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Borhat Tea Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer.

Calcutta High Court
Dec 5, 1989
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Appeal by the Assessee under Section 263

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, a non-resident company, appealed against an order of the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-I dated 14-3-1988 made under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessment for the assessment year 1985-86 had been completed by the Income-tax Officer (ITO) under section 143(3) on 26-12-1985. The Commissioner considered that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue because the ITO had applied an incorrect rate of tax and had incorrectly applied Article 12(2) of the Double Taxation Avoidance (D.T.A.) Convention between India and the United Kingdom, resulting in an undercharge of tax of Rs. 37,690. The Commissioner issued notice under section 263 dated 23-2-1988, considered the assessee's written submissions and set aside the assessment, directing the ITO to frame a fresh assessment after allowing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal against the Commissioner's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the words "first created" in Article 12(2) of the India–U.K. Double Taxation Convention apply to deposits that were renewed after the Convention came into force (i.e., whether a renewal of a deposit constitutes a loan or debt "first created" after the date of entry into force of the Convention).
  2. Whether the ITO's application of a 15% tax rate on interest earned by the assessee from short-term deposits (on the basis of Article 12(2) of the Convention) was incorrect such that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue, justifying revision under section 263.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee is a non-resident company that derived interest of Rs. 68,375 from short-term deposits with banks and Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (HDFC). The ITO assessed this interest applying a 15% tax rate under Article 12(2) of the India–U.K. Convention (in force from 23-11-1981).
  • The assessee contended that renewals of matured deposits amount to fresh deposits because HDFC and banks require submission of a prescribed application form for renewal; therefore a fresh contract of deposit is created upon renewal.
  • Supporting material filed included a letter from Grindlays Bank stating that a fresh contract is created on renewal, the HDFC certificate of deposit and terms showing renewal requires a fresh application, and an extract from A. Ramaiya's commentary stating renewal of deposits after expiry will be deemed fresh deposits.
  • The assessee also relied on an authorization by the Commissioner permitting receipt in India of interest on deposits made with HDFC after October 1981 after deduction of tax at 15%, arguing the Commissioner could not now retrace that position.
  • On this basis the assessee argued that the ITO correctly applied Article 12(2) and the impugned section 263 order should be annulled.

Departmental Representative's Arguments

  • The departmental representative argued that the ITO's assessment order did not show that he had examined the India–U.K. Convention and therefore the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
  • Reliance was placed on several judicial decisions (cases cited in the opinion) to support the proposition that the Commissioner's exercise under section 263 was justified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mool Chand Mahesh Chand v. CIT [1978] 115 ITR 1 (All.) Placed in reliance by the departmental representative in support of revision under section 263. The opinion records that the department relied on this decision; the court's reasoning does not adopt or analyze this case in its interpretation of Article 12(2).
CIT v. Sunder Lal [1974] 96 ITR 310 (All.) Placed in reliance by the departmental representative in support of revision under section 263. Cited by the department; the Tribunal's decision does not explicitly rely upon or apply this authority in its interpretative analysis of "first created".
Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Union of India [1973] 92 ITR 1 (Delhi) Placed in reliance by the departmental representative in support of revision under section 263. The opinion notes departmental reliance; the Tribunal's own reasoning on the Convention and renewals does not expressly rest on this case.
CIT v. Electro House [1971] 82 ITR 824 (SC) Placed in reliance by the departmental representative in support of revision under section 263. Recorded as relied upon by the department; the Tribunal's decision turns on interpretation of Article 12(2) and other authorities, not upon this case.
Clifford v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 249 P. 938 Used to explain the meaning of "renew" or "renewal" in commercial and legal parlance: renewal implies execution of a new instrument or re-establishment of a contract for a further period. The Tribunal quoted this authority (via Words and Phrases) to support the proposition that renewal requires execution of a new instrument and thus can create a fresh contract for the purposes of Article 12(2).
Keday v. Petty, 54 N.E. 798, 153 Ind. 179 Quoted (via Clifford excerpt) for the definition that renewal means to re-establish a contract for another period, restoring former conditions with extended time of payment. The Tribunal cited the Keday passage (as quoted in Words and Phrases) to support its interpretation that renewal can amount to creation of a new contractual obligation.
Abdul Hamid Sahib v. Ramati Bi AIR 1965 Mad. 427 Applied for the principle that a deposit is repayable according to the terms of the agreement (supporting that renewal on fresh application produces a new contract). The Tribunal relied on this authority to support the conclusion that renewals effected on fresh application create a new contract and thus can be "first created" after the Convention's entry into force.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal undertook a textual and contextual interpretation of Article 12(2) of the India–U.K. Double Taxation Convention (published at 133 ITR (St.) 34), which provides that interest paid in respect of a loan or debt first created after the date of entry into force of the Convention may be taxed in the source State at a rate not exceeding 15% of the gross amount.

Key steps in the Tribunal's analysis:

  1. Identified the dispositive phrase: Article 12(2) applies to interest "paid in respect of a loan or debt first created after the date of entry into force" of the Convention (the date being 23-11-1981).
  2. Framed the central interpretative question as the meaning of "first created" in the context of deposits that had been made prior to the Convention but were subsequently renewed after the Convention came into force.
  3. Examined the Commissioner's position: the Commissioner held that deposits originally made before 21-10-1981 (date of entry into force mentioned earlier in the Commissioner's order) and subsequently renewed could not be considered "fresh deposits" within Article 12(2), and therefore the correct rate was the domestic rate prescribed by the Finance Act.
  4. Considered documentary material filed by the assessee, including the terms and conditions of HDFC deposit scheme showing that discharged deposits would not be accepted for renewal unless a prescribed application form was submitted. The Tribunal treated the submission and acceptance of such an application as bringing into existence a fresh contract.
  5. Relied upon established authorities and reference works concerning the meaning of "renewal": quoted the definition from Clifford v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (as reproduced in Words and Phrases), which explains that "renewal" of promissory notes implies more than substitution and involves re-establishing the particular contract for another period; cited Keday v. Petty for similar language. The Tribunal also cited Abdul Hamid Sahib v. Ramati Bi for the proposition that a deposit is repayable according to its agreement.
  6. Applied these principles to the contractual practice shown by the HDFC documents: because the renewals required a fresh application and acceptance, they produced new contracts (i.e., loans or debts "first created" upon renewal).
  7. Concluded that deposits renewed by the assessee with HDFC after 23-11-1981 must be interpreted as loans "first created" after the Convention's entry into force; therefore the ITO's application of the 15% rate under Article 12(2) to the interest in question was correct.
  8. As a result, the Tribunal found no error in the ITO's assessment order and held that the Commissioner was not justified in setting aside that assessment under section 263.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Tribunal allowed the appeal and annulled the order under section 263 dated 14-3-1988, holding that there was no error in the assessment order of the ITO insofar as the application of Article 12(2) and the 15% rate on the interest in question.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The ITO's assessment dated 26-12-1985, which applied the 15% rate under Article 12(2) to the assessee's interest arising from deposits renewed after 23-11-1981, is restored and is not to be set aside under section 263.
  • The Commissioner’s direction to frame a fresh assessment under section 263 is annulled; the Tribunal found the ITO's original application of the Convention to be correct in this respect.

Broader implications: The opinion reasons about the interpretation of "first created" in Article 12(2) and applies established notions of "renewal" and contract formation. The judgment does not expressly claim to lay down a new general precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Tribunal; it confines its holding to the conclusion that renewals effected by fresh application create new contracts for the purpose of Article 12(2) in the circumstances presented.

Disposition: Appeal allowed.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal filed by the assessee is against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-I dated 14-3-1988 under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

2. The assessment for the assessment year 1985-86 was completed under section 143(3) on 26-12-1985. The Commissioner found the said assessment order as erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interest of revenue on the ground that the ITO had applied an incorrect rate of tax and that there had been an incorrect application of Article 12(2) of the D. T. A. Convention resulting in a total under charge of tax of Rs. 37,690. In that view he started proceedings under section 263 by issue of notice dated 23-2-1988. The assessees counsel appeared before the Commissioner and filed written submissions. It had been stated therein that the rate of tax at 15% was correctly applied by the ITO on interest on short-term deposits with Banks and the Housing Development Finance Corporation and that the said interest satisfied the conditions necessary for applying in Article 12(2) of the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation between India and the United Kingdom. The Commissioner after referring to Article 12(2) held as under :

"It is seen from records that the rate of 15% was not to be applied to interest on dividend arising from investments made prior to 21st October, 1981 which is the date of entry into force of the D. T. A. Convention between India and the UK. It is, further noticed from records that the deposits were all along kept with Banks and other Organisations over before the Convention came into force. It is also seen that old deposits were renewed from time to time with the permission of the RBI which shows that the deposits were old which were being renewed from time to time. A renewal cannot be called to be a fresh deposit within the meaning of Article 12(2) of the aforesaid convention. Hence, the correct rate of tax applicable in this case was not 15% as the Article 12(2) of the Convention but the rate prescribed by the relevant Finance Act. Since it was not done by the ITO, who framed the asst., the order passed by him is erroneous being prejudicial to the interest of revenue."

Accordingly, he set aside the assessment order and directed the ITO to frame a fresh assessment keeping in view his discussions in the order under section 263 and after allowing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Against the said order under section 263, the assessee filed the present appeal before the Tribunal.

3. At the time of hearing, the assessees counsel filed a paper book of 10 pages containing, inter alia, copies of notice under section 263 dated 23-2-1988, assessees reply dated 9-3-1988, letter dated 12-8-1987 from Grindlays Bank P. L. C. to the Consolidated Tea & Lands Co. (India) Ltd. (a company under the group of James Finlay), copy of the Certificate of Deposit issued by Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. He also filed copy of letter dated 11-4-1985 addressed by the assessee to the ITO, A-Ward, foreign Companies Circle-I, Calcutta and also letter dated 15-6-1983 from Tata Tea Ltd. addressed to the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Calcutta and copy of letter dated 27-1-1984 addressed by James Finlay P.I.C. to the CIT, West Bengal-V, Calcutta. The arguments of the assessees counsel were to the following effect : The assessee is a non-resident company. The assessees derived interest of Rs. 68,375 from short-term deposits with banks and Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (HDFC for short). It was offered for assessment. The ITO had applied the Income-tax rate of 15% on the said interest on the basis of Article 12(2) of the Convention between the Government of India and the Government of the U. K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for avoiding double taxation. The said Convention came into effect from 23-11-1981. It is published at pages 34 to 54 (Statues) of Vol. No. 133 of Income-tax Reports. Otherwise he would have taxed the said interest @ 70% as he had done in respect of other interest of Rs. 8,524. The Commissioner is not correct in saying that a renewal cannot be called to be a fresh deposit within the meaning of Article 12(2) of the aforesaid Convention. The said Article 12(2) speaks of interest paid in respect of a loan or debt first created after the date of entry into force of the said Convention. The question to be seen is what is meant by the words "first created". The Grindlays Bank vide their letter dated 12-8-1987 (placed at page 3 of the paper book) stated that a fresh contract of deposit is created when a matured deposit is discharged and renewed. A photo copy of the certificate of deposit with HDFC is given at pages 5 & 6 of the paper book. In the said certificate of deposit, under the terms and conditions of the Deposit Scheme, under the sub-heading "payment and renewal" it is mentioned that discharged deposits will not be accepted for renewal unless an application in the prescribed form is submitted. The terms and conditions of the Deposit Scheme with HDFC are given at pages 7 & 8 of the paper book. In it also the same condition appears that for renewal a fresh prescribed form of application has to be submitted. Thus, whenever a renewal is made it amounts to a fresh deposit. On the commentary contained at page 1014 to section 370 of the Companies Act, 1956 by A. Ramaiya, 11th edition, it is mentioned that renewal of deposits after the expiry of the term will be deemed to be fresh deposit. The photostat copy of page 1014 from the said book is given at page 10 of the paper book. Further, the Commissioner has authorised the assessee to receive in India interest on deposit made with HDFC after October 1981 after deduction of tax @ 15% on the amount of interest. This authorisation is filed at page 9 of the paper book. In such circumstances the Commissioner in his order under section 263 dated 14-3-1988 cannot re-trace his steps. Therefore, the impugned order should be annulled.

4. The arguments of the departmental representative were to the following effect. A perusal of the assessment order dated 26-12-1985 by the Income-tax Officer, A Ward, Foreign Company Circle-I, Calcutta does not reveal that he had examined the aforementioned Convention between the Govt. of India and the Govt. of the U. K. Hence, the assessment order of the ITO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Reliance is placed on the decisions in the cases of Mool Chand Mahesh Chand v. CIT [1978] 115 ITR 1 (All.), CIT v. Sunder Lal [1974] 96 ITR 310 (All.), Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Union of India [1973] 92 ITR 1 (Delhi) and CIT v. Electro House [1971] 82 ITR 824 at p. 827 (SC).

5. In reply, the assessees counsel contended that the ITO was well aware of the said Convention and that is why he had applied the rate of 15% to the interest of Rs. 68,375. Otherwise he would have applied the rate of 70% to it also.

6. I have considered the matter and the papers filed before me. The Convention between the Govt. of India and the Govt. of the U. K. came into force with effect from 23-11-1981. The said Convention is given at 133 ITR (St.) 34. In the said convention, clauses (1) & (2) of article 12 read as under :-

"1. Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

2. However, such interest may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which it arises and according to the law of that State, provided that where the resident of the other Contracting State is the beneficial owner of the interest and it is paid in respect of a loan or debt first created after the date of entry into force of this Convention, the tax so charged shall not exceed 15 per cent of the gross amount of the interest".

Clause (2) of Article 12 speaks of charging of interest at a rate not exceeding 15% in respect of interest paid in respect of a loan or debt first created after the date of entry into force of the said Convention. The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is the interpretation of the words "first created". According to the Commissioner since the deposits of the assessee with the HDFC were renewed, they cannot be called fresh deposits within the meaning of Article 12(2). According to the terms and conditions of deposits with HDFC, which are given at pages 7 & 8 of the paper book, discharged deposits will not be accepted for renewal unless an application in the prescribed form is submitted by the depositor. The prescribed application form for deposits submitted by the depositor and accepted by the HDFC brings into existence a fresh contract. That means a loan is freshly created. The Commissioner has not given any authority for his proposition to say that a renewal cannot be called to be a fresh deposit. "Renew" or "renewal" as applied to or used in notes, certificates of deposits, bills of exchange implies and requires execution of new instrument. Clifford v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 249, P. 938, 941, please see page 650 of Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Vol. 36A published by West Publishing Co. In the said book at page 651 it is stated as under :-

"The word "renewed" or renewal, as applied to promissory notes, in commercial and legal parlance means something more than the substitution of another obligation for the old one. It means to re-establish a particular contract for another period of time, to restore to its former conditions and obligation on which the time of payment has been extended. Keday v. Petty, 54 N. E. 798, 800, 153 Ind. 179".

In the case of a deposit it is repayable according to the terms of the agreement. (Abdul Hamid Sahib v. Ramati Bi AIR 1965 Mad. 427). Thus, when a deposit is renewed on the basis of a fresh application, a new contract comes into existence. So, the deposits renewed by the assessee with HDFC after 23-11-1981 have to be interpreted as loans "first created" and so the tax to be charged was only @ 15%. In the circumstances, there is no error in the assessment order of the ITO. The Commissioner is not justified in setting aside the said assessment order. The impugned order under section 263 dated 14-3-1988 is hereby annulled.

7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.