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Sunity Chandra Bose v. Nil Ratan Sinha .

Calcutta High Court
Mar 15, 1985
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sankari Prasad Das Ghosh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit (original trial in Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore) was for specific performance of a contract for sale of a brick-built one-storeyed house at No. 38.J/4 Maharaja Road, Dhakuria (now P.S. Jadavpur), together with recovery of khas possession and other reliefs.

On 11-4-1973 the parties executed an agreement (Ext. 1). The property was mortgaged to the State of West Bengal for Rs. 6,001/-, which sum was paid as earnest money by the plaintiff-respondent. The agreed sale price was Rs. 38,000/-. Under the contract the defendant-appellant was to obtain release of the property from the State within two months and, on making over true copies and permitting inspection of originals to show marketable title, execute the sale deed within three months of release and delivery of documents.

The plaintiff alleged readiness and willingness to perform and paid an additional Rs. 1,000/- on 13-12-1973 via his advocate. The defendant contended that the property was released on 18-7-1973 and true copies were supplied on 19-7-1973, that he was ready to complete, and that the plaintiff delayed completion and suggested changes to the draft conveyance late.

On consideration of evidence (plaintiff as P.W.1 and defendant as D.W.1) the trial court passed a conditional decree for specific performance with costs. The decree required the defendant to execute and register the sale deed within 90 days on payment of the balance of the purchase money by the plaintiff (with deductions for arrears of taxes and rent). If the defendant failed to execute within 90 days, the plaintiff could deposit the balance in court within 120 days and have the deed executed through the court. The decree contained a default clause that if the plaintiff failed to pay or deposit within the stipulated time the defendant would not be liable to execute the sale deed.

The defendant appealed. Post-decree, the plaintiff filed petitions seeking deduction of decretal costs and other sums from the balance, deposited Rs. 25,901.57 with the court on 24-8-1978, obtained an ex parte injunction on 4-12-1978 restraining the defendant from withdrawing that deposit, and later obtained an order (27-10-1979) permitting deposit of the decretal cost of Rs. 3,473.90 (which was subsequently deposited). The appellant challenged these post-decree actions and the trial court's extension/modification orders in this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff had been continuously "ready and willing" to perform his contractual obligation to pay the balance consideration-money so as to entitle him to specific performance.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's insistence on inserting a warranty/indemnity clause (as reflected in Ext. 2) disentitled him to specific performance when no such clause was in the registered agreement.
  3. Whether granting specific performance would entail undue hardship on the defendant and if that could bar relief.
  4. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to extend time or otherwise amend the conditional decree (including allowing deduction of costs from the balance, accepting deposits contrary to the conditional decree, and restraining the defendant from withdrawing deposited funds), particularly in view of the default clause in the conditional decree and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was not continuously ready and willing to perform; insistence on an indemnity/warranty clause (Ext. 2) showed lack of readiness.
  • The decree for specific performance would cause hardship to the defendant (e.g., need for funds for daughter's marriage and increased valuation causing loss if forced sale now).
  • The learned Subordinate Judge erred in allowing the plaintiff's post-decree prayers (deduction of costs, extension of time to deposit, injunction restraining withdrawal) because a conditional decree containing the default clause was not a preliminary decree and the court lacked jurisdiction to extend time or amend the decree in that manner.
  • Additional ground (noted) challenged extension of time for deposit of amounts under the decree; cited authorities to support limits on court's power to vary conditional decrees.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments

  • The plaintiff consistently demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform: he paid Rs. 6,001 as earnest money, later gave Rs. 1,000 through his advocate, and had bank balances and a provident-fund withdrawal permission sufficient to meet the balance. Documentary evidence (Exts. 6, 6(a), 7 and letter Ext. 3(z)(5)) supported that he had roughly Rs. 39,000 available.
  • The plaintiff need not have produced cash in hand; borrowing or creditability and entitlement to withdraw from Provident Fund sufficed to show readiness (relying on authorities).
  • The court could exercise jurisdiction to extend time and make appropriate orders under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, and relevant case-law supported such extension and relief in appropriate circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon (1928) AIR 1928 PC 208 Referenced by appellant to support point that continuous readiness and willingness must be shown. Cited by appellant; court considered it among authorities on readiness but relied on documentary evidence in this case to hold plaintiff was ready and willing.
Gomathinavagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar AIR 1967 SC 868 Referenced by appellant re: continuous readiness to perform purchase obligation. Cited by appellant; court considered this but found documentary bank evidence showed continuous readiness in present case.
Bank of India v. J.A.H. Chinoy AIR 1950 PC 90 Principle that a purchaser need not produce money in hand or vouch a concluded financing scheme to show readiness and willingness. Relied upon by the court to support conclusion that plaintiff's bank balances and entitlement to withdraw from Provident Fund sufficed to show readiness and willingness.
Babu Binde Shri Parshad v. Mahant Jairam Gir (14 Ind. App. 173) Privy Council authority that a purchaser's delay insisting on an absolute warranty of title (where none agreed) may disentitle him to specific performance. Cited by appellant to argue plaintiff's insistence on warranty clause showed lack of readiness. Court held evidence did not show plaintiff insisted on such clause, so this authority did not preclude decree here.
Md. Ziaul Haque v. Calcutta Vyaper Pratisthan AIR 1966 Cal 605 Authority that insistence on a warranty where no agreement exists indicates lack of readiness to perform. Relied on by appellant; court found the facts did not show insistence and therefore did not accept the submission based on this case.
Bhutnath v. Sahodeb (66 Cal WN 645) : AIR 1962 Cal 485 Authority suggesting a conditional decree with default clause was not a preliminary decree and court could not extend time. Cited by appellant. The Division Bench in Tapan Chatterjee later did not approve Bhutnath; this court discussed Bhutnath but observed later Supreme Court decisions and re-examined the issue of conditional decrees.
Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das AIR 1961 SC 882 Distinction between peremptory procedural orders and conditional orders. Appellant relied on it. The court observed the distinction and noted it had been relied upon in argument about limits of court's power to vary conditional decrees.
B. Ganapati v. S. Rajaram AIR 1974 Bom 104 Referential authority in the debate over the power to vary conditional decrees / extension of time. Referred to by parties; the court noted prior cases considered in Tapan Chatterjee and weighed them in its analysis.
Sandhyarani v. Sudharani AIR 1978 SC 537 Supreme Court authority holding that a decree for specific performance with a default clause (dismissing suit on default) was not a preliminary decree. Cited by appellant to argue conditional decree is not preliminary; the court observed Sandhyarani had not been placed before the Division Bench in Tapan Chatterjee and acknowledged its relevance while refraining from conclusively resolving the broader doctrinal issue.
M. Sakuntala Debi v. V. Sakuntala AIR 1978 Andh Pra 337 Authority relied upon regarding the scope of court's power under older law/Specific Relief Act. Cited by appellant; court noted it in the context of arguments about whether Section 28 confers new power to extend time.
Tapan Kumar Chatterjee v. Kalyani Debi (1985) 89 Cal WN 27 : AIR 1985 Cal 243 Division Bench decision holding a decree in a suit for specific performance is preliminary in initial stage and court retains ample jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders including extension of time; criticized and discussed in this appeal. The court analyzed and stated that there is scope for rethinking about conditional decrees; it considered Tapan Chatterjee but ultimately did not rest its final decision solely on that precedent, instead deciding the matter on facts and post-decree conduct.
H.I. Trust v. Haridas Mundhra AIR 1972 SC 1826 Authority relating to rescission/relief in contexts that did not involve Section 28 (movable property case) and discussed in Tapan Chatterjee. Referred to by the respondent; court observed H.I. Trust concerned movables and Section 28 was inapplicable there; used to distinguish factual and statutory contexts.
Bisun Prasad v. Kamala Kant AIR 1972 Pat 322 One of several cases referred to in support of extension of time and interlocutory powers. Referred to by respondent's counsel; court considered these cases in the debate over the scope of Section 28 and inherent powers but resolved the present matter on post-decree conduct.
Pankaj Kumar v. Manmatha Nath AIR 1973 Cal 439 Authority cited in discussion about court powers post-decree. Referred to in the course of arguments considered by the court; not determinative of the result here beyond being part of the judicial context.
M. V. Kshirsagar v. B. K. Jadhav AIR 1970 Bom 398 Authority referred to in support of extension/variation powers in certain circumstances. Referred to by respondent; court considered it among others in assessing the legal background.
Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo AIR 1982 SC 137 Supreme Court authority referred to in Tapan Chatterjee's discussion of jurisdictional powers of trial courts in specific performance matters. Referred to by respondent; court noted it among Supreme Court precedents considered in prior decisions.
Babulal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal AIR 1982 SC 818 Supreme Court authority referred to in discussion regarding post-decree powers and remedial jurisdiction. Referred to by respondent and considered by the court in the broader doctrinal context.
K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar AIR 1980 SC 512 Supreme Court authority cited in the jurisprudential debate about court powers post-decree. Referred to by respondent; part of the background authorities considered by the court.
Sahida Bibi v. Golam Mohammad 86 Cal WN 727 : AIR 1983 Cal 216 Authority used by the court to justify remand for permitting amendment of plaint to seek refund of purchase money. The court relied on this decision to direct remand so that the plaintiff could (within stipulated time) amend the plaint to include a claim for refund of sums paid/deposited.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded to analyze the competing contentions in stages, applying documentary evidence to fact questions and then considering the legal consequences of post-decree conduct.

  1. Readiness and willingness: The court examined bank pass-books (Exts. 6, 6(a), 7) and a letter from the Reserve Bank of India (Ext. 3(z)(5)) permitting the plaintiff to withdraw Rs. 15,000 from his Provident Fund. The Subordinate Judge had found that the plaintiff had roughly Rs. 24,000 in three bank accounts and, with Provident Fund withdrawal, roughly Rs. 39,000 available against a balance due of Rs. 30,999. The Bench applied the principle (from Bank of India v. J.A.H. Chinoy) that a purchaser need not have the money physically in hand or a concluded financing plan; the plaintiff's demonstrated cash and credit sufficed to prove continuous readiness and willingness. The court found no reason to interfere with the trial court's finding on this point.
  2. Warranty/indemnity clause: Appellant argued (relying on Babu Binde and Md. Ziaul Haque) that insisting on a warranty amounted to lack of readiness. The court inspected the evidence and concluded there was nothing to show the plaintiff insisted on retention of a warranty clause in the draft deed. The draft had been sent for approval (Ext. 2) and the defendant could have objected; the record contained no such objection nor evidence of insistence. Accordingly the court rejected this contention.
  3. Hardship: The court considered the defendant's evidence about financial difficulty (daughter's marriage) and increased property valuation. It held that such hardship did not bar specific performance; increase in valuation or temporary financial pressure do not defeat specific performance as a matter of law.
  4. Post-decree modification, extensions and jurisdiction: The court set out the chronology of post-decree petitions and orders: plaintiff's petition 27-6-1978 (for deduction of costs), order of notice 3-7-1978, adjournments, unilateral petition 16-8-1978 allowing deduction of costs without hearing the defendant, deposit of Rs. 25,901.57 on 24-8-1978, ex parte injunction of 4-12-1978 restraining withdrawal, and the trial court's 27-10-1979 order allowing deposit of decretal cost under sections 148 and 151 CPC.
  5. On the crucial legal point — whether the trial court could amend the conditional decree or extend time in the face of a default clause — the court reviewed conflicting authorities (including the Division Bench decision in Tapan Chatterjee which treated such decrees as preliminary and capable of alteration). The court noted that the Supreme Court's Sandhyarani decision (AIR 1978 SC 537) — which held a decree containing a dismissal-on-default clause was not preliminary — had not been placed before the Division Bench in Tapan Chatterjee and that there was scope for rethinking on conditional decrees. However, rather than resolve the entire doctrinal controversy, the court focused on the facts: the plaintiff had effectively modified the conditional decree without proper justification or notice to the defendant, obtained an injunction restraining withdrawal of deposits, and sought an unfair advantage inconsistent with the conditional decree's terms.
  6. The court concluded that the order of 16-8-1978 (allowing deduction of costs without hearing the defendant) and the ex parte injunction and subsequent modification amounted to impermissible alteration of the conditional decree and were not authorized by Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act or by inherent powers (Section 151 CPC) in the manner exercised. The court emphasized that Section 28 permits extension of time for deposit of purchase money but does not authorize altering the decree to permit installment deposit or to direct deduction of sums (like decretal costs) that were not ordered in the conditional decree, without notice to the affected party.
  7. Result on reasoning: Because plaintiff's post-decree conduct materially modified the decree to his advantage and because there was no direction in the conditional decree allowing deduction of costs (or the other modifications effected), the court held it would be inappropriate to allow specific performance to stand. The court therefore refused to permit specific enforcement of the contract on these grounds but protected the plaintiff's monetary claims by remanding for amendment of the plaint to claim refund and directing procedures for recovery of deposited sums and paid amounts.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF THE LEARNED SUBORDINATE JUDGE ARE SET ASIDE.

Direct consequences and orders made by the court:

  • The suit for specific performance is refused to stand as enforced by the trial court in its present amended/post-decree form because the plaintiff's post-decree conduct resulted in an impermissible modification of the conditional decree to his advantage.
  • The case is remanded to the trial court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The plaintiff is given an opportunity (within one month of service of notice of arrival of records in the court below on the plaintiff or his advocate, or within such further time as the court below may grant) to amend the plaint to include a prayer for refund of sums paid by him (Rs. 6,001/- and Rs. 1,000/-) with interest at 6% per annum from dates of payment until recovery, and to seek withdrawal of sums deposited in court (Rs. 25,901.57 and Rs. 3,473.90) that were deposited under the orders of the trial court.
  • If the plaintiff properly applies to amend the plaint and prays for refund/withdrawal, the court below will permit the amendment and pass a decree for refund of these sums with interest @ 6% per annum until recovery, subject to consideration of sufficiency of court-fees on the amended plaint.
  • If the plaintiff does not pray for amendment within the time permitted, the defendant is to be directed to apply for revision (rescission) of the contract under Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, so that appropriate directions may be passed for return of the purchase money paid and deposited sums.
  • Costs: In the special circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this appeal.
  • Administrative directions: No decree need be drawn in the appeal; the records are to be sent down as early as possible.

Broader implication on precedent or law: The court discussed conflicting authorities on the scope of a trial court's power to vary or extend terms of conditional decrees in specific performance suits (including Tapan Chatterjee and Sandhyarani) and indicated there is scope for rethinking, but the decision in this case turned primarily on the post-decree conduct and factual modifications of the decree rather than on establishing a new broad legal rule. The court did not purport to lay down a new general rule overruling previous authorities; it remanded the matter for factual and remedial relief consistent with the orders above.

Notes on Remedies Ordered

  • Refund requested (if plaintiff amends) to cover Rs. 6,001 and Rs. 1,000 with interest at 6% per annum from dates of payment until recovery.
  • Allow withdrawal of deposits made in court (Rs. 25,901.57 and Rs. 3,473.90) in accordance with the remand order if the plaintiff pursues amendment and obtains decree for refund.
  • If no amendment sought, defendant to apply for revision/rescission under Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for return of monies.

End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Sankari Prasad Das Ghosh, J.:— The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was for specific performance of a contract for sale of one brick-built one-storeyed house at premises No. 38.J/4 Maharaja Road, Dhakuria, now P.S Jadavpur along with prayers for recovery of khas possession of the property and some other prayers. On 11-4-1973, there was an agreement between the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-appellant for release of the suit-property by the plaintiff, within two months from the date of the execution of the agreement, from the State of West Bengal, to which the property was mortgaged. The terms of the agreement were that if the defendant-appellant had the property released from the State of West Bengal and had made over true copies of the relevant documents including the deed of release and had allowed inspection of the original documents to the plaintiff-respondent, when demanded, to show the marketable title of the defendant to the property, the deed of sale in respect of the property was to be executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff within three months of the release of the property and of making over of the true copies of the documents to the plaintiff. At the time of execution of the agreement, Ext. 1, and amount of Rs. 6001/- was paid as earnest money by the plaintiff to the defendant as the property was mortgaged with the State of West Bengal for that amount of Rs. 6001/-. The terms were that the property would be sold for a sum of Rs. 38,000/-.

2. The case of the plaintiff-respondent was that though he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and had also given subsequently to the defendant through his Advocate a further sum of Rs. 1000/- on 13-12-1973, the defendant did not execute the Kobala in respect of the property in favour of the plaintiff, even though time for execution of the sale deed was extended at the request of the appellant by several letters. As such, the suit was filed for specific performance of the contract for sale, recovery of possession of the property and for some other reliefs.

3. The case of the defendant-appellant was that on 18-7-1973, the property was released by the State of West Bengal and a deed of release was executed. In spite of his best attempt, the defendant could not get the deed of release earlier. The defendant was all along ready and willing to complete the transaction. On 19-7-1973, he made over to the plaintiff a copy of the deed of release and other documents. The plaintiff violated the terms and conditions of the agreement. Long after the time to complete the transaction, the plaintiff suggested a change in the deed of conveyance by a letter dated 29-12-1973. The plaintiff had never offered the balance of the consideration-money to the defendant. It was the plaintiff who deferred the completion of the transaction on flimsy grounds.

4. The plaintiff examined himself as P.W 1. The defendant examined himself as D.W 1. On a consideration of the evidences of these witnesses and the materials on record, the learned Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore, passed a conditional decree for specific performance of the contract for sale on contest with costs. The defendant was directed to execute and register a deed of sale in respect of the property within 90 days of the decree, on payment of the balance of the consideration-money to the defendant by the plaintiff minus the arrears for taxes due to the corporation and arrears of rent due to the landlord for the property on the date of the decree. It was mentioned in the decree that in case of the failure on the part of the defendant to execute and register the deed of sale within 90 days of the decree, on receipt of the aforesaid balance of consideration by the defendant, the plaintiff was to deposit the amount in court within 120 days of the decree. If the plaintiff paid the balance of the consideration-money to the defendant or deposited the same in court, the defendant would be entitled to accept or withdraw the same. If the plaintiff failed to pay or deposit the amount, the defendant would not be liable to execute the deed of sale. The defendant was directed to deliver khas possession of the property in favour of the plaintiff after execution of the deed of sale and in case of failure on the part of the defendant to deliver khas possession of the property, it was ordered that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the same through Court as per law. Being aggrieved by this decree for specific performance of the contract for sale of the property, the present appeal has been filed.

5. Mr. Das Gupta, learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant, has challenged the decree on several grounds. His first contention is that, on the basis of the materials on record, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He has argued that the insistence on the part of the plaintiff to have an indemnity clause in the draft deed of sale, Ext. 2, though there was no such agreement for indemnity clause between the parties, disentitles the plaintiff from having a decree for specific performance of the contract for sale. Mr. Das Gupta has argued that the decree for specific performance of the contract for sale will entail hardship on the defendant. Apart from these grounds, Mr. Das Gupta gave a notice on 8-2-1985 for taking up an additional ground to the effect that the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in allowing the plaintiffs prayer for extension of time to deposit the amount not deposited within the time specified in the decree and made submissions in this regard.

6. To show that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, Mr. Das Gupta had referred us to the cases of Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon (1928) 32 Cal WN 953 : (AIR 1928 PC 208) and Gomathinavagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar AIR 1967 SC 868 and has argued that it has not been proved, on the basis of the evidences on record, that there was a continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff from the date of the contract to the time of hearing to perform the contract. Mr. Mallick, learned Counsel for the respondent, has argued that if the evidences on record be considered, along with a letter dated 26-7-1975 from the Manager, Reserve Bank of India, to the plaintiff, in reply to the letter of the plaintiff dated 18-6-1975, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff had sufficient fund in his credit to purchase the property within the stipulated period. The learned Subordinate Judge referred to three documents, Exts. 6, 6(a) and 7, and came to the conclusion that at the relevant time the plaintiff had always in his account an amount of Rs. 33,000/- and odd ready for payment to the defendant. Considering the evidences on record, we find nothing to interfere with this finding of the learned Subordinate Judge. Ext. 6 is the pass Book of the plaintiff in the Reserve Bank Supervisory Staff Co-operative Credit Society. Ext. 6(a) shows that the plaintiff had an account at the Chartered Bank, 4, Netaji, Subhas Road Calcutta. Ext. 7 shows that the plaintiff had also an account at the Grindleys Bank. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiff had in his account, as shown in Ext. 6, a sum of Rs. 7872.81 paise on 29-11-1973. Actually, the amount at the credit of the plaintiff on 29-11-1973, as per Ext. 6, will be Rs. 8570/-. The plaintiff had a further sum of Rs. 9810.59 paise in the Chartered Bank on 30-11-1973, vide Ext. 6(a). Towards the end of 1973, the plaintiff had in his credit a sum of Rs. 5749.01 paise, vide Ext. 7. Out of the consideration-money of Rs. 38,000/-, the plaintiff paid Rs. 7001/- to the defendant, leaving a balance of Rs. 30,999/-. A scrutiny of the various entries in the Pass Books, Exts. 6, 6(a) and 7, shows that the plaintiff had roughly a sum of Rs. 24,000/- at his credit in the three Bank accounts. This is also the evidence of P.W 1. According to P.W 1, he had Rs. 24,000/- and odd in the Banks, apart from the amount that he had in the Provident Fund. The letter, Ext. 3(z)(5) dated 26-7-1975, from the Manager, Reserve Bank of India to the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff was permitted to withdraw Rs. 15,000/- from his Provident Fund balance for purchasing a readymade house in November, 1973. The plaintiff had thus roughly a sum Rs. 39,000/-, including the amount which could have been withdrawn by him from the Provident Fund balance. To show readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, the plaintiff had proved that at all material times, he could have raised the amount. The plaintiff need not prove or show that he had ready in his hands the requisite amount which had to be paid by him to the vendor. As the plaintiff has been able to prove that he had both cash and credit at his command to pay the balance of the consideration-money to the defendant, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract or that there was no continuous readiness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. As stated by the Privy Council in the case of Bank of India v. J.A.H Chinoy AIR 1950 PC 90, in order to prove himself ready and willing to perform his obligation under a contract, a purchaser has not necessarily produce the money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction. We are, thus, of the opinion that there was a continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, for payment of the balance of the consideration-money to the defendant.

7. As for the second contention of Mr. Das Gupta, it is to be stated that in the case of Babu Binde Shri Parshad v. Mahant Jairam Gir (1886-1987) 14 Ind. App 173, it was held by the Privy Council that where a purchaser delayed payment of purchase money of immovable estate, insisting upon the insertion in the conveyance of an absolute warranty of title by the vendor to the property sold, the delay of payment should not be excused and there should be no case for decreeing specific performance, if such a right to such warranty was not shown. In Md. Ziaul Haque…Plaintiff; v. Calcutta Vyaper Pratisthan…Defendant., AIR 1966 Cal 605, it was held by this Court that if there is no agreement regarding warranty of title, insistence on the same indicates lack of readiness to perform his part of the contract. Relying on these two cases, Mr. Das Gupta has argued that the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale should not be decreed, when the plaintiff demanded incorporation of a warranty clause in the draft deed of sale, Ext. 2, though there was no such warranty clause in the registered deed of agreement dated 11-11-1973, Ext. 1. This contention cannot be accepted. It is nowhere in the evidences on record that the plaintiff insisted on the retention of the warranty clause in the draft deed of sale. The evidences show that the plaintiff sent the draft deed of sale, Ext. 2, to the defendant for approval. If the defendant was not willing to retain the warranty clause in the draft deed, the defendant could easily have written to the plaintiff in the matter. There is nothing in the evidences or in the materials on record to show that the defendant ever objected to the insertion of the warranty clause in the draft deed of sale. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff insisted on the insertion of the warranty clause in the draft deed of sale. In these circumstances, this contention of Mr. Das Gupta is to fail.

8. As for hardship, the evidences of the defendant (D.W 1) are that he was hard-pressed for money for his daughter's marriage, and as such, he was in great difficulty due to the plaintiffs unwillingness to complete the transaction within the stipulated time. D.W 1 has further stated that at present the valuation of the property has gone up and that he will suffer heavy loss if he was forced to sell the property. Needless to say, the decree for specific performance cannot be defeated on these grounds. As stated by the learned Subordinate Judge, the increase in valuation of the property should not weigh with the court in deciding whether specific performance of contract should be granted or not. Because the defendant was hard-pressed for money for giving his daughter in marriage at the relevant time, the decree for specific performance should not also be defeated. The contention of Mr. Das Gupta for not decreeing the suit for specific performance on the ground that it will entail hardship on the defendant cannot, thus, be accepted.

9. The last ground taken by Mr. Das Gupta is that the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in allowing the plaintiffs prayer for extension of time for failure to deposit the amount mentioned in the decree within the time specified in the decree. This is, in fact, the main contention of Mr. Das Gupta in this appeal. To show that the learned Subordinate Judge was not entitled to extend the time for deposit of the money mentioned in the decree, Mr. Das Gupta has referred us to several cases. Mr. Mallick, appearing for the plaintiff, has also referred us to several cases. Before entering into a discussion of these cases, it is better to state the post-decree events. The decree for specific performance of the contract for sale was passed on 28-4-1978. As already stated, the plaintiff was asked by the decree to pay or deposit the balance of the consideration-money minus the arrears for taxes due to the corporation and the arrears of rent due to the landlord for the suit-property on the date of the decree. The payment by the plaintiff was to be made within 90 days of the decree. In case of the failure on the part of the defendant to execute the deed of conveyance and to have it registered within 90 days from the date of the decree, the plaintiff could have the deed of sale executed and registered through Court as per law on depositing in Court the balance of the consideration-money, minus the arrears for taxes due to the corporation and the arrears of rent, within 120 days of the decree. It was stated in the decree that if the plaintiff failed to pay or deposit the amount within 90 days or 120 days of the decree respectively, the defendant would not be liable to execute the deed of sale. On the basis of this default clause, “the defendant shall not be liable to execute the deed of sale”, the contention of Mr. Das Gupta is that the conditional decree passed in the suit was not a preliminary decree and the court was without jurisdiction to extend the time to deposit the balance of the purchase-money. It appears that after the passing of the decree on 28-4-1978, the plaintiff filed a petition in the court below on 27-6-1978 for deducting the amount of damages and cost of the suit from the balance of the consideration-money and for rectifying the omission in the decree. By an order passed on 3-7-1978, the learned Subordinate Judge directed issue of notice in the matter on the defendant, fixing 3-8-1978 for return and orders. On 3-8-1978, the learned Subordinate Judge noted the presence of the (Subordinate Judge noted the presence of the plaintiff with postal receipt and adjourned the matter till 23-8-1978 for return and orders, as the notice sent to the defendant was not received back after service. On 16-8-1978, the plaintiff filed another petition for deducting the cost of the suit from the balance of the consideration-money and for depositing the decretal sum. The decretal cost was to the tune of Rs. 3473.90 paise. The corporation tax up to 31-5-1978 was to the tune of Rs. 1614.33 paise. The arrears of landlord's rent amounted to Rs. 9.20 paise. On deducting these amounts towards decretal cost, corporation tax and arrears of landlord's rent, the plaintiff wanted to deposit the balance of Rs. 25,901.57 paise by filing the petition on 16-8-1978. This prayer of the plaintiff by the petition dated 16-8-1978 was allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge on hearing the learned Advocate for the plaintiff. It appears that on 24-8-1978, the plaintiff deposited this sum of Rs. 25,901.57 paise by a Bank order. Subsequently, on 12-9-1978, the plaintiff filed another petition for restraining the defendant from withdrawing the amount deposited by him. An ex parte order of injunction was passed in the matter by the learned Subordinate Judge on 4-12-1978. Thereafter, on the prayer of the plaintiff, the learned Subordinate Judge passed an order on 27-10-1979 by which the plaintiff was allowed to deposit the cost of Rs. 3473.90 paise on the grounds that the mistake was genuine and bona fide on the part of the plaintiff and that the Court was empowered under sections 148 and 151 C.P.C to extend the time for deposit of the amount. By that order dated 27-10-1979, the case was fixed on 27-11-1979 for depositing the balance of the consideration-money. Accordingly, the cost of Rs. 3473.90 paise was, subsequently, deposited by the plaintiff. On the basis of these facts, Mr. Das Gupta has contended that the court had no power to extend the time for depositing the cost of the suit. He has referred to the cases of Bhutnath v. Sahodeb (1962) 66 Cal WN 645 : (AIR 1962 Cal 485), Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das. AIR 1961 SC 882, B. Ganapati v. S. Rajaram, AIR 1974 Bom 104, Sandhyarani v. Sudharani AIR 1978 SC 537, and M. Sakuntala Debi v. V. Sakuntala AIR 1978 Andh Pra 337 to support his contention that a conditional decree, like the one passed in the suit, was not a preliminary decree and that the court was without jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the cost of the suit, in spite of the provisions in Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of covenience). Mr. Mallick, learned Counsel for the plaintiff has, on the other hand, referred us to the case of Tapan Kumar Chatterjee… v. Kalyani Debi…. (1985) 89 Cal WN 27 : AIR 1985 Cal 243 wherein some of the cases referred to by Mr. Das Gupta, viz., 66 Cal WN 645 : (AIR 1962 Cal 485), AIR 1961 SC 882 and AIR 1974 Bom 104 were also considered and has argued that the court was within its power to extend the time for deposit of the cost of the suit on the basis of section 28 of the Act. To lend assurance to his contention, Mr. Mallick has referred us to the case of H.I Trust v. Haridas Mundhra, AIR 1972 SC 1826 discussed also in the case of Tapan Chatterjee (supra) as well as to the cases reported in AIR 1972 Pat 322 (Bisun Prasad v. Kamala Kant) AIR 1973. Cal 439 (Pankaj Kumar v. Manmatha Nath) and AIR 1970 Bom 398 (M.V Kshirsagar v. B.K Jadhav). Mr. Mallick has also referred us to several other cases of the Supreme Court, discussed in the case of Tapan Chatterjee 89 Cal WN 27 : (AIR 1985 Cal 243) viz. AIR 1982 SC 137 (Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo), AIR 1982 SC 818 (Babulal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal) and AIR 1980 SC 512 (K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S Somasundaram Chettiar).

10. The Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Tapan Chatterjee (supra) is to the effect that though the court can fix a time limit for discharge of mutual obligations by the parties in a suit for specific performance of contract, the prescriptions can never be peremptory that they cannot be subsequently altered under any circumstances. It has been decided in the case of Tapan Chatterjee (supra) that the decree at the initial stage in a suit for specific performance of contract is in the nature of a preliminary decree, or to be more specific not final in character, leaving ample jurisdiction in court to pass appropriate orders that may be necessary in such a suit and that the court cannot, on the terms of its decree, oust its jurisdiction either to grant an extension of time or to deprive the vendor of a relief to which it is otherwise entitled. Such an act of ouster of its own jurisdiction by passing a conditional decree would really be, according to the Division Bench decision, ultra vires the courts' power because no court can foreclose its jurisdiction conferred by the statute. The case of Bhutnath reported in 66 Cal WN 645 : (AIR 1962 Cal 485) was not approved by the Division Bench on a consideration of the cases reported in AIR 1961 SC 882, AIR 1972 SC 1826, AIR 1980 SC 512, AIR 1982 SC 137 and AIR 1982 SC 818.

11. Mr. Das Gupta has asked us not to agree with the view of the Division Bench in the case of Tapan Chatterjee (AIR 1985 Cal 243) (supra) on the ground that several decisions were not placed before their Lordships, at the time of hearing of the case of Tapan Chatterjee. Mr. Das Gupta has argued that in the case reported in AIR 1978 SC 537 it was decided that a decree passed in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property, calling upon the purchaser to deposit the balance of the consideration-money within the time stipulated in the decree with superadded condition that in the event of default, the suit would stand dismissed, was not a preliminary decree. According to Mr. Das Gupta, the decision in the case of Tapan Chatterjee rested on the grounds that a decree in a suit for specific performance was a preliminary decree in the initial stage, that such a decree was not a conditional decree and that section 28 of the Act clothed the court with power to extend the time for deposit of the balance of consideration-money, even if there was a default clause in the decree for specific performance of contract. Mr. Das Gupta has argued that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sandhya Rani AIR 1978 SC 537 a decree for specific performance of contract with a default clause is not a preliminary decree. He has argued that the case of H.I Trust, AIR 1972 SC 1826 was not a case of any conditional decree. Moreover, it was held in that case that an application to rescind a decree for specific performance of an agreement for sale of movables was not maintainable under section 28 of the Act, which related to immovable property. According to Mr. Das Gupta, the Supreme Court made a distinction in the case of Mahanth Ram reported in AIR 1961 SC 882 between peremptory procedural orders and conditional orders. He has argued that this distinction made by the Supreme Court was not considered in the case of Tapan Chatterjee. According to Mr. Das Gupta, the power to extend time for depositing the balance of consideration-money existed in court even under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 on the basis of decided case-laws, irrespective of section 28 of the present Act. It is contended that section 28 has not conferred any new power on the court to extend the time for depositing the balance of consideration-money as section 28 falls within Chapter IV of the Act dealing with the recission of contracts. To lend assurance to this contention, Mr. Das Gupta has relied on the case of M. Sakuntala reported in AIR 1978 Andh Pra 337.

12. We have carefully considered the Division bench decision of this Court in the case of Tapan Chatterjee and we are of the opinion that there is scope for rethinking in the matter so far as the conditional decrees are concerned. In the case of Mahanth Ram AIR 1961 SC 882, a distinction was made by the Supreme Court between peremptory procedural orders and conditional orders. The case of H.I Trust AIR 1972 SC 1826 related to moveable property in respect of which section 28 of the Act had no application. In the case reported in AIR 1978 SC 537 it was decided by the Supreme Court that a conditional decree for specific performance of contract, containing a condition that in the event of default in depositing the balance of consideration-money within the time stipulated in the decree, the suit would stand dismissed, was not a preliminary decree. Unfortunately, this decision was not placed before their Lordships while dealing with the case of Tapan Chatterjee. It is not, however, necessary for us to discuss further the various cases referred to by both the parties for the purpose of showing as to whether the court has power in the case of a conditional decree for specific performance of contract for sale, containing a default clause, to extend the time for deposit of the balance of the consideration-money in spite of the default clause. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the court has power to extend the time for deposit of the balance of the consideration-money in such a conditional decree, about dismissal of suit containing a default clause, or a default clause as appearing in the decree of the present suit viz., that if the plaintiff failed to pay or deposit the amount of the balance of the consideration money in the manner directed in the decree the defendant would not be liable to execute the deed of sale, the fact remains that if the decree for specific performance of contract is allowed to stand on the basis of the post decree events, the plaintiff would get an unfair advantage. It has already been shown that there was no direction in the decree for deducting the cost of the suit from the balance of the consideration-money.

13. In the plaint, there was a prayer for deduction of the arrears of taxes due to the corporation, the arrears of rent due to the landlord, other dues to make the property free from all encumbrances, damages and costs. In the conditional decree, the deduction was allowed in respect of the arrears of taxes due to the Corporation and arrears of rent from the balance of the purchase-money. Though there was no direction in the conditional decree for deduction of the cost of the suit from the balance of the consideration-money, the plaintiff first tried to have the cost of the suit deducted from the balance of the consideration-money by filing a petition, on 27-6-1978. Though the date regarding the hearing of the petition was adjourned to 23-8-78, awaiting service-return of the notice sent to the defendant, the plaintiff took step unilaterally by filing another petition on 16-8-78 for having the cost of the suit deducted from the balance of the purchase-money and this prayer was allowed on 16-8-78 without hearing the defendant. The deposit of Rs. 25901.57P towards the balance of the consideration-money after deducting the cost of the suit amounts to modification of the decree. Courts have inherent powers to amend or vary the decrees so as to bring them in accordance with the judgments. The order of the court on 16-8-78 allowing the plaintiff not to deposit the cost of the suit cannot be justified on the basis of section 151 C.P.C as the plaintiff asked the court to make practically a different judgment regarding the balance of purchase-money to be deposited in court by him. Moreover, as the decree was a conditional decree, it should not have been amended without notice to the party affected, viz., the defendant. The plaintiff deposited the sum of Rs. 25901.57P without the time mentioned in the conditional decree. There was no question of extension of any time for deposit of the sum of Rs. 25901.57P Section 28 of the Act does not authorise the court to amend the decree in the manner it was done by the order passed by the court on 16-8-78. Moreover, though it was stated in the conditional decree that the defendant would be entitled to accept or withdraw the balance of the consideration-money, paid or deposited by the plaintiff, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte order of injunction on 4-12-78 by filing a petition on 12-9-78. This prayer for not withdrawing the amount of Rs. 25901.57P amounts also to a modification of the conditional decree, which is not permitted by section 28 of the Act or any other provision of the Act. By filing this' petition for injunction the plaintiff wanted to obtain an unfair advantage over the defendant. Similarly, by not depositing the cost of the suit, the plaintiff wanted to obtain an unfair advantage over the defendant, inasmuch as the plaintiff could have recovered the cost of the suit by filing an execution case under Order 21, Rule 32 C.P.C The subsequent deposit of the cost of the suit on the basis of the order dated 27-10-79 is also not permissible under S. 28 of the Act as it is nowhere stated in that section that the court can extend the time for deposit of a part of the balance of the consideration-money. Under section 28 of the Act, the court can extend time for deposit of purchase-money or balance of the purchase-money but the said section does not empower the court to direct deposit of purchase-money or balance of purchase-money by instalments, not allowed by conditional decree in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property.

14. Considering the above facts and circumstances as well as the materials on record, we are of the opinion that as specific performance is a conscious attempt on the part of the Court to do complete justice to both the parties with respect to all the juridical relations growing out of the contract between them, the plaintiff should not be allowed to have the contract for sale specifically enforced as the plaintiff himself took the initiative of not depositing the cost of the suit and thereafter took the initiative for restraining the defendant from withdrawing the amount deposited in court, though both these prayers were not in accordance with the conditional decree passed by the court.

15. Though the suit for specific performance of contract is thus to fail, the plaintiff should not be deprived of the amounts paid to the defendant. In view of the decision of this court in the case of Sahida Bibi v. Golam Mohammad 86 Cal WN 727 : (AIR 1983 Cal 216), the suit is to be sent back on remand to the court below for granting an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint for incorporation of the prayer for refund of the purchase-money paid by him and deposited in court.

16. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside. The case is sent back on remand to the court below for fresh disposal in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint, within one month of the service of the notice of arrival of records in the court below on the plaintiff or his Advocate, for refund of the sums of Rs. 6001/- and Rs. 1000/- paid to the defendant with interest commat; Rs. 6% per annum from the dates of payment of these sums to the defendant by the plaintiff till recovery and for withdrawal of the sums of Rs. 25901.57 paise and Rs. 3473.90 paise deposited in court on the basis of the orders of the trial court dated 16-8-78 and 27-10-79 respectively. If the plaintiff prays for amendment of the plaint by incorporating a prayer for refund and withdrawal of these amounts, court below will allow the prayer for amendment of the plaint and will pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff for refund of these sums with interest @ Rs. 6% per annum till recovery and for withdrawal of these sums. Before passing the decree for refund of these amounts, the court below will consider the sufficiency of the court-fees paid on the plaint. In case the plaintiff does not pray for amendment of the plaint within the time as mentioned in this order or within such further time, as may be granted by the court, the defendant is to be directed to apply for revision of the contract under section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 so that necessary directions can be passed by the court for return of the purchase-money to the plaintiff viz., the amounts paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as well as the amount deposited in court.

17. In the special circumstances of the case, parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.

18. No decree need be drawn in this appeal.

19. Let the records be sent down as early as possible.

G.N Ray, J.:— I agree.

Order accordingly.