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The Cotton Corporati... v. The Oriental Fire & ...
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner carried on a business of purchasing and selling cotton bales. The cotton bales were hypothecated to respondent No. 2 (Bank of Baroda) and stored in godowns of respondent No. 3 (West Bengal State Warehousing Corporation). The petitioner insured goods with respondent No. 1 under a policy dated 3 October 1980, and by agreement on or about 30-6-81 the policy was extended to cover goods in godown No. 6 for Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. The policy contained an arbitration clause (Cl. 18) and a time-limitation clause (Cl. 19) which provided that the company would not be liable for loss after 12 months from the happening of the loss unless the claim was the subject of pending action or arbitration, and that a disclaimer would bar recovery unless suit was filed within 18 calendar months from the disclaimer.
On or about 10-7-81 a fire destroyed the goods in godown No. 6. The petitioner notified respondent No. 1 (11-7-81); surveyors were appointed and the petitioner submitted its claim (16-7-81). A dispute arose as to the number of bales destroyed: surveyors assessed and treated 996 bales as salvaged (sold for Rs. 5,15,000 and paid to the petitioner), while the petitioner contended that 1,860 bales were lost. A joint statement recorded delivery of salvaged goods and that nothing more remained to deliver; the petitioner disputed that statement as not accounting for completely destroyed bales. Respondent No. 3 later confirmed 1,860 bales on 30-12-81; the surveyors maintained their position (7-1-82).
Correspondence continued: the respondent for the first time requested the Fire Brigade report in late May 1982; compensation on the view of 996 bales was assessed at Rs. 21,94,181. The petitioner indicated willingness to accept Rs. 20,00,000 as an on-account payment "without prejudice to our rights and contentions under the policy" (letter dated 21-6-82, which records a claim of Rs. 57,66,200/-). Respondent No. 1 alleged in its affidavit that the petitioner had agreed to accept Rs. 20,00,000 in full and final settlement (para 25) — a point addressed in the proceedings when the copy of the 21-6-82 letter was produced and admitted.
The dispute about quantum of liability was treated by the petitioner as arising after the 12-month period (which expired on 9-7-82); the petitioner regarded respondent No. 1's conduct (its letter of 27-8-82 and other steps) as effectively a disclaimer or as conduct that prevented reference within the contractual 12 months. After obtaining legal advice the petitioner applied (in June 1983) under S.37(4) of the Arbitration Act for an extension of time to refer the dispute to arbitration.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, the court should extend the time to make the reference to arbitration in respect of this dispute.
- Whether the petitioner has shown sufficient cause (including that the delay was caused by the respondent's conduct and a bona fide mistake by the petitioner) to justify such an extension.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The dispute as to quantum arose only after the 12-month period had expired (after 9-7-82) because respondent No. 1, by its actions and correspondence, first raised the basis of the dispute in August 1982.
- Respondent No. 1 did not clearly tell the petitioner earlier that it would not accept the petitioner's and respondent No. 3's business records as evidence; that conduct caused the delay in referring the dispute to arbitration.
- The petitioner made a bona fide mistake in construing its letter dated 25-9-82 as a disclaimer; this mistake was corrected after obtaining legal advice, which contributed to delay but was not culpable.
- The records kept in the ordinary course of business (by petitioner and respondent No. 3) are admissible under the Evidence Act and would support the petitioner's large claim; therefore it is desirable the dispute be resolved on proper evidence in a judicial forum.
- The petitioner relied on precedent (Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Planters Airways Pvt. Ltd. — AIR 1975 SC 415 and Planter's Airways v. Sterling General Insurance — AIR 1974 Cal 193) for a liberal construction of undue hardship and consideration of all relevant facts causing delay.
- Refusal to extend time would cause serious hardship to the petitioner, and no prejudice would be occasioned to respondent No. 1 because the delay resulted from respondent No. 1's own conduct.
Respondent No. 1's Arguments
- The one-year period to refer the dispute expired on 9-7-82 and the present application (taken out in June 1983) was made well after that period; therefore the delay should not be condoned.
- Respondent No. 1 alleged (in para 25 of its affidavit) that by letter dated 21-6-82 the petitioner agreed to accept Rs. 20,00,000 as full and final settlement of its claim — an allegation later scrutinized in the proceedings when the letter was produced.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1975 SC 415 — Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Planters Airways Pvt. Ltd. | The Supreme Court's statement that, in interpreting S.37(4) of the Arbitration Act, the court must take a liberal view of the meaning of "undue hardship"; "undue" must be something not merited by the claimant's conduct or very much disproportionate to it. | The petitioner relied on this authority to support a liberal exercise of the court's discretion to extend time; the court considered the petitioner’s conduct and hardship in light of this principle when exercising discretion. |
| AIR 1974 Cal 193 — Planter's Airways v. Sterling General Insurance | The principle that "all the relevant facts which are the cause of such delay in the background of a particular case should be taken into account in a practical sense." | The petitioner relied on this decision to argue that the court should consider all background facts causing delay (including respondent conduct and bona fide mistakes); the court took these relevant circumstances into account in deciding to grant an extension. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the admitted chronology and emphasized that the dispute as to quantum became clear only after the 12-month contractual period had expired (12 months from the fire ending on 9-7-82). The court noted the following points as critical to its exercise of discretion under S.37(4):
- The dispute regarding the number of bales and the quantum of loss crystallized after expiry of the 12-month period — the respondent's conduct (including reliance on the surveyor's joint statement and initial handling of the claim) contributed to this timing.
- The petitioner had committed a bona fide mistake in construing the respondent's correspondence (specifically the letter dated 25-9-82) as a disclaimer; the petitioner corrected this mistake after obtaining legal advice, which contributed to delay but was not deliberately dilatory conduct.
- The amount at stake was substantial (claims in excess of fifty-two lacs), and the petitioner relied on business records and the respondent No. 3's confirmation to substantiate the claim; the court treated this as a factor weighing in favour of permitting adjudication on evidence rather than denying access to arbitration on technical time grounds.
- Precedent requires a liberal construction of "undue hardship" and consideration of all relevant facts causing delay; applying that guidance, the court found the petitioner's conduct was not such as to disentitle it to relief.
- The court considered potential prejudice to respondent No. 1 and concluded that respondent No. 1 would not be prejudiced because the delay arose from respondent No. 1's own conduct.
- Practical procedural considerations under the arbitration clause were also relevant: although the petition sought a one-month extension, the mechanism for appointing an arbitrator (and potential disagreement necessitating an umpire) might require more time; the court concluded a four-month extension was necessary to make the order effective and avoid rendering it infructuous.
On that basis, the court exercised its discretion under S.37(4) to extend the time for reference to arbitration, aligning its decision with the principles cited in the authorities relied upon by the petitioner.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court granted the petitioner's application for extension of time under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act and extended the time to refer the dispute to arbitration for four months from to-day.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner may refer the dispute to arbitration within the four-month extension period; the costs of the application are ordered to be costs in the reference.
- Procedural consequence emphasized by the court: one month's extension was considered insufficient given the arbitration appointment procedure; the four-month extension was granted to ensure the order would be effective and not rendered infructuous if the respondent did not cooperate.
- Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applies established authorities (as cited) and exercises discretion in the particular facts of this case. The court did not state any novel rule beyond applying existing principles of liberal construction of S.37(4) and consideration of all relevant facts causing delay.
Order made: parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the order.
Order accordingly.
1. This is an application under S. 37(4) of the Arbitration Act for extension of time to make the reference.
2. The admitted facts of this case are as follows:—
The petitioner carried on business in purchase and sale of cotton bales in various parts of India. All these cotton bales are hypothecated with the respondent No. 2, Bank of Baroda and are stored in the godowns of the West Bengal State Warehousing Corporation, the respondent No. 3. The goods stored at the godowns situate at Nos. 27, 28 and 29 of the respondent No. 3 were insured with the respondent No. 1 under a policy of insurance No. 3120/0/0.F-9647/80 dated 3rd October, 1980 against any loss or damage by fire and the petitioner paid the premium of Rs. 48,628/- which was accepted by the respondent No. 1. By mutual agreement, on or about 30-6-81 the aforesaid fire policy was extended to cover the fire risk of the cotten bales stored at godown No. 6 of the respondent No. 3 situate at No. 4, Khagen Chatterjee Street, Calcutta for Rs. 1,00,00,000/- The said policy contained an arbitration clause as follows:—
Cl. 18:— “If any difference shall arise as to the quantum to be paid under this policy (liability being otherwise admitted) such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decisions of an arbitrator, to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference or if they cannot agree upon a single Arbitrator to the decision of two disinterested persons as arbitrators of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calendar months after having required so to do in writing by the other party in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as amended from time to time and for the time being in force. In case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint sole arbitrator; and in case of disagreement between the arbitrators, the difference shall be referred to the decision of an umpire who shall have been appointed by them in writing before entering upon the reference and who shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at the meetings……………………………………………….
Cl. 19: “In no case whatsoever shall the company be liable for any loss or damage after expiration of 12 months from the happening of the loss or damage unless the claim is the subject of pending action or arbitration, it being expressly agreed and declared that if the company shall disclaim liability for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within 18 calendar months from the date of the disclaimer have been made the subject-matter of a suit under court of law then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.”
3. It is also an admitted fact that on or about 10-7-81 a devastating fire broke out at the godown No. 6 of the respondent No. 3 situate at No. 4 Khagen Chatterjee Street, Calcutta, and the said fire completely destroyed and damaged all the goods kept in that godown by the petitioner. The petitioner immediately informed the respondent No. 1 about the destruction caused by the fire by its letter dated 11-10-81 and the respondent No. 1 appointed Ascon and Avins as the surveyor to assess the loss and damages and by its letter dated 11-7-81 informed the petitioner about the same and sent the claim forms. The petitioner submitted its claim on 16-7-81. On 18-7-81, the surveyors informed the petitioner that they wanted to commence survey and to have physical verification of the stock for that purpose under joint supervision of the surveyor, the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 and that the assessment would be made on an allowance basis. The petitioner by its letter dated 22-7-81 pointed out that the assessment ought to be made on total loss basis and that the petitioner was not agreeable to accept the salvaged goods. The surveyor and the petitioner disagreed regarding the number of bales involved. On physical verification the number of bales were found to be 996 which were sold at Rs. 5,15,000/- by the Surveyors and the said sum was paid to the petitioner in part payment of its claims. On 20-11-81, the surveyor proposed to assess the loss of goods on the basis of counting of the metal bands which were found at the godown at the time of physical verification of salvaged goods evidencing existence of 996 bales only. It should be noted that after the salvaged goods were delivered, a joint statement was prepared and signed by the representatives of the surveyor, petitioner and the respondent No. 3 recording that there was nothing more to deliver from the godown and the delivery was complete. The aforesaid proposal was made by the surveyors on the basis of the said joint statement. By letter dated 4-12-81 the petitioner informed the surveyor that while signing the joint statement, its representative Mr. B.K Jha did not take into account the bales which were completely destroyed by fire leaving no physical trace and as such the statement should be corrected accordingly. By another letter dated 9-12-81, the petitioner recorded that the surveyors' allegations that there were only 996 bales in the godown was not correct as will be evident from the records of the petitioner as well as that of the respondent No. 3. According to the petitioner 1860 bales of goods were in the godown. By letter dated 14-12-81 the surveyor insisted that only 996 bales were involved in the fire as mentioned in the joint statement. By letter dated 30-12-81, the respondent No. 3 confirmed that on the date of fire, 1860 bales of, cotton were in the godown. But in reply dated 7-1-82, the surveyor refused to accept the said fact on the ground that the fire might destroy the cottons but not the metal bands and as such they would proceed on the basis of the joint statement. Thereafter various correspondence passed between the petitioner and the surveyor. By letters dated 25-4-82 and 28-4-82 the petitioner requested the respondent No. 1 to settle its claim for Rs. 52,57,199/-. In reply dated 25/26th May, 1982, the respondent No. 1 for the first time asked the petitioner to submit the Fire Brigade Report. In the meantime the compensation for 996 bales was assessed at Rs. 21,94,181/-. It is the petitioner's case that the petitioner, due to administrative reasons, wanted to accept Rs. 20,00,000/- as on account payment without prejudice to its other rights and contentions under the said policy. In the affidavit-in-opposition, para 25, the respondent No. 1, however, alleged that by letter dated 21-6-82, the petitioner agreed to accept Rs. 20,00,000/- in full and final settlement of its loss amounting to Rs. 2-1,94,181/-. As this letter dated 21-6-82 was not disclosed in the proceeding before me. I directed the parties to disclose this letter and a xerox copy of the letter was produced in Court by the respondent No. 1 and was admitted to be a correct copy by the petitioner. The said letter is kept on record. In this letter the petitioner stated “We hereby agree to accept on account payment without prejudice to our rights and contentions under the policy”. The subject matter of this letter was as follows:—
“Fire of 1860 bales in the godown of West Bengal State Warehousing Corporation on 10-7-1981 — Rs. 57,66,200/-.”
4. This letter clearly proves that the petitioner was pressing a claim for Rs. 57,66,200/- by way of loss and damage of 1860 bales of goods and was agreeable to accept on account payment without prejudice to its rights and contention under the policy concerned. The respondent No. 1, taking advantage of the fact that the letter dated 21-6-82 was not disclosed by the petitioner, deliberately misconstrued the same in para 25 of its affidavit-in-opposition with the sole motive to mislead the Court. This affidavit was verified by the Regional Manager of the respondent No. 1, Mr. Umanath Sadhu on 9-8-83 and the contents of para 25 of this affidavit was verified by him on oath as true to his knowledge. It is surprising that a responsible officer of the respondent No. 1 has deliberately made this false statement on oath with the mala fide motive to defeat the petitioner's case if possible. It is painful to observe that this respectable insurance company has no respect for truth and its business moral is so low. By letter dated 9-7-1982, the petitioner submitted the Fire Brigade report to the respondent No. 1 as per its demand. Thereafter some correspondence passed between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 and by letter dated 27-8-82, the respondent No. 1 stated that in case of a fire claim, the records of the claimant should not be accepted as the reliable evidence. On the basis of the surveyor's joint statement, the respondent No. 1 denied that there were 1860 bales of cotton in the godown at the time of the fire. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 regarding the number of bales involved in fire, and the quantum of loss suffered by the petitioner arose for the first time in August, 1982. It is significant to note that the fire took place in 10-7-81, and 12 months time expired on 9-7-82. Therefore the dispute as to the quantum of liability of the respondent No. 1 arose only after expiry of 12 months from the date of fire. The petitioner, however, treated this letter of the respondent No. 1 dated 27-8-82 as a disclaimer. Under the circumstances, by a letter dated 25-9-82, the petitioner demanded payment of Rs. 52,51,199/- after giving credit for Rs. 5,15,001/- received by the petitioner as the price of the salvaged goods and further intimated the respondent No. 1 that in default of payment the petitioner would file a suit. Subsequently the petitioner was advised that this letter of the respondent No. 1 did not amount to a disclaimer as the respondent No. 1 admitted its liability partially. By this letter the respondent No. 1 only disputed the quantum of its liability under the said policy and this dispute was referable to arbitration. Thereafter by letter dated 25-1-83, the petitioner informed the respondent No. 1 the petitioner would accept the admitted amount as on account of payment and the balance disputed amount would be referred to arbitration. The petitioner waited for a considerable time for reply but ultimately no reply came from the respondent No. 1. The nature of the dispute between the parties came to light clearly after expiry of 12 months, time from the date of occurrence of fire. As the 12 months, period had already expired on 9-7-82 the dispute could not be referred to arbitration. The petitioner thereafter took legal advice and was instructed to make the present application and this application was taken out in June 1983.
5. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the time expired on 9-7-82 and one year had elapsed before the present application was taken out in June 1983. Therefore, this delay should not be condoned. It is to be noted that prior to 9-7-82, the respondent No. 1 never intimated the petitioner in clear terms that they would not receive in evidence the records of the case in possession of the petitioner and the respondent No. 3. The entire transaction for storage of goods is carried on between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 on the basis of the records kept in the usual course of business and they are admissible evidence under the provisions of the Evidence Act. They are also good documentary evidence in case of a reference to arbitration. The respondent's contention that these records would not be accepted in evidence is arbitrary. As there was no dispute regarding the quantum of respondent's liability earlier, the petitioner could not refer this dispute to arbitration within the agreed period. The time expired not due to any default on the part of the petitioner but due to the conduct of the respondent No. 1 who did not make it clear to the petitioner that they would not accept the petitioner's case of 1860 bales of goods or the records in their possession and that they would only accept 996 bales on the basis of the joint statement recording delivery of goods. It is true that some time was wasted on account of the fact that the petitioner proceeded on the basis that the letter dated 25-9-82 was a disclaimer. This bona fide mistake was corrected by legal advice subsequently. The petitioner should not be penalised for making a bona fide mistake. The present application was made after obtaining legal advice for extension of time. The petitioner is making a huge claim of over fifty two lacs on the allegation that 1860 bales were gutted and the records of the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 3 would prove and corroborate the said claim of the petitioner. On the other hand the respondent No. 1 is refusing to treat as evidence the records of the case kept by the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 in the usual course of business. Under the circumstances it is desirable that this dispute should be decided in a judicial forum on proper evidence. In view of the fact that the dispute itself was raised after expiry of the time by the respondent No. 1, the petitioner was entitled to extension of time to make the reference. The petitioner's counsel relied on AIR 1975 SC 415 (Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Planters Airways Pvt. Ltd.) where the Supreme Court held:
“In interpreting Sec. 37(4) of the Act the Court has to take liberal view of the meaning of the word ‘undue hardship’. Undue must mean something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant or is very much disproportionate to it.”
6. He also relied on AIR 1974 Cal 193 (Planter's Airways v. Sterling General Insurance) where it was held:—
“…………… all the relevant facts which are the cause of such delay in the background of a particular case should be taken into account in a practical sense.”
7. Taking into consideration the fact that the dispute was raised after expiry of term and all relevant circumstances of this case, such as the bona fide mistake committed by the petitioner in construing the letter of 25-9-82, the amount of stake involved in this case and the unavoidable delay in obtaining the legal advice and preparing this application and particularly the fact that refusal to exercise my discretion in this case would cause serious hardship to the petitioner, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case where extension-should be granted. There is no question of the respondent No. 1 suffering any prejudice in this case as the time had expired due to the conduct of the respondent No. 1 itself. In the petition, the prayer has been made for extension of time for one month. But considering the procedure laid down in the agreement for appointment of arbitrator one month's time will not be sufficient unless the respondent No. 1 co-operates in appointment of a sole arbitrator. In case of disagreement it will take longer time. In view of the provision of the arbitration clause, I feel that unless extension is granted for 4 months, the order passed herein may become ineffective or can be rendered infructuous. In that view of the matter, the time to refer the dispute to arbitration is extended for four months from to-day. The cost of this application will be cost in the reference. All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order.
Order accordingly.
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