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Bihar State Agro-Industries Development Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Chand Khosla And Another
Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges an order dated 27 August 1979 of Mrs. Khastgir, J., which dismissed the appellant's application to revoke leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to institute Suit No. 906 of 1978 (Ram Chand Khosla v. State of Bihar).
The factual matrix in the opinion (as stated by the court) is:
- Premier Traders (a Patna firm) received an order from the State of Bihar dated 21 April 1973 for 300 pumping sets. The appellant corporation was the consignee and was to make payment.
- 200 sets were delivered to Muzaffarpur and 100 to Sitamari. Premier Traders received part payments totalling Rs. 5,93,249.75, leaving a claimed balance. Premier Traders deposited Rs. 16,950 as security.
- Pursuant to a consent decree dated 5 April 1977 in Suit No. 587 of 1973, Ram Chand Khosla was appointed Receiver by this Court for the purpose of collecting and realising dues payable to Premier Traders and was empowered to bring suit.
- Acting under that power the Receiver (Ram Chand Khosla) filed Suit No. 906 of 1978 against State of Bihar and the appellant for recovery of money alleged to be due (including interest and the security deposit).
- The appellant contended that many pumps were defective or not conforming to specification; Premier Traders failed to replace defective pumps or open a service station; the appellant claimed losses and asserted set-offs (including a sales tax liability claimed against Premier Traders) such that only a small sum remained payable.
- The appellant applied to revoke leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on three principal grounds: (i) no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court; (ii) the balance of convenience favoured trial in Bihar; and (iii) there was a forum-selection/choice-of-forum clause (allegedly referring disputes to Patna High Court) between the parties (as to Premier Traders and State of Bihar).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver by this Court (in Suit No. 587 of 1973) is a part of the cause of action in Suit No. 906 of 1978 and therefore gives this Court jurisdiction to try the suit.
- Whether the balance of convenience favors trial of the suit in this Court (Calcutta) or in Patna (i.e., whether leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent should be revoked so the suit proceeds in Bihar).
- Whether a purported forum-selection clause (or an agreement regarding Patna jurisdiction) operates to oust this Court's jurisdiction as against the appellant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appointment of the Receiver by this Court is not part of the cause of action; reliance was placed on Muthuchellappa Chettiar v. Paliniappa (AIR 1955 Mad 526).
- The place from which goods were sent (Calcutta) is not part of the cause of action; reliance was placed on Yeluchuri Venkatachannaya v. Emperor ((1920) 56 Ind Cas 50 : AIR 1920 Cal 337) (FB).
- The purported admissions/acknowledgements relied upon by the plaintiff are qualified or conditional; Srivastava (who attended the Receiver's meeting) had no authority to make any binding admission on behalf of the appellant.
- Balance of convenience strongly favours trial at Patna because the majority of witnesses (a list of about 30 witnesses is indicated in the affidavit), documents, inspection reports and other relevant records are located at Patna, Muzaffarpur and Sitamari; it would be expensive and burdensome to bring them to Calcutta.
- The appellant asserted set-offs and counter-claims (losses and damages and sales tax liabilities) which must be proved at trial; reliance was placed on authorities (cited as AIR 1972 Cal 82; ILR (1956) 2 Cal 255; AIR 1970 Cal 394) in support of the contention that the admissions were not decisive.
Respondent No. 1's Arguments (Plaintiff / Receiver)
- The appointment of the Receiver by this Court, admissions made at the Receiver's meeting and letters dated 30 October 1977 and 3 November 1978 containing acknowledgements of liability make it unnecessary for defendants to bring witnesses to Calcutta; admission unless explained is decisive.
- Accordingly, the plaintiff submitted that the suit should be tried in this Court and that the leave under Clause 12 should not be revoked. Counsel relied on AIR 1960 SC 100 and AIR 1953 SC 758 (as cited in the opinion) to support the proposition regarding the decisiveness of admissions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Muthuchellappa Chettiar v. Paliniappa, AIR 1955 Mad 526 | Cited by appellant's counsel for the proposition that the appointment of a Receiver by the Court is not part of the cause of action. | The court recorded that counsel relied on this case, but did not accept that proposition; instead the court relied on an earlier Division Bench decision (Satya Narain Mundra) to hold the appointment is a part of the cause of action. |
| Yeluchuri Venkatachannaya v. Emperor, (1920) 56 Ind Cas 50 : AIR 1920 Cal 337 (FB) | Cited by appellant's counsel for the proposition that the place from where goods are sent is not part of the cause of action. | The court noted the reliance but, on the facts, concluded that other elements (including the appointment of the Receiver and admissions) rendered part of the cause of action within this Court's jurisdiction; it did not accept appellant's submission that no part of the cause of action arose within the Court's original jurisdiction. |
| Satya Narain Mundra v. Rai Bahadur Kishore Chand, (Unreported) Appeal No. 143 of 1954, DB, 12 March 1956 | Held that where a Receiver appointed by this Court files suit for realisation of claims or dues, the fact of appointment by this Court is part of the cause of action. | The court followed this Division Bench decision and held that the appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver by this Court is a part of the cause of action in Suit No. 906 of 1978. |
| AIR 1972 Cal 82; ILR (1956) 2 Cal 255; AIR 1970 Cal 394 | Cited by appellant's counsel in support of his contention concerning the nature and effect of admissions/acknowledgements (i.e., that the claimed admissions were qualified and not decisive). | The court considered the appellant's reliance on these authorities when examining whether the alleged admissions were unconditional. The court held that the statements relied upon were qualified/conditional and that the appellant was entitled to defend and prove its claims. |
| AIR 1960 SC 100 | Cited by respondent's counsel for the proposition that an admission, unless explained, is decisive. | The court noted this principle but held that the particular statements and letters were qualified/conditional and that the admission relied upon was not an unconditional admission that would obviate the need for evidence. |
| AIR 1953 (sic) SC 758 (as cited at p. 765) | Cited by respondent's counsel alongside AIR 1960 SC 100 to support the decisiveness of admissions unless explained. | The court referenced the reliance but treated the specific admissions/letters in this case as qualified and therefore insufficient to dispense with evidence or witnesses; the court did not treat the case as dispositive on these facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two main steps corresponding to the principal contentions before it: (A) whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, and (B) where the balance of convenience lay for trial.
A. Cause of Action / Jurisdiction
- The court addressed the contention that appointment of the Receiver by this Court was not part of the cause of action. The appellant relied on Muthuchellappa Chettiar v. Paliniappa for that proposition.
- The court instead relied on an earlier Division Bench decision (Satya Narain Mundra v. Rai Bahadur Kishore Chand, Appeal No. 143 of 1954, dated 12 March 1956) which held that where a Receiver appointed by this Court files suit against a third party for realisation of claims or dues, the fact of appointment by this Court is part of the cause of action.
- Applying that precedent, the court held that the fact of appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver by this Court in Suit No. 587 of 1973 was part of the cause of action in Suit No. 906 of 1978.
B. Balance of Convenience and Admissions / Acknowledgements
- The court examined the admissions and acknowledgements relied upon by the plaintiff: (a) statements by Mr. D.P. Srivastava at a Receiver's meeting on 24 January 1974 in Calcutta, and (b) letters dated 30 October 1977 and 3 November 1978 from Bihar authorities / the appellant's Accounts Officer.
- The court found the Srivastava statement to be a qualified/conditional statement: it expressly conditioned payment upon "observing all rules and regulations of the orders placed" and upon "detailed checking" and clearance by relevant Bihar authorities and the legal section of the appellant. The authority of Srivastava to bind the appellant was also challenged.
- The letters (including the 30 Oct. 1977 letter) made payment subject to consideration of Sales Tax dues and consideration by the Corporation of how much was due; these, the court held, did not amount to an unconditional acknowledgement of the plaintiff's claim.
- The 3 Nov. 1978 letter was a request that Premier Traders confirm a credit balance as per accounts up to 31 March 1976; the court observed that the appellant had pleaded claims (set-offs and damages) that might have arisen after 31 March 1976, and thus the letter did not amount to an unconditional acknowledgment that dispensed with the need for evidence.
- Considering these documents and the totality of facts, the court concluded that the admissions/acknowledgements were not unconditional or decisive; the appellant was entitled to prove its claims (including defects, loss and damages and set-offs).
- The court then weighed the balance of convenience: most witnesses, documents, inspection reports, commercial records and the business of Premier Traders were located at Patna, Muzaffarpur and Sitamari; the appellant would suffer great inconvenience and expense if required to litigate in Calcutta. By contrast, the plaintiff's evidential burden in Calcutta would be comparatively limited (certified copy of the decree and minutes of the Receiver's meeting).
- Taking into account that there was an express notation in a letter of the firm stating "Subject to Patna Jurisdiction," the court concluded that, on balance, convenience favoured trial at Patna.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court allowed the appeal. The specific operative order is stated as:
Leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is revoked and all further proceedings in Suit No. 906 of 1978 (Ram Chand Khosla v. State of Bihar) are stayed.
Implications and consequences:
- The direct effect is that the leave previously granted to proceed with Suit No. 906 of 1978 on the original side of this Court has been revoked and the suit is stayed in this Court (i.e., the matter is to be litigated in the appropriate forum in Bihar, consistent with the court's reasoning on balance of convenience and jurisdictional facts).
- The court ordered that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond its application of existing authorities; it relied on an earlier Division Bench (Satya Narain Mundra) for the key jurisdictional proposition and applied established principles on admissions and balance of convenience to the facts. The decision's practical effect is procedural: revocation of leave and transfer / stay of proceedings; the court did not indicate that it was creating a novel precedent in doctrinal law.
Appeal allowed. (S.C. Ghose, C.J. concurred.)
R.N Pyne, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order dated 27th Aug., 1979 of Mrs. Khastgir, J. dismissing the appellant's application for revocation of leave granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent to institute the Suit No. 906 of 1978 (Ram Chand Khosla v. State of Bihar). The facts out of which the said application in the Court of the first instance arose are briefly as follows:
Ram Chand Khosla, the plaintiff in Suit No. 906 of 1979 (1978?) was appointed as Receiver by and under a consent decree dated 5th April, 1977 passed in Suit No. 587 of 1973 (Universal Engineers and Traders v. Premier Traders) by this Court for the put-pose of collecting and realising the dues payable to Premier Traders and was empowered to bring suit for that purpose.
2. Pursuant to the power conferred under the said decree Ramchand Khosla as plaintiff filed the said suit being Suit No. 906 of 1978 against State of Bihar and the appellant, inter alia, for recovery of Rupees 4,46,576.40 p. and other reliefs. The plaintiff's case in the plaint is as follows:
Pursuant to an order dated 21st April, 1973 placed by the defendant No. 1, State of Bihar with the said Messrs Premier Traders, Exhibition Road, Patna 300 pumping sets were sold by the said Premier Traders (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said firm’) to the defendant No. 1 and out of the same, 200 pumping sets were supplied to District Agricultural Officer at Muzaffarpur and 100 Pumping sets were supplied to the Sub-Divisional Officer at Sitamari as instructed by the State of Bihar. In the said order it is mentioned that the appellant is the consignee and payment is to be made by it. The appellant at the instance of the State of Bihar (respondent No. 2 herein) from time to time made part payments to the said firm of Messrs Premier Traders aggregating to Rs. 5,93,249.75 p. leaving a balance of Rupees 2,54,250.25 p. on account of price of the said goods. In terms of the said order the said firm deposited with the respondent No. 2 a sum of Rs. 16,950/- as and by way of security. According to the plaintiff in Suit No. 906 of 1979 (1978?) as Receiver he was authorised to collect the dues of the said firm of Premier Traders and as a result thereof there was due and owing by the defendants in the said suit a sum of Rs. 4,46,576.50 p. including the sum of Rs. 16,950/- the amount of security deposit and the sum of Rupees 1,75,376.15 p. being the amount of interest at the rate of 12% from 10th July, 1973 to 30th Nov., 1978. Here it may be mentioned that in the letter dated 24th May, 1973 addressed by the said firm to the Deputy Secretary, Department of Agricultural and Animal Husbandry (Agriculture) Govt, of Bihar, Patna, relating to the transaction it is stated ‘Subject to Patna Jurisdiction’.
3. It was alleged that the defendants in the said suit though expressly admitted and acknowledged the amount due and payable to the said firm of Premier Traders yet withheld the payment of the sum of Rupees 4,46,576.50 p. to the plaintiff in the said suit. Further, at a meeting of the Receiver appointed by an order dated January 3, 1974 passed in the said Suit No. 587 of 1973 held at Bar Library Club, Calcutta on Jan. 24, 1974 one Mr. D.P Srivastava the authorised agent and representative of the defendant No. 2 (i.e, appellant herein) acknowledged for and on behalf of the defendant No. 2 the liability of the defendant No. 2 and the dues of the said Premier Traders and promised to pay the said amount to the said Receiver appointed in the said suit after observing all rules and regulations of the orders placed on the said firm. It was further alleged that by letters the defendants in the said Suit No. 906 of 1979 (1978?) admitted and acknowledged their liability in respect of the plaintiff's dues.
4. The appellant's case as stated in its petition filed in the Court of the first instance was that State of Bihar defendant No. 1 in the said Suit No. 906 of 1979 (1978?) placed an order dated 21st April, 1973 upon Messrs Premier Traders at Patna for 300 pumping sets as fully mentioned in the said petition on various terms and conditions contained in the said order. It appears that appellant was the consignee of said pumps and would make payment for the same as mentioned in the said order. It is further stated that 200 pump sets were delivered to the District Agricultural Officer at Muzaffarpur and 100 pump sets were delivered to the Sub-Divisional Officer at Sitamari. It is stated that 50 pump sets out of the 200 sets supplied to Muzaffarpur and 52 sets out of 100 sets supplied at Sitamari were found fitted with duplicate pumps in place of Kirloskar pumps and in spite of the request of the appellant Premier Traders did not replace the said duplicate pumps. It is further stated that several pumps supplied by Premier Traders were found to be defective. The said firm was directed to remove the same but it failed and neglected to remove the same and thereby committed breach of the contract. Further, in breach of the terms of the said order the said firm did not open service station. Due to the said fact the appellant suffered loss and damages. The said fact was duly brought to the notice of the said firm by several letters addressed by the appellant to the said firm. It is also stated that the said firm was paid an aggregate sum of Rs. 5,93,249.75 on account of the price of the pump sets supplied by it. It is further stated that as the said firm failed and neglected to replace their 102 defective pumps, 41 pumps were disposed of by the defendant on account of the said firm and appellant directed the said firm to take back the remaining 61 pumps rejected by the appellant. The said firm, however, failed and neglected to replace the said defective pumps. In the petition at pages 16 and 17 of the paper book it appears that the appellant has stated the amount of loss and/or damages suffered by it and according to the appellant, a sum of Rs. 38,896.75 became due and payable to the said firm. The appellant received a notice dated 3rd July, 1976 under Section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act from the Sales Tax Authorities claiming a sum of Rs. 34,438.85 p. which became due on account of sales tax payable by the said firm for the period 1968-1969 and 1973-1974. The appellant stated that after deducting the said sum of Rs. 34,438.85 p. only a sum of Rupee 4,457.90 p. was due and payable by the appellant to the said firm. According to the appellant, a notice dated 8th Feb., 1977 was received by the appellant from Messrs T. Banerji and Company, Solicitors of the respondent No. 1 demanding payment on behalf of the said firm. The appellant through its advocate's letter dated 21st April, 1973 informed the Solicitor of the respondent No. 1 about the amount recoverable by the appellant from the said firm.
5. From the judgment appealed against it appears that before the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance three grounds were urged by the appellant for revocation of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent viz., (i) no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court; (ii) balance of convenience was in favour of the trial of the suit at a convenient forum in Bihar and (iii) parties had particularly chosen a forum, i.e High Court at Patna before which all disputes arising in respect of the agreement entered into by and between the parties should be referred to.
6. On the first point the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance held that the plaintiff (respondent No. 1 herein) was appointed as Receiver by this Court); goods were supplied from Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court and that at the meeting held by the Receiver in Suit No. 587 of 1973 one Mr. Srivastava appearing on behalf of the appellant acknowledged the liability of the appellant and a letter dated 3rd Nov., 1978 written by the appellant's Accounts Officer acknowledging liability was received by the Receiver in the said Suit No. 587 of 1973 within the jurisdiction of this Court. On the second point the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance was of the opinion that in view of the admission and acknowledgement made on behalf of the appellant it was not necessary for the defendants in Suit No. 906 of 1979 (1978?) to bring any witness to Calcutta at the time of hearing of the suit. Regarding the third contention it was held that the agreement regarding choice of forum was between Premier Traders and the State of Bihar but so far as the appellant is concerned there was no such agreement. Therefore, instead of bringing the suit piecemeal it should be decided by one Court.
7. On the question of whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver by this Court is no part of the cause of action. In this connection counsel relied on the case of Muthuchellappa Chettiar v. Paliniappa, AIR 1955 Mad 526. It has been further submitted that the place wherefrom goods are sent is no part of the cause of action and in this connection reliance has been placed on the case of Yeluchuri Venkatachannaya v. Emperor, (1920) 56 Ind Cas 50 : (AIR 1920 Cal 337) (FB). It was further submitted that there was in fact no admission of liability in the Receiver's meeting held at Calcutta because admission, if any, was qualified and conditional and Srivastava who attended the Receiver's meeting for the appellant had no authority to make any admission and therefore there was no valid admission. Regarding the question of acknowledgement by letter dated 3-11-1978 it was submitted that such letter was sent to Patna Office of the Premier Traders. Therefore, according to counsel, no part of the cause of action in Suit No. 906 of 1979 (1978?) had arisen within the original side of this Court.
8. Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in his argument supported the decision appealed against on the grounds mentioned by the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance.
9. The question whether the appointment of a Receiver by an order made by this Court with power to realise debts and claims is a part of the cause of action in a suit filed by such Receiver or not has been decided by an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Appeal No. 143 of 1954 (Satya Narain Mundra v. Rai Bahadur Kishore Chand) dated 12th March, 1956. It was held that where a Receiver appointed by this Court in a suit files suit against a third party for realisation of claims or dues the fact of appointment of the Receiver by the Court is a part of the cause of action. Therefore, the fact of appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver in Suit No. 587 of 1979 (1978?) by this Court in our view is a part of the cause of action in Suit No. 906 of 1979 (1978?).
10. The next point is in favour of which Court lies the balance of convenience. In the petition and in paragraph 15 of the affidavit-in-reply the appellant has stated in details the facts as to why the balance of convenience lies in favour of trial by a Court at Patna. It is stated that the balance of convenience is overwheuningly in favour of the suit being heard by the Court at Patna than this Hon'ble Court. It will be tremendously costly to call all the witnesses (a list containing the names of 30 witnesses is annexed to affidavit-in-reply) to Calcutta from Patna, Muzaffarpur and Sitamari and to produce the voluminous records relating to the, said contract, delivery of the pumping sets, the inspection reports of the competent Engineers of the Government of Bihar, the then Sub-Divisional Officers of Muzaffarpur and Sitamari and the inspector who visited the installations of the said pumps which were sent to the diverse places in the said Districts for operation and those pumps which were rejected as defective and not in accordance with the specification under the terms of the contract. According to the appellant almost whole of the cause of action has arisen in Patna and great hardships amounting to injustice will be caused to the appellant if the suit is allowed to be tried by this Hon'ble Court inasmuch as the competent Engineers and Officers of the defendants in the suit who would be more than thirty in number would be required to appear and give evidence as witnesses and all of them are at Patna, Muzaffarpur and Sitamari. The competent Officer of the Commercial Taxes Government of Bihar will be also required to appear and give evidence and also to produce records relating to the Sales Tax in respect of the said sale and the statutory demand notices that have been forwarded to the defendant No. 2 for non-payment of sales tax by the said Premier Traders to the Sales Tax Authorities. The entire records relating to the dealings and transactions with Premier Traders are at Patna and their representatives are also at Patna who are also necessary witnesses with regard to the disputes and differences as to the alleged claim of the plaintiff in the said suit. On the contrary the plaintiff is not required to produce any other records except the certified copy of the decree by which he has been appointed as Receiver and has been authorised to collect debts of the said Premier Traders as also the records of the meeting of the Receiver in which admission was made by the appellants representative. Further, according to the appellant, there is no scope for any oral evidence by the plaintiff or by Mrs. Indrani Chatterjee (previous receiver) in this suit and the records relating to the contract between the defendants and the said Premier Traders are all with the defendants and the said Premier Traders at Patna.
11. Counsel for the appellant in his argument reiterated the facts stated hereinbefore in support of his contention that balance of convenience lies in favour of the suit being tried at Patna. He has further submitted that the admission or acknowledgement of liability upon which the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance has relied upon are qualified and conditional. In support of his contention reliance has been placed on AIR 1972 Cal 82; ILR (1956) 2 Cal 255 and AIR 1970 Cal 394.
12. Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that in view of the admission made before the Receiver as stated hereinafter and the letters dated 3rd Oct., 1970 and 3rd Nov. 1978 containing acknowledgement of liability it is not necessary to call witnesses as stated by the appellant. Further, in view of the admission and acknowledgement of liability it is not necessary to prove the plaintiff's claim. It is the submission of the counsel that admission unless explained is decisive. Further, in view of the admission and acknowledgement the suit cannot be converted into a witness action. Counsel has relied on AIR 1960 SC 100 and AIR 1953 (sic) SC 758 at p. 765.
13. On the question of balance of convenience learned Judge has relied on the admission made before the previous Receiver and the letters dated 30th Oct., 1977 and 3rd Nov., 1978. In view of such admission and acknowledgement according to the learned Judge defendants need not come to Calcutta with their witnesses.
14. Admission of the liability according to the plaintiff was made by the appellant's representative in the Receivers meeting held on 24th Jan., 1974 at Calcutta. Relevant portion of the minutes of the Receiver's meeting is set out hereunder.
“Regarding Agenda No. (2): Statement of Mr. D.P Srivastava authorised representative of the Corporation. Mr. D.P Srivastava has received the letter dated 12th January, 1974 on behalf of the Corporation and states that the security deposit and other amount lying with the Bihar State Agro-Industries Development Corporation Ltd. on account of Messrs Premier Traders will be paid to the Id. Receiver after observing all rules and regulations of the orders placed on Messrs Premier Traders, Patna, by the Govt. of Bihar. The payment is subject to detailed checking of their pumping sets by the concerned authorities and clearance from Govt, of Bihar Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Deptt. as well as legal section of the Corporation (Books of account were produced by the authorised representative of the Corporation).”
Letters dated 30th October, 1977 and 3rd November, 1978 are set out hereunder.
“Annexure ‘C’
Bihar Government
Agriculture Department.
Shri S.P.N Sharma,
Joint Secretary,
Govt. of Bihar.
Chairman,
Bihar State Agro-Industries Development Corpn. Ltd., Sinha Library Road,
Patna.
Sub.: Payment of Diesel Engine Pumping Sets supplied by Premier Traders, Exhibition Road, Patna.
No.: Corporation Letter No. 440 D/- 5-2-1977, Letter No. 5540 dated 25-7-1976, Letter No. 1516 dated 28-6-1977.
Dear Sir,
According to the direction by the Agricultural Office Order No. 17503 dated 30-10-1973 in connection with the above subject and according to the judgment of Honourable High Court of Calcutta, you are requested to make the payment against the supply and against the security money to Shri Ram Chand Khosla receiver appointed by Honourable Calcutta High Court.
2. At the time of making payment the dues of Sales Tax Department should be also considered. The information in this connection is being sent to Sales Tax Office or to Sri Khosla.
3. Copies of the report in connection with the pumping sets received from District Agricultural Officer, Muzaffarpur Divisional Agricultural Officer, Sitamari, are enclosed herewith.
4. How much payment is due, it is to be considered by the Corporation.
Action taken in this respect should be made known to the Government.
Yours faithfully
S.P.N Sharma, Joint Secretary.”
“Bihar State Agro-Industries Development Corporation Ltd.
(Government Undertaking)
Regd. Office Krishi Udyog Bhawan Sinha
Library Road, Patna-800001.
Ref. 7300D/- 3-11-1978.
Premier Traders, Exhibition Road.
Patna.
Sub.: Confirmation of Balance.
Dear Sir,
As per our annual accounts for the year ending 31st March, 1976, a credit balance of Rs. 2,54,250.25 (two lakhs fifty four thousand two hundred fifty and paise twentyfive only) stands in your name. This may kindly be confirmed.
As the confirmation certificate in respect of the aforesaid balance is required by our Auditors, an early reply will be highly appreciated.
Yours faithfully,
for B.S.A.I.D.C Ltd.
A.K Sinha
Accounts Officer-II
21-10-1978.”
15. In the facts and circumstances of this case we are unable to uphold the finding of the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance that in view of the admission and acknowledgement of liability made by or on behalf of the appellant it will not be necessary for the plaintiff (i.e respondent No. 1) to prove his claim or no witness need be called at the hearing of the suit.
16. The statements made by Srivastava at the Receiver's meeting as stated hereinbefore upon which the respondent No. 1 relies as admission of liability is a qualified statement. It is made clear that payment would be made after observing all rules and regulations of the orders placed upon the said firm and subject to detailed checking of the pump sets by concerned authorities and clearance from the Government of Bihar, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Department as well as legal section of the appellant. Thus the admission of liability, if any, by Srivastava is qualified and/or conditional. Further, the authority of Srivastava to make such statement is also challenged by the appellant. Similarly, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the letter dated 30th Oct., 1977 makes it clear that at the time of making payment dues of Sales Tax Authorities is to be considered and further how much is due to the firm is to be considered by the appellant. In the premises it cannot be said that there is unconditional acknowledgement of liability by this letter.
17. On the letter dated 3rd Nov., 1978 strong reliance was placed by the respondent No. 1. It is to be noted that it is stated in this letter credit balance standing in the name of the firm was up to 31st March, 1976 and confirmation thereof was asked for from the said firm. This letter only shows the amount lying to the credit of the firm on the basis of the pump sets delivered by the firm to the appellant. But as stated hereinbefore the appellant has various claims against the said firm as was fully stated in its Advocate's letter dated 21st Sept., 1977 (p. 44 of the Paper Book). Those claims might have arisen after 31st March, 1976. If this letter is read along with other letters mentioned above it cannot, in our view, be said that there is unconditional acknowledgment of the respondent No. 1's claim in the suit for which it will not be necessary to call any witness at the trial. In our view, the appellant is entitled to claim loss and damages in respect of the defective pump sets as well as for breach of the contract. Of course such claim will have to be proved by the appellant. Accordingly it cannot be said that in view of the above letter no evidence is necessary in this suit. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, in our view, balance of convenience lies in favour of this suit being tried by the Court at Patna. The transaction out of which the claim arises took place at Patna. The place of business of the said firm who supplied the pump sets is at Patna and the relevant document relating to the contract and the transaction are at Patna. Both the defendants are at Patna. All the relevant documents of the defendants are at Patna, Muzaffarpur and Sitamari. To prove the defects in the pump sets supplied by the said firm and the loss and damages suffered by the appellant for breach of contract various witnesses will have to be called and various documents will have to be produced by the appellant. Further, the appellant will have to prove the circumstances in which the said letter dated 3rd Nov., 1978 was written. This letter was sent to the Patna Office of the said firm. All the documents and witnesses of the appellant are either at Patna or Muzaffarpur or Sitamari. Excepting that the respondent No. 1 was appointed by this Court and admission, if any, was made in the Receiver's meeting no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. If the suit is tried in this Court, all the said documents and witnesses will have to be produced before this Court. Apart from the great inconvenience that will be caused to the appellant it will have to incur enormous expenses. Whereas the plaintiff will have to produce the certified copy of the decree and the minutes of the Receiver's meeting entitling him to realise the claim of the said firm. The office of the said firm being at Patna all the documents relating to the transaction will be at Patna. If any witness is to be called by the plaintiff regarding the transaction they are at Patna. In the above circumstances if the appellant is compelled to contest this suit in this Court it will have to bring all the documents and witnesses at Calcutta and apart from great Inconvenience and hardship that would cause serious prejudice amounting to injustice to the appellant if the suit is tried in the Court at Patna the respondent No. 1 will not be required to take many documents or witnesses to Patna. Considering the respective advantages and disadvantages of the parties it appears to us that in the facts and circumstances of this case the balance of convenience is in favour of this suit being tried by a Court at Patna. In this connection the fact that in the letter dated 24th May, 1973 the firm stated ‘subject to Patna jurisdiction’ should also be taken into consideration.
18. For reasons stated above, in our view, the appeal should succeed and the same is allowed. Leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent is revoked and all further proceedings in the Suit No. 906 of 1978 (Ram Chand Khosla v. State of Bihar) are stayed. In the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.
S.C Ghose, C.J:— I agree.
Appeal allowed.
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