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Siba Prosad Bhattacharyya And Others v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bhattacharjee And Another

Calcutta High Court
Aug 18, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three brothers (the petitioners) filed Title Suit No. 131 of 1977 in the Subordinate Judge, First Court, Alipore, seeking partition and ancillary reliefs in respect of a dwelling house (17/4, Pitambar Ghatak Lane, Calcutta). The defendant No. 1 (their brother) sold his share during the pendency of the suit to a stranger purchaser, Chittaranjan Bhattacharjee, who was impleaded as defendant No. 1(a). After a preliminary decree was passed in the partition suit, the petitioners applied under Section 4 of the Partition Act (registered as Misc. Case No. 3 of 1983) claiming a right of pre-emption to purchase the share transferred to defendant No. 1(a) on the ground that the property was an undivided family dwelling house and the transferee was a stranger purchaser.

The Learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the Section 4 application by an order dated 11 February 1983 on the ground that the plaintiffs had waived the right of pre-emption because defendant No. 1 had previously offered to sell his share to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs offered an inadequate price. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a revisional application under Section 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging that order.

In revision, the stranger purchaser (opposite party No. 2) raised for the first time the contention that the Section 4 application was not maintainable because the stranger purchaser had neither sued for partition nor prayed for separate allotment. The Division Bench referred the matter to a Larger Bench (Special Bench) to resolve the conflict of authority, in particular the correctness of Netai/Netai Das v. Hari Das (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301) vis-à-vis a series of earlier Calcutta High Court decisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Section 4 of the Partition Act filed by co-sharers of an undivided family dwelling house is maintainable when the stranger purchaser has not himself sued for partition and has not prayed for separate allotment (i.e., whether Section 4 applies where the stranger purchaser is impleaded as defendant only).
  2. Whether the Division Bench decision in Netai/Netai Das v. Hari Das (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301), which held that Section 4 should be strictly construed and requires that the transferee must sue for partition or ask for separate allotment, was correctly decided.
  3. Whether the Learned Subordinate Judge was justified in dismissing the Section 4 application on the ground of waiver by the petitioners (based on an earlier alleged offer and counter-offer) without receiving evidence from the stranger purchaser in the Misc. Case to prove waiver.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners disputed that they had waived their right of pre-emption: the alleged prior offer (which the petitioners disputed) was made before the transfer and could not prevent their subsequent claim under Section 4, which accrues after a co-sharer sells his share to a stranger purchaser.
  • There is a consistent series of Calcutta High Court decisions (beginning with Satyabhama v. Jatindra, AIR 1929 Cal 269 and including Kshirode Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad) holding that the right of pre-emption under Section 4 is available to a co-sharer even when the stranger purchaser is impleaded as a defendant in a partition suit; Netai Das (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301) should not be followed as contrary to that series of decisions.

Opposite Party No. 2 (Stranger Purchaser)'s Arguments

  • The plea of waiver could be raised in a proceeding under Section 4; if the plaintiffs did not intend to buy when previously offered the share, they must be deemed to have waived the right.
  • Relied upon Netai Das v. Hari Das (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301) to support the contention that Section 4 is not attracted unless the transferee sues for partition or prays for separate allotment.
  • Submitted that, in the present case, the stranger purchaser had in his written statement claimed a share in the property and should be presumed to have prayed for separate allotment; therefore, on the Netai Das principle the petitioners' claim could not be defeated on that ground.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Netai/Netai Das v. Hari Das, ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301 Held that Section 4 must be strictly construed and that the right under Section 4 is attracted only when the transferee sues for partition or, as a defendant, asks for separate allotment. The Special Bench examined this decision, concluded it was wrongly decided, and overruled its restrictive interpretation; the Bench held Section 4 applies when the co-sharer files suit and the stranger purchaser is impleaded as a defendant even if the stranger has not prayed for separate allotment.
Satyabhama v. Jatindra, AIR 1929 Cal 269 Rejected the contention that Section 4 applies only when the stranger purchaser himself files the suit; adopted a liberal construction so that a stranger defendant in a partition suit can be treated as "suing" for the purposes of Section 4. The Special Bench relied on this decision as part of the consistent Calcutta High Court line supporting a liberal construction of Section 4 and used it to justify allowing Section 4 relief when the stranger purchaser is a defendant.
Kshirode Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad, (1910) 12 Cal LJ 525 Enunciated the principle that Section 4 should be liberally construed to achieve its object (preservation of the family dwelling house). Cited as foundational authority supporting the liberal interpretation adopted by the Special Bench.
Boto Krishna v. Akhoy Kumar, AIR 1950 Cal 111 Calcutta decision cited in the series endorsing a liberal construction of Section 4 and that a defendant may be treated as "suing". Included in the catalogue of Calcutta decisions the Bench relied upon to reject a narrow reading of Section 4.
Haradhon v. Ushacharan, AIR 1955 Cal 292 Another Calcutta decision following the liberal approach to Section 4. Relied on in the Court's survey of consistent Calcutta authorities.
Ramdulal v. Benode, AIR 1949 Cal 245 Calcutta decision in the line supporting liberal construction of Section 4. Summarily cited as part of the consistent Calcutta jurisprudence relied upon by the Bench.
Abu Isha Thakur v. Dinabandhu, AIR 1947 Cal 426 Calcutta decision cited in support of the proposition that "to sue" may include defending in a partition suit. Part of the cluster of Calcutta authorities favouring liberal construction; cited by the Bench.
Satyendra v. Amar Nath, AIR 1964 Cal 52 Calcutta precedent supporting expansive reading of Section 4. Included among the Calcutta decisions the Bench relied upon.
Surendra Nath Achar v. Ram Chandra Hazra, (1971) 75 Cal WN 195 Calcutta decision in the series applying Section 4 liberally. Listed among the authorities supporting the Court's conclusion.
Sunil v. Provas, AIR 1969 Cal 88 Calcutta decision endorsing the liberal construction of Section 4. Cited in the Court's jurisprudential survey.
Santosh Kr. Mitra v. Kalipada Das, AIR 1981 Cal 278 Calcutta decision consistent with liberal interpretation of Section 4. Relied upon to demonstrate continuity of Calcutta High Court decisions.
B. Karmakar v. S. Pramanik, 88 Cal WN 228 : (AIR 1984 Cal 319) Calcutta decision in which the Bench (Anil Kumar Sen and S.N. Sanyal JJ.) did not accept the Netai Das view and applied the liberal construction. The Special Bench expressly agreed with this decision and cited it as authority that Netai Das was not followed in subsequent Calcutta decisions.
Gopal Ch. Mitra v. Kalipada Das, 91 Cal WN 799 : (AIR 1987 Cal 210) Calcutta decision further reflecting the High Court's approach to Section 4. Included in the list of Calcutta precedents favoring the liberal construction applied by the Bench.
AIR 1937 Nag 4 (Stone C.J.) Decision noted as consonant with the Calcutta view (i.e., broader reading of "to sue"). Cited as supporting authority from outside Calcutta endorsing the broader interpretation.
Abinash v. Kamla, AIR 1950 Pat 317 Patna High Court decision following the Calcutta view. Noted by the Bench as an out-of-Calcutta authority consistent with the liberal approach.
Alekha v. Jagabandhu, AIR 1971 Orissa 127 Orissa High Court decision following the Calcutta view on Section 4. Cited as further support for the broader interpretation.
Khane Rao v. Balkrishna, AIR 1922 Bom 121 Bombay High Court decision that construed Section 4 strictly, holding Section 4 not attracted until the stranger purchaser files suit for partition. Identified as an authority taking the opposite (narrow) view; considered in the comparative survey but not followed.
Bntchi Ramayya v. Subba Rao, AIR 1950 Mad 214 Madras High Court decision strictly construing Section 4 (narrow view). Noted as another jurisdiction adopting a strict construction; not followed by the Special Bench.
Sakhawat Ali v. Ali Husain, AIR 1957 All 356 (Full Bench, Allahabad) Full Bench decision which took a different note: stated Section 4 does not entitle a co-sharer to buy whenever he likes and that the right cannot be exercised unless the stranger purchaser is claiming partition of his share either as plaintiff or as defendant. The Special Bench addressed this Full Bench view, treated it as a significant contrary authority, but ultimately declined to follow it, preferring the consistent Calcutta line.
B. Karmakar v. S.N. Pramanik, AIR 1984 Cal 319 Calcutta decision (same as above B. Karmakar entry) in which the Bench refused to follow Netai Das and applied the liberal construction. The Special Bench expressly aligned with this decision in rejecting Netai Das.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two parallel strands of analysis: (A) factual evaluation of the Subordinate Judge's finding of waiver, and (B) statutory interpretation of Section 4 of the Partition Act in light of conflicting authorities.

(A) Factual evaluation — waiver

  • The Special Bench acknowledged that an opponent may raise the plea of waiver in a Section 4 proceeding. However, on the facts of this case the Bench found insufficient material to justify the Subordinate Judge's conclusion of waiver.
  • The only basis for the Subordinate Judge's finding was evidence in cross-examination of defendant No. 1 (given before the preliminary decree) that he had offered his share to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs had offered Rs. 2,000. The Bench held that such testimony did not prove that the plaintiffs refused to buy or that they had knowledge of subsequent negotiations between defendant No. 1 and the stranger purchaser.
  • No evidence was adduced in the Misc. Case No. 3 of 1983 by the opposite party to establish waiver. Absent such evidence, the Subordinate Judge was not justified in dismissing the Section 4 application on the ground of waiver.
  • The Bench further noted that the stranger purchaser had, by his written statement, claimed his share and asked for a share in the property, so even on the Netai Das principle the stranger purchaser could not resist the petitioners' claim in the circumstances of this case.

(B) Statutory interpretation — Section 4

  • The Bench reproduced Section 4 and framed the interpretive issue around the phrase "such transferee sues for partition". This phrase had led to conflict among High Courts and within the Calcutta High Court's own decisions.
  • The Court conducted a thorough survey of authorities. It identified a long series of Calcutta High Court decisions (beginning with Satyabhama v. Jatindra and including Kshirode Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad) that interpreted Section 4 liberally so that the words "to sue" could include defending in a partition suit (i.e., a transferee impleaded as defendant could be treated as "suing" for Section 4 purposes).
  • The Bench contrasted this line with contrary decisions from Bombay and Madras High Courts that construed Section 4 strictly, and with the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Sakhawat Ali v. Ali Husain) which imposed limitations requiring the stranger purchaser to be claiming partition either as plaintiff or as defendant before Section 4 relief could be invoked.
  • The Division Bench decision in Netai Das (1967) — which favoured a strict construction and ruled that Section 4 is not attracted unless the stranger purchaser sues or asks for separate allotment — was analyzed carefully. The Court explained the practical injustice and the risk of frustrating Section 4's object if Netai Das's further limitation (that even where the stranger purchaser is a defendant he must at that stage have asked for separate allotment) were accepted.
  • The Court emphasized the legislative object of Section 4: to prevent the disintegration of the family dwelling house by excluding strangers from enforcing partition rights in a manner that undermines the family dwelling. The Court concluded that a liberal construction is necessary to secure that object, noting that parties in partition suits are "interchangeable" and a defendant may at any time seek separate allotment.
  • On these bases the Bench rejected the strict, limiting view of Netai Das and held that Section 4 is available to a co-sharer who files a suit for partition in which the stranger purchaser is impleaded as a defendant, irrespective of whether the stranger purchaser has actually applied for partition or prayed for separate allotment at the time of the Section 4 application.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court's core ruling is summarized as follows: THE REVISIONAL APPLICATION IS ALLOWED; THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED SUBORDINATE JUDGE IS SET ASIDE; THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE PARTITION ACT IS TO BE ALLOWED, AND THE SUBORDINATE JUDGE IS DIRECTED TO PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The revisional application succeeds; the Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the Section 4 application on the ground of waiver is set aside. The Subordinate Judge is directed to allow the Section 4 application and proceed further under Section 4 of the Partition Act (i.e., to value the transferee's share and direct sale to the purchasing co-sharer in accordance with the statute and applicable procedure).
  • On the legal question presented, the Special Bench overruled or declined to follow the restrictive view in Netai Das v. Hari Das (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301). The Bench held that Section 4 should be liberally construed: a co-sharer who sues for partition can invoke Section 4 when the stranger purchaser has been impleaded as a defendant, regardless of whether the stranger purchaser has separately sued for partition or at that time prayed for separate allotment.
  • Consequently, the Court reaffirmed the line of Calcutta High Court authorities beginning with Satyabhama v. Jatindra and Kshirode Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad, which interpret "to sue" in Section 4 broadly to include an impleaded defendant claiming a share in the dwelling house.

Final procedural direction: The order is to be communicated immediately and the Learned Subordinate Judge shall dispose of consequential matters expeditiously.

Disposition: Petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

Monoranjan Mullick, J.:— Anil Kumar Sen and S.N Sanyal, JJ. have referred this revisional application for disposal by Special Bench as the Learned Advocate appearing for stranger purchaser being the defendant No. 1(a) of the Title Suit No. 131 of 1977 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Court, Alipore, challenges the maintainability of the application under Sec. 4 of the Partition Act, on the ground that the same is not maintainable inasmuch as the stranger purchaser has neither prayed for partition nor for separate allotment. The Learned Judges have expressed the view that the view expressed in Nitai Das v. Hari Das, ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301 relied upon by the Learned Advocate is contrary to other earlier decisions of the Court. In order to resolve the conflict of the views, the Learned Judges have ordered that the revisional application should be decided by a Larger Bench.

2. Following are the facts:

The petitioners being three brothers have filed as plaintiffs a suit for partition, permanent and mandatory injunctions being T.S 131 of 1977 before Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Alipore against the defendant No. 1 claiming 3/4th share in the 17/4, Pitambar Ghatak Lane, Calcutta-27 and alleging that defendant No. 1 being the other brother has the remaining 3/4th share. During the pendency of the suit as the defendant 1 has sold away his share to Chittaranjan Bhattacharjee, a stranger purchaser, he has been impleaded as defendant No. 1(a). After the preliminary decree has been passed, the petitioners have applied for pre-emption u/s. 4 of the Partition Act for purchasing the share transferred to defendant No. 1(a) on the ground that the property is undivided family dwelling house of the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 1(a) is a stranger purchaser. The learned Subordinate Judge registered the application as Misc. Case No. 3 of 1983. The Learned Subordinate Judge however dismissed the said application under an order dated 11th February, 1983 only on the ground that the plaintiffs have waived the right to pre-emption as the defendant No. 1 prior to his sale of his share to defendant No. 1(a) offered the plaintiffs to purchase his share but the plaintiffs did not offer adequate price to purchase the share. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the revisional application u/s. 115, C.P Code challenging the above order as illegal.

3. The opposite party No. 2 being the stranger purchaser has opposed the application. Though in the trial Court no plea was raised that the application was not entertainable on the ground that the opposite party No. 2 neither filed the suit for partition nor prayed for separate allotment, such a contention was raised for the first time in revision before the Division Bench and the Learned Judges of the Division Bench have referred the revision application to be disposed of by the larger Bench. Before us Learned Advocate for the petitioners has made two-fold submissions. Firstly there is no question of waiver of the right of preemption because the alleged offer which the petitioners very much dispute was made prior to the transfer and cannot prevent the petitioners from claiming the right of preemption u/s. 4 of the Partition Act, which right accrues to petitioners after a co-sharer sells his share in the undivided family dwelling house to the stranger. Secondly, the series of the decisions of Calcutta High Court beginning from Satyabhama v. Jatindra, AIR 1929 Cal 269 has consistently taken the view that the right of pre-emption is available to a co-sharer even in a case when the stranger purchaser does not himself file the suit for partition and is arraigned as a defendant in a partition suit filed by the co-sharer and that the Division Bench decision of Netai Das v. Hari Das, ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301 should not be accepted as the said decision is against the series of decisions of this High Court. Mr. Arun Kr. Matilal learned Advocate for opposite party No. 2 has submitted that plea of waiver can be raised by the opposite party in a proceeding u/s. 4 of the Partition Act and if the plaintiffs did not intend to purchase the share of the defendant No. 1 when offered prior to sale to stranger purchaser, they must be deemed to have waived the right and the Learned Subordinate Judge did not commit any illegality in taking that view. He has also relied upon the Division Bench decision of Netai Das v. Hari Das (supra) but has concluded that in this case the stranger purchaser has in the written statement claimed his share in the property and should be presumed to have prayed for separate allotment and often on the basis of Netai Das's case the claim of the petitioners cannot be refused on that ground.

4. Even though we feel that there is scope for the opposite party in a proceeding u/s. 4 of the Partition Act to take the plea of waiver of such right by the petitioners, we are of the view that in this case there was no sufficient material before the Learned Subordinate Judge to hold that the petitioners have waived such right. Before the Learned Subordinate Judge no evidence was adduced in Misc. Case, No. 3 of 1983 by the opposite party No. 2 in support of the story of waiver. The Learned Subordinate Judge only on the basis of the evidence in cross-examination of the defendant 1 adduced before the preliminary decree was passed namely, that he offered to sell his share to the plaintiffs but the plaintiff offered to pay Rs. 2000/-, held that the petitioners had waived their right. That evidence does not show that the defendant No. 1 made any averment that his brothers had refused to pay his share and that is why he sold the share to opposite party No. 2. There is no whisper that he intimated his, brothers that he would not sell it at such a price and that he was selling to the opposite party No. 2 because he had offered higher price. On the contrary, there is nothing to indicate that the petitioners had any knowledge that the defendant No. 1 was negotiating for sale with opposite party No. 2 after the petitioners are alleged to have offered the lower price. As a matter of fact, prior to filing of the suit the petitioners had no knowledge of the sale to the defendant No. 1(a) who has been added after the filing, of the suit for partition against the defendant No. 1.

5. When at the time of hearing of the Misc. Case No. 3 of 1983 no evidence was tendered by the opposite party No. 2 in support of his case of waiver, the learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in refusing the prayer on the ground that the petitioners have waived the right u/s. 4 of the Partition Act. We have already indicated that Mr. Arun Kr. Matilal has conceded that in this case the opposite party No. 2 has claimed separate allotment by asking for a share in the property. Therefore, in this case even if the decision of Netai Das's case be treated as laying down the correct law, the opposite party No. 2 cannot resist the claim of the petitioners when, he is himself claiming separate allotment. Moreover, in our view when the petitioners have 3/4th share in the property and the opposite party No. 2 has purchased the remaining 1/4th share of defendant No. 1 even if no separate allotment was prayed for by the opposite party No. 2, the Court would have to grant the opposite party No. 2 separate allotment if the petitioners' claim for preemption failed. In that view of the matter we hold that the Learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in rejecting the prayer for preemption and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. We would now answer the reference namely, whether the stranger purchaser not having sued for partition nor having prayed for partition or separate allotment application u/s. 4 of the Partition Act filed by the co-sharers of the undivided family dwelling is maintainable or not and whether the Division Bench decision of Netai Das v. Hari Das, ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301 has been correctly decided or not, we would reproduce here the provisions of the Section 4 of the Partition Act.

Sea 4 reads thus —

“(1) Where a share of a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family has been transferred to a person who is not a member of such family and such transferee sues for partition, the court shall, if any member of the family being a shareholder shall undertake to buy the share of such transferee, make valuation of such share in such manner as it thinks fit and direct the sale of such share, to such shareholder and may give all necessary and proper directions, in that behalf.

(2) xxxxxxxxxx”

The interpretation of the words “such transferee sues for partition” has led to conflict of decisions.

6. In Satyabhama v. Jatindra, AIR 1929 Cal 269, Surwardy and Jack, JJ. were called upon to decide specifically as to whether the provision of Section 4 of the Partition Act would be attracted only when the stranger purchaser himself files the suit for partition or whether the same would also apply if the co-sharer files a suit for partition in which the stranger purchaser figures as a defendant. The learned Judge rejected the contention of the respondents that the right of the co-sharers u/s. 4 of the Partition Act would arise only when the stranger purchaser sues for partition. The following observations have been made “If effect is given to the respondent's contention the result will defeat the object of the legislature to secure the individuality of a dwelling house. It is possible that two persons buy two shares of the two members of the family and one of them brings a suit for partition making the other a defendant and if his right to purchase the share of the dwelling house fails on any account, the stranger defendant may yet be given a share in the dwelling house because he does not happen to be a plaintiff in the suit. This is not what the legislation intended and we must put a reasonable construction on the act of the legislature.”

7. This liberal construction to Sec. 4 was given by the Learned Judges. That Section 4 whose object is to prevent a transferee from a member of the family who is an outsider to the family from enforcing his way to the undivided family dwelling house in which the other member of the family and the transfer or belong have a right to live should be liberally construed has been enunciated by Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee in Kshirode Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad (1910) 12 Cal LJ 525. The Division Bench followed this principle and has given liberal construction so that the object of Sec. 4 is achieved and not frustrated. The Learned Judge also took into consideration that in a suit for partition the parties are interchangeable and in the suit for partition whether a plaintiff or defendant is at the same time a plaintiff as well as defendant and his dual capacity of a party in the partition suit does not preclude even a defendant who is claiming a share in the undivided family dwelling house from, being treated as plaintiff for the purpose of Section 4 of the Partition Act. This decision has been followed in several decisions. In some of them the definition of the expression “to sue” Stroud's Judicial Dictionary to include not only to prosecute but also ‘to defend’ was also taken into account. Reference may be made by the following decisions. Boto Krishna v. Akhoy Kumar, AIR 1950 Cal 111; Haradhon v. Ushacharan, AIR 1955 Cal 292; Ramdulal v. Benode, AIR 1949 Cal 245; Abu Isha Thakur v. Dinabandhu, AIR 1947 Cal 426; Satyendra v. Amar Nath, AIR 1964 Cal 52; Surendra Nath Achar v. Ram Chandra Hazra, (1971) 75 Cal WN 195; Sunil v. Provas, AIR 1969 Cal 88; Santosh Kr. Mitra v. Kalipada Das, AIR 1981 Cal 278; B. Karmakar v. S. Pramanik, 88 Cal WN 228 : (AIR 1984 Cal 319) and Gopal Ch. Mitra v. Kalipada Das, 91 Cal WN 799 : (AIR 1987 Cal 210).

8. The view expressed in the above Calcutta decisions are in consonance with the view of Stone C.J in AIR 1937 Nag 4. The Patna High Court Abinash v. Kamla, AIR 1950 Pat 317 and Orissa High Court in Alekha v. Jagabandhu, AIR 1971 Orissa 127 have followed the Calcutta views — Section 4 has been strictly construed by Bombay High Court in Khane Rao v. Balkrishna, AIR 1922 Bom 121 and Madras High Court in Bntchi Ramayya v. Subba Rao, AIR 1950 Mad 214. These High Courts have held that Section 4 will not be attracted until and unless the stranger purchaser files a suit for partition.

9. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Sakhawat Ali v. Ali Husain, AIR 1957 All 356 has, however, struck a different note. The Full Bench does not fully (Sic) the co-sharer the right u/s. 4 even when the stranger purchaser is arraigned as defendant in the suit for partition but the Full Bench has expressed the view that Section 4 does not entitle a co-sharer of an undivided family dwelling house to buy the share purchased by the stranger purchaser whenever he likes and he cannot exercise such power unless the stranger purchaser is claiming partition of his share in the dwelling house either as a plaintiff or as a defendant.

10. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Netai Das v. Hari Dass, ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301 has followed the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Sakhawat Ali v. Ali Husain, AIR 1957 All 356. The learned Judges have noted that the Calcutta High Court consistently expressed the view that section 4 should be liberally construed in favour of the co-sharer of the undivided family dwelling house and that the co-sharer has the right to buy the share of the stranger whatever in the said dwelling house irrespective of the fact that the stranger purchaser is the plaintiff or a defendant. The learned Judges have also noted that the Calcutta High Court consistently rejected the narrow interpretations of Section 4 of the Partition Act. The learned Judges were also aware that the Full Bench decisions of Allahabad High Court never found favour with the Calcutta High Court. Even then the learned Judges have expressed that it must appear to the court that the stranger purchaser has claimed partition or separate allotment and that application of section 4 in a case where the stranger purchaser does not claim or is not claiming partition and separate allotment is unwarranted by the language of Section 4 of the Partition Act. The learned Judges overruled the view expressed in series of decisions beginning from (1910) 12 Cal LJ 525 (Kshirode v. Saroda) that regard being had to the object of section 4 it must be liberally construed. The learned Judges have for the first time observed that section 4 providing for invasion of legal right of the stranger purchaser must be strictly construed.

11. It is to be noted that even after the above learned Judges expressed the view contrary to what has been so long held by Calcutta High Court, the subsequent decisions of Calcutta High Court did not even take note of the above view. The view expressed since Satyabhama's case in AIR 1929 Cal 269 has been consistently followed. In B. Karmakar v. S.N Pramanik, 88 Cal WN 228 : (AIR 1984 Cal 319) before Anil Kumar Sen and S.N Sanyal, JJ., Mr. S.N Ray Chaudhury, learned Advocate for the appellant relied upon the decision of Netai Dass's Case (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301). The learned Judges in that decision found that in the said case the stranger purchaser himself wanted to purchase the share of the plaintiff co-sharer, and even on the principle laid down in Netai Dass's case the respondent was entitled to get the relief u/s. 4 of the Partition Act and that is why the learned Judges did not refer the case to a larger Bench. The learned Judge, however, did not agree with the view expressed in Netai Dass's case.

12. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in B. Karmakar v. S.N Pramanik (supra). When from Kshirode v. Saroda (1910) 12 Cal LJ 525 this High Court constantly held that Section 4 should be liberally construed so that the object of Section 4 is not frustrated the learned Judges in Netai Dass's case (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301) have for the first time struck a different note that Section 4 should be strictly construed as it affects the legal right of the stranger purchaser. The object of Section 4 is to prevent the disintegration of the family dwelling house by preventing to introduce stranger therein. The stranger is adequately compensated by the market value of the property purchased so that dwelling house of the family be preserved. The view that it must be strictly construed and that until and unless the stranger either sues for partition as a plaintiff or asks for separate allotment as defendant (Sic) be accepted then the whole object of Section 4 would be frustrated. In a suit for partition parties are interchangeable. The defendant can, at any time before the decree for partition is finally passed, ask for separate allotment. The right under Section 4 is available to the co-sharer as soon as a preliminary decree is passed. The defendant may frustrate the right of the co-sharer to buy out the share by not asking for separate allotment up to the last moment. The possibility cannot be ruled out that after the co-sharer's right of pre-emption u/s. 4 is rejected on the ground that the defendant has not asked for separate allotment, the defendant could ask for separate allotment. In this way if the view of Netai Dass's case be accepted great injustice will be caused to the co-sharer of an undivided family dwelling house. On the other hand the consistent view of Calcutta High Court is that the words “to sue” would include both “to prosecute” and “to defend” and only if such a view is taken the object of Section 4 is not frustrated. Otherwise there is every possibility of object of Section 4 being frustrated. When the liberal interpretation of Section 4 is made that the right would be available to the co-sharer even when the stranger is a defendant, then there is no scope for further limiting the right of the co-sharer that if the stranger purchaser is arraigned as defendant he must apply, for separate allotment to give the co-sharer the right to apply u/s. 4. In Netai Dass's case the learned Judges appear to accept the view that the right is also available to the co-sharer when the stranger purchaser is impleaded as defendant. In that case there is no reason why any further limitation not contemplated by Section 4 would be placed in exercise of such right.

13. Therefore, we are unable to accept the decision of Netai Dass v. Hari Dass (ILR (1967) 2 Cal 301) (supra) as correctly decided we hold that the right of pre-emption under Section 4 of the Partition Act is available to a co-sharer of an undivided family dwelling house when he himself files a suit for partition and the stranger purchaser is arraigned as defendant and irrespective of the fact whether the stranger purchaser has actually applied for partition or for separate allotment of his share or not. The parties of the suit for partition being interchangeable the right to claim separate allotment is germane in any party be he the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for partition and in such case the right of pre-emption cannot be defeated only because on or before the filing of the application for pre-emption u/s. 4 of the Partition Act the stranger purchaser as defendant did not ask for separate allotment. We also uphold the view that Section 4 should be liberally construed

14. In the result we allow the revisional application, set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and direct that the application u/s. 4 of the Partition Act be allowed and the learned Subordinate Judge is directed to proceed in accordance with law and to pass further order u/s. 4 of the Partition Act

15. The order be communicated at once and the learned Subordinate Judge shall dispose of the consequential matters as expeditiously as possible.

Mookerjee, C.J:— 16. I agree.

Sudhanshu Sekhar Ganguly, J.:— 17. I agree.

Petition allowed.