M.M Dutt, J.:— In this appeal the appellant, Umasankar Chatterjee, has challenged the propriety of the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court whereby the learned judge discharged the Rule Nisi issued on the application of the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.

2. The appellant was appointed the Finance Manager of the Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation), a Government Company under the control of the Central Government and was posted at Namrup in Assam. At the relevant time, his scale of pay was Rs. 1800/- to Rs. 2250/-. On August 25, 1975, the appellant was transferred to Kobra in Madhya Pradesh, but before his transfer he was sent on tour from Namrup to Calcutta on August 15, 1975 for finalisation of the annual accounts with the Government auditors. He was, however, released from Calcutta on August 25, 1975 on account of his illness, and he joined the Kobra Division on September 4, 1975.

3. While the appellant was working in the Kobra Division, he was served with a charge sheet containing six Articles of charges by the Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation under cover of his memo dated September 14, 1976. All the charges, except one, related to the T.A Bills submitted by the appellant in respect of traveling and transportation costs incurred by him for himself and the members of his family in Calcutta before he joined the Kobra Division in Madhya Pradesh. It was inter alia alleged that in the T.A Bills the appellant had made certain false claims of cost which he did not incur during his tour in Calcutta. The appellant was put under suspension and, after such suspension, he was permitted by the authority concerned to stay at his Calcutta residence and draw his susbsistence allowance from the Calcutta office of the Corporation.

4. An enquiry was held in respect of the charges levelled against the appellant. The Enquiry Officer found the appellant guilty of all the charges. The Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and, after considering the reply of the appellant to the second show-cause notice, he by his order dated December 9, 1977 removed the appellant from the service of the Corporation with immediate effect. It is not disputed that the order of removal was sent to the appellant at his Calcutta residence. Indeed, in the order of removal the address of the appellant was mentioned as 21.C/1B, Prince Baktiar Shah Road, Calcutta-33. Being aggrieved by the order of removal, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Board of Directors of the Corporation. The appeal was however, dismissed by the Board of Directors as communicated to the appellant by the Officer on Special Duty (PIR) by his letter dated September 12, 1977. Both she said order of removal and the order dismissing the appeal were passed in New Delhi.

5. Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the validity of the order of removal and the order of the Board of Directors dismissing the appeal. The learned Judge took the view that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the writ petition, for the appellant served all along in Madhya Pradesh and the order of removal and the order of dismissal of the appeal were both passed in New Delhi. In the opinion of the learned Judge, either the Madhya Pradesh High Court or the Delhi High Court, but not the Calcutta High Court, had jurisdiction in the matter. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge discharged the Rule Nisi issued on the writ petition of the appellant. The learned Judge, however, granted liberty to the appellant to challenge the orders before the appropriate forum. Hence this appeal.

6. The principal question involved in this appeal is whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition of the appellant. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ petition will be maintainable in this Court if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the State of West Bengal. It has been urged by Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that in the instant case, a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta. In support of this contention, he has strongly relied on the fact that the impugned order of removal was served on the appellant at his residence in Calcutta. It is submitted that the order of removal became effective only when it was served on the appellant in Calcutta. He has also placed reliance on the fact that the incidents constituting the changes, except one, had all happened in Calcutta. It is, accordingly, contended by the learned Counsel that a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court, and that the learned Judge was not right in discharging the Rule Nisi on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

7. On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. Somendra Chandra Bose, learned Counsel for the Corporation that the order of removal became effective the moment it was put into the post box for communication to the appellant. Counsel submits that as the order of removal was issued and posted in New Delhi, it is not correct to say that it became effective only when it was actually served on the appellant at his Calcutta residence. Further it is submitted by the learned Counsel that even assuming that the order of removal or dismissal becomes effective only when it is served on the employee concerned, he will not have to prove such service in order to succeed in the suit that may be instituted by him challenging the validity of the order. It is, therefore, contended that the fact about the service of the order does not constitute any part of the cause of action and, as such, in the instant case, no part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta simply because the order of removal was served on the appellant at his Calcutta residence. The learned Counsel for the Corporation has also seriously disputed the contention of the appellant that as the incidents constituting the charges against the appellant, except one, had happened in Calcutta, a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is, accordingly, submitted that the learned Judge was right in holding that either the Delhi High Court or the Madhya Pradesh high Court, but not the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the appellant.

8. The question that arises for our consideration is whether the order of removal became effective only when it was served on the appellant in Calcutta or when it was put into the post box in New Delhi at the instance of the authority concerned who was the Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation. In this respect, certain decisions have been cited at the bar, which will be discussed presently. In the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1313, the respondent, Amar Singh, was under suspension during the disciplinary proceeding started against him. He was dismissed from service by an order dated June 3, 1949 of the authority concerned. The order of dismissal was not communicated to him, but on May 28, 1951, the Assistant Comptroller, Pepsu informed him that the record of the office showed that he had been dismissed from Government service with effect from the date of his suspension. It has been observed by Gajendragadkar, C.J, speaking for the Court, that if it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. After pointing out the complications, the learned Chief Justice concluded that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it does not take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. As the respondent came to know about the order of dismissal on May 28, 1951, it was held that the order of dismissal had taken effect from that date.

9. The above decision of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh's case undoubtedly supports the contention of the appellant before us that the order of removal became effective only when it was served on him in Calcutta. There is no dispute that the appellant had no earlier knowledge of the order. The learned Counsel for the Corporation, however, submits that as in view of the decision in Amar Singh's case such an order will be effective after its communication to the officer concerned, actual service of the order on the officer or actual receipt of the same by him is not necessary. In Amar Singh's case, by the word ‘communication’ what is meant by the Supreme Court is that the concerned officer has knowledge of the order. He will have such knowledge when he is told about the order and, in the absence of any proof of prior knowledge by any other means, communication of the order of dismissal will mean when the older is actually received by him.

10. We may now refer to a later decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Kehmi Ram, AIR 1970 SC 214 relied on by the learned Counsel of the Corporation. The broad facts of that case are that the respondent, Kehmi Ram, a Government servant was granted leave preparatory to retirement and, while he was on such leave, an order suspending him was passed and a telegram was sent to his home address informing him of such suspension. The telegram was received by him after he had retired from service. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the order of suspension became effective after the telegram was sent out before his retirement of after he actually received the telegram. In other words, whether it could be said that the order of suspension was communicated to him as soon as the telegram was sent out before his retirement or after he actually received the telegram. In order words, whether it could be said that the order of suspension was communicated to him as soon as the telegram was sent out before his retirement. Shelat, J., after referring to the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ‘communicate’ as to impart, confer or transmit information, observed that once such order is sent out, it goes out of the control of the authority concerned, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. Further, his Lordship observed. “In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective.” It should, however, be borne in mind that in Kehmi Ram's case the Supreme Court was considering the communication of an order of suspension and not an order of removal or dismissal from service. In Kehmi Ram's case itself, after the above observation a distinction has been made between the communication of an order of suspension and that of an order of dismissal, for it has been observed by Shelat J. that actual knowledge by the concerned Government servant of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in Amar Singh's case (supra) contemplates. In a later decision of the Supreme Court in B.J Shelat v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1978 SC 1109, that followed the principles of law laid down in Kehmi Ram's case (supra) with regard to the proper meaning of communication of an order of suspension, also noticed the distinction between she meaning of communication of an order of suspension and that of communication of an order of dismissal. It thus follows that while in the case of an order of suspension, it becomes effective when it goes out the hand of the concerned authority for being communicated to the Government servant, no matter when he actually receives it, in the case of an order of removal or dismissal, it will be effective only when the Government servant has knowledge of it. It has been already said that the Government servant will have such knowledge when he is told about the order as that happened in Amar Singh's case (supra) or, in the absence of any prior knowledge, when he actually receives the order.

11. In this connection, we may refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, AIR 1977 SC 629 also relied on by the learned Counsel of the Corporation. In that case, the respondents were granted officiating promotions to the posts of Sub-Divisional Officers, Class II by the State of Punjab. Thereafter, on October 29, 1966 by the impugned order, the respondents were reverted to their substantive posts. The erstwhile State of Punjab was organized by the Punjab Re-organization Act 1966. On the appointed day, that is, on November 1, 1966, the former State of Punjab ceased to exist and the successors States of Punjab, Haryana, Union Territory of Chandigarh and the Transferred Territory came into being. As the impugned orders of reversions were communicated to the respondents after the appointed day, that is, after November 1, 1966, it was contended by them that they “remained ineffective and still-born by reason of their not having been communicated to the respondents before November 1, 1966.” In the context of the above facts, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the impugned orders of reversion became effective after they were sent out. In that regard, the Supreme Court relied on the observations of Shelat J. in its earlier decision in Khemi Ram's case (supra) and also noticed the decision in Amar Singh's case (supra). Thereafter, it was observed by Untwalia J., speaking for the Court, as follows:

“Applying the principles of law aforesaid we find in this case that the orders went out of the control of the authority which bad passed that order on 20-10-1966 when copies of the orders were forwarded to the Accountant General and the Chief Engineer. In any event, we think that the orders were despatched from the office of the Chief Engineer on 30-10-1966. It is one thing to say that in the case of dismissal or the like the order becomes effective only after it is received by the officer concerned and a different thing to say that an order has no effect at all before it is communicated in the sense of receipt of the order by the concerned officer. In the sense we have said above the orders were communicated to all the respondents before 1-11-1966. They became effective as soon as they were sent out. And for the purpose of S. 83 of the Act, the respondents must be deemed to be holding the posts to which they were reverted on 1-11-1966.”

12. Much reliance has been placed on the above observation by the learned Counsel for the Corporation. We do not however, think that the observation is of any help to the Corporation. It is apparent from the observation that a distinction has been made regarding the points of time when an order of dismissal and an order of reversion or suspension become effective. In the case of an order of revision or suspension, when it goes out of the control of the authority concerned, that is to say, when it is despatched to the Government servant either by post or by messenger, it becomes effective not only on the authority concerned in the sense that the order cannot be changed or modified, but also on the Government servant sought to be bound by it. This principle is not, however, applicable in the case of an order of dismissal in view of the consequences as pointed out in Amar Singh's case (supra). When an order of dismissal or removal from service is sent out, it is effective on the authority concerned, but so far as the Government servant is concerned, it becomes effective only when he is apprised of it either by oral communication or by actual service of it upon him. This, we think, was all that was meant by Untwalia, J. in the above observation in Balbir Singh's case. In view of the principles aforesaid, we hold that in the instant case, the impugned order of removal became effective when the same was received by the appellant through post in Calcutta, he having no prior knowledge of the same by any other means.

13. We have so long discussed as to when the impugned order of removal became effective. We are, however, really concerned with the question as to whether a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court as the order of removal was received by the appellant in Calcutta. It has been urged by Mr. Mukherjee for the appellant that as the order of removal became effective when it was served on the appellant in Calcutta, a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta and, consequently, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. We have also noticed the contention of Mr. Bose for the Corporation that even assuming that the order of removal became effective when it was received by the appellant in Calcutta, still no cause of action arose in Calcutta simply because the order become effective in Calcutta. It is submitted by him that only such facts give rise to a came of action as are required to be pleaded and proved by a plaintiff for his success in the suit and the non-pleading of which will merit dismissal of the suit. It is urged that the receipt of the order by the appellant in Calcutta or its being effective and operative in Calcutta, are not such facts as are required to be pleaded and proved in a suit if instituted by the appellant and, therefore, there is no question of the arising of any cause of action in Calcutta.

14. The Code of Civil Procedure does not contain any definition of the term ‘cause of action’. But cause of action has been defined by some authorities. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the Corporation has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mr. Bansi v. Governor-General of India in Council, 56 CWN 83 F.B In that case, the question was “Whether service of notice under S. 77 of the Indian Railways Act is part of the plaintiff's cause of action.” It was held by the Full Bench that service of the notice of claim under S. 77 of the Railways Act was not a part of the cause of action for a suit against the Railway Administration within S. 18(A) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and, consequently, service of such notice on a place within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Small Cause Court cannot give that court jurisdiction to try the suit. The reason that commended with the Full Bench was that the fact constituting the cause of action must precede the suit, but the giving of such a notice was not a condition precedent to the institution of the suit; the notice might be given during the pendency of the suit, but subject to the condition that it must be given within the prescribed period of six months. The Full Bench case, in our opinion, is of no help to the Corporation. While a notice under S. 77 of the Railways Act may not give rise to a part of the cause of action, an order of removal or dismissal does give rise to a cause of action. Moreover, unless there is the existence of an order of removal or dismissal, the question of instituting a suit does not arise. The learned Counsel for the Corporation has, however, drawn our attention to the definition of cause of action given in some judicial decisions which have been referred to by G.N Das J. in his judgment of the Full Bench. One of such definitions has been given by Brett, J. in Cooke v. Gill (1873) L.R.C.P 107 as follows:

“Cause of action has been held from the earliest time to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse.”

15. Much reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the Corporation on the above definition. We, however fail to understand how an order of removal can be excluded as not a material fact. In this connection, we may refer to another definition of ‘cause of action’ in clause 12 of the Letters Patent as given by Rankin, C.J in Engineering Supplies Ltd. v. Dhandhania & Co., ILR 58 Cal. 539 which was also noticed in the above Full bench case. The definition is as follows:

“….the only definition that will work if it has to be applied to cases of all kinds, is the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim.”

16. Applying the definition of Rankin, C.J it can very well be said that an order of dismissal constitutes an important fact out of a set of facts which gives rise to an enforceable claim to damages for wrongful removal or dismissal or for reinstatement in a suit instituted by the aggrieved employee.

17. It is now well settled that so long as the right of a person is not infringed or sought to be infringed, there is no right of action. In Md. Kahil v. Mahhoob, AIR 1942 All 1221, it has been held that in its restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infringement of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In Walley v. Whalley, (1816) 1 M.R 436, it has been observed that the cause at action arises when the aggrieved party has the right to apply to the proper tribunals. In the instant case the service of the order of removal was the immediate occasion giving rise to a cause of action to the appellant to move against the same before a Court or a tribunal.

18. We may consider the question from the point of view of the Limitation Act, 1963. The residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act (corresponding to Article 120 of the Act of 1908) prescribes a limitation of three years, the starting point of which is “when the right to sue accrues”. The expression ‘right to sue’ is synonymous with ‘cause of action’ and unless cause of action arises, there is no accrual of the right to sue. In Musammat Bolo v. Musamat Koklan, 34 CWN 1169 P.C, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee had to interpret the provision of Article 120 of the Act of 1908. It has been observed that there can be no “right to sue” until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. The same principle has been reiterated by the Privy Council in a later decision in Annamalai Chettiar v. A.M.K.C.T Muthnkaruppan Chettiar, 35 CWN 145 P.C

19. Thus it appears from the principles of law laid down in the above decisions that the infringment of rights gives rise to a cause of action and, consequently, right to sue. It is the case of the appellant in the instant case that his right to remain in service has been infringed by the impugned order of removal. The order of removal, therefore, undoubtedly gave rise to a cause of action for the appellant to institute an action for the establishment of his right to be in service. It has been already held that the impugned order of removal became effective only when it was served on the appellant in Calcutta. So long as the order was not effective there was no question of accrual of a cause of action or the right to sue. But the moment it became effective there was such accrual of cause of action or the right to sue. The impugned order of removal having become effective in Calcutta where it was received by the appellant, a part of the cause of action must be held to have arisen in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court.

20. We may, at this stage, refer to a decision of Anil Kumar Sen, J. in Serajuddin & Co. v. The State of Orissa AIR 1971 Cal 414. In that case, a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the respondents that as the offices of all the respondents had been located beyond the territorial limits of this Court, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In repelling the objection, it was held by the learned Judge that all the effective orders including the impugned order terminating the mining lease of the petitioner had been served on the petitioner at its Calcutta address, a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of this Court and this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. This decision supports the view we have taken.

21. It is not the case of the Corporation that in order to create jurisdiction of this Court, the appellant came to stay at his Calcutta residence so that the order of removal would be served upon him there. On the contrary, it is not disputed that after his suspension, the appellant was permitted to stay at his Calcutta residence and to draw his subsistence allowance from the Calcutta office of the Corporation. Therefore, there was no want of bona fide on the part of the appellant and in the normal course of business the authority concerned sent the impugned order of removal to the Calcutta address of the appellant. It is also not disputed that till the impugned order was not received by the appellant, he was not aware of the same. In the circumstances and for the reasons aforesaid we hold that a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition of the appellant.

22. Another contention of the appellant that has been already noticed is that all the incidents constituting the charges levelled against the appellant having happened in Calcutta, a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court. In our opinion, there is some substance in the contention. When the facts on the basis of which charges were framed against the appellant and the appellant was removed from service, it is difficult to hold that such facts did not constitute a part of the cause of action. These facts having originated in Calcutta when the appellant was staying in Calcutta when the appellant was staying in Calcutta on the eve of his transfer to Kobra Division, a part of the cause of action also arose in Calcutta. The learned Judge did not consider this aspect of the case, presumably because his attention was not drawn to the charges most of which were based on facts originating in Calcutta.

23. The above finding that a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition is sufficient to dispose of this appeal, for, as stated already, the learned Judge discharged the Rule Nisi on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction. But Mr. Bose for the Corporation has raised two other objections to the maintainability of the writ petition. The first objection is that as that as the appellant has crossed the age of superannuation during the pendency of this appeal, his claim to reinstatement in service is no longer maintainable. He submits that even if the order of removal is ultimately set aside, the appellant can, at the most, claim his arrears of salary up to the date of his superannuation, but this Court should not in a proceeding under Article 226 allow any claim for money. It is, accordingly, submitted by the learned Counsel that the appeal should be dismissed as the writ petition has become infructuous. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in The Managing Director, U.P Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan, AIR 1980 SC 840. In that case Sarkaria, J. observed as follows:

“Thus, in matters of employment, while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, over the orders and quasi-judicial proceeding of the administrative authority not being a proceeding under the industrial/labour tribunal-culminating in the dismissal of the employee, the High Court should ordinarily, in the event of the dismissal being found illegal, simply quash the same and should not further give a positive direction for payment to the employee full back wages (although as a consequence of annulment of the dismissal, the position as it obtained immediately before the dismissal is restored), such peculiar power can properly be exercised in a case where the impugned adjudication or award has been given by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court………………………………………………………………………………………………Furthermore, whether a workman or employee of a statutory authority should be reinstated in public employment with or without full back wages, is a question of fact depending on evidence to be produced before the tribunal. If after the termination of his employment the workman/employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, that is one of the important factors to be considered in determining whether or not the reinstatement should be with full back wages …………….”

24. We fail to understand how the above observation affects the maintainability of the writ petition of the appellant as contended on behalf of the Corporation. It has been laid down in the above observation that the High Court should ordinarily, in the event of the dismissal being found illegal, simply quash the same and should not further give a positive direction for payment to the employee full back wages. It follows, therefore, that in the instant case, the writ petition is maintainable for the purpose of getting the order of removal quashed in the event it is found to be illegal. So for as payment of full back wages is concerned, it is not the decision of the Supreme Court that the High Court shall in no case direct reinstatement of the employee in public employment with full back wages, but the decision is that the High Court should ordinarily simply quash the order of dismissal. The word ‘ordinarily’ in the observation is significant. Whether the High Court should also direct payment of full back wages will depend on the facts of each particular case. In the case before the Supreme Court, the employee concerned was a workman. He did not raise any industrial dispute, nor invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, but directly moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of dismissal. That seems to be one of the reasons for the said observation. The other reason is that after termination of his employment, the workman or the employee might be gainfully employed elsewhere, and so it would not be proper for the High Court to direct payment of full wages. In our opinion, the above observation of the Supreme Court applies more to the cases of dismissal of workmen who can raise industrial disputes and approach the Industrial Tribunals for reliefs than to employees or Government servants who are not workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Be that as it may, as we are concerned with the maintainability of the writ petition, we do not think we are called upon to consider whether in the event of the impugned order of removal being quashed, this Court should also direct payment to the appellant of the arrears of salary up to the date of his superannuation. The first objection of the Corporation against the maintainability of the writ petition is, therefore, overruled.

25. The next objection to the maintainability of the writ petition is founded on the ground that no writ lies against the Corporation which is a Government Company. This will not detain us long, for in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Som Prakash v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212, a Government company is an ‘authority’ within the meaning of the expression “other authorities under the control of the Government of India” as provided in Article 12 of the Constitution and is, therefore, ‘Stats’ and is subject to the same constitutional limitations as the Government. Further, it has been laid down in Som Prakash's case (supra) that a Government company being a State under Part III and not under Part XIV of the Constitution, the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution is not available to an employee of a Government company.

26. In the instant case, the Corporation being a Government company under the control of the Government of India is a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and is, therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court subject to this that the appellant will not be entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. No other point has been urged by either party.

27. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned Judge is set aside and the case is sent back to the appropriate Bench which shall now dispose of the Rule Nisi on merit.

28. The appeal is allowed, but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.

29. A.K Sarkar, J.:— I agree.

Appeal allowed.