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S. Paul & Co. v. State Of Tripura And Others
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, S. Paul & Co., a registered firm, was appointed sole agent for sale of Tripura State Lottery tickets pursuant to a written contract dated 23 October 1982 (a modification of an earlier agreement dated 12 November 1981). The sole agency continued until the 166th draw scheduled for 4 October 1983, after which it stood terminated by mutual agreement.
Relevant contractual provisions (clauses 8, 9 and 16 of the 23 October 1982 agreement) provided, inter alia, that:
- Clause 8 — the sole agent would pay the Government 60% of the value of tickets (the balance 40% being retained as commission); the agent was to pay in advance and/or execute bank guarantees equivalent to net values payable to the Government in lieu of lots of tickets earmarked for each draw; accounts for a draw were to be settled within fifteen days.
- Clause 9 — the sole agent was authorised to make direct payments to claimants/agents/sellers/prize winners up to Rs. 1,000 and be reimbursed by the Government; amounts paid were to be submitted to the Government within the period prescribed in the rules.
- Clause 16 — copies of invoices issued by the sole agent to agents against sale of tickets would be forwarded to the Government on demand for records and verification.
During the material period, lottery tickets worth Rs. 27,00,000 were earmarked for each draw; 60% of that value (Rs. 16.20 lacs) was secured by two bank guarantees furnished by the petitioner. One guarantee expired on 21 October 1983; the other (Bank Guarantee No. 13/83 dated 4 July 1983 from Vysya Bank) covered reimbursement "of the amount of loss, if any, subject to the maximum limit of Rs. 16,20,000/- only" and was renewed during the case.
The petitioner claimed that from the 118th draw a fixed refundable sum of Rs. 1,18,000 per draw (for agents/sellers' incentives under clause 9) had been received and adjusted up to the 141st draw. From the 142nd to the 156th draw, inclusive, reimbursement of Rs. 1,18,000 per draw was withheld despite timely submission of reimbursement claims, resulting in an asserted net refundable balance of Rs. 18,87,590 (per the petitioner’s account annexure ‘E’).
The petitioner alleged that the respondents threatened to encash the bank guarantee and demanded vouchers to disallow reimbursement; the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from enforcing the bank guarantee and from demanding vouchers for incentives.
Respondents (the State of Tripura and officials) countered that the petitioner had to support reimbursement claims with supporting documents (prize-winning tickets, invoices, counterfoils); specific complaints prompted requests for documents which the petitioner allegedly failed to furnish; respondents stated that until an amount of Rs. 33,10,070 payable to the State was settled, Rs. 18,87,590 could not be treated as excess payment, and that even after deduction there would remain an amount payable to the State.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is available to restrain the State from enforcing a bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner where enforcement is threatened in relation to disputes arising out of a concluded contract.
- Whether the respondents' demand for vouchers/invoices in support of the petitioner’s reimbursement claims (under clauses 9 and 16 of the contract) is arbitrary or otherwise unlawful such that relief by way of writ is justified.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The bank guarantee is conditional and provides that the bank "agrees to reimburse the amount of loss, if any, subject to the maximum limit of Rs. 16,20,000/- only," and therefore cannot be validly enforced until the loss (if any) is determined and proved; the State cannot simply encash it unilaterally.
- Clause 9 does not require production of supporting evidence for reimbursement claims; historically (up to the 141st draw) the Government adjusted reimbursement without asking for vouchers; therefore, the later demand for vouchers and withholding of sums is arbitrary and not justified by the contract.
- The respondents are acting arbitrarily and highhandedly in threatening to encash the bank guarantee and withholding legitimate dues; petitioner sought mandamus to restrain encashment and voucher demands.
- Reliance was placed on judicial authority (including M. & M. Trading Corporation v. S. Sethi, Sudhu Ram Yadav v. Board of Trustees, Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., and the principle in R.D. Shetty/International Airports Authority of India) to contend that State action in contractual matters must not be arbitrary and that writ jurisdiction can be invoked where State acts unreasonably.
Respondents' Arguments
- The writ petition is not maintainable in respect of disputes arising out of interpretation and performance of a concluded contract; contractual disputes must ordinarily be resolved in civil fora rather than by Article 226 relief.
- The petitioner was required by the agreement to submit supporting documents for reimbursement claims and habitually did so; in the present case, specific complaints led to requests for documents which the petitioner failed to produce despite reminders.
- Until an amount of Rs. 33,10,070 payable to the State is settled, the amount claimed as excess by the petitioner (Rs. 18,87,590) cannot be regarded as refundable; even if deducted subject to checking there would still remain an amount payable to the State.
- Reliance was placed on Supreme Court authorities (Harshankar v. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr, Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, Premjibhai v. Delhi Development Bank) to support the proposition that writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate remedy to resolve contractual disputes with the State.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M. & M. Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. S. Sethi (1970) 74 Cal WN 991 | Observed that bank guarantees have a dual aspect and that conditions for payment under a bank guarantee must be satisfied before payment can be legitimately claimed; the guarantee may provide that the beneficiary's decision on loss or damage is final. | The petitioner relied on this decision to argue that the bank guarantee could not be enforced until loss is admitted or proved. The Court recorded the authority but did not accept that it made the writ maintainable in the present contract dispute. |
| Sudhu Ram Yadav v. Board of Trustees (1982) 1 Cal LJ 286 | Single Judge held that Article 226 can be used to prevent arbitrary action by State authorities, relying on Ramana v. International Airport Authority of India. | The petitioner invoked this decision to argue for writ relief against alleged arbitrary withholding and enforcement. The Court noted the decision but treated it as distinguishable/insufficient to allow writ relief in a contractual dispute governed by private law principles. |
| Ramana v. International Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628 (R.D. Shetty cited) | Authority for the proposition that the State must act reasonably and not arbitrarily when exercising statutory power or discharging contractual obligations; used to show the State's action is subject to reasonableness. | The petitioner relied on the general principle that State action must be reasonable. The Court observed that Ramana's principle relates to entry into statutory or contractual fields and was not a basis to grant writ relief for ordinary contractual performance disputes once parties are in the domain of private law. |
| Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1983 SC 848 | Applied doctrine of promissory estoppel and recognized the corporation as an instrumentality of the Government subject to reasonableness; discussed State action in contractual/statutory context. | The petitioner cited it to show that governmental/ quasi-governmental entities cannot act arbitrarily. The Court noted the case but treated it as not altering the general rule that contractual disputes (absent statutory obligations) are matters for civil courts. |
| Harshankar v. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner AIR 1975 SC 1121 | Restated limitations on use of writ jurisdiction to challenge contractual obligations; writ is not appropriate to resolve breaches of private contract. | Respondents relied on this authority; the Court accepted the proposition and treated it as supporting refusal to entertain the writ petition. |
| Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar AIR 1977 SC 1496 | Held that once the State or its agents enter the field of ordinary contract, relations are governed by the contract and rights/obligations are to be enforced under contract law; writ is not ordinarily available to impeach contractual obligations. | The Court relied on this authority as central: because rival claims arise from alleged non-fulfilment of contractual obligations, the petitioner’s remedy lies in the civil forum and not by Article 226. The Court applied this principle to dismiss the writ petition. |
| Premjibhai v. Delhi Development Bank AIR 1980 SC 738 | Reiterated that writ jurisdiction cannot be used to recover contractual monies or to challenge contract performance where civil remedies are available. | The Court cited this case in support of the proposition that after the State enters ordinary contract, constitutional remedies are not the appropriate route for contractual disputes; applied to deny Article 226 relief. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying that the dispute before it arose from rival claims and counterclaims concerning alleged non-fulfilment of contractual obligations under a concluded agency agreement between the petitioner and the State.
The Court then analyzed controlling authorities. It relied principally on the Supreme Court's decision in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar and related precedents which establish the following legal propositions (as stated in the opinion):
- Once the State or its agents have entered the field of ordinary contract, the relations between the parties are governed by the legally valid contract, not by constitutional provisions; contractual rights and obligations determine inter se rights (Radha Krishna Agarwal).
- No question arises of violation of Article 14 or other constitutional provisions merely because the State performs acts within the contractual field; in that sphere parties are governed by contract law unless a statute confers special statutory power apart from the contract.
- Consequently, a writ petition under Article 226 is not the appropriate remedy for resolving breaches or threatened breaches of ordinary contractual obligations — such matters must be pursued in civil courts (reaffirming Harshankar, Premjibhai and Radha Krishna Agarwal).
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the petitioner sought relief against a threatened enforcement of a bank guarantee and against the respondents' demand for vouchers, both arising from the concluded contract. Therefore, the dispute was essentially a private-law contractual dispute and not a matter appropriately remedied by writ jurisdiction.
The Court specifically addressed the petitioner's reliance on authorities (such as M. & M. Trading Corporation and Sudhu Ram Yadav) which emphasize that payment under a bank guarantee requires satisfaction of conditions and that State action must not be arbitrary. The Court noted those authorities but held that they did not alter the basic rule that where the dispute is in the field of a concluded contract, the remedy is civil litigation rather than Article 226 relief.
On the question of vouchers, the Court observed that irrespective of contract terms, an agent has a duty at common law to render proper accounts to the principal and to produce supporting vouchers on demand under Section 213 of the Contract Act; the principal is not estopped from enforcing that obligation. Thus, there was no prima facie arguable case that the demand for vouchers was arbitrary or illegal such as to justify writ intervention.
Taking the foregoing together, the Court concluded that the petitioner's contentions amounted to a request to adjudicate contractual disputes and to restrain enforcement of contractual securities (the bank guarantee), which were matters to be decided in the appropriate civil forum rather than by constitutional writ.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
DISMISSED — The writ petition under Article 226 was dismissed. The Court held that the writ petition could not be maintained and must fail; the petition was dismissed without any order as to costs. The formal disposition recorded in the opinion is: "Petition dismissed."
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The petitioner was not granted the requested mandamus forbidding the respondents from enforcing the bank guarantee or from demanding vouchers; those matters were to be pursued in the civil courts as contractual disputes.
- The respondents retained the ability to press their contractual claims and to require supporting documents/vouchers for reimbursement claims; the Court expressly noted the agent's duty to render accounts and produce vouchers under Section 213, Contract Act.
Broader implications:
The opinion applies and reiterates established authority that writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily available to adjudicate disputes arising solely from a concluded contract between a private party and the State. The Court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying existing Supreme Court principles; the direct effect is procedural and party-specific — the petitioner must seek relief via civil proceedings. The opinion does not articulate any wider or novel rule beyond these applications.
Petition dismissed.
1. The petitioner S. Paul & Co., a registered firm was appointed sole agent for sale of Tripura State Lottery Tickets by a concluded contract of agency in the form of written agreement dt. 23rd Oct., 1982, in modification of an earlier agreement dt. 12th Nov., 1981 and the sole agency continued till the 166th draw of the lottery which was scheduled to be held on Oct. 4, 1983, after which it stood terminated by mutual agreement.
2. Clauses 8, 9 and 16 of the said agreement dt. 23rd Oct., 1982 (Annexure ‘A’ to the writ petition) were as follows:—
“8. That in consideration of the grant of the sole agency the sole agent shall pay to the Government a sum equivalent to 60% of the value of the tickets, balance 40% being retained by the sole agent as commission including expenses on publication of result, publicity for the lottery, checking of tickets and other organisational and administrative expenses of the sole agency. That it shall be obligatory for the sole agent always to pay in advance and/or execute bank guarantee equivalent to net values payable to the Government in terms of the foregoing paragraphs in lieu of lots of tickets earmarked for each draw, to the Government. It is agreed that the accounts in connection with a draw shall be completed squared up and/or settled by the sole agent within fifteen days from the date of each draw.
9. In order to popularise and to give an impetus to the purchasers of the tickets, the sole agent shall stand authorised to make direct payment in respect of claims from the individuals/agent/sub-agents/sellers in prescribed form and to prize winners up to Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand) for prize money/share of agents/sellers commission/incentive, etc., on prizes on surrendering of the prize winning tickets counterfoils invoices and the amount so paid would be reimbursed/adjusted by the Government. Amount paid by the sole agent towards the prize winning tickets/commission/incentives should be submitted by the sole agent so as to reach the Government within the, period prescribed in the rules.
…………..
16. That copies of invoices issued by the sole agent to the agents against sale of tickets by sole agent will be forwarded to the Government on demand for records and verification.”
3. During the material period lottery tickets worth Rs. 27,00,000/- used to be earmarked for each draw and 60% of that value is Rs. 16.20 lacs. The petitioner furnished two bank guarantees for Rs. 16.20 lacs each to secure payment of the contractual money to the Government of Tripura, one of which being dt. 21-10-1982 from United Industrial Bank, Ultadanga Branch expired on October 21, 1983. The other bank guarantee was executed by the Branch Manager of the Vysya Bank, Chittaranjan Avenue, Branch, Calcutta for Rs. 16.20 lacs favouring Government of Tripura being Bank Guarantee No. 13/83 dt. 4th July, 1983 for one year which has been renewed for another year during the pendency of this case. A copy of the said bank guarantee No. 13/83 is annexure ‘C’ to the affidavit-in-reply sworn on the 2nd July 1984. Under it the bank guarantees payment of the sale money of the lottery tickets sold by the petitioner firm and “agrees to reimburse the amount of loss, if any, subject to the maximum limit of Rs. 16,20,000/- only.”
4. Petitioner's case may be briefly stated. According to the scheme operative from the 118th draw a fixed sum of Rs. 1,18,000/- was the reimbursable sum on account of payments made by the petitioner towards agents/sellers' incentives in terms of cl. 9 of the agreement dt. 23-10-1982 and that the petitioner received adjustment of the entire sum of Rs. 1,18,000/- per draw up to 141st draw. The Government of Tripura accepted the claim for such reimbursement without asking for any supporting vouchers from the petitioner. But from the 142nd draw up to 156th draw both inclusive the said sum of Rs. 1,18,000/- for each draw has been kept unadjusted although reimbursement claims for such amount had been duly forwarded to the State Government of Tripura and received by them in time. Thus a net sum of Rs. 18,87,590/- is refundable to the petitioner by way of payments made in excess as would appear from the account of the petitioner (annexure ‘E’ to the writ petition). The petitioner is under no obligation to forward the invoices issued by them to their agents against sale of ticket and such invoices will be forwarded to the Government of Tripura only on demand for records and verification according to cl. 16 of the agreement dt. 23-10-82. Clause 9 of the said agreement does not require production of any supporting evidence of disbursement to claim reimbursement and in fact up to and including the 141st draw such reimbursement claims were adjusted against the dues of the said State Government without any supporting vouchers and in any case even if there be such obligation, non-submission of vouchers cannot be a ground for withholding the legitimate dues of the petitioner. The petitioner apprehends that the respondents may enforce the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner for the purpose of recovery of imaginary claim put forward by the respondents. They are acting in a highhanded and arbitrary manner in trying to encash the bank guarantee given in their favour by the petitioner. The petitioner repeatedly wrote to the authorities concerned for refund of the excess amount paid but far from making the payment the respondents by their letter dt. Jan. 4, 1984 called upon the petitioner to submit within 15 days from the date of the said letter documents in support of the petitioner's claim for agents/sellers' incentives relating to 140th draw and onwards. Thus the respondents have withheld payment of petitioner's legitimate dues and on the other hand threatened to encash the bank guarantee. The petitioner has therefore, prayed for Mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from enforcing the bank guarantee and from demanding vouchers for incentives given to the sellers and agents by the petitioner.
5. The respondent 1 is the State of Tripura, respondent 2 is the Director, Tripura State Lottery and respondent 3 is the Deputy Director, Small Savings and State Lotteries, Government of Tripura. Respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition have stated that by cl. 9 of the agreement dt. 23-10-1982 the petitioner was authorised to make payment of prize money, agents/sellers' incentives, etc., up to Rs. 1000/-. Against such payments the petitioner always preferred reimbursement claims along with the prize winning tickets as supporting vouchers. The petitioner is required to submit all supporting documents along with the claims. In the instant case as specific complaints were received, the petitioner was requested to furnish the documents for verification. But in spite of repeated reminders, the petitioner failed to submit the vouchers and contravened the relevant clause of the agreement. Respondents have further said that until an amount of Rs. 33,10,070/- payable to respondent 1 is settled, the amount of Rs. 18,87,590/- cannot be treated as excess payment. On the other hand, if the amount of Rs. 18,87,590/- (subject to result of checking) be deducted from the total amount payable to respondent 1, still, there would remain an amount of Rs. 14,22,480/- payable to respondent 1. On receipt of duplicate claims of the third prize of Rs. 1000/-, the petitioner was requested to furnish invoice/counter foils as per cl. 16 of the agreement on the basis of which the petitioner made payment of the incentives to agents/sellers and sought reimbursement in a consolidated way without supporting vouchers. The petitioner's claims for reimbursement were withheld as the petitioner failed to submit relevant vouchers, invoices, etc., in support of such claims in spite of demands.
6. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the respondents' act of threatening to encash the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner is arbitrary and illegal as the said bank guarantee is conditional and it cannot be enforced till the loss, if any, is determined and quantified by a competent court after that trial on evidence. In this connection, reference has been made to the essential term of the bank guarantee which is annexure ‘C’ to the affidavit-in-reply that the bank agrees to reimburse the amount of loss, if any, subject to the maximum limit of Rs. 16,20,000/- (Rupees sixteen lacs and twenty thousand) only. It is submitted that there is no term in the bank guarantee in question to the effect that the State Government of Tripura shall have the power to decide finally the amount of loss. So the bank guarantee cannot be enforced until the loss, if any, is admitted or proved. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the Bench decision in M. & M. Trading Corporation or India Ltd. v. S. Sethi, (1970) 74 Cal WN 991 in which the learned Judge S.K Mukherjee, J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as follows:—
“It is true that the guarantees were executed by the bank in favour of the appellant; it is equally true that the agent is not a party to either of the guarantees. The guarantees, however, have a dual aspect. They are not merely contracts between the appellant and the bank; they are also securities furnished by the agents in terms of the agreements between the agent and the appellant. In seeking to enforce the bank guarantees the appellant is in effect seeking to realise the securities furnished by the agent on the basis that it has suffered loss and the loss has been occasioned by negligence or default on the part of the agent.”
The learned Judge further observed:—
“The guarantee may, however, provide that the decision of the beneficiary on the question of loss or damage suffered by them or on the question of default or negligence by reason of which the guarantee becomes enforceable will be final. A bank guarantee like any other contract is no more or no less than what the parties make it….. Conditions for payment under a bank guarantee have to be satisfied before payment can be legitimately claimed.”
The aforesaid observations were made in an appeal from an interlocutory order of temporary injunction in a suit on the original side of this Court. On behalf of the petitioner reliance has also been placed on Sudhu Ram Yadav v. Board of Trustees (1982) 1 Cal LJ 286 in which the petitioner challenged the withholding of the release order in respect of certain lots of unserviceable goods auctioned by the Calcutta Port Trust Authorities after the petitioner as the highest bidder had paid the entire price according to the terms and conditions of sale and the sale had become complete. Repelling the contentions raised on behalf of the Calcutta Port Trust Authorities that the constitutional remedy under Art. 226 does not lie to establish rights flowing from contract or in the event of breach of contract, by-passing the normal channels of Civil litigation, the learned Single Judge observed:—
“In my view, this contention of Mr. Dutt is no longer valid in view of the Supreme Court decision in the well-known case of Ramana v. International Airport Authority of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628. This decision of the Supreme Court is clear authority of the proposition that whether in the field of exercise of statutory power or in the discharge of its contractual obligation the State must act reasonably and not arbitrarily.”
The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1983 SC 848 and invited the attention of this Court to the observation in para 11 of the judgment at page (852) “It is not in dispute that the appellant is the instrumentality of the Government and would be the other authority” under Art. 12 of the Constitution. If it be so as held by this Court in R.D Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India (AIR 1979 SC 1628 at Pp 1641-1642), the rule inhibiting arbitrary action by the Government would equally apply where such corporation dealing with the public whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise and it cannot act arbitrarily and its action in conformity with some principles which meets the test of reason and relevance.”
7. On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that the present writ petition cannot be maintained for adjudication of dispute arising out of the concluded contract between the petitioner and the respondents' over interpretation of the clauses of the agreement and the petitioner cannot have any remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution against allegedly threatened breach of contract because of the intention of the Government of Tripura to enforce the bank guarantee, as the petitioner cannot escape the liability to pay the dues of the State Government on account of sale of said lottery tickets as sole agent. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on several decisions of the Supreme Court, viz., Harshankar v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr. AIR 1975 SC 1121, Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar AIR 1977 SC 1496 and Premjibhai v. Delhi Development Bank AIR 1980 SC 738. It has been submitted that the observation of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Sudhu Ram Yadav's case (1982) 1 Cal LJ 286 relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has been made per incuriam as the decision in the International Airport Authority of India's case AIR 1979 SC 1628 invalidates unreasonable or arbitrary action or discrimination by the State in entering into contract or at the stage of entry into the contractual area and does not deal with contractual obligations in the field of performance or non-performance of the terms and conditions of a concluded contract. It is submitted that Gujrat State Financial Corpn.'s case AIR 1983 SC 848 is a case of application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to compel the corporation to perform its statutory duty to advance the loan as the agreement to advance the loan was entered into in performance of the statutory duty cast on the corporation by the statute under which it was created. It is pointed out that the expression “or entering into contracts or otherwise” in the observation of the Supreme Court in para 11 of the judgment referred to on behalf of the petitioner relates to the stage of entry into the field of contract or discharge of statutory obligation in the context of the facts of the reported case.
8. In my view, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents are well founded and must prevail. In this case there are rival claims and counter claims arising out of alleged non-fulfilment of contractual obligations. In Radha Krishna Agarwal's case AIR 1977 SC 1496 the writ petitions were directed against revision of rates of royalty under a lease of 1970 followed by cancellation of the lease and the ground of challenge was that such acts of the Government of Bihar and its officers were illegal and mala fide. Primarily the case of the petitioner was that of a breach of contract for which the State would be ordinarily liable to pay damages if it had broken it. The Supreme Court observed (at P. 1500):
“But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Art. 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract (vide para 10 at page 1500).”
The Court reaffirmed the observation in Harshankar's case AIR 1975 SC 1121. That “a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations (see para 19 at page 1502).” In Premjibhai's case AIR 1980 SC 738 the writ petitioners who were allottees of flats claimed refund of surcharge said to have been illegally collected in allotting flats to the petitioner by the Delhi Development Authority and the court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to get back part of the purchase price paid and benefit taken. After the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract no question arises of violation of Art. 14 or of any other constitutional provision. In the absence of any special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field apart from the contract the petitioners are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract. The principles laid down in Radha Krishna Agarwal's case AIR 1977 SC 1496 have been restated. I cannot accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that the aforesaid cases, of the Supreme Court are distinguishable and have no application in this case because in those cases the petitioners wanted to wriggle out of the contracts while in the present case the facts are different and that the petitioner's simple claim is that the State cannot act arbitrarily or illegally in attempting to enforce the bank guarantee contrary to its terms, without admission or proof of loss, if any, sustained by the State Government should be accepted. In my view, the petitioner has sought to claim relief against the alleged threat held out by the State Government of Tripura of breach of the contract of guarantee in the field of concluded contract and in view of the principles laid down in Radha Krishna Agarwal's case restated in several decisions of the Supreme Court thereafter the present writ petition claiming such relief cannot be maintained, as the remedy against the alleged threat of breach of contract by the State lies elsewhere. The petitioner is not entitled to any remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution for threatened enforcement of the bank guarantee by the respondents. Arbitrariness or illegality of action by the State in the field of contract not governed by any statute falls within the domain of private law which is outside the realm of public law, the remedy for which is to be pursued in the civil court and not in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It has been alleged in ground VII of para 33 of the writ petition that the respondents have deliberately misread and misconstrued the clauses of the agreement between the parties. But dispute over interpretation of the terms of the contract cannot be resolved in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
9. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the respondents cannot demand vouchers from the petitioner, under the terms of the contract and in view of their past action of settling accounts without demanding vouchers in support of payment of incentives to agents/sellers of prize winning tickets by the petitioner on behalf of the respondents. So, it is argued that the respondents' demand for vouchers is illegal and arbitrary. Such contention must fail in this forum for the same reason namely, that it relates to alleged breach of contractual obligation on the part of the State in the field of concluded contract. That apart the petitioner as agent has duty, irrespective of any contract to that effect, to produce vouchers by which items of disbursement are supported as part of the obligation to render proper accounts to, the principal on demand under S. 213, Contract Act. The principal is not estopped from enforcing it. So, there is no prima facie arguable case against the demands for vouchers on the ground of arbitrariness or illegality even if the dispute appertains to the field of concluded contract between the parties.
10. In view of the foregoing discussions I hold that the writ petition cannot be maintained and must fail. The writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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