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Eastern And North East Frontier Railway Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. B. Guhaand Co. .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (a party to a construction contract) entered into Contract No. PRE-34-4/V-1 dated 27 March 1971 with the petitioner for construction, addition and alteration of a building in Calcutta. The contract rates were revised and completion extended by agreement dated 30 June 1972. The works were completed on or about 31 March 1973.
The respondent claimed amounts by a letter dated 23 August 1973 (final bill Rs. 40,950.49 and refund of security deposit) and further claimed "Other claims and dues" by a letter dated 8 January 1974 of Rs. 58,500/-, later revised by a letter dated 1 March 1974 to Rs. 57,563.01. The petitioner disputed the validity and legality of that claim and refused payment (while paying other sums claimed).
The respondent applied under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act for filing the arbitration agreement and reference of disputes; the Court ordered filing and reference on 24 January 1976 (Special Suit No. 24 of 1976) and an appeal by the petitioner was dismissed. Subsequently the Court appointed Brigadier Mihir Kumar Basu (Retd.) as sole arbitrator by order dated 9 February 1982.
The arbitrator conducted proceedings, heard parties and evidence, and on 11 July 1983 made an award directing payment to the claimant (B. Guha & Co.) of Rs. 49,199 (claim), Rs. 45,920 (interest) and Rs. 3,500 (cost), with payment to be made within 45 days or attracting 9% p.a. thereafter; claimant to bear stamp duty for publication of the Award.
The petitioner challenged the award under Ss. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act seeking to set aside the award on multiple grounds (described below). The present opinion disposes of that application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Award could be set aside on the ground that the arbitrator's award on the claim (Rs. 57,563.01, reduced in award to Rs. 49,199) was made on no evidence and was perverse.
- Whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award interest where the award did not specify the basis, rate and period for interest and where there was no agreement or statutory provision expressly supporting interest (and whether notice under the Interest Act was required).
- Whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award costs where no evidence was adduced as to costs allegedly incurred by the respondent.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The claim for Rs. 57,563.01 was not made before the final account or immediately after completion; it was asserted nine months after completion and was an afterthought.
- At the arbitration hearing the respondent failed to produce evidence of any work order authorizing the extra work, or evidence that such work was undertaken by the respondent.
- There was no evidence before the arbitrator as to the rate or value of the alleged extra work; therefore the Award was made on no evidence and is perverse.
- The award of interest was unsupported by any agreement or statutory provision; no notice under the Interest Act was given and the arbitrator did not indicate the basis or period for interest—thus the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to award interest.
- The arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award costs as no evidence was adduced regarding costs incurred by the respondent.
- Counsel cited authorities (including Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions) to contend that interest may only be claimed on a sum certain or when payable at a certain time, and that such requirements were not met here.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent asserted by affidavit that particulars and the basis of the claim for Rs. 57,563.01 were indicated in letters dated 8 January 1974 and 1 March 1974 and that the fact of extra work was not denied.
- The arbitrator was satisfied on the evidence that the work was executed and that the petitioner denied payment on the ground of non-issue of a work order.
- The claimant's statement of claim before the arbitrator specifically sought interest at 12% per annum (or such rate as the arbitrator considered reasonable) from 1 March 1974 until the date of Award, and a demand for such interest was made by the letter dated 1 March 1974.
- The respondent relied on Supreme Court authority (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. and Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukamchand Mills Ltd.) to contend that where all disputes including interest were referred to arbitration the arbitrator had power to award pendente lite interest; the Court is not a court of appeal and should not re-open the arbitrator's reasoning in a non-speaking award.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Kalinga Construction Company, AIR 1971 SC 1646 | That a Court in proceedings to set aside an award cannot sit in appeal over the arbitrator by re-examining and reappraising the evidence; findings not perverse cannot be disturbed. | The Court relied on this authority to state the limited scope of its review and to support refusal to re-evaluate evidence considered by the arbitrator. |
| Allen Berry and Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 696 | Where parties chose their arbitrator, errors in law or fact that are not apparent on the face of the award (or in documents forming part of it) cannot be remitted or set aside. | Cited to support the proposition that mistakes of the arbitrator not evident on the award's face cannot be corrected by the Court on an application to set aside. |
| Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Baloo Spinning & Weaving Co., AIR 1923 PC 66 | Privy Council decision referenced for the same principle that an award good on its face cannot be attacked for errors not appearing therein. | Used as part of the chain of authority to underscore that the Court may not re-open errors not evident on award's face. |
| N. Chellappan v. Kerala S.E. Board, AIR 1975 SC 230 | The Court cannot investigate the merits and re-examine documentary and oral evidence on record to find whether the arbitrator committed an error of law or fact. | Relied upon to emphasize that the arbitrator is the judge of fact and law in the reference and that his conclusions attract finality absent apparent error. |
| Bengal Nagpur Rly. Co. v. Ruttanji Ramji, AIR 1938 PC 67 | A Privy Council authority cited by the petitioner in support of arguments on the principles governing claims for interest. | Cited by petitioner's counsel to support the contention that interest can only be claimed on a sum certain or with appropriate notice; the Court records this citation as part of the petitioner's submissions. |
| Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 468 | Authority dealing with interest (and referred to in subsequent cases); distinguished in later cases on the question whether an arbitrator can award pendente lite interest. | Referred to in the Court's discussion (and in the line of authorities) when examining whether arbitrator could award interest where all disputes were referred to him. |
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 1507 | Discusses and cites authority that an arbitrator has the power to award pendente lite interest if all disputes, including interest, are referred to him. | Cited by respondent's counsel and relied upon by the Court to conclude that an arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest when the claim for interest is before him. |
| Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukamchand Mills Ltd., (1967) 1 SCR 105 : AIR 1967 SC 1030 | Held that if all disputes are referred to the arbitrator the arbitrator can decide the question of pendente lite interest and grant such relief as a Court could if it decided the dispute. | Used by the Court to support the proposition that the arbitrator may award pendente lite interest where the claim for interest is part of the reference. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by stating the fundamental limitation on its jurisdiction in proceedings under the Arbitration Act: only errors apparent on the face of an award permit remittance or setting aside; it cannot reappraise evidence or sit in appeal over the arbitrator's conclusions (citing Union of India v. Kalinga Construction Company and related authorities).
On the petitioner's contention that the award on the extra-work claim was made on no evidence and was perverse, the Court noted the respondent's averment that particulars were provided in letters dated 8 January 1974 and 1 March 1974 and that the arbitrator was satisfied on evidence that the work had been executed. The Court found that it was not proved to its satisfaction that there was no evidence before the arbitrator and therefore it could not hold that the award lacked any evidentiary basis.
The Court reiterated settled law that it cannot investigate merits, re-examine documents, or reassess oral evidence to conclude that the arbitrator made an error of law or fact. The arbitrator is the judge of both fact and law in the reference, and some finality attaches to his decision.
On the point of interest, the Court examined whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award interest despite the award not specifying the rate or period. The Court accepted respondent's submission (and relied on the authorities cited, including Firm Madanlal and State of Madhya Pradesh cases) that an arbitrator has power to award pendente lite interest if the claim for interest is before him. The Court observed that although the award did not indicate the rate or period, it could not, in exercise of its limited jurisdiction, investigate how the arbitrator arrived at the figure for interest or re-open the arbitrator's reasoning; absent an error apparent on the face of the award, this was not a matter for the Court to decide.
Regarding costs, the Court observed that under Rule 8, Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act the arbitrator is empowered to award costs as a discretionary relief and has full discretion to make orders about costs incurred in connection with arbitration proceedings. Thus the arbitrator's award of costs fell within his power.
Concluding, for the reasons stated—principally the limited scope of judicial review of arbitral awards, the respondent's averments about evidence before the arbitrator, and the authorities on arbitrator's jurisdiction to award interest and costs—the Court found that the challenge to the Award must fail.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The application to set aside the Award is dismissed. The opinion concludes: "For the reasons aforesaid, the challenge to the Award must fail and the application is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed."
Implications:
- The arbitrator's Award, including the sums awarded for the claim, interest and costs, stands and will not be set aside by this Court on the grounds urged by the petitioner in this application.
- The Court applied established principles limiting judicial review of arbitral awards: it will not re-examine or reappraise evidence nor sit in appeal over the arbitrator's conclusions where no error is apparent on the face of the award.
- The decision confirms that where a claim for interest is submitted to the arbitrator as part of the reference, the arbitrator may have jurisdiction to award pendente lite interest; the Court declined to interrogate the arbitrator's calculation in a non-speaking award.
- No broader precedent beyond the application of settled law on the limited scope of court review of arbitral awards is created by this opinion; the direct effect is that the petition to set aside the award was dismissed and the award remains enforceable between the parties as adjudicated by the arbitrator.
This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.
This is an application under Ss. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for setting aside an Award dt. 11th July, 1983 made by a sole arbitrator in respect of disputes and claims arising out of Agreement No. PRE-34-A/V-1 dt. 27th March, 1971.
2. The respondent entered into an agreement being Contract No. PRE-34-4/V-1 dt. 27th March, 1971 with the petitioner for construction, addition and alteration of the building at Nos. 34A and 34B Sashi Bhusan Dey Street, Calcutta. By a subsequent agreement dt. 30th June, 1972 the rates of work mentioned in the agreement dt. 27th March, 1971 were revised and the date of the completion of the work was extended till 15th September, 1972.
3. The works under the said contract were completed on or about 31st March, 1973. By a letter dt. 23rd Aug., 1973 addressed to the petitioner the respondent claimed from the petitioner the final bill amount of Rs. 40,950.49 p. and refund of security deposit. By another letter dt. 8th Jan., 1974 addressed to the petitioner the respondent made a further claim of Rs. 58,500/- under the head “Other claims and dues”. This figure was later on revised upon giving full particulars by the letter dt. 1st March, 1974 to a sum of Rs. 57,563.01 p. By a letter dt. 3rd September, 1974 the petitioner informed the respondent that the said claim of Rs. 57,563.01 p. was placed before the Board of Directory of the petitioner Bank for consideration and the Board was unable to consider as there was no work order for the work for which the said bill was presented. In a meeting held thereafter on 5th April, 1975 between the parties it was stated by the respondent that there were some addition and alteration work which had to be attended on the instruction for which said Bill for Rs. 59,563.01 p. was submitted and there was no work order for the said work. The petitioner, however, denied and disputed the validity and legality of the said claim of the respondent, and as such refused to make any payment in respect thereof. The petitioner paid the other sums claimed by the respondent.
4. The disputes and differences arose between the parties which were referable to the arbitration under an Arbitration Agreement contained in the said contract between the parties. The respondent made an application in this Court under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act for filing of the said arbitration agreement and for reference of said disputes and differences. The said application was marked as Special Suit No. 24 of 1976. By an order dt. 24th Jan., 1976 this Court directed filing of the said arbitration agreement and further ordered that all matters and differences in the special suit be referred to the arbitration of an arbitrator to be appointed in terms of the said arbitration agreement. An appeal preferred by the petitioner from the said order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.
5. Thereafter, another application was made by the respondent to this Court for revoking the authority of the General Manager of the petitioner Bank to appoint an arbitrator, and for an appointment of an arbitrator by this Court for adjudication of the said disputes between the parties. By an order dt. 9th February, 1982 this Court allowing the application appointed one Brigadier Mihir Kumar Basu (Retd.) as sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties.
6. The said sole arbitrator duly entered into reference and issued necessary directions regarding submissions of the statements and counter-statements of the case by the respective parties. After setting out the reference and reciting the fact that the parties were given equal opportunities to present their respective cases in detail with all supporting documents and arguments in several sittings and the arbitrator had examined and considered the pleadings, documents produced by the parties the said sole arbitrator made the following Award:
“1. I award and direct that E & N.F Rly. C.B Ltd., 34A and B, Sashi Bhusan Dey Street, Calcutta 12, do pay to B. Guha & Co. 9, Clive Row, Calcutta 1, the undermentioned amounts as shown against items so stated in full and final settlements of all the claims and disputes referred to the Arbitration before me.
a. Claim amount Rs. 49, 199/- (Rupees Fortynine thousand one hundred ninety nine only) b. Interest Rs. 45,920/- (Rupees Fortyfive thousand nine hundred and twenty only) c. Cost Rs. 3,500/- (Rupees three thousand five hundred only).
2. That the above award sums be paid to B. Guha & Co. 9, Clive Row, Calcutta 1, within fortyfive days from the date of this award failing which the award will carry an interest of rate 9 per cent per annum from date of expiry of the aforesaid fortyfive days.
3. That the claimant will bear the costs of stamp duty for publication of the Award.
I, Brigadier Mihir Kumar Basu, (Retd.), the I Sole Arbitrator, signed and declared this award on this date the eleventh day of July, 1983.
Dated, 11-7-83.Sd/- Illegible
Brigadier Mihir Kumar Basu (Retd.)
Sole Arbitrator.”
7. The said award is now being challenged in this application on several grounds. Regarding the claim for Rs. 57,56,3.01 p. the contentions of the petitioner are, first, that the said claim of Rs. 57,563.01 was not claimed at all before the Final Account bill or immediately after the completion of the work. It was claimed after nine months after the completion of work and was an afterthought. Secondly, at the hearing before the said arbitrator the respondent failed to produce any evidence to show that any work order in respect of the said work was issued by the petitioner nor there was any evidence before the said arbitrator that the said work was at all undertaken or performed by the respondent. Thirdly, that there was no evidence before the arbitrator as to the rate or value of the said work. It is, therefore, contended that the said Award has been made on the basis of no evidence and is perverse.
8. The said award has also been challenged on the ground that the award for interest is unsupported by either any agreement between the parties or any statutory provision of law. Further, claimant has not given any notice under Interest Act claiming interest and the arbitrator has not indicated on which basis such interest has been awarded. Therefore, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest. Similarly, the contention of the petitioner is that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award cost as no evidence was adduced as to the cost alleged to have been incurred by the respondent.
9. It is well settled proposition of law that only error of law apparent on the face of the award, entitles a party to have the award remitted or set aside.
10. In the case of Union of India v. Kalinga Construction Company, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1646, the Supreme Court observed that in a proceeding to set aside an award the Court could not sit in appeal over the conclusion of the arbitrator by re-examining and reappraising the evidence considered by the arbitrator and hold that the conclusion arrived at by the arbitrator was wrong. If the findings of the arbitrator are not perverse then the Court even though differs from such finding cannot set aside the award as it cannot be said that there is any error apparent on the face of the award.
11. In the case of Allen Berry and Co. v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1971 SC 696 the Supreme Court, referring to the well known decision of the Privy Council on this point in the case of Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Baloo Spinning & Weaving Co. reported in AIR 1923 PC 66, observed that as the parties chose their own arbitrator they could not, when the award was good on the face of it, object to the decision either upon the law or the facts. Therefore even when an arbitrator committed a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matters referred to him but such mistake did not appear on the face of the award or in a document appended to or incorporated in it so as to form part of the award would neither be remitted nor set aside notwithstanding the mistake.
12. In the instant case, it has been stated by the respondent in its affidavit-in-opposition that particulars and the basis of such claim for Rs. 57,563.01 p. have been fully indicated in the letter dt. 8th January, 1974 and the letter dt. 1st March, 1974 and it is also stated that factum of such extra work in respect whereof such bill was submitted was not denied. It is further stated by the respondent that the arbitrator was satisfied on evidence that the work was executed and the payment for the said work was denied by the petitioner on the ground of non-issue of work order.
13. I have set out above the award impugned in this application. The arbitrator has awarded the claim amount without indicating on what basis he had awarded the said sum of Rs. 49,199.00 and there was no proposition of law enunciated either. It has not been proved to the satisfaction of the Court that there was no evidence at all before the Arbitrator in support of the said claim. Therefore, it is not possible for this Court to hold that there is no evidence before the arbitrator to make the award. It is again well settled proposition of law that the Court has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence on the record to find out whether or not the arbitrator had committed any error of law. (See N. Chellappan v. Kerala S.E Board, AIR 1975 SC 230). It is not for this Court, however, to say that in its opinion the evidence was not sufficient to establish the conclusion at which the arbitrator arrived or that the arbitrator has not given proper weight to such evidence. He is the judge of the questions of both fact and of law referred to him, and some finality is attached to his decision.
14. Now I will deal with the petitioner's contention that the award for interest being unsupported either by any agreement between the parties or any statutory provision of law, was clearly inadmissible. Further, claim for interest has not been referred to the arbitrator.
15. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the claim in respect of extra work was on the basis of fair and reasonable rates and not on the basis of any rate agreed to by the parties. Learned counsels contention is that interest can be claimed on a sum certain and is agreed to by the parties. Alternatively, the learned counsel argues that if it is claimed on the basis of a notice under Interest Act then such interest can be claimed on a sum certain which is payable at a certain time. It is the contention that neither the claim on account of extra work was a sum certain nor was it payable at a certain time by virtue of a written instrument. In any event, the learned counsel contends that it was not indicated in the award the basis on which such interest has been calculated and from which period such interest would run. Further, he contends that the question of interest has not been specifically referred to the Arbitrator. The learned Counsel has cited the decision of the Privy Council in Bengal Nagpur Rly. Co. v. Ruttanji Ramji, reported in AIR 1938 PC 67, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. Union Of India reported in AIR 1955 SC 468.
16. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has contended that this Court not being a Court of Appeal, cannot investigate as to how the sum awarded as interest has been determined by the arbitrator since the Award is a non-speaking award. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to claimant's statement of claim to show that the claimant has specifically claimed interest at the rate of 12% per annum or at such rate as the arbitrator shall consider reasonable and fair from the date i.e to say 1st March, 1974 till the date of Award before the arbitrator and due notice was given demanding such interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum by the letter, dated 1st March, 1974.
17. Regarding the arbitrator's jurisdiction the learned counsel for the respondent cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. reported in AIR 1972 SC 1507. In that case the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“31. In Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukamchand Mills Ltd., Indore, (1967) 1 SCR 105: AIR 1967 SC 1030, the power of the arbitrator, to whom the subject matter of a suit had been referred for arbitration, to award pendente lite interest was considered by this Court. It was held in the said decision that all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator for his decision. One of the disputes, so referred, was whether the respondent therein was entitled to pendente lite interest. It was held that though in terms S. 34 C.P.C does not apply to the arbitration, it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator was to decide the dispute, according to law, to grant such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the Court itself could give, if it decided the dispute. It was further held that such a power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by arbitration agreement or by the Act. The decision in (1955) 2 SCR 48: AIR 1955 SC 468 was distinguished on the ground that the said decision is silent on the question whether an arbitrator can award interest during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, if all the disputes in the suit including the claim for interest were referred for arbitration.
32. From the decision in (1967) 1 SCR 105: AIR. 1967 SC 1030 it is clear that if all the disputes are referred for arbitration, the arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite, i.e during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.”.
18. From the above decision it can be said that the arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest if such claim is before the arbitrator. The arbitrator has authority to grant interest also from the date of award to the date of the decree. In the present case the arbitrator has made an award for interest for Rs. 45,920/-. It is, however, not indicated in the award at which rate such interest has been allowed and in respect of which period. But this Court not sitting in appeal over the conclusion of the Arbitrator cannot investigate as to how such interest has been determined. It also cannot be said that there is an error appearing on the face of the award. Assuming the arbitrator has committed an error in awarding interest, such error not appearing on the face of the award cannot be looked into by this Court exercising a limited jurisdiction.
19. Regarding the cost, it is well settled that under R. 8, Sch. 1 of the Arbitration Act, arbitrator is empowered to award costs, it is a discretionary relief. The arbitrator has full discretion to pass orders about costs incurred by the parties in connection with the arbitration proceedings.
20. For the reasons aforesaid, the challenge to the Award must fail and the application is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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