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Mohammadbhai Sk. Mohsinbhoy And Others v. Trustees For The Improvement Of Calcutta And Others

Calcutta High Court
Aug 4, 1983
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner applied to be added as a party-defendant in a pending suit because, during the pendency of the suit, he entered into an agreement for sale with defendant No. 3 (the owner of the suit property) and alleges payment of Rs. 37,656/- to defendant No. 3 under that agreement.

The underlying suit (Suit No. 2046 of 1968) was instituted by the plaintiffs against, inter alia, defendant No. 3 for a declaration entitling the plaintiffs to specific performance of an agreement for sale of the suit property, upon payment of the balance purchase money to defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who had acquired the property under the Land Acquisition Act. The plaintiffs had purchased the property at an auction conducted by defendant No. 1, who had a statutory right of preemption.

It is alleged by the petitioner that the suit, instituted in 1967–1968, remained part-heard and pending for about fourteen years despite evidence having been concluded. The petitioner contended that defendant No. 3 was not taking interest in the proceedings in view of the agreement for sale executed in the petitioner’s favour, and that the petitioner’s rights are dependent on the outcome of the suit and would be prejudiced if defendant No. 3’s interest were not properly represented.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner should be added as a party-defendant to the pending suit under the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the relief claimed by the plaintiffs will directly and legally affect the petitioner’s rights (i.e., whether the petitioner has a present or direct legal interest in the subject matter that would justify joinder).
  3. Whether, in the absence of the petitioner, the issues in the suit can be effectively and completely adjudicated.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Dipankar Ghosh)

  • The petitioner executed an agreement for sale with defendant No. 3 during the pendency of the suit and paid Rs. 37,656/- to defendant No. 3.
  • The petitioner’s right is dependent on the outcome of the pending suit and therefore his interest would be prejudiced if defendant No. 3 does not properly represent those interests in the suit.
  • Reliance was placed on Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum (AIR 1958 SC 886) for the proposition that addition of parties is a matter of judicial discretion and an applicant should have a direct interest (not merely commercial interest).
  • Reliance was placed on Effective Trade House (P.) Ltd. v. United Bank of India ((1981) 2 Cal LJ 4) for the proposition that a person acquiring a direct interest under a commercial agreement could be added as a party.
  • Reliance was placed on Jayanta Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1981 Cal 138) for the proposition that prejudicial affection of a right, not mere acquisition of interest, is the test for locus standi in certain contexts.
  • Reference to the statement in Mulla on Code of Civil Procedure (citing Sampatbai v. Madhu Singh, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 84) that the intervener must be directly and legally interested and the relief must directly affect enjoyment of his rights.

Plaintiffs' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Pratap Chatterjee)

  • The petitioner is neither a proper nor a necessary party to the suit.
  • Reliance was placed on Manmohan Singh v. Sat Narain (AIR 1971 Punj 400), which held that a person who comes under a subsequent sale agreement in respect of the same property should not be added as a defendant under Order I Rule 10 in a suit for specific performance, since such a person has no interest in the property analogous to a purchaser and addition would lead to misjoinder.

Defendant No. 1's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Surbid Roy Chowdhury)

  • Opposed the application, relying on paragraph 12 of the petition, which stated that the petitioner’s right depends on the outcome of the suit and not that the suit cannot be effectively and completely adjudicated without him.
  • Reliance was placed on Dy. Commr., Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain (AIR 1953 SC 521) for the proposition that the eventual interest in the fruits of litigation is not the true test for impleading; the crucial test is whether the issue can be completely and effectively disposed of in the absence of the person sought to be added (Order I Rule 10 CPC).

Defendant No. 3's Arguments (as advanced by Miss Monju Roy Chowdhury)

  • Adopted the contentions of the other respondents opposing joinder.
  • Argued that no person should be added merely because they would be incidentally affected by the judgment and that the presence of the petitioner is necessary only if it is required to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate the matter in issue.
  • Reliance was placed on Narayan Chandra Garai v. Matri Bhandar Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1974 Cal 358) to support the proposition that a stranger should not be added if the question can be decided without him.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 Addition of parties is a matter of judicial discretion; applicant should have a direct interest (not merely commercial interest); rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in suits regarding status or legal character. The Court found the decision distinguishable on the facts of the instant case and noted that the relaxation recognized in that decision applies to declarations regarding status or legal character; the Court did not apply it to grant joinder because the petitioner had no present legal right until adjudication in favour of defendant No. 3.
Effective Trade House (P.) Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (1981) 2 Cal LJ 4 Test for adding a party where a person acquires a direct interest in the subject matter under a commercial agreement; whether the petitioner has interest in the plaintiff’s security. The Court held this authority not applicable on the facts because that case involved a consent order creating a security in favour of the petitioner (subject to bank’s lien); here no analogous security or present interest in plaintiffs’ rights was shown.
Jayanta Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1981 Cal 138 In the context of locus standi for challenging acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, acquisition of interest is not the sole test; prejudicial affection of a right concerning the property is the relevant test. The Court observed that this principle relates to locus standi in writ petitions challenging acquisition and found it of no assistance to the petitioner’s application to be added as a party in the present specific performance suit.
Sampatbai v. Madhu Singh, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 84 (cited via Mulla on CPC) The intervener must be directly and legally interested in the matters in issue; joinder depends on whether the relief will directly affect the intervener’s enjoyment of rights. The Court relied on the principle to hold that the relief claimed by the plaintiffs will not directly affect the petitioner’s enjoyment of rights because the petitioner has no present legal interest until adjudication in favour of defendant No. 3.
Manmohan Singh v. Sat Narain, AIR 1971 Punj 400 In a suit for specific performance, a person under a subsequent sale agreement in respect of the same property should not be added as a defendant under Order I Rule 10 CPC as such person has no interest analogous to a purchaser; addition would cause misjoinder. The Court followed and applied this principle, holding that the petitioner is neither a necessary nor a proper party and should not be added to the proceedings.
Dy. Commr., Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521 The eventual interest in the fruits of litigation is not the true test for impleading; the key test is whether the issue can be completely and effectively disposed of without the person sought to be added (Order I Rule 10 CPC). The Court applied this test and concluded the suit could be effectively and completely disposed of in the petitioner’s absence; therefore joinder was not warranted.
Narayan Chandra Garai v. Matri Bhandar Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1974 Cal 358 One should not be added as a party merely because he would be incidentally affected by the judgment; presence is required only if necessary for effective and complete adjudication. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce that the petitioner should not be added merely because his rights might be affected incidentally; the petitioner was not necessary for adjudication.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused analysis on whether the petitioner was a "necessary" or "proper" party within the meaning of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and whether the relief claimed by the plaintiffs would directly and legally affect the petitioner’s rights.

Key steps in the Court's reasoning, drawn strictly from the opinion, are:

  • The Court examined the petitioner's own averments (paragraph 12 of the petition) and noted that the petitioner alleged his right depended on the outcome of the suit rather than asserting that the suit could not be effectively and completely adjudicated without him.
  • The Court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that there was no dispute between the petitioner and the plaintiffs requiring adjudication and that the petitioner was neither a necessary nor a proper party.
  • The Court concluded that the relief sought by the plaintiffs would not directly affect the petitioner’s enjoyment of any rights because the petitioner has no present legal rights until the rights of defendant No. 3 are first adjudicated in favour of defendant No. 3. The petitioner’s asserted right was characterized as speculative and dependent on the fruits of the pending decree (lis pendens).
  • The Court posed and answered the pivotal factual/legal question—whether the petitioner could seek specific performance of his contract with defendant No. 3 during the pendency of the suit and prior to adjudication in favour of defendant No. 3—and answered "No," concluding the petitioner had no present right to seek specific performance in the circumstances as pleaded.
  • The Court considered the precedents relied upon by the parties and distinguished or found them inapplicable as follows: Razia Begum was distinguishable and relevant only to declarations regarding status/legal character; Effective Trade House was inapplicable because it involved a consent order creating a security in favour of the petitioner (which is not present here); Jayanta Kumar Banerjee related to locus standi in writ petitions and was not helpful to the present facts.
  • The Court also observed there was no evidence of dilatory tactics or laches on the part of defendant No. 3 and that a history of pending cases on the Court’s cause list could not be attributed to default by defendant No. 3 without specific proof.
  • Applying the tests and principles in the cited authorities (notably Manmohan Singh and Narayan Chandra Garai), the Court concluded the petitioner was neither necessary nor proper for adjudication and that the suit could be effectively and completely decided in his absence.
  • The Court noted that if an ex parte decree were eventually found to have been obtained against defendant No. 3 or if collusion were proved, the petitioner could seek relief from the Court at the appropriate stage; this possibility did not, however, justify joinder at the present stage.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application by the petitioner to be added as a party-defendant is dismissed with costs.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The petitioner will not be joined as a party to Suit No. 2046 of 1968; the proceedings between the plaintiffs and the defendants will continue and can be effectively and completely adjudicated in the petitioner’s absence.
  • The Court found no present legal right or interest in the petitioner that would be directly affected by the relief claimed by the plaintiffs; the petitioner’s claimed right was dependent on the outcome of adjudication in favour of defendant No. 3 and therefore speculative.
  • The petitioner remains free to seek appropriate relief later if circumstances arise (for example, if an ex parte decree is obtained or collusion is proved), but joinder at this stage was not permitted.
  • No new legal precedent was announced; the Court applied existing principles and authority to the facts and dismissed the application on those grounds.

Order: Application dismissed. (Costs awarded against the petitioner.)

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner herein seeks to be added as a party-defendant to the proceedings by reason of the fact that during the pendency of the present suit an agreement for sale of the suit premises was entered upon between himself and the defendant No. 3, the owner of the suit property, under which agreement he claims to have paid a sum of Rs. 37,656/- to the defendant No. 3.

2. The present suit filed by the plaintiffs against, inter alia, the defendant No. 3 is for a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of an agreement for sale of the suit-property upon payment of the balance sum of the purchase money to the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who had acquired the property under the Land Acquisition Act. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs purchased the property at an auction sale held by the defendant No. 1 who admittedly had a statutory right of preemption to purchase the land in the event of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 deciding to sell the same. The petitioner alleges that although the present proceedings have been instituted in 1967-1968, the same has not been disposed of during the last fourteen years and although the evidence in the suit has been concluded, the suit remains part-heard and adjourned. It is urged that the defendant No. 3 is not taking any interest in the proceedings in view of the agreement for sale executed in petitioners favour. It is contended that the right of the petitioner is solely dependent on the outcome of this suit (Suit No. 2046 of 1968), now pending before the Court, and if due to inaction and laches on the part of the defendant No. 3 the interest of the defendant No. 3 is not properly represented in the suit, the petitioner's interest will be greatly prejudiced and/or jeopardised.

3. Mr. Dipankar Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886, for the proposition that the question of addition of parties is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of a particular case and in order to be added as a party to a suit relating to a property, the applicant should have direct interest as distinguished from commercial interest.

4. Mr. Ghosh has also placed reliance on Effective Trade House (P.) Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (1981) 2 Cal LJ 4, where the Court considered the test for adding a party to a suit and viewed that a person acquiring a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit under a commercial agreement could sustain a prayer for being added as a party. In that case, a consent order was passed creating a security in favour of the petitioner, subject to the permanent lien of the plaintiff-Bank arising out of an original mortgage. In deciding the question at issue as to whether the petitioner having entered into a contract with the defendant to run a mill, which was the subject matter of the mortgage, by investment of his moneys could be said to have such an interest on the subject matter as would entitle them to be added as a party to the suit, the Court held that in deciding the question it is to be considered whether upon the agreement between the parties the petitioner has got any interest in the plaintiff's security or not. Merely because the plaintiff and the defendant have now agreed to release that part of the security from the original mortgage could not be a ground for holding that the petitioner had no interest in the plaintiff's security.

5. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Ghosh on a Division Bench judgment, of this Court in jayanta Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1981 Cal 138, the principles enunciated wherein are that acquisition of interest in property is not the sole test for determining the locus standi to move a writ petition challenging the validity of the order passed under the Land Acquisition Act, but prejudicial affection of a right concerning the property should be the test to determine the locus standi to move a writ petition. The Court further viewed that a person is legally interested in an answer only if he can say that it may lead to the result that would affect him legaly, i.e, by curtailing his rights, and held that in the facts and circumstances of the case the right of the petitioner to enforce a contract for sale would be curtailed and such contract would be frustrated if the property in question were to be acquired. In such circumstances, the petitioner was held to have locus standi to question the correctness of the acquisition; proceeding because the acquisition of the property would ultimately frustrate the contract.

6. Reliance was also placed on a passage from Mulla on Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition, page 626, where the learned author restated the view of the Court in Sampatbai v. Madhu Singh, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 84, namely the test is not whether the joinder of the person proposed to be added as a defendant would be according to or against the wishes of the plaintiff, but whether the relief claimed by the plaintiff will directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his rights. In that case, the Court viewed that the intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the questions involved in the case. A person is legally interested in the answer only if he can say that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally i.e, by curtailing his legal fights.

7. Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the applicant is neither a proper nor a necessary party and cites Manmohan Singh v. Sat Narain, AIR 1971 Funj 400. In that case, the Court held that in a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement, a person coming under subsequent sale agreement in respect of the same property should not be Added as a party under order 1 Rule 10 of the Cede of Civil Procedure since unlike a purchase he has no interest in the property and addition of such a person as party will result is misjoinder of parties.

8. Mr. Surbid Roy Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing for the defendant No. 1 has also opposed the application and placed reliance on para 12 of the petition, wherein the petitioner has averred that his right depends on the outcome of the suit and not that the suit cannot be effectively and completely adjudicated upon his absence.

9. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury on Dy. Commr., Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521, which is an authority for the proposition that the eventual interest of a party in the fruits of a litigation cannot be held to be the true test of impleading parties under the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that the crucial test as laid down in that case is whether in the absence of the petitioner the issue in the case can be completely and effectively disposed of, as provided in Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

10. Miss Monju Roy Chowdhury learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant No. 3 owner, adopts the contentions on behalf of the other respondents and further urges that no person ought to be added as a party merely because he or she would be incidentally affected by the judgment delivered and contends that the main consideration for the Court in exercising its judicial discretion is whether the presence of the petitioner is necessary to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon the matter in issue. If the question at issue between the parties can be decided without anyone else being brought on record, a stranger should not be added as a party-defendant, as has been held in Narayan Chandra Garai v. Matri Bhandar Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1974 Cal 358.

11. Having heard the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and having considered the decision relied upon by them, I do not see that the petitioner ought to be joined as a plaintiff or a defendant, or that without his presence the question in the suit cannot be effectively and/or completely decided, which two circumstances alone would entitle the petitioner to be added as a party to the proceedings either as a necessary or proper party. I accept the contention of Mr. Pratap Chatterjee that there is no dispute between the petitioner and the plaintiffs, which requires adjudication requiring him to be made a party-defendant to the proceedings.

12. The other important aspect of the matter to my mind is that relief claimed by the plaintiffs will not directly affect the person seeking to intervene in the ‘enjoyment of his rights’ as he has no ‘rights’, until and unless the defendant No. 3's rights have first been adjudicated upon and found that the defendant No. 3 has a right, title and interest in the property-in-question. The right of the petitioner, if any, is based on speculation and the matter being lis pendens, his rights will crystallise, only if the fruits of the decree enure to the benefit of the defendant No. 3. Nor do I find that any case is made that the defendant No. 3 is fraudulently suffering a decree against himself in contesting the proceedings. If an ex parte decree is suffered by the defendant No. 3 and/or found that there is collusion between himself and the plaintiffs, it is always open to the petitioner to seek the Court's protection and necessary orders can be passed at any stage of the proceedings.

13. This apart, it is settled law that an agreement for a sale in India does not create any interest in property and the agreement for sale between the defendant No. 3 and the petitioner at best is subject to the adjudication in the pending proceedings. Thus unless shown that the petitioner, had a present right and is legally interested in the adjudication between the plaintiffs and the defendants, it could not be said that the result of the proceedings would affect him legally. That the petitioner has no present legal interest and no present legal rights would be apparent by answering the vital question, viz., “can the petitioner seek specific performance of the contract between himself and the defendant No. 1 during the pendency of the suit and prior to the adjudication thereof in favour of the defendant No. 3?” The answer must be an emphatic ‘No’.

14. The decision reported in AIR 1958 SC 886 is distinguishable. In any event, the said decision is an authority for the proposition that where the subject-matter for litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. In the instant suit, as observed hereinbefore the petitioner has no legal right until adjudication of the suit in favour of the defendant No. 3 and in exercising judicial discretion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that he is neither a necessary nor a proper party for the purpose of adjudicating whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance in his favour which is the only point required to be adjudicated in the present suit filed by the plaintiffs.

15. The ratio of (1981) 2 Cal LJ 4 is also not applicable to the facts of the instant case, as rightly pointed out by Miss Roy Chowdhury, inasmuch as in that case a consent order was passed between the petitioner, who sought to be added as a party, and the parties to the proceedings had created a security in favour of the petitioner subject to the permanent lien of the bank arising out of the original mortgage. For deciding the issue as to whether the petitioner should be added as a party, the Court took cognisance of the agreement between the parties and viewed that the petitioner, had an interest in the plaintiffs security, and further viewed that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to release that part of the security from the original mortgage could not be a ground for holding that the petitioner has no interest in the plaintiff's security.

16. The decision reported in AIR 1981 Cal 138 is also of no assistance to the petitioner as therein the Court viewed that the petitioner had a right to challenge the orders passed under the Land Acquisition Act and bad locus standi to move a writ petition, inasmuch as his rights might be prejudicially affected. The ratio of the Court appears to be flat for determining the locos standi in the writ petition, acquisition of title or interest in the property was not the sole criterion but prejudicial affection of a right should be the test to declare whether the petitioners bad locus standi to move a writ petition.

17. The contention of the petitioner that the suit filed in 1968 has not yet been disposed of, does not give the petitioner any right to be added as a party to the proceedings, if considered neither a proper nor a necessary party. It has not been shown that there has been any dilatory tactices on the part of the defendant No. 3 in preventing the hearing of the said suit and observing the Daily Cause List of the Court it will be apparent that many old cases are still pending which cannot be held to be by reason of default or negligence of any party-litigant. In any event, in paragraph 12 of the petition, it is alleged that “if due to in action and laches the interest of the defendant No. 3 is not property represented, the interest of the petitioner will be prejudiced”. Where is no basis for supposing any inaction; and/or laches on the part of the defendant No. 3 and none has been shown.

18. Following the principles enunciated in AIR 1971 Punj 400 in which similar and/or identical facts were present, I respect-folly accept the proposition laid down and hold that the petitioner is neither a proper nor a necessary party who is required to be joined in the proceedings and the proceedings between the plaintiff and the defendants can be effectively and completely disposed of in his absence. The principles enunciated in AIR 1974 Cal 358 is also of great assistance and applying the principles enunciated therein, this Court views that the petitioner has no right to be made a party to the proceedings merely because his rights, if any, may be affected by the judgment to be delivered and/or the conclusion reached.

19. In this view of the matter, the application is not sustainable and is dismissed with costs.

Application dismissed.