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Sudhirindra Coomar v. Sm. Monmohini Coomar & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Sen, J. (with Sanyal, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, one of the sons of Benoypada Kumar, filed a suit for partition and accounts against his mother (defendant No. 1) and his other brothers and sisters (other defendants). The subject-matter included several immovable properties and businesses. The plaintiff alleged that during Benoy's lifetime a false and collusive proceedings under the Arbitration Act were initiated, in collusion with defendant No. 1, resulting in a fictitious award and a decree in Title Suit No. 87 of 1957. The decree purportedly covered premises No. 4, Loudon Street and three businesses run as Messrs B. Kumar & Company, Messrs Kumar Construction Company and Messrs India Floors. The plaintiff claimed that, despite the decree, Benoy remained the owner in fact and that on his death the plaintiff inherited a 1/6 share.
On contest, the trial court (learned Subordinate Judge, 9th Court, Alipore) framed two preliminary issues whether the suit (or part of it) was barred under Section 281A of the Income-tax Act and Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. The Subordinate Judge decided those issues against the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff's claim in respect of premises No. 4, Loudon Street and the three businesses was barred under both Section 281A of the Income Tax Act and Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. The plaintiff filed the present revisional application challenging that order dated 15 March 1982. The revisional application was heard on notice to and upon contest by the contesting defendants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's suit (or part of it) is barred by Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, on the ground that the claim involves the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration award or decree.
- Whether the plaintiff's suit (or part of it) is barred by Section 281A of the Income-tax Act on the ground that the properties were held benami and the plaintiff is a person claiming to be the real owner without having complied with the conditions in Section 281A.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Banerjee
- The learned Subordinate Judge misread the scope and effect of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act (Section 281A) and the Arbitration Act (Sections 32 and 33).
- The plaintiff does not seek to set aside the award nor directly challenge the existence or validity of the award; instead he pleads that the award and decree are sham and collusive and that title by inheritance remains with his father (Benoy) and hence with the plaintiff.
- By reason of the above, the part of the suit dismissed by the trial court was wrongly non-suited.
Respondents' (Contesting Defendants') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Ghosh
- The substance of the plaintiff's claim is a declaration that the properties and businesses were held by Benoy in the benami name of his wife (defendant No. 1), and thereafter by his heirs in the same manner.
- Such a claim falls squarely within the scope of Section 281A of the Income Tax Act; the three conditions specified in that section were not fulfilled by the plaintiff, and therefore the suit (in respect of those properties/businesses) was rightly held to be barred.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the two statutory bases relied upon by the trial court separately: the Arbitration Act provisions (Sections 32 and 33) and Section 281A of the Income Tax Act.
On the Arbitration Act (Sections 32 and 33)
- The court explained the effect of Section 33: a person challenging the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award shall apply to the Court under the Arbitration Act, and Section 32 bars a suit for a decision upon existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award or to set them aside.
- The pivotal question was whether the plaintiff's claim involved a cause of action which a separate suit would be barred from adjudicating under those provisions.
- The court found it difficult to answer that question in the affirmative because the plaintiff did not ask for setting aside the award nor did he challenge the award's existence or validity as such. Instead, the plaintiff claimed partition on the basis of inherited title and asserted that the award and decree were sham and collusive (i.e., a factual plea that the award/decree was not genuine).
- The court held that a claim involving adjudication of the factual existence or sham character of the decree based on the award does not fall within the purview of Section 33, and therefore Section 32 does not bar such adjudication in an independent suit. Consequently, one of the objections upheld by the Subordinate Judge rested on a misconception of the scope and effect of Sections 32 and 33.
On Section 281A of the Income Tax Act
- The court set out Section 281A(1), which conditions institution of a suit in respect of any property held benami on the fulfilment of one of three requirements: (a) income from such property disclosed in an income-tax return by the claimant; or (b) property disclosed in a return under the Wealth Tax Act; or (c) notice in the prescribed form given to the Income Tax Officer.
- The court analysed the provision and identified two essential conditions for Section 281A to apply: (i) the right asserted must be in respect of property held in the name of the benamdar, and (ii) the suit must be instituted by or on behalf of a person "claiming to be the real owner" of that property.
- The court expressed doubt whether the first condition (that the property is held in the name of the benamdar) was satisfied on the plaintiff's pleaded case, because the plaintiff pleaded that Benoy himself held the property in his lifetime and that the arbitration proceeding and decree were sham and collusive.
- Even assuming the decree created a benami transaction between Benoy and his wife, the court concluded the second condition was not fulfilled: "the person claiming to be the real owner" in Section 281A refers to the real owner vis-à-vis the benamdar (i.e., the person who created the benami and the person claiming through that transaction), and the statutory notice form contemplates a person who has acquired property in the name of another giving notice.
- The court emphasised that Section 281A was not intended to have as wide a reach as Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which covers not only a real purchaser but also those claiming through him). Had the legislature intended a similarly wide application, it would have framed Section 281A accordingly.
- On the facts pleaded, the plaintiff was asserting title by inheritance from his father and setting up that his father was the real owner notwithstanding the sham arbitration decree; the court held this did not make the plaintiff a person who had acquired property in benam and who claimed to be the real owner for the purpose of Section 281A.
- Accordingly, the trial judge materially misread Section 281A in concluding that part of the plaintiff's claim was barred under that provision.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revisional application is allowed; the impugned order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 15 March 1982 is set aside. The two preliminary issues were answered in favour of the plaintiff. There will be no order as to costs. (Sanyal, J. agreed.)
Implications:
- The direct effect of the court's decision is to remove the partial non-suit ordered by the Subordinate Judge: the portion of the plaintiff's claim in respect of premises No. 4, Loudon Street and the three named businesses is no longer held to be barred under Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act or under Section 281A of the Income Tax Act, as the trial judge had ruled.
- The court's analysis clarifies, in the context of the facts pleaded, that (a) a claim asserting that an arbitration award and consequent decree are sham is not necessarily barred by Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act when the plaintiff is not seeking to set aside the award as such but is alleging factual sham; and (b) Section 281A applies to persons who claim to be the real owner in the statutory sense (i.e., persons who have acquired property in the name of another and must give statutory notice), and does not automatically extend to persons asserting title by inheritance even though they plead that a predecessor held the property in benam.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader precedent beyond the statutory interpretation and application to the pleaded facts; it confines itself to setting aside the trial judge's order because of misreading of the statutory provisions.
Exact language, quotations and statutory references in this summary are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion of Sen, J., with Sanyal, J. concurring.
Sen, J.:—This is a revisional application at the instance of the plaintiff and is directed against an order dated March 15, 1982, passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 9th Court, Alipure deciding two preliminary issues against the plaintiff. The plaintiff who is one of the sons of Benoypada Kumar filed the aforesaid suit for partition and accounts against his mother, defendant No. 1, and his other brothers and sisters who were other defendants. The subject-matter involved included several immovable properties and business. In claiming partition by inheritance from Benoy, the plaintiff pleaded that Benoy in his life time in order to defraud the creditors and the Income Tax Department caused a false and collusive proceedings to be started under the Arbitration Act, in collusion with defendant No. 1. In that proceeding, the defendant No. 1 raised a sham dispute based on a sham claim and obtained a fictitious award and a decree passed thereon in the Title Suit No. 87 of 1957. This decree covers premises No. 4, Loudon Street and three businesses run under the name and style of Messrs B. Kumar & Company, Messrs Kumar Construction Company and Messrs India Floors. The plaintiff claimed that notwithstanding such a sham decree Benoy during his life time continued to remain the owner of the said property and the businesses and on his death the plaintiff has inherted 1/6 share in them along with the other properties incorporated in the plaint schedule.
2. On a contest put forward by the contesting defendant the Court framed two issues as to whether the suit is barred under the provisions of S. 281A of the Income-tax Act and Ss. 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. These two issues having been heard as preliminary issues the learned Subordinate Judge has decided the issues against the plaintiff when he held that a part of the plaintiff's claim in respect of premises No. 4, Loudon Street, Calcutta, and the three businesses, namely, Messrs B. Kumar & Co., Messrs Kumar Construction Company and Messrs India Floors stand barred both under the provisions of S. 281A of the Income Tax Act and Ss. 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has challenged the said order in the present revisional application. The application is being heard upon notice to and upon contest by the contesting defendants.
3. Mr. Banerjee appearing in support of this revisional application, has contended that the learned Subordinate Judge wholly misread the scope and effect of the material provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Arbitration Act, in holding that the plaintiff's suit stands barred in part and as a result thereof the plaintiff stands non-suited to that extent.
4. Mr. Ghosh appearing on behalf of the contesting defendants, supported the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge. According to Mr. Ghosh, the plaintiff's claim in substance constitutes a declaration that premises No. 4, Loudon Street, and the three businesses referred to hereinbefore were held by Benoy during his life time in the benami of his wife, the defendant No. 1, and after his death by all his heirs including the plaintiff in a similar manner. Such a claim, according to Mr. Ghosh, comes squarely within the provision of S. 281A of the Income Tax Act and the three conditions specified therein not having been fulfilled the suit to that extent had been rightly held to be barred under the said provision.
5. We propose to deal with the two grounds on which the learned Subordinate Judge has held a part of the claim to be barred, separately. Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, no doubt provides that any person challenging the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court obviously under the said Act, and the Court shall decide the same. Section 32 bars a suit for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award or to set them aside. The point, therefore, that arises for our consideration is as to whether the plaintiff's claim in respect of premises No. 4, Loadon Street, and the three business above referred to involves any claim the adjudication whereof in a separate suit is barred in view of the above provisions of the Arbitration Act. It is, however, difficult for us to answer this question in affirmative. The plaintiff has not asked for setting aside the award nor has he challenged the existence or validity thereof. The award as such is not being challenged. The plaintiff claims partition on the basis of his title by interitance not affected by the award and the decree which being sham is not in existence in fact. Admitting the existence and the validity of the award otherwise as an award, the plaintiff claims that it is a sham decree set up by his father and mother to defraud the creditors. Such a claim involving an adjudication as to factual existence of the decree based on the award in our view does not come within the purview of S. 33 of the Arbitration Act, and as such S. 32 does not bar such an adjudication in an independent suit. One of the objections upheld by the learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, appears to us to be based on misconception of the scope and effect of the two provisions of the Arbitration Act, referred to hereinbefore.
6. Next we proceed to consider the scope and effect of S. 281A of the Income Tax Act. Section 281A(1) provides as follows:—
“No suit to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a person (hereafter in this section referred to as the claimant) claiming to be the real owner of such property unless.
(a) the income, if any, from such property has been disclosed in any return of the income furnished by the claimant under this Act, or
(b) such property has been disclosed in any return of net wealth furnished by the claimant under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (XXVII of 1957), or
(c) notice in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars in respect of the property has been given by the claimant to the Income Tax Officer.”
7. Analysing this provision on its terms, we find that two conditions need be fulfilled to attract its application. In the first place, the right to be enforced must be in respect of a property held in the name of the benamdar and secondly such a claim must be made by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner. In the facts of the present case there is considerable doubt in our mind as to whether the first of the aforesaid conditions is fulfilled. As indicated hereinbefore, according to the plaintiff both the immovable property and the businesses were held by his father who merely created a sham decree based on a collusive arbitration award. According to the plaintiff, the entire proceeding under the Arbitration Act was sham and collusive intended to have no effect other than throwing the properties beyond the clutches of the creditors and the Income Tax Department.
8. Assuming, however, that the true effect of the decree on the award was to create a benami transaction as between Benoy and his wife, the present suit cannot be said to be a suit by or on behalf of the person claiming to be the real owner or in other words the second condition referred to hereinbefore cannot be said to have been fiulfilled. The person claiming to be the real owner in sub-s. (1) of S. 281A above referred to, necessarily means the real owner vis a vis the benamdar, that is the person who creates the benami. This position is rendered clear when we refer to the statutory form of notice under clause (c) which is set out hereunder:
“To
The Income Tax Officer,
I/We…………hereby bring to your notice that the property particulars of which are given below, is held by……………as my/our benamdar and that I am/we are the real owner (s) of the said property;
(a) Detailed description of the property
(b) Address of benamdar
(c) Date on which the right, title or interest to or in the property was acquired
(d) consideration paid for acquiring the right, title or interest.
2. I/We propose to institute a suit to enforce my/our right in the aforesaid property in the Court of…………
Signature
Permanent A/C No.
Address.
This section, therefore, contemplates that a person who having acquired the property in the benam of another, hold the same as such, is required to give notice disclosing that facts to the Income Tax Authorities before he can institute any suit to enforce any right in respect thereof. This provision, does not cover the case of a person like the present plaintiff who claims title to a property by inheritance although in tracing such title he pleads that one amongst his predecessors held the same in benam.
9. In our opinion S. 281A of the Income Tax Act was never intended to be made so wide as S. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure which brings within its purview not only the real purchaser but also all those who claim through him. If the legislature wanted to give such a wider connotation to S. 281A of the Income Tax Act it would have framed the provision in like manner as it did in S. 66 of the Code. For reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Ghosh that the plaintiff in the present case is a person who has laid any claim in respect of any property held by him in benami and claiming himself to be the real owner thereof. On the other hand, according to us he is laying his claim on inheritance from his father setting up a claim that his father was the real owner notwithstanding the sham decree in an arbitration proceeding in favour of the plaintiff's mother. The learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, materially misread the provision as aforesaid in holding that a part of the plaintiff's claim is barred thereunder.
10. As the learned Subordinate Judge has totally non-suited the plaintiff in respect of a part of his claim action upon a clear misreading of statutory provisions, the order impugned needs to be set aside in exercise of our powers in revision as otherwise the plaintiff would suffer irreparable prejudice in the suit and we direct accordingly. The revisional application, therefore, succeeds and impugned order is set aside. The two issues are answered in favour of the plaintiff.
There will be no order for costs.
Sanyal, J.—I agree.
Application allowed. Order set aside.
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