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Sm. Kalyani Bhattacharjee & Anr. v. Sri Monoranjan Roy
Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs-appellants filed a suit for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, on grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-letting and reasonable requirement of the suit premises for own use and occupation. The suit premises comprised two rooms and a kitchen on the ground floor of No. 286A, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, and one bath-room and privy on adjacent premises No. 284.
The plaint also sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondent from making additions, alterations or changing the tenancy, and a separate prayer for recovery of khas possession of remaining vacant land described in Schedule C.
The respondent contested the suit and alleged suspension of rent since July 1974, claiming dispossession from a small room under the staircase on 30.6.74.
After suit was filed the respondent petitioned under ss. 17(2) and 17(2A)(b) of the Act. The trial court (court below) rejected the s.17(2) petition and allowed s.17(2A)(b), directing the respondent to pay arrears by instalments and to continue payment of current rent. On the plaintiffs' application under s.17(3) the defence to delivery of possession was struck out on 18.4.79, narrowing the contested issue at peremptory hearing to the legality and validity of a notice of ejectment dated 15.1.76 (Ext. 1) under s.13(6) of the Act and s.106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The learned Judge of the Seventh Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, after examining P.W.1 (appellant No.2), held that the notice of ejectment was not legal, valid or sufficient and that the landlord-tenant relationship between appellant No.1 and the respondent had not been proved, and consequently dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed from that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notice of ejectment dated 15.1.76 (Ext. 1) was legal, valid and sufficient under s.13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and s.106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs (appellants) and the defendant (respondent) had been proved so as to sustain the eviction suit.
- Whether oral evidence (including P.W.1's testimony) could be admitted to establish that appellant No.2 collected rent on behalf of appellant No.1 and that appellant No.1 was the owner, in light of ss. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act and s.116 of the Evidence Act.
- How the inclusive definition of "landlord" in s.2(d) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act should be interpreted when a third person collects rent on behalf of the owner.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants alleged in the plaint that the respondent was inducted into the suit-premises by appellant No.2 acting for and on behalf of his wife, appellant No.1, and that the rent receipts were issued by appellant No.2 in his own name for convenience.
- P.W.1 (appellant No.2) testified that appellant No.1 was the owner by purchase from her father and that the respondent was a tenant under appellant No.1; this evidence was not effectively challenged on cross-examination.
- Ext. A (letter dated 11.7.72) was characterized by the appellants as an arrangement to collect rent, not as the contract of tenancy; rent receipts (Ext. B series) expressly refer to the arrangement in Ext. A.
- The appellants relied on the admission of relevant facts and on s.116 of the Evidence Act to read P.W.1's evidence together with documentary evidence in support of the claim that appellant No.2 collected rent for appellant No.1 and that appellant No.1 was the owner/landlord.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent denied the material averments in the plaint and alleged suspension of rent payments by him since July 1974 due to dispossession from a small room under the staircase.
- Counsel for the respondent (Mr. Dey) argued that ss. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act barred reception of oral evidence to vary the terms of the written arrangement (Ext. A), and thus oral testimony could not be used to change the legal effect of Ext. A.
- The respondent earlier relied on the trial court's finding (drawing on Parekh Brothers) that the notice of ejectment was not legal, valid or sufficient and that the landlord-tenant relationship had not been proved.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra (as cited in the judgment) | Principle that plaintiffs must succeed on the case pleaded and proved; if plaintiffs' pleaded contract differs from contract proved, plaintiffs cannot succeed on defendant's version. | The court distinguished the facts of the present case from Parekh Brothers and held that Parekh Brothers did not apply because P.W.1's testimony supported the plaint and was not effectively challenged by cross-examination. |
| Charubala Dey v. Sarashi Bala Roy (90 CWN 796) | Interpretation that the definition of "landlord" in s.2(d) may include the owner and any other person who collected rent on behalf of the owner, as rent-collector or agent (as held in that case). | The court considered this interpretation but declined to adopt a reading so wide as to treat any rent-collector or agent as "landlord" without regard to the requirement of being "entitled"; the court refused to go as far as Charubala Dey was held to go in that case. |
| B. Haldar v. P.H. Chakraborty (71 CWN 152) | Emphasis on the word "entitled" in the definition of "landlord" and the proposition that "landlord" presupposes some legal right to receive rent. | The court relied on this principle to interpret s.2(d) of the Act narrowly — to require a legal entitlement as between landlord and tenant — and used it to limit the scope of who may be treated as "landlord". |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a sequence of analytical steps, applying statutory and evidentiary principles to the facts in the record:
- Distinguishing Parekh Brothers: The court examined Parekh Brothers and concluded that its facts were materially different. In Parekh Brothers the plaintiffs pleaded a multi-person ownership and failed to prove it, whereas in the present case P.W.1's unchallenged evidence supported the plaintiffs' pleaded case that appellant No.1 was the owner and appellant No.2 acted for her.
- Nature of Ext. A and Ext. B series: The court found Ext. A (letter dated 11.7.72) was not itself a contract of tenancy but an arrangement for letting and collection; Ext. B rent receipts explicitly referred to the arrangement in Ext. A. On that basis Ext. A did not operate as an immutable written tenancy contract excluding all oral evidence.
- Evidentiary objections (ss. 91 & 92 Evidence Act): The respondent argued that ss. 91 and 92 barred oral evidence to vary the terms of Ext. A. The court rejected this as a complete bar in the present circumstances because Ext. A was not a tenancy contract whose terms were being displaced, and because s.116 of the Evidence Act permitted the reception of relevant facts (the court expressly relied on s.116 to read documentary and oral evidence together).
- Interpretation of "landlord" under s.2(d) of the Act: The court considered earlier authority (Charubala Dey) that had construed s.2(d) broadly to include owners and persons collecting rent. The court declined to accept an overly broad reading and emphasized the requirement of being "entitled" to receive rent (following the reasoning in B. Haldar v. P.H. Chakraborty). The court therefore required some legal entitlement as between landlord and tenant.
- Application to facts: Given that P.W.1's testimony — that appellant No.1 owned the premises and appellant No.2 collected rent on her behalf — was essentially unchallenged, and combined with the documentary rent receipts and Ext. A, the court concluded that the landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant had been proved at the time the notice dated 15.1.76 was issued.
- Conclusion on notice: On the above bases the court held that the notice of ejectment dated 15.1.76 was legal, valid and sufficient, and that the learned Judge below erred in dismissing the suit for invalidity of the notice.
- Reliefs and conditions: The court detailed conditional relief — it allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree below, decreed the suit in part against the defendant, and framed conditions for delivery of vacant possession tied to deposits of arrears of mesne profits (if any) and timely payment of current mesne profits (Rs.100 per month), with clear consequences on failure to pay.
- Rejection of other prayers: The court rejected the plaintiffs' prayers for recovery of khas possession of Schedule C land and for permanent injunction because the record contained no evidence in support of those claims, no court fee had been paid for those prayers, and there was no valuation of these prayers in the plaint.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED. The appellate court set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and decreed the suit in part in favour of the plaintiffs.
Direct consequences and directives from the court:
- The defendant-respondent is directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit-premises (schedules A and B) to the plaintiffs within six months from the date of the order, subject to conditions.
- Condition precedent: the respondent must deposit any arrears of mesne profits (if any) in the trial court within three months from the date of the order.
- Ongoing condition: the respondent must deposit current mesne profits at the rate of Rs.100 per month, month by month, by the 15th of the calendar month next following the month for which mesne profit is due.
- If the respondent fails to deposit the arrears within three months or fails to deposit the monthly current mesne profits as ordered, the decree becomes executable at once and the plaintiffs will be entitled to evict the respondent and recover khas possession of the suit premises.
- If the respondent complies with the deposits but still does not deliver possession within six months, the plaintiffs will be at liberty to recover khas possession by eviction.
- In the event the deposits are made in accordance with the order, the plaintiffs may withdraw the amounts so deposited without furnishing any security.
- The court rejected the plaintiffs' separate prayers for khas possession of Schedule C land and for permanent injunction due to absence of evidence, non-payment of court fee for those prayers and absence of valuation in the plaint.
- The parties were directed to bear their own costs of the appeal.
Broader implications: The opinion adopts a fact-specific approach to documentary and oral evidence where the court emphasized the necessity of legal entitlement to rent in designating a "landlord" under s.2(d) of the Act and refused to accept an unqualified extension treating any rent-collector or agent as landlord. The judgment does not assert the setting of a novel binding precedent beyond its reasoning; it applies and distinguishes prior authorities to the facts before it.
Judge L.M. Ghosh agreed with the result. (Appeal allowed.)
Sankari Prasad Das Ghosh, J.:—This appeal relates to the dismissal of a suit for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 on the grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-letting and reasonable requirement of the suit-premises for own use and occupation. The suit premises mean two rooms and a kitchen at the ground floor of premises No. 286A, Chittaranjan Avenue, P.S Jorasanko, Calcutta, as well as one bath-room and one privy on the open land in an adjacent premises, being premises No. 284, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta.
2. The plaintiffs-appellants filed the suit for eviction on the a foresaid grounds. In the suit, there was also a prayer for permanent injunction for restraining the defendant-respondent from making any addition, alteration and/or construction and from changing the character of the tenancy described in Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ to the plaint. There was a further prayer for recovery of khas possession of the remaining vacant land in premises No. 284, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, which was described in Schedule ‘C’ to the plaint.
3. The suit was contested by the respondent by filing a written statement, wherein all the material averments in the plaint were denied. The respondent alleged suspension in payment of rent by him since July, 1974 on the ground of dispossession from a small room under the stair case at premises No. 286A, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta on 30.6.74
4. After the filing of the suit, there were petitions by the respondent under ss. 17(2) and 17(2A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the sake of convenience). By an order passed on 25.9.78, the court below rejected the petition under s. 17(2) of the Act and allowed the other petition under s. 17(2A)(b) of the Act. By that order, the respondent was directed by the court below to pay the arrears from July, 1974 by way of monthly instalments and to continue to pay the current rent. Subsequently, on the prayer of the appellants under s. 17(3) of the Act, the defence against delivery of possession was struck out by an order passed on 18.4.79 by the court below. As the defence against delivery of possession was struck out, the contest in the suit, at the time of peremptory hearing of the suit, remained confined to the legality and validity of a notice dated 15.1.76, Ext. 1 under s. 13(6) of the Act and s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not disputed that the notice was received by the respondent. The learned Judge, Seventh Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, who tried the suit, after examining P.W 1 (appellant No. 2), was of the opinion that the notice of ejectment was not legal, valid and sufficient and that relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant no. 1 and the respondent had not been proved. As such, the suit was dismissed. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs appellants.
5. The learned Judge held that the notice of ejectment was not valid, legal and sufficient on the basis of the decision of this court. In the case of Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra (AIR 1968 Calcutta 532). After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties, we are unable to agree with the finding of the learned Judge that the notice of ejectment is not legal, valid and/or sufficient. In the case of Parekh Brothers (supra), a suit for eviction was filed by three persons including one Kartick on alleging that those three persons were the landlords of the suit-premises of that suit. The defendant in that suit denied the existence of three landlords and accepted only Kartick as the Landlord of the premises. It was proved in evidence in that suit that Kartick and not his other two brothers was the landlord of the premises. The plaintiffs are to succeed or fail on their own case. When the plaintiffs in that suit pleaded a case that they three were the landlords of the premises and failed to prove it and when the defendant proved its case that Kartick was the sole landlord of the premises. It was held in that case that the contract, that had been pleaded in the plaint of that case, was different from the contract that had been proved by evidence and that the plaintiffs could only succeed on the case made out by the plaintiffs in their evidence and not on the basis of the case made out by the defendant. The facts of the present suit are quite different from the facts of that suit. In this suit, the plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that the respondent was inducted in the suit-premises by the appellant no. 2 acting for and on behalf of his wife, the appellant no. 1 and that rent-receipt was issued by the appellant no. 2 in his own name for the sake of convenience. The evidence of P.W 1 was that the appellant no. 1 was the owner of the premises nos. 284 and 286A, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, by purchase from his father and that the respondent was a tenant under his wife (appellant no. 1) in respect of the suit-premises. There was virtually no cross-examination of this evidence of P.W 1. The cross examination of P.W 1 related to the question as to whether there was any power-of-attorney in his favour by his wife for looking after her properties or her suits on her behalf. In these circumstances, the appellant no. 2 adduced evidence as P.W 1. In support of the case made out in the plaint, which was not challenged by way of cross-examination of P.W 1. This is not thus a case where the contract pleaded was different from the contract proved in evidence. As such, the case of Parekh Brothers (AIR 1961 Calcutta 532) Can have no application to the facts of the present suit.
6. Mr. Dey, the learned Advocate for the respondent, referred us to the provisions of ss. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act and contended that oral evidence was not admissible to vary the terms of the contract of tenancy mentioned in Ext. A. Ext. A is a letter dated 11.7.72 by the appellant no. 2, whereby the appellant no. 2 agreed to let out the ground floor of the premises no. 286A, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, and to permit user of the latrine and bath-room at premises No. 284, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, by his tenant, the respondent Ext. A, is not, however, a contract of tenancy. Ext. B series are the rent receipts granted by the appellant no. 2 to the respondent. By these rent receipts, Ext. B to B(3), the appellant no. 2 collected rent of the suit premises from the respondent by mentioning explicitly in each of these rent receipts, “as per arrangement vide my letter dated 11.7.72 to Monoranjan Roy”. The letter, Ext. A, dated 11.7.72 is thus an arrangement made by the appellant no. 2 for collection of rent of the suit premises from the respondent, though he described the respondent as his tenant in that letter. The question is whether, in view of this letter, Ext. A and the rent-receipts, the suit is to be dismissed, as done by the learned Judge. If a property is owned by a person and is let out by a third person, the owner is entitled to institute a suit for eviction against the tenant on the basis of the Inclusive definition of the word “landlord” in s. 2(d) of the Act. This s. 2(d) of the Act came up for interpretation in the case of Charubala Dey v. Sarashi Bala Roy (90 CWN 796). It was held in the case of Charubala Dey (supra) that the definition of the word “landlord”, included the owner and any other person, who collected rent on behalf of the owner either as rent-collector or as agent. With due respect, we are unable to go so far as to hold that the definition of “landlord” in the Act will include any other person, who will collect rent on behalf of the owner either as rent collector or as agent. The emphasis in the definition of the word, “landlord”, in s. 2(d) of the Act is on the word, “entitled” (B. Haldar v. P.H Chakraborty, 71 CWN 152). The expression, “landlord”, presupposes some legal right. Any person for the time being entitled to receive the rent refers only to the person entitled as between the landlord and the tenant. The appellant no. 2 will be the landlord on the basis of the letter dated 11.7.72, Ext. A, in view of the provisions in s. 116 of the Evidence Act. The appellant no. 1 will also be the “landlord” (landlady) as she is the owner of the suit premises. The terms of the letter, Ext. A, were not varied by the evidence of P.W 1. As such, the provisions of ss. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act do not stand as a bar to the contention of the appellants that the appellant no. 1 is the owner and the appellant no. 2 collected rent for and on behalf of the owner, the wife of the appellant no. 2. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the notice of ejectment is legal, valid and sufficient. The learned Judge thus erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of invalidity of the notice.
7. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendant has been proved in evidence inasmuch as the appellant no. 1 is the owner of the suit premises and the appellant no. 2 was a landlord on the basis of the averments in the plaint and the evidence read with s. 116 of the Evidence Act, at the time of issuing the notice of ejectment dated 15.1.76
8. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment end decree passed by the court below are set aside. The suit itself in the court below is decreed in part on contest against the defendant. The defendant-respondent is directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit-premises (premises described in schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ to the plaint) to the plaintiffs within six months from this date on condition of the respondent's depositing the arrears of mesne profits, if any, in the court below within three months from this date and on further condition of the respondent's depositing in the court below in favour of the plaintiffs appellants the current mesne profits at the rate of monthly rent of Rs. 100/- per month, month by month, by 15th of the English calendar month next following the English calendar month for which the current mesne profit is due. On failure of the respondent's depositing in favour of the plaintiffs appellants in the court below the arrears of mesne-profits if any, within three months from this date or failure of the respondent to deposit in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants in the court below, the current mesne profit as stated above, the decree will be executable at once and the plaintiffs appellants will be entitled to evict the respondent from the suit-premises (premises mentioned in the schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ to the plaint) and to recover khas possession of the same. In case the respondent does not deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs appellants, after complying with the aforesaid conditions, within six months from this date, the plaintiffs appellants will be at liberty to recover khas possession of the suit-premises (premises mentioned in schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ to the plaint) on evicting the respondent therefrom. In the event the deposits are made in accordance with this order, the plaintiffs-appellants will be at liberty to withdraw the amounts so deposited without furnishing any security.
9. Prayer for recovery of khas possession of the premises mentioned in schedule ‘C’ to the plaint and the prayer for permanent injunction are rejected, as there is no evidence in the matter, no court fee has been paid for these prayers and there is no valuation of these prayers in the plaint.
10. In the special circumstances of this appeal, the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.
L.M Ghosh, J.: I agree.
Appeal allowed.
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