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Dr. Ashis Ranjan Das v. Rajendra Nath Mullick .

Calcutta High Court
Apr 20, 1982
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Factual and Procedural Background

Dr. Ashis Ranjan Das (plaintiff) instituted a suit on 24th July 1981 against Rajendra Nath Mullick (defendant) claiming specific performance of an oral agreement for a lease of a portion of premises No. 2 Auckland Place, Calcutta. The agreement, allegedly made on or about 30th August 1978, involved a 50-year building lease with an option for renewal, at specified rents and a premium. The plaintiff alleged part payment of the premium and possession delivery after the defendant persuaded a third party, Gonzales, to vacate the plot. The defendant denied a concluded contract and claimed the payment was a loan to be adjusted against a future lease premium. The defendant also alleged wrongful possession and trespass by the plaintiff since 1982 and sought interlocutory reliefs including appointment of a receiver and injunctions restraining the plaintiff's activities on the plot.

Both parties filed affidavits supporting their respective contentions regarding possession, construction, and the terms of the alleged lease. The plaintiff asserted continuous possession since 1978 and denied wrongful acts, while the defendant maintained that no lease was finalized and that the plaintiff's possession was wrongful.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant is entitled to interlocutory reliefs such as injunctions and appointment of a receiver restraining the plaintiff from altering or using the disputed property pending disposal of the suit.
  2. Whether the defendant's claim for interlocutory relief arises out of or is incidental to the plaintiff's cause of action for specific performance of the lease agreement.
  3. The entitlement of the plaintiff to continue possession and make constructions on the plot pending final determination of the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed specific performance of an oral lease agreement and alleged possession was delivered in part performance.
  • The plaintiff denied having erected any new bamboo or tin structures, stating temporary constructions pre-existed.
  • The plaintiff contended that the defendant was not entitled to interlocutory reliefs in the plaintiff's suit.
  • The plaintiff asserted continuous possession since 1978 without objection and denied wrongful possession allegations.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant denied a concluded contract and stated the Rs. 29,000/- payment was a loan, not a premium.
  • The defendant alleged wrongful possession and trespass by the plaintiff since January 1982.
  • The defendant sought interlocutory reliefs including appointment of a receiver and injunctions to restrain the plaintiff from construction and parking activities on the plot.
  • The defendant claimed that the plaintiff obstructed access and wrongfully occupied the plot.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai, AIR 1975 Kant 137 Defendant can only apply for interlocutory injunction if relief arises out of plaintiff's cause of action or is incidental to it. The Court applied this principle to assess whether the defendant's interlocutory relief claim arose from or was incidental to the plaintiff's suit for specific performance.
Carter v. Fey, 1894 (2) Ch. 541 Defendant is not entitled to interlocutory injunction against plaintiff without filing counterclaim unless relief arises from or is incidental to plaintiff's cause of action. The Court relied on this precedent to conclude that the defendant's interlocutory relief was connected to and incidental to the plaintiff's cause of action, thus permitting the application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature of the defendant's application for interlocutory reliefs in the context of the plaintiff's suit for specific performance of the lease agreement. It analyzed whether the defendant's claim for injunction and appointment of a receiver arose out of or was incidental to the plaintiff's cause of action.

Relying on the precedents of Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai and Carter v. Fey, the Court held that the defendant's reliefs were connected to the plaintiff's claim because the subject matter—the disputed plot—was in the plaintiff's possession, and the defendant was deprived of its use. The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff was enjoying the property and collecting fees, the defendant was entitled to seek interlocutory relief to preserve the property pending final adjudication.

The Court emphasized the equitable principle that the plaintiff seeking specific performance must not alter the character of the property until the suit is decided. Consequently, the Court allowed an injunction restraining the plaintiff from making further constructions on the plot during the pendency of the suit. The Court also noted that the defendant could file a counter-claim and seek further interim orders if necessary.

Holding and Implications

The application for interlocutory relief filed by the defendant is allowed.

The Court granted an injunction restraining the plaintiff from making any further construction on the disputed plot until the suit is disposed of. The order preserves the status quo and prevents the plaintiff from altering the property pending final determination. The plaintiff is permitted to make necessary alterations or repairs only upon reasonable notice to the defendant during the stay period.

No new precedent was established; the decision applies established principles regarding interlocutory reliefs in suits for specific performance and equitable conduct by plaintiffs. The defendant remains entitled to file a counter-claim and seek additional interim reliefs if appropriate.

Show all summary ...

Dr. Ashis Ranjan Das, the plaintiff, instituted this suit, on the 24th July, 1981 against Rajendra Nath Mullick the sole defendant, claiming, inter alia, (a) a decree for specific performance of an agreement between the parties for a lease of a portion of premises No. 2 Auckland Place, Calcutta, to be executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff, (b) mandatory injunction directing the defendant to execute and register in favour of the plaintiff a lease in the form set out in Annexure B to the plaint or in such other form as may be prescribed, (c) in default, the Registrar, Original Side of this Court be directed to execute and register such lease in favour of the plaintiff, (d) in the alternative, a decree for Rupees 29,000/- and a further decree for Rupees 1,00,000/- or (e) alternatively, an enquiry into the compensation and a decree for the sum as may be ascertained on such enquiry and other reliefs.

2. The plaintiff's cause of action is materially as follows:—

The defendant is the owner of the said premises No. 2 Auckland Plance, Calcutta, which includes a plot of land measuring about 4 cottahs 5 chattacks and 7 sq. ft.

3. The plaintiff and the defendant arrived at an agreement on or about the 30th Aug., 1978 for grant of a building lease of the said plot of land by the defendant to the plaintiff for a period of 50 years from execution with option to the plaintiff of renewal thereof for further 20 years at a rent of Rs. 900/- per month payable according to the English calendar for the first two years and thereafter at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per month for the next ten years with provision for further increase thereafter as also a premium of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant at or before the execution of the lease.

4. It was also agreed that the plaintiff would construct a four storeyed building on the said plot and would make over possession of a flat in the second floor thereof for the use and occupation of the defendant. It is alleged that the said agreement was entered into between the parties orally and is implied from their course of dealings thereafter.

5. On the same day that is the 30th Aug., 1978, subsequent to the said agreement the plaintiff it is alleged paid Rs. 29,000/- in part payment of the said premium to the defendant who accepted the same.

6. At the material time there was a motor garage in the said plot owned by one Gonzales. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant persuaded Gonzales to vacate the said plot whereafter the possession thereof was delivered to the plaintiff on or about the 8th Sept., 1978.

7. On or about the 29th May 1981, a draft lease was sent to the Advocate of the defendant for approval and return, but the defendant thereafter avoided the execution of the lease on diverse pretexts.

8. The case of the defendant is, that there has been no concluded contract between the parties and that the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance.

9. The defendant alleges that in or about 1978 the parties had negotiations for grant of a building lease by the defendant to the plaintiff of the said plot on inter alia the following terms and conditions:—

(a) The plaintiff could construct a 4 storeyed building on the said plot within 4 years from the date of the contract and the entire second floor containing 2 self-contained flats would be given to the defendant;

(b) The lease would be for 50 years certain with an option for renewal for a further period of 20 years;

(c) The monthly rent to be agreed upon would be subject to an increase at the rate of 15% every 10th year for certain term and 20% after every 10 years for an option period;

(d) A premium would be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.

10. A draft of the proposed terms and conditions of the lease was made over by the defendant to the plaintiff in June or July 1978.

11. It was tentatively agreed that the premium payable by the plaintiff to the defendant would be between Rs. 1.5 Lakhs and Rs. 2,00,000/- and that the rent would be approximately Rs. 1,000/- per month subject to periodic increases.

12. The defendant alleges that before finalisation of the terms and conditions on or about the 30th Aug., 1978 the defendant obtained a loan of Rs. 29,000/- from the plaintiff and it was agreed that the said loan would be adjusted against the premium on finalisation of the agreement of lease.

13. The defendant alleges that since July, 1981 the defendant was obstructed by the plaintiff from having access to the said plot and that the plaintiff, its servants and agents trespassed into the said plot wrongfully. The defendant lodged complaints to the police and instituted criminal proceedings before the Executive Magistrate, Calcutta.

14. It is alleged that the said Gonzales surrendered the possession of the said plot of land to the defendant and not to the plaintiff.

15. It is alleged that the plaintiff has since taken forceful possession of the said plot wrongfully since the middle of Jan., 1982 and has put up bamboo structures and tin shades thereon and is utilising the same by letting it out for parking of cars. It is contended that the plaintiff has no right, title and interest in the said plot and should not be permitted to continue in wrongful possession thereof.

16. In this application of the defendant on a notice dated the 23rd Feb., 1982, inter alia, the following orders have been prayed for:—

(a) A Receiver over the said plot.

(b) An injunction restraining the plaintiff from making any or further construction in the said plot till the disposal of the suit.

(c) An injunction restraining the plaintiff from parking or allowing the parking of vehicles in the said plot till the disposal of the suit.

(d) An injunction restraining the plaintiff from realising any fee for parking of vehicles in the said plot.

(e) The Receiver be directed to realise all fees for parking of vehicles in the said plot and to invest the same.

17. The plaintiff has affirmed an affidavit on the 12th March, 1982 which has been filed in opposition to the petition. It is, inter alia, alleged in this affidavit that after the defendant persuaded the said Gonzales to vacate the said plot of land possession thereof was duly delivered to the plaintiff in part performance of the said lease. The plaintiff alleges further that he has constructed the fencing demarcating the said plot from the rest of the premises and has constructed a gate for the purpose of egress and ingress to the same. The plaintiff denies having put up any bamboo structures or tin sheds in the said plot and alleges that temporary constructions were already there before he came into the possession of the plot.

18. The plaintiff alleges that it is the defendant who intended to occupy the said plot forcibly after the possession thereof was made over to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had to lodge complaints to the police and initiate proceedings under S. 144 of the Cr. P.C The plaintiff alleges further that the defendant knew long ago that the said plot was being utilised for parking of cars upon payment of fees.

19. The plaintiff alleges that he has been in continuous possession of the said plot since Sept., 1978 without any objection from the defendant and that the defendant did not institute any legal proceedings for recovery of possession of the said plot. It is contended that the defendant is not entitled to make the application in the suit instituted by the plaintiff.

20. The defendant has affirmed an affidavit on the 1st April, 1982, which has been filed in reply to the said affidavit of the plaintiff. It is, inter alia, stated in this affidavit that the constructions were made by the plaintiff in the said plot only since the middle of Jan., 1982.

21. At the hearing learned counsel reiterated the respective contentions in the pleadings. Documents were brought to the notice of the Court on behalf of the defendant to show that there was no concluded contract between the parties and that the case of the plaintiff as recorded in the correspondence from time to time indicated that the terms of the contract were never finalised.

22. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that irrespective of merits, the defendant was not entitled to ask for interlocutory reliefs in the suit of the plaintiff.

23. In support of such contention learned counsel for the plaintiff cited:

(a) Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai, reported in AIR 1975 Kant 137. In this case the plaintiff instituted a suit in the Munsiff's Court for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the premises in disputes, but did not apply for any interlocutory relief. Later, the defendant No. 1 made an application in the suit for an injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with her possession of the property in dispute.

On a revision from an order allowing the application it was held by the Karnataka High Court that the cause of action of the defendant No. 1 was different from that of the plaintiff and had arisen later. Following two, English decisions it was also held that only where the relief claimed by the defendant arose out of the plaintiff's cause of action or was incidental to it that the defendant could apply for an interlocutory injunction against the plaintiff.

(b) Carter v. Fey, reported in 1894 (2) Ch. 541. In this case the plaintiff's action was for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from carrying on a particular business within a certain limit in Winchester. On the same day the plaintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction. The defendant entered appearance and thereafter, gave a notice for an interlocutory injunction restraining the plaintiff from using the name of the defendant in carrying on the business of the plaintiff. Both the motions were dismissed in the first Court. On an appeal by the defendant Lindley L.J held that the defendant was not entitled to any interlocutory injunction and observed as follows:—

“The question is whether a defendant who is in a hurry is entitled to apply by way of motion in the plaintiff's action for an injunction without waiting to deliver a counterclaim or issuing a writ in a cross-action, where the relief which he seeks is not in any way comprised in or incidental to the plaintiff's cause of action. In the present case the plaintiff only claims an injunction to restrain the defendant from carrying on a business within a certain limit.”

The defendant's claim is not for any relief arising out of or incidental to the relief sought to be obtained by the plaintiff in his action.

******

If the defendant's application for an injunction were in any way connected with or incidental to the object and purpose of the plaintiff's action, he would have good ground for his contention; but it has really nothing to do with the relief sought by the plaintiff.”

“The question is this — whether the defendant can move for an injunction against the plaintiff without filing a counter-claim or issuing a writ in a cross-action. In my opinion, he can in some cases, but only in cases where the defendant's claim to relief arises out of the plaintiff's cause of action, or is incidental to it.”

24. Relying on the above decisions learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the defendant's cause of action, if any, was in tort, viz., trespass by the plaintiff in the ‘defendant's land whereas the cause of action of the plaintiff was an agreement of which specific performance was being claimed.

25. In the facts it appears that the subject matter of the suit i.e, the said plot, is admittedly in the possession of the plaintiff. It is also admitted that no lease has yet been executed in favour of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has not paid the premium nor is paying the rent which is payable according to him. The plaintiff being in possession is enjoying the fruits of the property by collecting parking fees. The defendant has been totally deprived of the use of the said land.

26. Hence, if the defendant had been in possession of the land in dispute the plaintiff would have been entitled to apply for orders restraining the defendant from altering the character of the property. Such a relief would arise out of the plaintiff's cause of action. The plaintiff being in possession of the property, in the instant case there is no reason why the defendant should be held disentitled from claiming the said relief and a claim to such relief in my view must be held to arise out of the plaintiff's cause of action and in any event incidental thereto. If the suit fails the defendant will have a right to obtain possession of the property in the condition as it was originally. It is also open to the defendant to make a counter-claim by amending his written statement or by way of an additional written statement.

27. The plaintiff has come to this Court seeking the equitable relief of specific performance. He must do equity himself and not alter the character of the property till he succeeds in the suit.

28. For the reasons above, the application is allowed. There will be an injunction restraining the plaintiff from making any further construction in the said plot till the disposal of the suit. In the event the defendant makes a counter-claim in the suit the defendant will be at liberty to apply for further interim orders.

29. Costs: costs in the cause.

30. There will be a stay of operation of the order for one week from date. The ad-interim order will continue. In the event the plaintiff makes any alteration or repair to the existing structures, in the said plot in the meantime the same should be done on a reasonable notice to the defendant.

31. Liberty to apply.

Application allowed.