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Gulabchand Harekchand And Another v. State Of West Bengal And Others

Calcutta High Court
Sep 21, 1984
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Judgment Summary — Prabir Kumar Majumdar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners seek writs of mandamus or prohibition to restrain the respondents from making any assessment or collecting any tax or further tax on “gudaku” or “guraku” (packed or unpacked) under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and the Taxes on Entry of Goods into Calcutta Metropolitan Area Act, 1972 (Entry Tax Act). The petitioners also seek refund of taxes already assessed and collected in respect of “gudaku” or “guraku” sold during the four quarters ended Chait Sudi 8 of Sambat years 2028, 2029, 2030 and 2031 and subsequent periods.

Petitioner No. 1 is a dealer under the Sales Tax Act. The petitioners deal in tobacco brought from outside West Bengal, including tobacco leaf and tobacco paste known as “gudaku” or “guraku” used for teeth cleansing and for hookah. Assessments and demands were made by sales tax authorities; at least one Commercial Tax Officer allowed exemption relying on an Orissa High Court decision and ordered refund in one assessment (annexure B), but the Assistant Commissioner kept the matter in abeyance because the question was sub judice. The petitioners assert they paid taxes under a mistaken view of law and discovered the mistake in September 1976. The matter is before the High Court on the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether “gudaku” or “guraku” is covered by the definition of “tobacco” (as incorporated in rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules read with item 19 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944) and hence exempt from tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
  2. Whether “gudaku” or “guraku” falls within the expression “tooth-paste or powder” under item 41(c) of the Schedule to the Entry Tax Act (and thus whether it is taxable under that Act).
  3. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the statutory remedies and adjudicatory machinery provided under the relevant tax statutes (i.e., whether the petitioners should first exhaust remedies under the statute rather than approach the High Court under article 226).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Mr. Gopal Chakraborty)

  • “Gudaku” manufactured out of tobacco (with lime, molasses, gerumati and flavour) is covered by the expression “tobacco” as defined in the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and incorporated by rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules; therefore it is exempt from tax under item 18 of Schedule I to the Sales Tax Act.
  • Because it is essentially a tobacco product, gudaku cannot be included in taxable turnover for sales tax purposes.
  • Gudaku used for hookah has been held to be manufactured tobacco in earlier decisions; therefore gudaku used for teeth should also be construed as tobacco.
  • Gudaku is not a toothpaste or dentifrice within the meaning of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act (or the Entry Tax Act); constituents of toothpaste prescribed by Indian Standards Institution (polishing agents, detergents, humectants, binders, astringents, deodorants, water, permitted colours/preservatives/flavour/sweeteners) are absent in gudaku, so occasional use for cleansing teeth does not make it a toothpaste.
  • Reliance was placed on the Orissa High Court decision in State of Orissa v. Samsuddin Akbar Khan & Co. [1976] 35 STC 179 and the Gujarat High Court decision in B. Dar Laboratories v. State of Gujarat [1968] 22 STC 160 to support a wide construction of “tobacco”.
  • On maintainability, the petitioner argued that the question is one of construction of statutory provisions and requires no further fact-finding, so the writ petition can be decided on merits; cited Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Saifuddin Erahimbhai Vadnagarwalla v. Assistant Commissioner in support.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. S.N. Dutta)

  • Gudaku is not essentially or wholly a tobacco product; it is given a tobacco flavour but essential elements include gerumati and molasses — mere flavouring or insignificant tobacco content does not make it “tobacco in any form.”
  • In West Bengal, gudaku is specially used as toothpaste/dentifrice and therefore is not exempt under the Sales Tax Act or the Entry Tax Act.
  • Whether gumdaku contains ingredients of toothpaste is a disputed question of fact that requires investigation and cannot be resolved in writ proceedings under article 226; the proper authorities should examine evidence and materials.
  • The petitioners should avail themselves of the statutory remedies provided by the Sales Tax and Entry Tax Acts, since those Acts provide a complete adjudicatory machinery; the Commercial Tax Officer allowed exemption under a mistaken view and matter had been referred upwards and was sub judice.
  • Relied on Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa ([1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); 1983 2 SCC 433 : AIR 1983 SC 603) for the proposition that where a statute creates rights or liabilities and provides a special remedy, that remedy should be availed of.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of Orissa v. Samsuddin Akbar Khan & Co., [1975] 35 STC 179 (Orissa High Court) Held that gudaku fell within the definition of “tobacco” and was therefore exempt from sales tax under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The High Court respectfully followed this decision, agreeing that gudaku is manufactured out of tobacco and is covered by the definition of “tobacco” in rule 3(28)(b) read with item 19 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944; the court cited and adopted the reasoning and reached the same conclusion.
B. Dar Laboratories v. State of Gujarat, [1968] 22 STC 160 (Gujarat High Court) Supported a liberal and wide interpretation of “tobacco” in the Central Excises and Salt Act — found that “Ipco-dental creamy snuff” was tobacco and exempt from sales tax. The court accepted the Gujarat High Court's view that the legislature intended a wide meaning for “tobacco of any form” (cured/uncured, manufactured or not) and relied on that approach in construing “tobacco” to include gudaku.
Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); (1983) 2 SCC 433 : AIR 1983 SC 603 (Supreme Court) Stated the principle that when a statute creates a right or liability and provides a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by the statute should ordinarily be availed of. Invoked by the respondents to argue the writ petition was not maintainable because statutory remedies should be pursued; the High Court considered this submission but held that the question involved a jurisdictional fact and was open to examination in writ jurisdiction, so the petition remained maintainable.
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1980] 46 STC 256 (SC); (1980) 4 SCC 71 : AIR 1980 SC 1552 (Supreme Court) Cited by petitioners in support of the proposition that certain questions of construction can be decided without remanding for factual investigation (as relied upon by the petitioners). The petitioners relied on this authority to contend no further factual investigation was necessary; the High Court accepted that in the present case no investigation of disputed fact need be made and that the question could be decided on construction of statutory provisions.
Saifuddin Erahimbhai Vadnagarwalla v. Assistant Commissioner, [1976] 38 STC 463 (Calcutta High Court) Cited by petitioners to support the contention that the matter could be decided on construction and without fresh factual inquiry. Relied upon by petitioners and considered by the High Court when determining maintainability and whether factual inquiry was necessary; the Court concluded that no further investigation was needed for the question before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining statutory definitions and admitted authorities, and by assessing whether factual inquiry was necessary for deciding the legal question.

  1. Incorporation of Definition: The court observed that rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules attributes to the expression “tobacco” the same meaning as in the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (item 19). The court treated that incorporation as operative and decisive for the Sales Tax Rules' meaning of “tobacco.”
  2. Width of Definition: The court noted that the definition in item 19 of the Central Act is “very wide and comprehensive,” including “any form of tobacco whether manufactured or not,” and therefore should be given a broad interpretation.
  3. Reliance on Precedents: The court respectfully agreed with the Orissa High Court decision in State of Orissa v. Samsuddin Akbar Khan & Co., which held that gudaku falls within the definition of tobacco, and also accepted the Gujarat High Court's approach in B. Dar Laboratories that the expression “any form of tobacco” should be given a liberal meaning. The court adopted the reasoning of those courts and found no reason to depart from them.
  4. Essential Character Test: The court applied an “essential character” analysis: although gudaku contains gerumati or molasses as constituents, that does not cause it to lose its essential characteristic of being manufactured out of tobacco. It is not disputed that gudaku is manufactured from tobacco; therefore it remains a tobacco product.
  5. Use vs. Character: The court rejected the argument that occasional or common use for cleansing teeth transforms gudaku into a toothpaste or tooth-powder. The court emphasized that toothpaste or tooth-powder, in trade understanding, have the primary and sole use of cleansing teeth; gudaku has other uses (e.g., for hookah) and is not understood by dealers or consumers as exclusively toothpaste.
  6. Entry Tax Act Construed: With regard to item 41(c) of the Entry Tax Act Schedule (“Tooth-paste or powder, guraku”), the court accepted the petitioner's contention that the category should be confined to commodities whose use is essentially as toothpaste or powder. Because gudaku has uses beyond cleansing teeth, it should not be treated as toothpaste or tooth-powder for the purposes of that Schedule and thus is not taxable under the Entry Tax Act as such an item.
  7. Maintainability and Jurisdictional Fact: Confronting the respondents' submission based on statutory remedies and Titaghur, the court held that the central question—whether gudaku is covered by the expression “tobacco” (and therefore exempt)—is a jurisdictional fact. Whether a jurisdictional fact exists is open to judicial review under article 226; consequently the writ petition is maintainable and the High Court may decide the matter on construction without remitting it for further factual investigation.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court held that tax cannot be levied on gudaku because it is covered by the expression “tobacco” as defined in rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules read with item 19 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The petitioners' claim for exemption under rule 3(28)(b) is allowed. The court also held that gudaku is not a tooth-paste or tooth-powder and, therefore, is not subject to levy under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act and the Entry Tax Act.

Direct Consequences:

  • The writ rule is made absolute in favour of the petitioners; the application succeeds.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The court ordered a stay on the operation of this judgment until a fortnight after the long vacation, as requested by the State.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by granting exemption and restraining tax assessments on gudaku in the circumstances of this case. The opinion follows and applies existing High Court authorities (Orissa and Gujarat) and considered Supreme Court authority on available statutory remedies; it does not purport to lay down broader novel principles beyond its construction and application of the definition of “tobacco” and the determination that the question was a jurisdictional fact reviewable under article 226.

Note: This summary strictly reflects only the content and conclusions contained in the provided judgment text and does not add information beyond that source.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Prabir Kumar Majumdar, J.:— This is an application under article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this application the petitioners ask for a writ of mandamus or prohibition prohibiting the respondents from making any assessment or collecting any tax or further tax on “gudaku” or “guraku” packed or unpacked under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and the Taxes on Entry of Goods into Calcutta Metropolitan Area Act, 1972. The petitioners also pray for writ of or in the nature of mandamus calling upon the respondents to make refund of taxes already assessed and collected in respect of “gudaku” of “guraku” sold during the periods 4 quarters ended Chait Sudi 8, 2028, 2029, 2030 and 2031 Sambat year and subsequent periods.

2. The case of the petitioners is that petitioner No. 1 is a dealer within the meaning of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the Sales Tax Act). The petitioners have been dealing in tobacco brought from outside the State of West Bengal, that is to say, tobacco leaf and tobacco paste popularly known as “gudaku” or “guraku” for use in teeth and also for hookha. According to the petitioners, under item 18 of Schedule I to the Sales Tax Act, tobacco for hookah in any form and under rule 3(28) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941 (hereinafter referred as the “Rules”) the sale of tobacco as defined under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 are deductible from gross turnover in calculating taxable turnover. Therefore, such gudaku being a tobacco product cannot be subject to tax, either under the Sales Tax Act as also under the Taxes of Entry on Goods into Calcutta Metropolitan Area Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Entry Tax Act).

3. Mr. Gopal Chakraborty, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners, contends that “gudaku” manufactured out of tobacco and having as its constituents lime, molasses, gerumati and some essence to give it flavour is covered by the expression “tobacco”. He further argues that “gudaku” being wholly or essentially manufactured out of tobacco, which is an exempted item both under the Sales Tax Act and the Entry Tax Act, is non liable to be assessed to tax. As such, the said item cannot be taken into consideration in calculating taxable turnover.

4. Mr. Chakraborty draws my attention to item 18 of Schedule I to the said Sales Tax Act and rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941. He refers also section 5 of the said Sales Tax Act which provides, inter alia, that no tax shall be payable under this Act on the sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule I, subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column of the said Schedule I. Item 18 of the said Schedule I to the said Sales Tax Act mentions tobacco for hookah (that is to say tobacco paste ready for use in hookah). Rule 3 of the said Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941 provides, inter cilia, that in calculating his taxable turnover a dealer liable to pay tax under section 4 or 8(3) of the Act (the said Sales Tax Act) may deduct from his gross turnover the various items set out under rule 3. Rule 3(28)(b) which says that in this sub-clause the expression “tobacca” has the same meaning as attributed to it in the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. “Tobacco” as defined in the First Schedule to the said Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 so far releva it for this application runs thus: “Tobacco means any form of tobacco, whether manufactured or not, and includes the leaf, stalks and stems of tobacco plant, but does not include any part of a tobacco plant while still attached to the earth”

5. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Senior Advocate, relying cm the said provisions referred to above, argues that definition of “tobacco” has not been changed till today in the said Sales Tax Act. As tobacco and its products are not taxable under the said Sales Tax Act and also the Rules framed thereunder, the gudaku being essentially a tobacco product cannot be brought to tax as sought to be done by the respondents-sales tax authorities in respect of the said four assessment years referred to in the petition.

6. It is also his argument that the constituents of hookaht gudaku are not very much different from the gudaku used for cleansing teeth.

7. He also submits relying on certain decisions which I will refer to presently, that gudaku used for smoking by hookah comes within the: meaning of manufactured tobacco. Therefore, he submits, there is no reason why gudaku used for teeth would not be construed as tobacco.

8. Mr. Chakraborty further submits that under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 tobacco for hookah or teeth gums are not taxable under the said Act. He, however, points out that under Notification No. 3123-FT dated 15th July, 1975 the tooth-paste/dentifrice has been brought to tax. But according to Mr. Chakraborty, the tobacco for hookah or teeth gums could never be brought within the meaning of tooth-paste and dentifrice. It is his submission that gudaku which may be used for cleansing teeth cannot be tooth-paste or dentifrice within the meaning of the said West Bengal Sales Tax Act.

9. It is the case of the petitioners that the ingredients which constitute a tooth-paste are absent in gudaku. The petitioners state that according to the specification for tooth-paste as prescribed by the Indian Standards Institution the materials used in the manufacture of tooth-paste fall into the following categories—(a) polishing agents, (b) soap or detergent, (c) humectant, i.e, glycerol or sorbitol, (d) binding agent, (e) astrigent, (f) deodorant, (g) water and (h) permitted colours, preservatives, flavour and sweetening agents.

10. Mr. Chakraborty submits that the constituents of tooth-paste are not present in gudaku. Therefore, according to Mr. Chakraborty, occasional use of gudaku for cleansing teeth cannot make such thing a tooth-paste or dentifrice.

11. Mr. Chakraborty in support of his contention that gudaku cannot be subject to tax places strong reliance on a decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of State Of Orissa v. Samsuddin Akbar Khan & Co. reported in [1976] 35 STC 179.

12. This is a case arising out of a reference under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The question raised in the said reference was whether gudaku was covered by the expression “tobacco” and exempted from tax under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The Orissa High Court after reviewing certain authorities came to the conclusion that gudaku came within the definition of “tobacco” and as such was tax-free.

13. The learned counsel for the petitioners points out in this connection that the petitioners have been purchasing the very same product, namely, gudaku, from Messrs. Samsuddin Akbar Khan & Co., a dealer in Orissa, in whose case the said decision was rendered by the Orissa High Court.

14. He further submits that the petitioners' claim for exemption under rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules was allowed by the Commercial Tax Officer, Rajakatra Charge, relying on the said decision of the Orissa High Court. In the assessment order being annexure B to the petition, in respect of the year Chait Sudi 8, 2031. The Commercial Tax Officer following the said Orissa case also made an order for refund of the tax already paid by the petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioners that they paid taxes on gudaku both under the said Sales Tax Act and the said Entry Tax Act under a mistaken concept of law, such mistake was detected in September, 1976.

15. Mr. Chakraborty also cites a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of B. Dar Laboratories v. State of Gujarat reported in [1968] 22 STC 160. In this case the question came up for consideration under a reference under the Bombay Sales Tax Act as to whether “Ipco-dental creamy snuff” was covered by entry 49 in Schedule A to the Bombay Sales Tax Act which exempted “tobacco” as defined in the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 from the levy of sales tax.

16. The Gujarat High Court observed that the expression “any form of tobacco, whether cured or not and whether manufactured or not” as given in the definition of “tobacco” in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 should be given a liberal interpretation. Giving such interpretation the Gujarat High Court held in that case that the said “Ipco-dental creamy snuff” was tobacco and was therefore exempt from sales tax.

17. Regarding taxability of gudaku under the said Entry Tax Act, Mr. Chakraborty's contention is that gudaku” has been placed in item 41(c) of the Schedule to the said Entry Tax Act which reads: “Tooth-paste or powder, guraku”. The contention of Mr. Chakraborty is that tobacco is not specified article in the said Schedule and is not liable to tax and gudaku being a tobacco product should be exempted from the levy of tax. He also submits that gudaku not being a toothpaste nor a tooth-powder as understood in the trade cannot be placed in the category of tooth-paste or tooth-powder under item 41(c) of the said Schedule.

18. Mr. S.N Dutta, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, strongly contests the contentions of Mr. Chakraborty.

19. Mr. Dutta contends that gudaku is not essentially dr wholly a tobacco product. It is given a tobacco flavour and essential elements of gudaku are “gerumati” and molasses. Just by giving a flavour of tobacco or some insignificant quantity of tobacco to it, it cannot become a tobacco in “any form”. He further contends that gudaku in West Bengal is specially used as tooth-paste or dentifrice, and as such this is not exempted under either the Sales Tax Act or the Entry Tax Act.

20. It is also his argument that whether an essential or all the ingredients of tooth-paste are present in gudaku or not can only be investigated by proper authorities upon relevant materials and evidence. He submits that this is highly disputed question of fact, and this Court exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution should not take upon itself the burden of investigation of this fact in this proceeding. He further submits that the petitioners' claim for exemption under rule 3(28) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules was allowed by the concerned Commercial Tax Officer under a mistaken impression that the said decision of the Orissa High Court was binding upon him. He has drawn my attention to paragraph 12 of the affidavit affirmed by the: concerned Commercial Tax Officer in which he states that he was misled to think that he was to obey the said decision of the Orissa High Court. He also states that exemption resulted in the excess payment, and therefore, the matter was referred to the Assistant Commissioner for sanction of refund. But since this question being sub judice the said Assistant Commissioner kept the matter in abeyance.

21. Referring to the taxability of gudaku under the said Entry Tax Act, Mr. Dutta submits that under the said Entry Tax Act the taxes are levied on the items specified in the Schedule to the said Act. Gudaku being a specified item under item 41(c) of the said Schedule is liable to be taxed, moreover, even if gudaku is taken to be a tobacco it is liable to tax being a specified item.

22. The next argument of Mr. Dutta is that both the said Acts provide complete machinery for adjudication of the question involved in this application, and such remedy as provided in the relevant statutes should be availed of. Moreover, it is the contention of the petitioners in the writ petition that it is the statutory obligation of the respondents to suo motu re vise the assessment or dispose of the application for revision. Mr. Dutta submits that the petitioners in fact have made application for suo motu revision to the relevant authorities being annexure D to the petition at pages 45 and 58, In that view of the matter, he submits that this writ petition is not maintainable.

23. Mr. Dutta cites a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co, Ltd. v. State of Orissa reported in [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); (1983) 2 SCC 433 : AIR 1983 SC 603. The Supreme Court observes in this case that it is now well-recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute should be availed of. To this submission of Mr. Dutta, Mr. Chakraborty argues in reply that in the present case it is a question which concerns the construction of item 19 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and also rule 3(28) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, and other relevant provisions of the statutes. It is also his submission that no further investigation as to any fact need be made in this proceeding, and as such this writ petition can be decided on merits having regard to the construction of the relevant provisions of law involved in this application.

24. In support of his said contention Mr. Chakraborty cites a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan reported in [1980] 46 STC 256 (SC); (1980) 4 SCC 71 : AIR 1980 SC 1552 and a decision of this Court in the case of Saifuddin Erahimbhai Vadnagarwalla v. Assistant Commissioner reported in [1976] 38 STC 463.

25. I have carefully considered the rival submissions of the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties. There is a considerable force in the contention of Mr. Chakraborty, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners. The expression “tobacco” as defined in item 19 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 has been incorporated in the definition of “tobacco” as provided under rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, and therefore whatever be the meaning of tobacco in the said Central Act of 1944, the same should attach to the definition of “tobacco” as provided in the said Bengal Sales Tax Rules.

26. In my view, definition of “tobacco” in item 19 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 is very wide and comprehensive. It includes “any form of tobacco whether cured or uncured and whether manufactured or not”.

27. Respectfully agreeing with the decision of the Orissa High Court in case of State Of Orissa v. Samsuddin Akbar Khan & Co., [1975] 35 STC 179, I am of the view that gudaku is manufactured out of tobacco and is covered by the expression “tobacco” as defined in rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules read with item 19 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

28. I also respectfully accept the view of the Gujarat High Court in the case reported in B. Dar Laboratories v. State of Gujarat, [1968] 22 STC 160 that the Legislature has intended to give wide meaning to the expression tobacco “of any form”, cured or uncured, manufactured or not.

29. I am of opinion that gudaku has not last its essential character, just because some gerumati or molasses are some of the constituent parts. It is not in dispute that gudaku is manufactured out of tobacco, and as such a tobacco product. This very same commodity may be used for smoking by hookah and also may be used for cleansing teeth. It cannot be said that gudaku if used for cleansing teeth will lose its character as tobacco. Taking into account the ingredients of gudaku, it cannot be said that the people familiar with tooth-paste or tooth-powder will take it as tooth-paste or tooth-powder. It must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer. I cannot imagine that gudaku is undrstood in that trade by the dealer or the consumer as tooth-paste and nothing but tooth-paste. There are no materials placed before me in consideration of which I can come to a conclusion that gudaku can be taken as tooth-paste or tooth-powder. Mr. Chakraborty submits, and in my view rightly, that occasional use of gudaku for cleansing teeth cannot make it a tooth-paste or dentifrice. In this particular case the test is whether gudaku is covered by the expression of “tobacco” as defined in rule 3(28)(b) read with explanation of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules or not. If it is found that it comes within the definition of “tobacco” then this item is entitled to exemption from the levy of tax.

30. The Orissa High Court in the case of State Of Orissa v. Samsuddin Akbar Khan & Co., [1975] 35 STC 179 has considered this question whether gudaku is tobacco or not and came to this conclusion that gudaku came within the definition of “tobacco”. I respectfully agree with reasoning of the Orissa High Court and do not see any reason to take a different view.

31. I also accept the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that no investigation of any disputed fact need be made in this proceeding. The question involved in this petition can be decided on the constructions of the relev int provisions of the statutes.

32. Now I will consider whether gudaku, being a specified item of 41(c) of the Schedule to the said Entry Tax Act, is liable to tax under the said Entry Tax Act. Mr. Chakraborty contends that gudaku cannot be taken as a tooth-paste or tooth-powder and it is not understood as such in common parlance. Therefore, if it is not a tooth-paste or tooth-powder or the like, then it cannot be placed in that category under item 41(c) of that Schedule. In this category such thing can be placed which will have no other use but as tooth-paste or powder. His submission is that if it is not considered as tooth-paste or tooth-powder or the like, then it cannot be subject to tax only because it is a specified item under the said item 41(c). I accept this contention of Mr. Chakraborty. Tooth-paste or tooth-powder cannot have any other use except for cleansing teeth. In my opinion gudaku is not such a commodity. It may have different uses.

33. I will now consider the objection of Mr. Dutta as to the maintainability of the writ petition. He contends that the petitioners cannot maintain this application in view of this not having availed themselves of the remedies provided for in the statute. The question involved in this petition is as to whether the petitioners' claim for exemption can be sustained on the construction of the relevant provisions of law involved. If gudaku is covered by the expression “tobacco”, it is exempted from tax and there is no jurisdiction in the tax authorities to assess the petitioners on its turnover. The question is, therefore, in the nature of a jurisdictional fact. It is now well-settled that whether a jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by the Court in its writ jurisdiction. I will, therefore, hold that this writ petition is maintainable.

34. In the premises, I hold that tax cannot be levied on gudaku as this is covered by the expression “tobacco”. The petitioners' claim for exemption under rule 3(28)(b) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules should be allowed. I also hold that gudaku, not being a tooth-paste or tooth-powder, is not subject to the levy of tax under the said West Bengal Sales Tax Act and also under the said Entry Tax Act.

35. For the reasons aforesaid, this application succeeds. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.

36. There will be an order of stay of the operation of the judgment till a fortnight after the long vacation as prayed for by Mr. S.N Dutta, learned Advocate for the State.