenance to a workman during the pendency of adjudication (by providing subsistence-equivalent interim relief and pressing for day-to-day hearings).
  3. The court reasoned that the two provisions serve distinct objects: the Central amendment is procedural and temporal (shortening the agony of delay and structuring timelines for awards), whereas the State provision is remedial/welfare (providing interim sustenance to workmen so they may pursue their cause). Because the provisions operate for different purposes, they do not, in the court's view, occupy the same field in the sense required to render the State provision nugatory under Article 254.
  4. The court therefore rejected the petitioner's contention that the State-inserted Section 15(2)(b) was rendered inoperative by the Central amendment. The court explicitly held that the State provision survives and is operative alongside the Central amendments because they cannot reasonably be said to occupy the same field or to be in irreconcilable conflict.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as inserted by the West Bengal Act of 1980 is not rendered inoperative by the subsequent Central amendment (Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982). Consequently, the petitioner's challenge to the Tribunal's allowance of interim relief (Order No. 10 dated 13 November 1987) failed and the writ application was dismissed.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The application (writ petition) fails and the rule is discharged.
  • The case is remitted to the learned Tribunal forthwith. The Tribunal is directed to take up the hearing on a day-to-day basis without allowing adjournments except under compelling circumstances and to complete the adjudication as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months from communication of the order.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • All parties may act on a xeroxed copy of the operative part of the judgment on the undertaking that they will apply for and obtain the certified copy.

Broader implications: The opinion confines itself to the statutory interaction in the facts of the case and does not purport to establish a broad new principle of law beyond holding that, on the facts and as a matter of textual and purposive construction, the State provision and Central amendments are not mutually exclusive. The decision therefore directly affects the parties and the ongoing Tribunal proceedings; the opinion does not announce that it establishes a sweeping binding precedent beyond the reasoning applied to these provisions.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner, in the instant application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, pray for a writ, inter alia, in the nature of certiorari requiring respondent 1 “to transmit and certify to this Hon'ble Court the record of the proceedings it had before it under Reference No. 2391 — I.R I R/131-17/86, dated 29 October, 1986, and its order made thereon being order No. 10, dated 13 November, 1987, to be in this Court dealt with in order that your petitioner may have the more sure and speedy justice and that the same may be set aside or quashed” and for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents and each of them to forbear from enforcing or taking any step to enforce or giving any effect to the said pretended order.

2. Although the petitioners have prayed for quashing not only the order No. 10, dated 13 November, 1987, but also the order reference, dated 29 October, 1986, yet no argument was advanced on the question of the order of reference being bad in law. The entire argument was directed against the order No. 10, dated 13 November, 1987, allowing the application of respondent 2 workman under S. 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act.

3. The pleadings were lengthy and the arguments lengthier but the point is rather short.

4. Respondent 2 at all material times, was a workman employed by the petitioner as an electrician in its Calcutta office. A show-cause notice was issued to respondent 2, a disciplinary proceeding ensued and the proceeding culminated in an order of dismissal of respondent 2 by the petitioner, dated 11 February, 1985, which is annexed to the petition and marked with the letter “B.”

5. Conciliation proceedings were initiated and the same having failed an industrial dispute was referred by the appropriate authority, to the Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, under order of reference No. 2391.I.R./I.K/131 — 17/86, 29 dated October 1986. The issue was as follows:

“Whether the termination of service of Sri Akhil Kr. Tarafdar is justified? What relief, if any, is he entitled to?”

Although it has been stated in Para. 6 of the petition that the order of reference has been annexed to the petition marked with the letter ‘D’ yet I tried in vain to find the said annexure which is sadly missing in the petition.

6. The parties to the proceedings, namely, the petitioner and respondent 2, filed their respective written statements before the learned Tribunal.

7. Subsequently, on or about 25 May, 1987, respondent 2 workman made an application before respondent 1 claiming interim relief under the provisions of S. 15(2)(6) of the 1947 Act as inserted by S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1980, hereinafter referred to as the West Bengal Act, The writ-petitioner filed an objection to the application of respondent 2 mainly on two points, viz.:

(i) that respondent 2 was not entitled to get any interim relief inasmuch as he was gainfully employed as an electrician in Eagle Lithography Company (Private), Ltd., at 26-B, Chistopher Road, Calcutta, and in addition thereto carried on the business of running a workshop at Ms residence in partnership with his brother;

(ii) that in law also respondent 2 was not entitled to take the protection of S. 15(2)(b) of the 1947 Act as the said section had been rendered inoperative by Parliament with effect from 21 August, 1984 by S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, which received the assent of the President on 31 August, 1982 but was brought into force by notification on 21 August, 1984.

8. So far as the question of the factum of respondent 2 being gainfully employed elsewhere is concerned, the learned Tribunal, on an appreciation of the evidence came to the finding that the writ-petitioner had failed to discharge its burden to prove that respondent 2 was so gainfully employed. The contention of the employer to the effect that the onus of proof shifted to respondent 2 (oral evidence) tendered by the employee of the writ-petitioner is not tenable. The evidence tendered by the writ-petitioner was rather vague and hearsay. The writ Court not being a Court of appeal should not try to act as such and try to upset a finding of fact arrived at by the appropriate forum by substituting its own wisdom in the place and stead of the wisdom of the trying authority by reappreciating the evidence. This is simply not permissible. There being no apparent error of law in such finding or any palpable perversity by the learned Tribunal this writ Court should not seek to sit in appeal over the finding of the learned Tribunal.

9. Even if we assume that for part of the period in question, respondent 2, was in fact, gainfully empolyed elsewhere, that should not, by itself stand in the way of his getting the benefit under S. 15(2)(b). In this connection a reference may be made to the case of S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading, Ltd. [1986 — I L.L.N 986]. In Para. 24 of the said decision at page 1004 this aspect of the matter received the attention of the Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and their Lordships were constrained to observe as follows:

“It was lastly submitted that several employees must have taken up alternative employment during the intervening period between the date of the closure of the Churchgate division and the hearing of this appeal and an inquiry, therefore, should be directed to be made into the amounts received by them from such alternative employment so as to set off the amount so received against the back-wages and future salary payable to them. It is difficult to see why these eighty-four workmen should be put to further harassment for the wrongful act of the company. It is possible that rather than starve while awaiting the final decision on their complaint some of these workmen may have taken alternative employment. The period which has elapsed, is however, too short for the moneys received by such workmen from the alternative employment taken by them to aggregate to any sizeable amount, and it would be fair to let the workmen retain such amount by way of solatium for the shock of having their services terminated, the anxiety and agony caused thereby, and the endeavours, perhaps often fruitless, to find alternative employment.”

10. In view of the aforesaid observation I am constrained to hold that even if respondent 2 had been in gainful employment during the interregnum between the date of dismissal and the date of the impugned order the Court should not be cruel enough to deprive the workman on that ground from obtaining the benefits conferred upon him otherwise under the provisions of S. 15(2)(b).

11. So far as the second point is concerned, viz., that respondent 2 was not entitled to take the benefits under the provisions of S. 15(2)(b) of the 1947 Act as introduced into the statute by the West Bengal Act of 1980, as the said section has been rendered inoperative by Parliament with effect from 21 August, 1984 by S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, which received the assent of the President on 31 August, 1982 but was brought into force by notification on 21 August, 1984 is concerned, brilliant arguments were made on behalf of both the sides.

12. Although the learned Tribunal relied on the case of Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Industrial Co-operative Society, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal [91 C.W.N 480], its not necessary to refer to that case as I agree with the submission made by Sri Ginwala appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the said decision was given at a point of time when the 1982 Amendment effected by the Parliament in the 1947 Act did not come into force when the learned Tribunal in that matter passed its order. To be more precise the learned Tribunal in connection with that case passed its order on 7 November, 1983, long before the coming into effect of the 1982 Amendment, which came into force on 21 August, 1984. In that view of the matter the decision in the above Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Industrial Co-operative Society, Ltd. is not very material.

13. In support of the contention that S. 15(2)(b) as inserted by the 1980 Act of the said Legislature is rendered inoperative by the enactment of the 1982 Amendment Act enacted by the Parliament, the learned counsel for the petitioner embarked on a very lengthy argument pointing out the entire chronological metamorphosis of the Industrial Disputes Act in relation to Ss. 10, 15 and 17 and tried to establish that from the sequence of the enactments it should be held that S. 15(2)(b) of the 1947 Act as introduced by the State Legislature is rendered inoperative. In support of such argument the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the case of State of Orissa v. M.A Tulloch and Company [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1284].

14. It is not necessary to go into the aforesaid decision as the same is a very celebrated one laying down the proposition that for invoking the mischief of Art. 254 of the Constitution of India, it is not necessary that there should be some repugnancy, conflict or inconsistency between the State and the Central Legislature but even if the two provisions enacted by the State and the Central Legislature can operate side by side, Art. 254 will still intervene and render the State Legislature nugatory, all that is needed under Art. 254 to render the provisions of a State Legislature nugatory is that both the enactments should intend to occupy and operate in the same field. The question of repugnancy is not the only test. As stated earlier, a very salutory principle has been laid down in the aforesaid case and I respectfully agree with the same.

15. The question to be gone into in the instant case is whether S. 7 of the 1980 Act enacted by the State Legislature introducing S. 15(2)(b) occupies the same field occupied by the enactment of the Amendment Act, 1982, which came into force on 21 August, 1984 by the Parliament.

16. However, as elaborate arguments were made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties on this aspect of the matter I shall fail in my duties if I do not at least refer to the said argument in brief.

17. Section 15 of the Act as it stood before its amendment by the West Bengal Legislature by the 1980 Act read as follows:

“15. Duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals.— Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as it is practicable on the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the appropriate Government.”

18. Section 7 of the 1980 Act amended S. 15 by providing as follows:

“7. Amendment of S. 15.— (1) Section 15 of the principal Act shall be renumbered as Sub-sec. (1) of that section and in Sub-sec. (1) as so renumbered, the words ‘a Labour Court, Tribunal or’ shall be omitted.

(2) After Sub-sec. (1) as sore-numbered the following sub-section shall be inserted:

‘(2) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court or Tribunal, it shall—

(a) after filing of statements and taking of evidence, give day-to-day hearing and give its award, other determination or decision in the manner specified in S. 17-B without any delay:

(b) upon hearing the parties to the dispute determine, within a period of sixty days, from the date of reference under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 10 or within such shorter period as may be specified in the order of reference under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 10, the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any:

Provided that the quantum of interim relief relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of workmen shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance as maybe admissible under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969 (Act 38 of 1969).”

19. Thereafter S. 15 of the 1947 Act was further amended by the Central Legislature by S. 10 of the Act 46 of 1982 to the following effect:

“15. Duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals.— Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, within the period specified in the order referring such industrial dispute or the further period extended under the second proviso to Sub-sec. (2-A) of S. 10 submits its award to the appropriate Government”,

20. We have already seen that the aforesaid amendment was brought into force by notification on 21 August, 1984.

21. Section 10(2-A) of the Act which was inserted by S. 8 of Act 46 of 1982 was also brought into force on the same day, namely 21 August, 1984 and reads as follows:

“(2-A) An order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section shall specify the period within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the appropriate Government:

Provided that where such industrial dispute is connected with an individual workman, no such period shall exceed three months.

Provided further that where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner whether jointly or separately, to the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for extension of such period or for any other reason, and the Presiding Officer of such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal considers it necessary or expedient to extend such period, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period as he may think fit:

Provided also that in computing any period specified in this sub-section, the period if any for which the proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal had been stayed by any injunction or order of a civil Court shall be excluded:

Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall lapse merely on the ground that any period specified under this sub-section had expired with-out such proceedings being completed.”

22. Sri Ginwala also referred to S. 17-B of the Act relating to payment of full wages to workmen pending proceeding in higher Court. In my opinion the reference to the aforesaid section is wholly irrelevant and immaterial as the said section deals with some benefits to be given to a workman during the “post award” stage. We, in the instant case, have nothing to do with the “post award” stage but at the stage when the proceeding is pending before the Tribunal itself.

23. Sri Ginwala also referred to various other amendments engrafted into the 1947 Act both by the State Legislature and the Parliament and from that wanted to establish that the Central Legislature wanted to occupy the field which was till then occupied by the State Legislature in the matter of giving relief to a workman during the pendency of an adjudication.

24. Before proceeding further we should remind ourselves that one of the main objects and purpose of the said 1947 Act is not only to arrange for speedy resolution of industrial adjudication for the purpose of bringing peace and amity in the industry but also to ameliorate the conditions of the workmen who were, previous to such enactment, exposed to the vagaries of their employers. This Act conferred various rights on the workmen to agitate their grievances against their employers before the industrial fora. This is one of the most important pieces of social legislation and has to be interpreted keeping in mind the welfare of the workmen.

25. The learned counsel for the parties, as I have already observed, advanced brilliant and erudite arguments in support of their respective contentions. In this connection I cannot resist the temptation to refer to a passage in the case of Seksaria Cotton Mills, Ltd. v. State of Bombay [A.I.R 1953 S.C 278]. In the aforesaid judgment the Hon'ble Justice Sri Vivian Bose was pleased to observe, inter alia, that:

“it is not till one is learned in the law that subtleties of thought and bewilderment arise as the meaning of plain English words which any ordinary man of average intelligence, not versed in the law, would have no difficulty in understanding. In a penal statute of this kind, it is our duty to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they will not become traps for honest, unlearned (in law) and unwary men. If there is honest and substantial compliance with an array of puzzling directions that should be enough even if on some hypercritical view of the law other ingenious meanings can be devised…”

26. It was sought to be strenuously contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that both the State Amendment in engrafting S. 15(2)(b) into the body of the 1947 Act and S. 15(1) as engrafted by S. 10 of Act 46 of 1982 by the Parliament intend to alleviate the hardship caused to workmen by the prolonged pendency of an industrial adjudication before the Tribunal. In that sense, the learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised that both the Central Amendment and the State amendment took to occupy the same field and as such the State Amendment is rendered inoperative by the subsequent Central Amendment within the meaning of proviso to Cl. (ii) of Art. 254 of the Constitution of India.

27. Quoting the passage from Sakseria case [A.I.R 1953 S.C 278] (vide supra), I am tempted to confess that I am not learned enough in law to be puzzled in the construction of simple sentences in English. To me the Central Amendment limits the time within which an award should be published or the industrial adjudication should come to an end. Even the Central Amendment does not lay down any inflexible rule that an industrial adjudication must, in any case, has to be concluded within the time specified but on the contrary it not only postulates extension of time but also categorically provides that an industrial adjudication is not to be rendered nugatory simply because the time schedule prescribed could not be adhered to. Section 15(2)(b) proceeds on the basis that whatever the length of time taken by the particular industrial forum to finalise and complete the adjudication, during the pendency of such adjudication the workman is not starved to death. The object behind the Central Amendment is to shorten the agony, the object behind the State Amendment is to provide sustenance and nourishment to enable the workman to back up his cause before the industrial forum. By no stretch of imagination, that is to my limited imagination of course, the two provisions can be said to occupy the same field.

28. In view of what I have discussed above it is not necessary for me to refer to the other cases cited at the Bar, it is not also necessary for me to enter into an intellectual debate and to preach sermons when stomachs are churning.

29. For reasons stated above I am constrained to hold that S. 15(2)(b) of the 1947 Act as inserted by the West Bengal State Legislature is not rendered inoperative by the subsequent amendment made by the Central Legislature in Ss. 10(2-A) and 17 of the parent Act.

30. For the reasons stated above both the contentions of the petitioner fail. Also for the reasons stated above, it is not necessary to go into the question of the subsequent amendment made in S. 15 by the State Legislature which also came into force on 21 August, 1984.

31. In the circumstances, the application fails. This rule also fails and is discharged. As the matter is a long standing one the case should go back to the learned Tribunal forthwith and the learned Tribunal be directed to take up the hearing of the case on a day-to-day basis without allowing any adjournment except under compelling circumstances. It is also desired that the adjudication be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably within three months from the date of communication of this order.

32. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

33. All parties to act on a xeroxed copy of the operative part of this judgment signed by the officer of the Court on the undertaking that the parties will apply for and obtain certified copy.