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J.N Roy Chowdhury (Traders) P. Ltd. v. Jainti Enterprises.
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, Messrs. Jainti Enterprises (describing itself as a registered firm), presented a petition for the winding up of the appellant company based on an alleged unpaid balance arising from an agreement dated 28 November 1975. Under that agreement the appellant agreed to supply dolomite and the respondent to purchase against advance payments; settlement of accounts was to be made quarterly. The respondent alleged that after account adjustment a sum of Rs. 24,062.42 (settled at Rs. 24,000) remained due, of which Rs. 6,000 was paid in cash and four cheques for Rs. 18,000 were issued but not presented for encashment, leaving Rs. 18,000 unpaid.
The respondent's winding-up petition was admitted by a learned single judge on 3 August 1982. The appellant deposited Rs. 10,000 in cash as security with its advocates on record, and upon appeal the court of appeal stayed the operation of the order and the appellant deposited Rs. 8,000 with the Registrar, Original Side. The appellant contended that (a) the debt was bona fide disputed, (b) the account was not final because quarterly settlement was to continue during the five-year contract, and (c) it had a prima facie counterclaim for breach of contract and damages amounting to Rs. 4,52,250 due to the respondent's alleged cessation of orders and closure of business without the required notice.
The learned trial judge rejected the appellant's submissions and admitted the winding-up petition. The appellant appealed against the order dated 3 August 1982. The present opinion disposes of that appeal: the appellate bench (Prabir Kumar Majumdar, J., with R.N. Pyne, J. concurring) allowed the appeal, set aside the admission order and made directions concerning the funds deposited and the parties' rights going forward.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioning creditor's debt was bona fide disputed by the company such that the petition for winding up should not be admitted.
- Whether omission to pay (after statutory notice) amounts to "neglect to pay" within section 434(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, when the company raises a bona fide dispute or a prima facie valid counterclaim.
- Whether a winding-up petition is a proper remedy where the petitioning creditor's claim has been secured (and whether security of the claim affects the deemed insolvency under section 434).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant argued that the debt was bona fide disputed and that the company had a prima facie valid counterclaim (for Rs. 4,52,250) arising from the respondent's alleged wrongful cessation of orders and closure of business without the contractual notice — therefore there was reasonable excuse for non-payment under section 434(1) of the Companies Act, 1956.
- It was submitted that the account said to show Rs. 24,000 was not a final account but a quarterly account subject to further adjustment in subsequent quarters under clause 7 of the agreement dated 28 November 1975; hence the amount had not crystallised into a debt.
- The appellant also argued that when the entire claim of the respondent had been secured (by deposits ordered by the appellate court), there could be no question of deemed insolvency under section 434 and that the discretionary remedy of winding up should not be granted in the circumstances.
- Other points originally raised in the court of first instance (that the respondent was not a registered firm and that the claim was barred by limitation) were not pressed before the appellate court.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent's counsel submitted that where the company has no bona fide defence the petitioning creditor is entitled to a winding-up order; the mere fact that the petitioner's claim is secured is immaterial to the question of whether there is a bona fide dispute.
- On counter-claims, the respondent argued that a counter-claim must be bona fide, substantial and likely to succeed; the court must scrutinise the counter-claim to ensure it is not a manufactured dispute to defeat enforcement of the petitioner's dues.
- Reliance was placed on authorities establishing that if there is no bona fide dispute, and the company fails to comply with the statutory notice, the creditor is entitled to winding up ex debito justitiae.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Company… v. Rameshwar Singh Of Darbhanga… [1919] 23 CWN 844 : AIR 1920 Cal 1004 | Held that omission to pay is negligence only if it is without reasonable excuse; mere omission by itself does not amount to negligence. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a bona fide dispute or counter-claim can amount to a reasonable excuse for non-payment, and therefore defeat the presumption of inability to pay under section 434. |
| Bharat Vegetable Products, In re [1952] 22 Comp Cas 62 : [1952] 56 CWN 29 | Held that presentation of a winding-up petition is an abuse of process if the debt on which it is founded is bona fide disputed. | The court cited this decision in support of the view that bona fide disputes should be litigated in a regular action and that winding up should not be used to enforce disputed debts. |
| Amalgamated Commercial Traders P. Ltd. v. A.C.K. Krishnaswami [1965] 35 Comp Cas 456 | Supreme Court authority that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means of enforcing a debt which is bona fide disputed by the company; if debt is bona fide disputed, there cannot be "neglect to pay" under section 434(1)(a). | The court relied on this Supreme Court principle to conclude that a bona fide dispute by the company prevents the deeming provision in section 434(1) from operating. |
| Federal Chemical Works Ltd., In re [1964] 34 Comp Cas 963 (All) | Explained that to raise the presumption under section 434(1) it must be shown that omission to pay was without reasonable excuse; existence of a valid counter-claim constitutes a reasonable excuse for non-payment. | The court applied this rule to hold that the appellant's prima facie counterclaim could constitute a reasonable excuse and thus rebut the presumption of inability to pay. |
| Madhusudan Gordhandas and Co. v. Madhu Woollen Industries P. Ltd. [1972] 42 Comp Cas 125 | Principles that if a debt is bona fide disputed and the defence is substantial and likely to succeed, the court will not order winding up; the defence must be in good faith and supported by prima facie proof of facts. | The court invoked these criteria when assessing whether the appellant's defence and counterclaim were bona fide and of substance, concluding they were prima facie substantial. |
| Bangarsi Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. v. Kali Charan Banerjee, AIR 1962 Cal 613 | Authority referenced regarding scrutiny of counter-claims to see whether they are bona fide and not manufactured to defeat creditor's claim. | The court noted the respondent's submission relying on this authority and used the general principle that counter-claims must be investigated for bona fides before admitting winding up. |
| Sarkar Estates P. Ltd. v. Kusumika Iron Works P. Ltd., AIR 1961 Cal 439 : [1962] 32 Comp Cas 575 | Similar authority emphasising that courts must ensure counter-claims are genuine and substantial. | The court considered these local authorities when concluding that the appellant's counter-claim was not frivolous or mala fide and warranted trial in a regular action. |
| Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd., In re [1969] 39 Comp Cas 475 | Held that if a company fails to comply with statutory notice under section 434(1)(a) and there is no bona fide dispute, creditor is entitled to winding up ex debito justitiae; commercial insolvency is immaterial to that conclusion. | The court treated this authority as supporting the proposition that absence of a bona fide dispute justifies winding up, but distinguished it because the court found a bona fide dispute on the instant facts. |
| Advent Corporation P. Ltd., In re [1969] 39 Comp Cas 463 | Referenced as a relevant Bombay decision concerning principles on disputes and winding up petitions. | Referred to as part of the body of authorities the court considered in determining whether the appellant's dispute was bona fide; the court concluded it was. |
| Welsh Brick Industries Ltd., In re [1946] 2 All ER 197 (CA) | English Court of Appeal authority cited in the context of disputes and winding-up petitions. | The court noted this authority among others illustrating the established principle that bona fide disputes preclude winding up proceedings as a method of debt enforcement. |
| Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills' case [1954] 58 CWN 689 : AIR 1955 Cal 273 | Held that if the grounds on which liability is disputed are substantial and bona fide, the court will not decide the dispute in winding-up proceedings and such claims should be tried in a regular action. | The court applied this principle directly, finding the appellant's defence and counter-claim substantial and bona fide and therefore directing that the matters be investigated in ordinary proceedings rather than by winding up. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the decisive question as whether there was a bona fide dispute — in other words, whether the company merely declined to pay without reasonable cause (para 22). It proceeded by examining the contractual terms and contemporaneous correspondence:
- The agreement required quarterly settlement of final accounts; by letter of 15 November 1977 the respondent forwarded a final statement for the quarter ending November 1977, which the appellant confirmed (paras 22–23).
- Correspondence between the parties showed that the claim was treated as a running claim and that the appellant had asserted a counter-claim and alleged the respondent had stopped orders and closed business without giving the contractual notice (paras 22–24).
- The court held these were substantive disputes not suitable for resolution on affidavits in winding-up proceedings and that they required a regular action for full investigation (para 24–25).
- Applying established authorities, the court reiterated the legal propositions that (a) omission to pay amounts to neglect only if without reasonable excuse, (b) a bona fide and substantial defence or counter-claim can constitute a reasonable excuse, and (c) winding-up proceedings should not be used to resolve such disputes when the defence is bona fide and substantial (paras 26–29).
- On evaluating the facts and the parties' cases, the court found that the appellant's defence — that the Rs. 24,000 had not crystallised into a debt and that it had a prima facie counter-claim for significant damages — was not frivolous or mala fide (paras 24–25, 30–31).
- Consequently, the court concluded there was a bona fide dispute and a prima facie case on the appellant's counter-claim; therefore the learned trial judge had erred in admitting the petition for winding up and ordering advertisement (para 30–31).
- The court then exercised a remedial, conditional direction: it allowed the appellant a three-month period to initiate appropriate proceedings to establish its claim; in the interim the sums deposited (Rs. 8,000 with Registrar and Rs. 10,000 with advocates-on-record) were to remain held under court order (para 31).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was allowed and the judgment and order dated 3 August 1982 admitting the respondent's petition for winding up was set aside. There will be no order as to costs (para 32).
Implications and consequences for the parties:
- The winding-up proceedings (admission and advertisement) were vacated because the court found a bona fide dispute and a prima facie valid counter-claim by the appellant, making winding up an inappropriate remedy at that stage (paras 30–31).
- The appellant was given liberty to institute appropriate proceedings within three months to establish its counter-claim; during that period the deposited sums (Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 10,000) were to remain held by the Registrar and the appellants' advocates as security under court orders (para 31).
- If the appellant commenced suit or proceedings within three months, the respondent might raise the previous claim of Rs. 18,000 by way of counter-claim or set-off in such proceedings; if the appellant did not take steps within three months, the respondent could apply to withdraw the monies held, which had been invested in short-term fixed deposits, in satisfaction of its claim (para 31).
- No new legal principle or precedent was created by this decision; the court applied existing authorities and principles concerning bona fide disputes, counter-claims and the proper use of winding-up proceedings. The direct effect is procedural and dispositive between the parties rather than declaratory of novel law.
Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the opinion's content have been introduced.
Prabir Kumar Majumdar, J.:— This appeal arises out of a judgment and order passed by a learned single judge of this court on August 3, 1982.
2. The respondent, Messrs. Jainti Enterprises, describing itself as a registered firm, presented a petition for the winding up of the appellant company. The case as made out by the respondent in its petition for winding up is that by an agreement dated November 28, 1975, the appellant agreed to sell dolomite to the respondent for a period of five years with an option for cenewal upon the terms and conditions contained therein. Pursuant to the said agreement, the respondent had been buying from the appellant igainst advance payment from 1975 to 1977. After adjustment of accounts t was found, according to the respondent, that the appellant was indebted: o the respondent for a sum of Rs. 24,062.42. It is alleged by the respon-ient that the statement of account between the parties was settled and onfirmed wherefrom a sum of Rs. 24,062·42 remained due to the respon-lent from the appellant and was settled at Rs. 24,000. The respondent illeged that in confirmation of the said account, the appellant paid is. 6,000 in cash and issued four cheques for the balance sum of Rs. 18,000. The said cheques were, however, not presented for encashment and, as such, he said sum of Rs. 18,000 remained unpaid. The said sum of Rs. 18,000, remained due and owing to the respondent by the appellant. Hence, the aid petition for winding up.
3. After presentation of the said petition for winding up, the appellant leposited a sum of Rs. 10,000 in cash by way of security with Messrs. K. Gupta and S. Brahmachari, the two advocates on record for the paries. On August 3, 1982, the said petition for winding up was admitted, ‘he appellant, being aggrieved by the said order dated August 3, 1982, (referred the present appeal to this court and upon admission of the said appeal, the court of appeal granted stay of operation of said order appealed from. Pursuant to the order of the court of appeal, the appellant deposited the balance claim of Rs. 8,000 in cash with the Registrar, Original Side, of this court. The appellant's case was that in terms of the said agreement dated November 28, 1975, the appellant agreed to supply and the respondent agreed to purchase dolomite against advance payment to be made to the appellant. According to the appellant, it was, inter alia, provided in the agreement that the part payments to be paid by the respondent to the appellant against the price of dolomite would be adjusted against the fortnightly bills to be drawn by the appellant upon the respondent and the settlement of the final account was to be made quarterly. The said agreement, according to the appellant, further provided that if the respondent closed down its business, then a written notice thereof should be given to the appellant at least three months before. It was the allegation of the appellant that without any notice to the appellant, the respondent suddenly stopped placing any further order on the appellant for the purchase of the products since the middle of November, 1977, whereby the appellant suffered huge losses and damages to the tune of Rs. 4,52,250, particulars whereof were set out in annexure “C” to the affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant before the court of the first instance. Regarding the issuance of four cheques for the sum of Rs. 18,000, the appellant's case was that the appellant issued those cheques on the agreement between the parties that the said cheques would not be presented to the bank for encashment until the respondent's dues under the said agreement dated November 28, 1975, was settled. It was alleged by the appellant that in view of its claim to the tune of Rs. 4,52,250 against the respondent, nothing remained due and owing by the appellant to the respondent.
4. Three points urged by the appellant before the court of the first instance were, firstly by that the respondent not being a registered firm could not maintain the petition for winding up; secondly, that in any event, the alleged claim of the respondent was barred by limitation and, thirdly, as to the merits, the respondent's alleged claim was disputed bona fide.
5. The learned trial judge held against the appellant on all the aforesaid submissions and admitted the respondent's petition for winding up of the appellant.
6. This appeal now comes up for final disposal.
7. Mr. S.B Mookherjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that there cannot be any question of deemed insolvency under section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, when the entire claim of the respondent has been secured. He also argues that the alleged claim of the respondent was disputed bona fide and the company also raised a prima facie valid counter-claim. It is, therefore, his submission that the company raised a bona fide defence to the alleged claim of the petitioner creditor, and the winding up being a discretionary relief cannot be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. Mr. Mookherjee in this appeal has not pressed the other two points urged by the appellant in the court of the first instance, namely, the point of maintainability of the petition and the question of limitation.
9. Mr. Mookherjee argues that mere omission to pay is not a neglect to pay within the meaning of section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, but such omission should be without reasonable excuse. It is, therefore, his submission that when the company bona fide disputed the debt and refused to pay, then it cannot be said that the company neglected to pay on demand the alleged claim of the respondent.
10. Mr. Moohkerjee, in support of his aforesaid submission, has relied on a Bench decision of this court in the case of The The Company… v. Rameshwar Singh Of Darbhanga…., [1919] 23 CWN 844 : AIR 1920 Cal 1004. It has been observed in this case that negligence in paying a debt on demand is omitting to pay without reasonable excuse, but mere omission by itself does not amount to negligence.
11. Next case relied on by Mr. Mookherjee is the case of Bharat Vegetable Products, In re, [1952] 22 Comp Cas 62 : [1952] 56 CWN 29. This court held in that case that the presentation of a petition for winding up was an abuse of the process of the court if the debt on which the petition was founded was disputed bona fide. It further held that the court would not allow the process of winding up to be used as an instrument for extorting a claim which was disputed bona fide.
12. Mr. Mookherjee has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court on the point in the case of Amalgamated Commercial Traders P. Ltd. v. A.C.K Krishnaswami, [1965] 35 Comp Cas 456. It is observed by the Supreme Court that it is settled that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means of seeking to enforce payment of a debt which is bona fide disputed by the company. It is further observed that if a debt is bona fide disputed, there cannot be a “neglect to pay” within the meaning of section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956.
13. Mr. Mookherjee contends that in the instant case, the statement of account was not a final account but a quarterly account. He has referred us to clause 7 of the said agreement dated November 28, 1975, entered into between the parties. The said clause provided that part payments to sellers, i.e, the company, against the price of dolomite would be adjusted against fortnightly bills and settlement of the final account between the parties was to be made quarterly. According to Mr. Mookherjee, the said agreement was for a period of five years and the settlement of final account between the parties was to be made every quarter in the said period of five years. He contends that the said sum of Rs. 24,000 was settled till the quarter ending November, 1977, and it cannot be a final adjustment of accounts as the said agreement was still running. Further, such settled amount was subject to further adjustment and/or settlement in subsequent quarters. It is the argument of Mr. Mookherjee that the said amount could not be transformed into a debt until a final adjustment of accounts between the parties was made either at the termination of the agreement or at the end of the contract period. Therefore, according to Mr. Mookherjee, there was no question of any indebtedness of the appellant to the respondent.
14. Mr. Mookherjee has next argued that the appellant has a valid counterclaim in excess of the claim of the petitioner creditor, i.e, the respondent. Mr. Mookherjee submits that if there is a prima facie valid counter-claim, then the existence of such a valid counter-claim would constitute reasonable excuse for non-payment. Mr. Mookherjee submits that the appellant's case is that the respondent wrongfully, illegally and without any notice to the appellant, suddenly stopped placing any further order on the appellant since November, 1977, and closed the business without any notice. The appellant, as a result, suffered huge losses and damages, amounting to Rs. 4,52,250. Mr. Mookherjee contends that the contract between the parties was for a period of five years and there was no notice of termination of the said agreement by either party. The respondent committed a breach of the said agreement by not placing order on the appellant in terms of the said agreement and, as a result, the appellant was entitled to damages.
15. Mr. Mookherjee referred to the following decisions in The The Company… v. Rameshwar Singh Of Darbhanga…., [1919] 23 CWN 844 : AIR 1920 Cal 1004 : [1902] 6 CWN 29 and In re Federal Chemical Works Ltd., [1964] 34 Comp Cas 963 (All). Relying on those decisions, Mr. Mookherjee contended that assuming that the respondent's alleged claim was admitted, in view of the appellant's counterclaim, it should be held that the debt of the petitioning-creditor was disputed and there could not be any failure nor neglect to pay the alleged dues of the petitioning-creditor.
16. Lastly, Mr. Mookherjee has contended that a winding-up order being a discretionary relief, such discretion may not be exercised on the facts and circumstances of the case even when inability of the company to pay its debts is proved. He argues that when the entire claim of the petitioning creditor has been secured by the orders of this court, the winding up petition should not have been admitted. He refers to an unreported Bench decision of this court in Appeal No. 122 of 1979 (Eastern Paper Mills Ltd. v. Susil Kumar Saraogi and Co.), the judgment being delivered on January 24. 1980.
17. Mrs. Ruma Pal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, contends that if the company does not have bona fide defence, then the peti-tioning-creditor is entitled to an order for winding up. She contends that for the purpose of deciding the question whether there is a bona fide dispute or not, the question of the claim being secured is wholly immaterial.
18. On the question of counter-claim, Mrs. Pal argues that mere raising of a counter-claim is insufficient. According to her, such a claim must be boda fide, substantial and it should be likely to succeed. She submits that the court has to investigate the counter-claim to determine whether the dispute has been manufactured to defeat and delay the realisation of the dues of the petitioning-creditor. Mrs. Pal referred to certain) decisions of this court Bangarsi Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. v. Kali Char an Banerjee, AIR 1962 Cal 613 and Sarkar Estates P. Ltd. v. Kusumika Iron Works P. Ltd., AIR 1961 Cal 439 : [1962] 32 Comp Cas 575.
19. Mrs. Pal submits that while admitting the petition for winding up, the court has to determine whether the company has a bona fide dispute as far as the petitioning-creditor's debt is concerned. Mrs. Pal places reliance on a Supreme Court decision in the case of Madhusudan Gordhandas and Co. v. Madhu Woollen Industries P. Ltd., [1972] 42 Comp Cas 125. It is observed by the Supreme Court that (headnote): “Where the petition for the winding up is based on the ground of inability of the company to pay its debts, it is well settled that if the debt is bona fide disputed and the defence is a substantial one, the court will not order winding up. The principles on which the court acts are first, that the defence of the company is in good faith and one of substance, secondly, the defence is likely to succeed in point of law and, thirdly, the company adduces prima facie proof of the facts on which the defence depends.”
20. Mrs. Pal then refers to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd., In re, [1969] 39 Comp Cas 475, wherein it has been observed that (headnote)” if a company fails to comply with a statutory notice under section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956, and the court comes to the conclusion that there is no bona fide dispute in regard to the petitioner's debt, the creditor is entitled to a winding up order ex debito justitiae. The fact that the company is not commercially insolvent is immaterial.” Mrs. Pal also cites another Bombay decision in Advent Corporation P. Ltd., In re, [1969] 39 Comp Cas 463. Mrs. Pal also referred to a decision in Welsh Brick Industries Ltd., In re, [1946] 2 All ER 197 (CA).
21. Therefore, it is the submission of Mrs. Pal, learned counsel for the respondent, that since there was no bona fide dispute nor was there any foundation in the appellant's alleged counter-claim, the court had no discretion but to admit the petition, and in her submission the court had rightly exercised the discretion in admitting the petition in the facts and circumstances of the case.
22. Now, the question in this appeal is whether there is bona fide dispute or in other words whether the company merely declines to pay without reason.
23. As we have noticed earlier, the settlement of the final account between the parties was to be made quarterly. By a letter dated November 15, 1977, the respondent forwarded a final statement of account as on November 15, 1977, i.e, for the quarter ending on November, 1977. The appellant confirmed the said account. According to the respondent, the appellant paid Rs. 6,000 leaving a balance sum of Rs. 18,000. As it would appear from the letter dated December 4, 1978, from the respondent to the appellant, the said claim was a running claim. The appellant by its letter dated January 2, 1979, addressed to the respondent, stated that the terms of the said agreement dated November 28, 1975, enjoined the respondent to guarantee advance payment to the appellant every week and settlements of final accounts were to be made quarterly. Further, the appellant pointed out in the said letter that the respondent stated that the said claim for Rs. 24,000 was made for the purpose of resolving the quarrels between the partners of the respondent firm. The appellant in the said letter dated January 2, 1978, also claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 75,000 on account of heavy losses suffered by the appellant for the failure of the respondent to give notice of the closure of business in terms of the said agreement. The respondent, however, by its letter dated February 16, 1979, disputed such plea of the appellant and alleged that the appellant committed breach of the said agreement by appointing another party for selling dolomite and reserves its right to clairr damages.
24. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the said clain of Rs. 18,000 was not a debt or a sum certain but subject to further adjustment in subsequent quarters. He contends further that the appel; lant has laid a satisfactory foundation for its counter-claim against th respondent. Admittedly, the contract was for five years and, according to the appellant, the respondent stopped placing further orders resulting ii loss and damages due to the aforesaid breach.
25. In our opinion, these are disputes which cannot be resolved on affidavits but in a regular action. On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the defence sought to be raised by the appellant in the instant case is frivolous or mala fide. In substance, the defence of the company appears to be that the said amount of Rs. 24,000 was not crystallised into a debt giving rise to an indebtedness of the company and further by reason of the respondent's stopping to place any further order or for closure of business without any notice in terms of the agreement, the appellant had suffered loss and damages. By reason of such breach, there was a prima facie case for the appellant's counter-claim. Therefore, in our opinion, it cannot be said that a such a claim is frivolous or made with an intention to defeat the claim of the respondent or without any merit. The respective cases as made out by the parties require thorough investigation which is only possible in a regular action.
26. In the case of The The Company… v. Rameshwar Singh Of Darbhanga…., [1919] 23 CWN 844 : AIR 1920 Cal 1004, the debt due to the petitioner was admitted and only a counter-claim for damages was set up and the appeal court held that the debt of the petitioner was disputed.
27. In the case of Federal Chemical Works Ltd., In re, [1964] 34 Comp Cas 963 (All), it is observed that (headnote): “In order to raise the presumption under section 434(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, as to the company's inability to pay its debts, it is not sufficient to show merely that the company has omitted to pay the debt due to the petitioner despite service of the statutory notice; it must be shown that the company has omitted to pay without reasonable excuse. It is also observed that the existence of a valid counter-claim would clearly constitute a reasonable excuse for nonpayment.”
28. I In the case of Amalgamated Traders (P) Ltd., [1965] 35 Comp Cas 456, the Supreme Court has observed that a winding up petition is not a legitimate means of seeking to enforce payment of a debt which is bona fide disputed by the company. It proceeds to observe that if the debt is bona fide disputed, there cannot be neglect to pay and if there is no neglect to pay, the deeming provision as contained in section 434(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, will not come into play.
29. It has also been held in a Bench decision of this court, Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills' case, [1954] 58 CWN 689 : AIR 1955 Cal 273, that if the grounds on which the liability was disputed were substantial and if the dispute in that sense bona fide, the court would not proceed further to decide the dispute and determine whether or not the debt existed. This court further held that in such a case, the claims should be investigated and decided in a regular action.
30. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, we feel that where there are claims and cross-claims by the parties, as in the instant case, “the winding up proceedings are not intended to be exploited as a normal alternative to the ordinary mode of debt realisation”.
31. In our opinion, the questions sought to be raised in the instant case are questions which, if established, may constitute a valid case for the company. Whether the company will succeed in establishing its case or not will naturally depend on the result of the suit. We are fully convinced that the petitioning-creditor's debt has been disputed bona fide and there is a prima facie case for the appellant's counter-claim. In view of such claims and cross-claims by the parties, we are of the opinion that the learned judge was not right in admitting the petition for winding up and in giving directions for advertisement. As we are satisfied that the appellant has raised a bona fide counterclaim against the respondent and there is no neglect to pay the alleged debt of the petitioning-creditor, the winding up proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed. The appellant will be at liberty to take such steps as the appellant may be advised for establishing its claims against the respondent. If within three months from the date, the appellant chooses to take any appropriate steps for establishing its claim against the respondent, the Registrar, Original Side of this court, and the said advocates-on-record, Messrs. T.K Gupta and S. Brahmachari will hold the said sums of Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 10,000 as held by them by way of security respectively under orders of this court until further orders. In the event of a suit being filed or any other proceedings being initiated by the appellant against the respondent for establishing its said claim, then the respondent may raise a claim for the said sum of Rs. 18,000 by way of counter-claim or set off as it may be advised. If no such steps are taken by the appellant for establishing its claim within the said period of three months, the respondent will be at liberty to apply for withdrawal of the money held by the said advocates-on-record and the Registrar, Original Side, which, we have been told, has been invested in short-term fixed deposits with a nationalised bank and the interest accrued on the said sums in satisfaction of its claim against the appellant company.
32. In the premises, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated August 3, 1982. There will be no order as to costs.
33. R.N Pyne, J.:— I agree.
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