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The Calcutta Chemical Company Limited v. Krishna Das Paul And Others

Calcutta High Court
May 20, 1983
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Factual and Procedural Background

Court: Calcutta High Court (Division Bench). Judges: M.M. Dutt, J. and Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. (agreeing).

The Calcutta Chemical Company Ltd. (the Company) appealed against an order of a learned single Judge dismissing the Company's application for leave to file a supplementary affidavit in a proceeding under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Background facts as stated in the opinion: - The Company held an overdraft account with United Bank of India. The existing credit limit was Rs. 146.37 lacs; after review and subject to conditions the Bank enhanced the facility to Rs. 178.04 lacs. - The Bank required the Company to appoint technical consultants and a firm of chartered accountants. With the Bank's approval, the Company engaged S.R. Batliboi & Co. to perform a techno-economic (viability) study and an internal audit. - S.R. Batliboi submitted an internal audit report (dated January 17, 1980) and a techno-economic study (submitted March 21, 1980) which contained adverse findings, comments and recommendations for organisational changes. - On June 17, 1981, three shareholders (respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3) filed an application under Ss. 327 and 398 praying, inter alia, for supersession of the Board of Directors and appointment of a Special Officer/Administrator, relying substantially on the adverse findings in the S.R. Batliboi reports. - The Company filed an affidavit-in-opposition denying allegations but did not specifically address the adverse findings in the Batliboi reports; it did, however, point to some implementations of recommendations. - Procedural history of interlocutory filings: the Company obtained leave to file a first supplementary affidavit (filed February 22, 1982). Later, after respondents' submissions, the Company applied (January 11, 1983) for leave to file a second supplementary affidavit (a copy annexed to the application) challenging the correctness of the Batliboi reports and annexing internal company documents. - The learned single Judge dismissed the Company's application for leave to file that proposed supplementary affidavit. The Company appealed that interlocutory dismissal (this appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an interlocutory order dismissing an application for leave to file a supplementary affidavit is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and therefore appealable to the Division Bench.
  2. Whether, alternatively, the appeal is maintainable under S. 483 of the Companies Act in respect of orders or decisions in proceedings under Ss. 397 and 398.
  3. Whether the learned single Judge erred in refusing leave to the Company to file the proposed supplementary affidavit — specifically, whether the application was an afterthought or mala fide and whether the Court should interfere with the exercise of discretion by the learned single Judge.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Calcutta Chemical Company Ltd.)

  • The impugned interlocutory order caused serious prejudice to the Company; therefore it is a "judgment" under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the appeal is maintainable.
  • Alternatively, the appeal is maintainable under S. 483 of the Companies Act because Ss. 397 and 398 are alternatives to winding-up and the scheme of S. 483 applies to orders in such proceedings.
  • The Company explained that, on counsel's advice, it had not specifically dealt with the Batliboi reports in the affidavit-in-opposition; after respondents' submissions impugning the Company's implementation of recommendations, the Company sought to file a second supplementary affidavit to challenge the correctness of those reports and annexed documents in support.

Respondents (Shareholders nos. 1, 2 and 3)

  • Objected to maintainability of the appeal: the impugned order was interlocutory and not a "judgment" under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent; hence no appeal lies.
  • Contended the Company's second application for leave to file a supplementary affidavit was an afterthought and mala fide, intended to delay the proceedings; the learned single Judge had properly exercised discretion to refuse leave and the Division Bench should not interfere with that discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 2786 Not every interlocutory order is a "judgment"; only those orders which decide matters of moment, affect vital and valuable rights or work serious injustice to a party qualify as a judgment for purposes of appeal under Letters Patent. The Court applied this principle to assess whether the dismissal of the Company's application for leave to file a supplementary affidavit caused such prejudice as to render the order a "judgment" under Clause 15. The Court concluded the order did cause serious prejudice and thus was appealable.
Shanta Genevience Pommerat v. Sakal Papers Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 269 Orders under Ss. 397, 398 (and 403) of the Companies Act cannot be said to be orders made "in the matter of winding up" but are alternatives to winding-up; nonetheless an appeal will lie to the Division Bench of the High Court in proceedings under those sections; S. 483's provision concerning appeals in winding-up matters has application to orders/decisions in proceedings under Ss. 397 and 398. The Court relied on this authority to hold that an appeal against the impugned order is maintainable under S. 483 of the Companies Act in respect of proceedings under Ss. 397 and 398.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench proceeded in two main stages: (1) admissibility/maintainability of the appeal; and (2) the exercise of discretion whether to permit the filing of the proposed supplementary affidavit.

1. Maintainability of the Appeal under the Letters Patent (Clause 15)

  • The respondents argued that the impugned order was interlocutory and therefore not a "judgment" within Clause 15, so no appeal would lie. The Court examined the question by reference to the principle in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben (supra) that only interlocutory orders which decide matters of moment or affect vital rights qualify as judgments.
  • The Court found the impugned order was not a mere routine interlocutory ruling (e.g., on admissibility of a document) but had the effect of precluding the Company from controverting the Batliboi reports — the "sheet anchor" of the respondents' case for supersession of the Board and appointment of an administrator.
  • Because exclusion of the Company's ability to challenge those reports could lead to a final decision resulting in supersession of the Board and appointment of an administrator, the order worked serious prejudice to the Company. The Court considered the prejudice comparable to striking out a defendant's written statement in a suit.
  • On that basis the Court concluded the impugned interlocutory order was a "judgment" within Clause 15 and therefore appealable; the objection to maintainability under the Letters Patent was overruled.

2. Maintainability under S. 483 of the Companies Act (Alternative Ground)

  • The Company also relied on S. 483 of the Companies Act as an alternative basis for the appeal. The Court referred to Shanta Genevience Pommerat v. Sakal Papers (supra) where the Supreme Court observed that Ss. 397 and 398 are alternatives to winding-up and that S. 483's scheme applies to orders in proceedings under those sections.
  • The Division Bench accepted that reasoning and held there was substance to the contention that the appeal was maintainable under S. 483.

3. Merits of the Application to File a Second Supplementary Affidavit

  • The respondents maintained the Company's proposed affidavit was an afterthought and mala fide, filed to delay proceedings; they urged the Division Bench not to interfere with the learned Judge's discretion.
  • The Court examined the Company’s explanation: it had earlier, on advice of counsel, not specifically challenged the Batliboi reports in the affidavit-in-opposition; following respondents' submissions accusing the Company of failing to implement recommendations, the Company filed a first supplementary affidavit and later sought leave to file a second supplementary affidavit challenging the reports and annexing company documents.
  • The Court found there had been some negligence in not dealing earlier with the reports, but it did not conclude the application was mala fide or an afterthought designed to delay. The presence of annexed company records aimed at showing incorrectness of the reports indicated bona fide purpose.
  • The Court held that refusal to permit the supplementary affidavit on the ground of negligence alone would be improper. Instead, the appropriate course was to allow the supplementary affidavit to be filed, but on terms — imposing conditions and costs to compensate for any delay or inconvenience.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench set aside the impugned order of the learned single Judge and granted leave to the Company to file the proposed supplementary affidavit, subject to conditions.

Specific directions and immediate consequences imposed by the Court (direct effect on the parties):

  • The Company was granted leave to file the supplementary affidavit, provided it files that affidavit by June 6, 1983.
  • The Company was ordered to pay costs of the appeal to respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 assessed at 100 G.Ms, payable to Mr. Partha Ghosh (advocate on record for the respondents) in cash or by account payee cheque, on or before June 6, 1983.
  • If the Company fails either to file the supplementary affidavit or to pay the assessed costs within the stipulated time, the appeal will stand dismissed with costs and the impugned order of the learned single Judge will be affirmed.
  • If the supplementary affidavit is filed in time, the respondents will be at liberty to file an affidavit-in-reply within three weeks thereafter.
  • Save as provided, there will be no further order as to costs in the appeal.

Implications beyond the parties: - The opinion resolves the questions of appealability of certain interlocutory orders in company law proceedings by applying established Supreme Court guidance: an interlocutory order which causes serious prejudice may be treated as a "judgment" under Letters Patent and be appealable. The Court also confirmed the applicability of S. 483 appeals to orders in proceedings under Ss. 397 and 398 as recognized by the Supreme Court.

Note on precedent-setting: The Court applied existing Supreme Court authorities to the facts; the judgment is decisive for the case and sets procedural directions for these parties. The opinion does not purport to announce a new legal principle beyond the application and reconciliation of cited authorities to the case facts.

Show all summary ...

M.M Dutt, J.:—This appeal has been preferred by the Calcutta Chemical Company Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the Company, against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court taking Company matters, dismissing the application of the Company to file a supplementary affidavit, a copy of the proposed supplementary affidavit having been annexed to the said application, in a proceeding under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956.

2. The Company has an overdraft account with its banker, the United Bank of India, hereinafter referred to as the Bank. The credit facilities that were available to the Company under the said overdraft account at the relevant time was up to Rs. 146.37 lacs. As such limit or extent of the credit facilities was considered by the Company to be inadequate for its purpose, it approached the Bank to enhance and/or modify the overall limit of the credit facilities. After some discussions that took place between the Bank and the representatives of the Company, the Bank by its letter dated July 6, 1979 required the Company to appoint a firm of technical consultants to study the viability of the unit of the Company and a firm of Chartered Accountants for the internal audit of the Company. Such appointments were to be made by the Company after the approval of the Bank. As required, the Company, with the approval of the Bank, appointed S.R Batliboi and Company, a firm of Chartered Accountants, both for the purpose of studying the viability of the unit of the Company and for internal audit. S.R Batliboi and Company by its letter dated July 23, 1970 informed the Company that the study would cover various aspects of the Company's working together with our suggestions for remedial measures as may be considered necessary for bringing out improvements in the future’.

3. After the technical report and the internal audit report were submitted by S. Batliboi and Company, the Bank considered the same and by its letter dated August 6, 1980 agreed to enhance and modify the credit facilities of the of the Company from Rs. 146.37 lacs to 178.04 lacs on certain terms and conditions which included, among others, a term that the Company should undertake to implement the modification in its organisational set-up as suggested by S.R Batliboi and Company in its report on Techno-Economic Study, within the next 6 months and submit a report to the Bank to that effect Another term was that a nominee of the Bank would be on the Board of Directors on non-rotational basis. It appears that the Company accepted the terms and conditions as proposal by the Bank for the enhancement of the credit facilities of the Company up to Rs. 178.04 lacs and, accordingly, the Bank in its turn enhanced and/or modified the credit facilities of the Company up to the said amount.

4. It appears that in its report on Techno-Economic Study and in the report on internal audit, S.R Batliboi and Company made certain adverse findings and comments in regard to the working of the Company and also made certain recommendations or suggestions required to be implemented by the Company for the improvement of its function and/or activities. The said report was submitted by S.R Batliboi and Company on March 21, 1980 and the report on internal audit was submitted by it on January 17, 1980.

5. On June 17, 1981, the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 who are the shareholders of the Company, filed an application before the Company Court under Ss. 327 and 398 of the Companies Act, inter alia, praying for the supersession of the Board of Directors of the Company and appointment of a Special Officer and/or an Administrator to carry on the business and affairs of the Company. In support of the said prayers, the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the said application under Ss. 397 and 398 relied upon the adverse findings and comments made in the said Techno-Economic Study report and the internal audit report of S.R Batliboi and Company and, inter alia, prayed for the supersession of the Board of Directors of the Company and for the appointment of a Special Officer or Administrator to take charge of all the books and assets of the Company and to carry on its business and affairs.

6. The Company opposed the said application under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act by filing an affidavit-in-opposition denying the allegations made in the application, but not specifically dealing with the adverse findings and comments made in the said reports submitted by S.R Batliboi and Company. The Company, however, pointed out in the affidavit-in-opposition some implementations and improvements made by it as suggested or recommended in the said reports.

7. Sometime in January, 1982, the case was opened on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 but the hearing did not proceed further. On February 22, 1982 the Company filed a supplementary affidavit with the leave of the learned Judge. Thereafter, submissions were made from time to time on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 at the hearing of the application. After the conclusion of the submissions on behalf of the said respondents on December 9, 1982, the Company started its submissions in reply. On the next day, it was submitted on behalf of the said respondents that an application would be made by them praying for leave of the Court to re-verify the application under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act. It was also represented to Court on behalf of the Company that it would file an application for leave to file a supplementary affidavit.

8. On December 21, 1982, the said respondents filed an application for leave to re-verify the application under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act. On January 11, 1983, the Company filed an application praying for leave to file a supplementary affidavit. A copy of the proposed affidavit was annexed to the application.

9. The case of the Company as pleaded in the said application was, inter alia, that as advised by its Counsel, it did not specifically deal with the contents of both the said reports submitted by S.R Batliboi and Company in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by it. In the course of submissions made on behalf of the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the month of January 1982, it was submitted on their behalf that in spite of various recommendations and/or suggestions made by S.R Batliboi and Company in its report on Techno-Economic Study of the Company, the management of the Company had not made attempts and/or taken any steps for the purpose of effective implementation of the said recommendations and/or suggestions. It was alleged that the said submission was devoid of any substance, and that in order to remove any doubt and/or cloud, the Company filed the supplementary affidavit with the leave of the Court. In the supplementry affidavit, it was alleged that the said reports were not at all relevant and should not be taken any notice of by the Court. It was averred that the Company did not agree with the contents of the said reports to a large extent. The Company, however, pointed out certain implementations and improvements made by it in terms of the Techno-Economic report submitted by S.R Batliboi and Company and annexed some documents in proof of the same.

10. The further case of the Company was that after the said supplementary affidavit was filed, the application under Ss. 397 and 398 again came up for hearing before the learned Judge. At the resumed hearing, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 that as no specific challenge was made as to the correctness of either the Techno-Economic report or of the internal audit report, the Company should not be permitted or allowed to challenge the correctness and validity of the said reports. According to the Company, in view of the said submission of the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3, the Company felt the necessity of filing a second supplementary affidavit showing the incorrectness of the findings made in the said reports of S.R Batliboi and Company. In that view of the matter, the Company filed the said application praying for leave to file a second supplementary affidavit. It appears that in the proposed supplementary affidavit, the Company has challenged the adverse findings and comments made in the said reports and has annexed a number of documents from the records, of the Company in support of its allegation as to the incorrectness of the said reports.

11. The learned Judges, as stated already, dismissed the said application of the Company praying for leave to file the supplementary affidavit. Hence this appeal.

12. The first thing that we propose to consider is the objection taken by Mr. Dipankar Gupta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the maintainability of the appeal. It may, however, be stated that the learned Counsel has not raised the objection at the outset as a preliminary objection, but has taken the same in course of his reply to the submissions made by Mr. Prabir Sen, learned Counsel for the Company, in support of the appeal including the submission that the appeal is maintainable. Be that as it may, the contention of Mr. Gupta is that the impugned order of the learned Judge, which is interlocutory in character, dismissing the application of the Company for leave to file a supplementary affidavit, is not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, as such, no appeal lies from such an order.

13. It is true that the impugned order is an interlocutory order, but the question as to whether it is a judgment under clause 15 or not will depend upon the nature of prejudice it has caused to the Company. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 2786, it has been observed by Fajal Ali, J. in paragraph 115 of the Report as follows:

“Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment.”

14. The above observation has been strongly relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 in support of his contention that the impugned order is not a judgment and, hence, not appealable. In our view, however, the observation leans against the contention of the learned Counsel. The impugned order is not as simple as an order deciding the question of admissibility or relevancy of a document, but it has impliedly decided matters of moment and has caused serious prejudice to the Company. The reports of S.R Batliboi and Company contain certain findings and comments against the Company. Such findings and comments which are the sheet anchor of the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3, if not allowed to be dealt with or controverted by the Company, there is every possibility of the final decision going against the Company resulting in the supersession of its Board of Directors and appointment of a special officer or Administrator. There can, therefore, be no doubt that by the impugned order, the Company has been seriously prejudiced. We do not find any substantial distinction between the nature of prejudice suffered by a defendant in a suit whose written statement is struck out or who is not permitted to file a written statement and that suffered by the Company in the instant case by the dismissal of its application for leave to file a supplementary affidavit in defence against the prayer for supersession of its Board of Directors and appointment of a Special Officer or an Administrator to take charge of the Company. It may be that the impugned order can be challenged in appeal against the final judgment disposing of the application under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, as contended on behalf of the respondents nos. 1, 2, and 3 but, in our opinion, the contention is quite irrelevant to the serious prejudice that has been caused to the Company by the impugned order. An interlocutory order, unless made expressly appealable by any statute under which it is passed, can always be challenged by the aggrieved party in an appeal form the judgment disposing of the proceeding. The seriousness of the prejudice or injustice caused to an aggrieved party by an interlocutory order is the guiding factor for the decision of the question as to whether such an order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order is a judgment under clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, consequently, the appeal is quite maintainable. The contention to the contrary is overruled.

15. It is submitted by Mr. Prabir Sen, learned Counsel for the Company that even assuming that the impugned order is not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, still the appeal is maintainable under S. 483 of the Companies Act. Section 483 provides that appeals from any order made, or decision given, in the matter of the winding up of a Company by the Court shall lie to the same Court to which, in the same manner in which, and subject to the same conditions under which, appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction. Section 483 is, therefore, a provision for appeal from any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding up of a company. Sections 397 and 398, however, do not relate to a proceeding for the winding up of a company, but are an alternative to the same. In Shanta Genevience Pommerat v. Sakal Papers Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 269, it has been observed by the Supreme Court as follows:

“Now an order under Ss. 397, 398 and 403 of the Companies Act, on the face of it, cannot be said to be an order made or decision given, in the matter of winding up of a company Relief, undoubtedly under S. 397 and/or 398 is in fact an alternative to winding up. No doubt order under Ss. 397 or 398 could be an order made or decision given by the High Court having jurisdiction under the Companies Act and, therefore, an appeal will lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. This is not disputed.”

It thus appears from the above observation of the Supreme Court that the provision for appeal as contained S. 483 of the Companies Act also applies to any order made, other than an administrative or ministerial order, or decision given in a proceeding under Ss. 397 and 398 which is, as held by the Supreme Court, an alternative to a winding up proceeding. There is, therefore, substance in the contention of the learned Counsel that the instant appeal against the impugned order is maintainable under S. 483 of the Companies Act.

16. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 that the said application for leave to file a supplementary affidavit was an afterthought and was filed by the Company mala fide with a view to delaying the proceeding. It is submitted that as the learned Judge in his discretion refused to grant leave to the Company to file the supplementary affidavit, this Court should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Judge. We are unable to accept the contention. It appears that the Company was wrongly advised not to deal with the said reports submitted by S.R Batliboi and Company. The very object of the Company was to get the loan facilities increased by the Bank and the said object having been achieved, it did not seriously consider the adverse findings and comments made in the said reports. In the proposed supplementary affidavit, the Company has annexed a number of documents from the records of the Company for the purpose of showing the incorrectness of such findings and comments. It is, therefore, difficult to say that it was an afterthought or that the said application was filed mala fide in order to delay the proceedings. It must, however, be said that there was some negligence on the part of the Company in not dealing with the said findings and comments in the affidavit-in-opposition and in the first supplementary affidavit. But on that ground, it would not be proper to refuse the prayer of the Company to file the proposed supplementary affidavit. The supplementary affidavit could be allowed to be filed on terms.

17. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the learned Judge and grant leave to the Company to file the supplementary affidavit by June 6, 1983. Further the Company shall pay to the said respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 cost of this appeal assessed at 100 G.Ms, on or before June 6, 1983. Such payment shall be made to Mr. Partha Ghosh, learned Advocate on record of the said respondents either in cash or by an A/C payee Cheque drawn in favour of the said learned Advocate. In case the Company either fails to file the supplementary affidavit or pay the said cost assessed at 100 G.Ms, within the time mentioned above, this appeal will stand dismissed with costs and the impugned order of the learned Judge will stand affirmed. If the supplementary affidavit is filed, the said respondents will be at liberty to file an affidavit-in-rely within three weeks thereafter.

Save as aforesaid, there will be no further order for costs in this appeal.

Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J.—I agree.