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Sk. Golap And Others v. Bhuban Chandra Panda And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (P.D. Desai, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The original Writ Petition (Civil Order No. 10849(W) of 1987) was instituted by respondents Nos. 1 to 4(a) challenging proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 which culminated in an order recording the appellants as Bargadars and issuing “Barga Certificates” in their favour in respect of land owned by the writ petitioners. A learned single Judge allowed the writ petition by judgment dated 12 December 1989, setting aside the impugned order recording the appellants as Bargadars and quashing any “Barga Certificates”; the Judge, however, afforded the respondent authorities a six‑month liberty to record names of Bargadars, if supported by proper materials and in accordance with law.
The appellants, who did not appear at the original hearing, filed a review petition. One ground of review was that the learned single Judge had earlier, while at the Bar, appeared for the present writ petitioners in an earlier proceeding (Civil Order No. 13055(W) of 1980) concerning the Operation Barga Scheme and related recording of Bargadars, and therefore ought not to have heard or decided the present writ petition. Other grounds included non‑service of notice/copy and that the decision was not in accordance with law. The review petition was rejected by a judgment dated 19 January 1990; the present appeal challenges that rejection and the underlying disposition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned single Judge's prior appearance, while at the Bar, for the writ petitioners in an earlier related proceeding disqualified him from hearing and deciding the subsequent writ petition under the principle nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (i.e., whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arose) and whether that circumstance justified review and setting aside of the judgment.
- Whether non‑service of notice or non‑service of a copy of the writ petition to the appellants justified review of the writ decision.
- Whether the decision was rendered in accordance with law (i.e., whether the decision contained an error apparent on the face of the record), including the question whether the learned single Judge's decision followed precedent or an earlier decision by another single Judge of the Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The learned single Judge ought not to have heard or decided the writ petition because he had previously appeared, while at the Bar, for the writ petitioners in an earlier proceeding concerning the same land; that prior professional involvement disqualified him and introduced a fatal infirmity in the decision.
- Some appellants contended that no notice of the proceeding was served upon them and that the writ petition was therefore decided ex parte against them.
- Other grounds in the review included that the decision was not in accordance with law.
Respondents' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Manak Lal Advocate v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425 | The authority articulates and applies the principle nemo debet esse judex in propria causa: members of a judicial or quasi‑judicial tribunal must act impartially; the applicable test is whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member might have affected the tribunal's decision (i.e., justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done). It also establishes that actual proof of prejudice is not required to invalidate proceedings where reasonable apprehension of bias exists. | The court relied on this precedent to conclude that the learned single Judge ought not to have heard and decided the instant case because his prior appearance for the writ petitioners created a real likelihood of bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. On that basis the appellate court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments under challenge, and ordered the writ petition to be restored and listed before a different Bench. The court emphasized that it did not consider the merits of the underlying dispute. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by identifying and applying the well‑established rule of natural justice encapsulated by the maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. It summarized the legal logic as follows:
- The central inquiry is whether a particular situation would produce in the mind of a litigant or the public at large a reasonable apprehension as to the fairness of adjudication — not whether the adjudicator actually acted from bias or bad faith.
- The test is objective: whether a reasonable person might think that the judge's prior professional association could have influenced the decision, i.e., whether there was a real likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias, rather than requiring proof of actual bias.
- The court referred to and extracted the principle from Manak Lal (AIR 1957 SC 425), which illustrates that even occasional prior professional involvement by a tribunal member may vitiate the tribunal's composition if a reasonable apprehension of bias arises, and that actual proof of prejudice is unnecessary in such circumstances.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the Court accepted that although the learned single Judge may not have remembered his earlier representation and there was no suggestion he was actually biased or had personal contact with the writ petitioners, those considerations did not negate the legal objection. The prior role as counsel was sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the circumstances.
- Consequently, the learned single Judge ought not to have heard or decided the writ petition; the appropriate remedy was to set aside the judgments and direct that the writ petition be restored and heard by a different Bench. The Court explicitly noted that it did not decide the underlying merits and left all substantive questions open for adjudication on the merits in accordance with law.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED
Holding (direct orders given in the opinion):
- The appeal succeeds and is allowed.
- The judgment under appeal (rejecting the review petition) is set aside.
- The Review Petition is allowed.
- The main judgment rendered in the Writ Petition (12 December 1989) is set aside.
- The writ petition is directed to be restored to the file and listed before any Bench other than the Bench presided over by the learned single Judge who previously dealt with and decided the case.
- No merits determination was undertaken by this Court; all substantive questions remain open for decision in accordance with law.
- No separate order on the application for interim relief was required; interim relief, if any, stands vacated.
- The Court provided administrative directions on certified/copy delivery: authenticated Xerox copies of the judgment may be obtained from the Deputy Registrar (Appellate Side) on payment, subject to a simultaneous application for a certified copy and an undertaking as described in the opinion.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the prior single‑Judge decisions (including the allowance of the writ petition and the quashing of Barga Certificates) have been set aside for reasons of potential bias arising from the judge's earlier professional role; the parties must now litigate the merits before a differently constituted Bench.
- The opinion reinforces the legal proposition that a judge's prior professional association with a party, even if remote or without evidence of actual bias, can give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias sufficient to invalidate adjudication and necessitate rehearing by an impartial Bench.
- The Court did not set any substantive precedent on the Barga issue itself; it confined its decision to procedural/recusal grounds and expressly left all merits issues open.
Appeal allowed.
P.D Desai, C.J:—The appeal is taken up for hearing by treating it as included in the day's cause list.
2. The respondents Nos. 1 to 4(a) are the original Writ Petitioners. The writ Petition, being Civil Order No. 10849(W) of 1987, was instituted by them challenging the proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”), which culminated into an order recording the names of the appellants as Bargadars and the consequential issue of “Barga Certificates” in their favour in respect of the land owned by the Writ Petitioners. The writ petition was heard and allowed by the learned single Judge who, by his judgment and order dt. Dec. 12, 1989, set aside the impugned order recording the names of the appellants as Bargadars and also quashed the “Barga Certificates”; if any, issued pursuant to such order. It was clarified, however, that the respondent authorities were not thereby prevented from recording the names of Bargadars, if any, “on the basis of proper materials and in accordance with law” within six months from the date of the communication of the said direction.
3. Be it stated that the appellants, although cited as private-respondents, were not appearing when the hearing of the writ petition took place. It is their case that no notice of the proceeding was served upon some of them and that under those circumstances the case was decided ex parte against them. In the course of the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge, however, the following observation is found to have been made which does not support the said version:
“It appears that the private respondents, although were intended to be served, but all of them have refused to accept the notice and an affidavit of service has been affirmed on March 7, 1988, and filed in Court.”
Be that as it may, an application for review was filed by the appellants and one of the grounds therein raised was that the learned single Judge having appeared, while at the Bar, for the present writ petitioners in a previous proceeding in this Court, being Civil Order No. 13055(W) of 1980, in which the “Operation Barga Scheme” initiated by the State Government and the initiation or apprehended initiation of the proceedings for the recording of the names of Bargadars in respect of the self-same land was under challenge, he should not have heard and decided the present writ petition. Other grounds also appear to have been taken, such as non-service of notice/copy of the writ petition and the decision being not in accordance with law. The review petition was rejected by the judgment under appeal rendered on Jan. 19, 1990. Hencee the present appeal against the said judgment.
4. In the course of the judgment under appeal the learned single Judge held that no case for review was made out because: (a) the writ petition was decided after due service of notice upon the parties and after a contested hearing and if some of the appellants did not choose to accept the notice they cannot be heard to make a grievance against the adverse judgment and seek a review; (b) the writ petition was allowed following an earlier decision rendered by another learned single Judge of this Court and there was thus no error apparent on the face of the record justifying the review and (c) liberty was still reserved for recording the names of the Bargadars, if any, on the basis of proper materials and in accordance with law and, therefore, no prejudice was likely to be occasioned to the appellants even if the review was not granted. The point that the learned single Judge ought not to have heard and decided the case on the ground of his having appeared for the writ petitioners in a previous proceeding in this Court is not dealt with in the judgment. There is some controversy between the parties as to whether the said point was actually raised during the course of the hearing of the review petition, but there is no dispute that at the hearing of an earlier writ petition concerning the recording or attempted recording of Barga in respect of the selfsame land, the learned single Judge had appeared, while at the Bar, on behalf of the present writ petitioners.
5. Mr. Mukiil Prakash Banerjee, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that since the learned single Judge had appeared for the writ petitioners in the previous writ proceeding, he should not have heard and decided the present case and that circumstance alone introduces a fatal infirmity in the decision and justifies a review. There is some force in this argument. One of the principles of natural justice universally recognised is nemo debet esse judex in propria causa: no man shall be a Judge in his own cause, or the deciding authority must be impartial and without bias. The principle has regard not so much perhaps to the motive which might be supposed to bias a Judge, as to the susceptabilities of the litigants parties. The underlying object is to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and distrust of the adjudicator and to promote the feeling of confidence in the administration of justice which is so essential to the rule of law. The question to be asked in the context of the applicability of the principle i always is whether a particular situation or factor present in the case is likely to produce in the mind of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable apprehension about the fairness of the administration of justice. It hardly matters that the adjudicator acted in good faith. The test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to the adjudicator might have operated against him in the final decision.
6. In Manak Lal Advocate v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425 a similar question arose although in a different context. There was a dispute between one Pukhraj, hereinafter called “P”, and others, on one hand, and Dr. Prem Chand, hereinafter called “PC”, and others, regarding a well and the surrounding land. The dispute gave rise to a proceeding under S. 145 of Cr. P.C Manak Lal, who was a practising Advocate of the High Court of Rajasthan, appeared as Counsel for ‘P’ in the said proceeding. Shri Changani, a senior member of the Bar, appeared in the said proceeding as senior Counsel at one time to argue the matter on behalf of ‘PC’. Certain orders passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the course of the said proceeding were challenged before the learned Sessions Judge. While proceedings were pending in the learned Sessions Judge's Court, it was discovered that a fraudulent stay order purportedly issued from his ofice was produced by Manak Lal before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The said stay order was found to have been prepared by a clerk of the learned Sessions Judge's Court and he was depart-mentally punished. An off-shoot, however, was a complaint u/S. 13 of the Legal Practioners' Act, 1879 by PC against Manak Lal alleging that he took an active part in the commission of the fraud and was thus guilty of professional misconduct in the discharge of his professional duties. The learned Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court to whom the complaint was sent constituted a Tribunal to enquire into the allegation u/S. 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926. The Tribunal consisted of three members with Shri Chhangani as its Chairman. The Tribunal, after holding an enquiry, unanimously concluded that Manak Lal was guilty of the professional misconduct alleged. The High Court agreed with the finding made by the Tribunal and directed that he should be removed from practice. This order was challenged before the Supreme Court, inter alia, on the ground that the Tribunal was improperly constituted and that all proceedings taken before the Tribunal, its report and the subsequent order passed by the High Court were all invalid. The contention was that Shri Chhangani's nomination as the Chairman of the Tribunal vitiated its proceedings since he was disqualified from acting as such on account of his having once appeared as senior Counsel and having argued the case on behalf of PC in the proceeding u/S. 145 of Cr. P.C In dealing with this contention the Apex Court observed as follows (at p. 430):
“There is some force in this argument. It is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.
If it is true that injudicial or quasi-judicial proceedings justice must not only be done but must appear to be done to the litigating public, it is equally true that when a lawyer is charged for professional misconduct and is given the privilege of being tried by a tribunal of the Bar Council, the enquiry before the tribunal must leave no room for a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the lawyer that the tribunal may have been even indirectly influenced by any bias in the mind of any of the members of the tribunal. In the present case, we have no hesitation in assuming that when Shri Chhangani agreed to work as the Chairman of the tribunal he did not remember that he had appeared against the appellant's clients in the criminal proceedings u/S. 145. We are told that Shri Chhangani is a senior member of the Bar and was once Advocate General of the High Court of Rajasthan. Besides, he had not appeared in the case at all stages but had appeared only once as a senior counsel to argue the matter. It is, therefore, not at all unlikely that Shri Chhangani had no personal contact with the client, Dr. Prem Chand, and may not have been aware of the fact that, in the case from which the present proceedings arose, he had appeared at any stage for Dr. Prem Chand. We are, however, inclined to hold that this fact does not in any way affect the legal argument urged before us by Shri Daphtary. It is not Shri Daphtary's case that Shri Chhangani actually had a bias against the appellant and that the said bias was responsible for the final report made against the appellant. Indeed it is unnecessary for Shri Daphtary to advance such an argument. If Shri Chhangani was disqualified from working as a member of the tribunal by reason of the fact that he had appeared for Dr. Prem Chand in the criminal proceedings u/S. 145 in question, then it would not be necessary for Shri Daphtary to prove that any prejudice in fact had been caused or that Shri Chhangani improperly influenced the final decision of the tribunal. Actual proof of prejudice in such cases may make the appellant's case stronger but such proof is not necessary in order that the appellant should effectively raise the argument that the tribunal was not properly constituted.
We would, therefore, hold that Shri Daphtary is right when he contends that the constitution of the tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan suffered from a serious infirmity in that Sri Chhangani, who had appeared for Dr. Prem Chand in the criminal proceedings in question, was appointed a member of the tribunal and in fact acted as its Chairman.”
7. The decision in Manak Lal's case is illustrative of the applicability of the principle nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. Against the background of the said ruling and the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no doubt that the learned single Judge ought not to have heard and decided the instant case. It is farthest from anyone's mind to suggest that as a matter of fact his decision of the case was influenced by his past professional association with the writ petitioners. We have no reluctance in assuming that the learned Judge, when he heard this matter initially, might not have remembered that he had appeared on behalf of the Writ Petitioners in the previous writ proceeding. We have no hesitation in believing also that he had no personal contact with the writ petitioners who were his erst-while clients since the previous writ petition was not decided in the recent past. These considerations do not, however, detract from the validity of the legal objection raised on behalf of the appellants. It is not necessary for the appellants to establish that the learned single Judge actually had a bias and that the said bias was the cause of the adverse verdict. The test to be applied in such cases is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment but whether there was a real likelihood of bias. The answer depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right minded people may have reason to go away thinking: “the Judge might have been biased.”
8. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment under appeal is set aside. The Review Petition is allowed. The main judgment rendered in the Writ Petition is also set aside. The writ petition is directed to be restored to file and to be listed before any Bench other than the Bench presided over by the learned single Judge who dealt with and decided the case. It is clarified that this Court has not gone into the merits of the dispute and that all the questions in controversy are left open to be decided in accordance with law.
9. No separate order is required to be passed on the application for interim relief, which too stands disposed of in light of the foregoing order. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
10. If an application for a duly authenticated Xerox copy of the judgment is made to the Deputy Registrar (Court), Appellate Side, by the learned Advocates on record for the parties or any of them, such copy shall be delivered to them/him on the payment of requisite charges provided an application is also simultaneously made for a certified copy and an undertaking is given that delivery of the certified copy will be taken on deposit of requisition when available.
Appeal allowed.
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