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Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. And Others v. Prabirendu Sen And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was, in April 1979, holding the post of Joint Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. (CIWTC). From 25 September 1978 he was deputed to look after the current duties of Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer in addition to his own duties, and he had also been looking after duties of project manager with effect from 13 September 1978. While posted at Raja Dock Yard the petitioner received a note on 26 February 1976 from the General Manager, Raja Bagan Dock Yard, in relation to certain cleaning, bunkering and loading/unloading jobs and an earlier contract (Contract No. E. 1.Gm/T-M/105 dated 7 January 1974 with Azmat Ali); the petitioner was directed to arrange a fresh tender for that work.
The petitioner was chargesheeted by letter dated 21 April 1979 (annexure C to the petition). He replied to the charge-sheet and requested certain documents relied upon by the disciplinary authority. An enquiry was conducted, the petitioner was held guilty of the charges and was dismissed from service by letter dated 25 October 1979. An appeal against dismissal was dismissed. The petitioner obtained writ relief from the High Court (a rule which was made absolute by the Single Judge). The CIWTC (the appellant) appealed that decision to the Division Bench whose judgment is summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. is an "authority" or "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 lies in a matter between master and servant when the employer is an entity that may constitute "State" under Article 12.
- Whether the principles of natural justice were observed in the disciplinary proceedings leading to the petitioner's dismissal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (CIWTC — Sri S.C. Bose)
- A writ in the matter between master and servant does not lie—such disputes are contractual/employment matters where damages are the proper remedy.
- The appellant is not "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution; therefore Article 226 is not the appropriate remedy for this employment dispute.
- There was no violation of the principles of natural justice in the disciplinary proceedings.
- Relied on authorities (including Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, Sirsi Municipality and Sukhdev Singh) to support the view that in ordinary master-servant contractual relations relief by way of writ may not be proper and that statutory context matters.
Respondent's Arguments (Petitioner — Sri Saktinath Mukherjee)
- The appellant is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12, and in light of relevant Supreme Court authorities an entity which is an instrumentality or agency of the Government falls within Article 12.
- Where there is no statutory regulation, at least the principles of natural justice apply; if there has been a violation of natural justice, the petitioner is entitled to relief under Article 226.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State Trading Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer [A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1811] | Held that a company registered under the Companies Act is not a "citizen" for Article 19 purposes; illustrates limits of treating companies as State for fundamental rights. | Used to show that mere corporate form under Companies Act does not by itself render a company equivalent to the State; relevant to test whether CIWTC is an instrumentality of Government. |
| Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1306] | Company incorporated under Companies Act, though majority-owned by governments, remained a separate legal entity and was not a statutory company or one with public duties imposed by statute. | Referred to for the proposition that being registered under Companies Act and government shareholding alone do not make a company a Government instrumentality. |
| Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis (Smt.) [1973 — I L.L.N 226] | Distinguishes between types of master-servant dismissals; municipalities (statutory bodies) must comply with statutory rules and natural justice; dismissal violating statutory rules may be ultra vires. | Cited by parties; Court noted it as authority where dismissal by a statutory body was held ultra vires for breach of rules and natural justice. |
| Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366] | Statutory bodies (e.g., Oil and Natural Gas Commission) are owned by Government and when rights are affected by decisions under statutory powers, courts presume a duty to observe natural justice. | Applied to reinforce that statutory or governmental organizations are bound by duty to observe natural justice when taking decisions affecting rights. |
| Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee [1980 — I L.L.N 297] | Corporation constituted under statute and wholly government-managed is an "authority" within Article 12; even if regulations are not framed, natural justice applies to public employment. | Relied upon to support the proposition that public/statutory employment requires due enquiry and compliance with natural justice, even in absence of detailed regulations. |
| Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India [1981 — I L.L.N (as cited in text)] | Where a corporate body is an instrumentality or agency of Government it is an "authority" within Article 12; Part III applies to such quasi‑governmental bodies. | Quoted for the principle that the constitutional scheme requires that instrumentalities/ agencies of the Government, if they meet the test, fall within Article 12. |
| Airport Authority case [1981 — I L.L.N 270] | Provides guidance that when a statutory corporation/body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government it is an "authority" and thus within Article 12; helps to articulate the instrumentality/agency test. | Referred to as part of the line of authorities shaping the test for when a corporation qualifies as "State" under Article 12. |
| Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal [(1967) 3 S.C.R. 377] | Referenced in discussions of State instrumentalities (as part of the jurisprudential navigation). | Cited among a group of authorities considered relevant to the instrumentality/agency analysis. |
| Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar [(1969) 1 SCC 765 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 82] | Cited in the context of precedents addressing whether certain bodies are State/authorities. | Used as part of the body of cases the court considered in assessing the instrumentality test. |
| Dr S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd. [(1970) 1 SCC 177 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1150] | One of the authorities dealing with status of public corporations and principles about State action. | Included in the court's survey of precedent on whether corporate entities are instrumentalities/ agencies of Government. |
| Sabhajit Tewari v. Union of India [1975 — I L.L.N 362] | Included among precedents on government instrumentalities and their constitutional character. | Considered in the court's review of relevant case law on Article 12. |
| Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1981 — II L.L.N 613] | Articulated that the test for an entity being an instrumentality/agency of the Government is factual and not dependent on whether it was created by statute; if so, it is an "authority" under Article 12. | Relied upon heavily: court adopted the instrumentality/agency test from Ajay Hasia to assess whether CIWTC is "State" under Article 12. |
| Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union, Sindri v. Union of India [1981 - I L.L.N 288] | Discusses distinction between enforcement of fundamental rights and the interest sufficient to claim relief under Article 226; noted in argument about scope of writ jurisdiction. | Cited by the appellant to argue limits of Article 226 in master-servant disputes; court considered but proceeded on instrumentality and natural justice grounds. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two principal phases: (A) whether CIWTC is an "authority" or "State" under Article 12; and (B) whether the disciplinary proceedings complied with the rules of natural justice.
(A) Analysis on Article 12 status
- The court surveyed leading precedents on the test for when a corporation or body amounts to an "instrumentality or agency" of Government, emphasizing that the test is factual and focuses on why the entity was brought into existence and the degree of governmental control (drawing on Ajay Hasia and related authorities).
- The court examined the CIWTC's constitutional and organizational arrangements: all shares are held in the name of the President of India and government officers are the company's officers and members of the board. Several corporate powers and important matters are reserved for the President's consideration or prior approval (borrowing beyond a limit, investments beyond threshold, issue of debentures, acquisition/ disposal of vessels above a threshold, voluntary winding up, important establishment matters, etc.).
- Statutory-seeming controls were noted: rules reserving appointment approvals, prior approval requirements and specific provisions (S.14(a), S.27(a) as described) showing entrenchment of governmental control and the power of the President to determine number of directors and to appoint representatives to meetings.
- On this factual matrix the court concluded that the President and Government officers effectively control the company's functions and finances. As a consequence, the CIWTC is an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and hence an "authority" and "State" within Article 12.
(B) Analysis on natural justice in disciplinary proceedings
- Having found CIWTC to be "State" under Article 12, the court proceeded on the basis that in disputes between such an authority and its officers the rules of natural justice must be followed.
- The court examined the disciplinary process facts and identified multiple procedural defects amounting to violation of natural justice:
- The Single Judge had found (and the Division Bench noted) that the appellate authority and the disciplinary authority were the same person, creating an appearance of prejudgment and lack of independent appellate review.
- Documents relied upon by the enquiry officers were not supplied to the petitioner: notably, the preliminary report on which the charge was framed and the deposition of Sri Bhowmick were not given to the petitioner, depriving him of effective opportunity to cross-examine and meet the evidence.
- The chargesheet was vague: it referred to "various irregularities" without enumerating specific allegations in the accompanying statement of allegations.
- Important witnesses who appeared on the list (e.g., Sri S.P. Roy, proprietor of M.M. Mondal and Company) were not called, though their names appeared on the list — undermining fairness of the enquiry.
- The enquiry officer found "not guilty" on certain factual contentions (for example, on the contention that two contractors cannot work on the same boiler simultaneously), yet the petitioner was nonetheless held guilty for failing to escalate the matter; the court found that reasoning infirm, including the attempt to fasten a quantified financial loss (Rs. 61,028.47) on the petitioner without adequate evidentiary support.
- On these grounds the court concluded that principles of natural justice were not observed and that the dismissal could not be sustained.
- The court expressly stated that it did not decide whether Article 309 of the Constitution applied to the case.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED. The Division Bench affirmed the view that the CIWTC is an instrumentality/agency of the Central Government and therefore an "authority" and "State" within Article 12. The court held that the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner violated principles of natural justice and the dismissal could not be sustained.
Direct consequences and orders:
- The appeal by the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. was dismissed.
- The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
- The operation of the order was stayed for a period of four weeks from the date of the judgment.
Broader implications: The court applied existing Supreme Court authorities (notably Ajay Hasia and related cases) to reaffirm that whether a corporate entity is "State" under Article 12 depends on factual assessment of governmental control; however, the opinion does not purport to lay down a new, distinct precedent beyond applying that established instrumentality/agency test to the CIWTC facts. The court also expressly refrained from deciding the applicability of Article 309 in this matter.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Banerjee, J.:— The petitioner in April 1979, was holding the post of Joint Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd., a Government of India undertaking. From 25 September, 1978, the petitioner was deputed to look after the current duties of Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer in addition to his own duties as Joint Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer and he was also looking after the jobs of project manager with effect from 13 September, 1978. While the petitioner was posted at Raja Dock Yard, the petitioner on 26 February, 1976, received a note from the General Manager, Raja Bagan Dock Yard, in connexion with cleaning of different types of boilers, bunkers, oil tanks, loading and unloading of coal and oil to and from vessels at Raja Bagan Dock Yard and T.T Saed and Contract No. E. 1.Gm/T-M/105, dated 7 January, 1974, thereof with Azmat Ali. By the said note the petitioner was directed to arrange for the fresh tender in respect of the said job. Be that as it may, it is stated that the petitioner-respondent was chargesaeeted by letter, dated 21 April, 1979. The charge-sheet is to be found in annexure C to the petition at pages 67 to 72. From the charge-sheet it appears that the petitioner was chargesheeted on many grounds. The petitioner replied to the chargesheet and asked for some papers which were relied upon by the disciplinary authority. There-after an enquiry was held. The petitioner was found guilty of the charges and by letter, dated 25 October, 1979, tae petitioner was dismissed from the service. An appeal was taken and the appeal was dismissed. Hence tae petitioner moved this Court and obtained the present rule which was made absolute by the Hon'ble single Judge. Hence the appeal by the Central Water Transport Corporation, Ltd.
2. Sri S.C Bose, on behalf of the appellant, contended that the writ in the matter between the master and servant does not lie and secondly, the appellant is not State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and there is no violation of the principle of natural justice in the proceeding. It is further argued by Sri Base that in a matter between the master and servant the only remedy of the petitioner is by way of damages and not by way of application.
3. On behalf of the respondent, Sri Saktinath Mukherjee argued that the appellant is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. In view of the different judgments, if it is State and as there is no statutory regulation, at least the principle of natural justice applies and if there is violation of principle of natural justice, the petitioner is entitled to the relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. The question for our consideration in this case is whether the appellant is the State or any other Authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. In the case in State Trading Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer [A.I.R 1963 S.C 1811], it has been held by the majority that the State Trading Corporation, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, is not a citizen within meaning of Art. 19 of tae Constitution and cannot ask for the enforcement of fundamental rights granted to citizens under the said article in a case in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R 1969 S.C 1306], it has been held by the Supreme Court that the tools corporation is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. At the material time the Union Government of Andhra Pradesh between them held 56 per cent and 32 per cent of its shares respectively and the balance of 12 per cent shares were held by private individual Being the largest shareholder, the Union Government had the power to nominate the company's directors. Even so, being registered under the Companies Act and governed by the provisions of that Act, the company is a separate legal entity and cannot be said to be either a Government corporation or an industry run by or under the authority of the Union Government. In the said case respondent 1 and forty other workmen filed a writ petition under Art. 226 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the validity of the agreement impleading therein the company the said union and the Regional Assistant Commissioner as respondent. The petitioner prayed for a writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus or any other order or direction restraining the respondents to implement or enforce the said agreement. In Para. 9, the Supreme Court, held that once the writ petition was held to be misconceived on the ground that it could not lie against a company, which was neither a statutory company nor one having public duties or responsibilities imposed on it by a statute, no relief by way of a declaration as to invalidity of an impugned agreement between it and its employees could be granted. The appeal by the Praga Tools Corporation was allowed and the writ application was dismissed.
5. The case reported in Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis (Smt.) [1973 — I L.L.N 226], is a case where an employee was dismissed by the municipality without giving any reasonable opportunity of defending herself against the charge. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in Paras. 15 to 17, at pages 230 and 231, as follows:
“15. The cases of dismissal of a servant fall under three broad heads. The first head relates to relationship of master and servant governed purely by contract of employment. Any breach of contract in such a case is enforced by a suit for wrongful dismissal and damages. Just as a contract of employment is not capable of specific performance, similarly breach of contract of employment is not capable of finding a declaratory judgment of subsistence of employment. A declaration of unlawful termination and restoration to service in such a case of contract of employment would be indirectly an instance of specific performance of contract for personal services. Such a declaration is not permissible under the law of Specific Relief Act.
16. The second type of cases of master and servant arises under industrial law. Under that branch of law a servant who is wrongfully dismissed may be reinstated. This is a special provision under industrial law. This relief is a departure from the reliefs available under the Indian Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act which do not provide for reinstatement of a servant.
17. The third category to cases of master and servant arises in regard to the servant in the employment of the State or other public or local authorities or bodies created under statute.”
In Para. 18, it has been held that the termination or dismissal of what is described as a pure contract of master and servant is not declared to be a nullity, however, wrongful or illegal it may be. The reason is that dismissal in breach of contract is remedied by damages. In the case of servant of the State or of local authority or statutory bodies, Courts have declared in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statutes. Apart from the intervention of statute there would not be a declaration of nullity in the case of termination or dismissal of a servant of the State or of other local authorities or statutory bodies. It has been held finally that the municipality is a statutory body. The dismissal was violation of statutory rules and, therefore, it has been held that the dismissal was ultra vires.
6. In the case reported in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366], was a case in which Sukhdev Singh and other employees of Oil and Natural Gas Commission challenged the order made by the Commission. Their Lordships considered the matter and held, intet alia, that the Oil and Natural Gas Commission is owned by the Government. It is a statutory body and not a company. The Commission has the exclusive privilege of extracting petroleum. The management is by the Government and it can be dissolved only by the Government. In Para. 33 their Lordships held that whenever a man's rights are affected by decision taken under statutory powers, the Court would presume the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute.
7. In a case reported in Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee [1980 — I L.L.N 297], it was held by the Supreme Court that the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation is constituted under the Madhya Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation Act which was subsequently replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Act 58 of 1962. It is a statutory body wholly controlled and managed by the Government. The corporation is, therefore, “authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. It was further held that, even if, at the time of the dismissal of respondent-employee of Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation, the statutory regulations had not been framed or had not come into force, then also, the employment of the respondent was public employment and the statutory body, the employer could not terminate the service of its employee without due enquiry in accordance with the statutory regulations if any, in force, or in the absence of such regulations, in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Such an enquiry into the conduct of a public employee is of a quasi-judicial character. That is to observe the rules of natural justice in the circumstances of the case, required that the respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny this guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the appellant-corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in the defence of the charge as also a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment.
8. The case reported in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India [1981 — I L.L.N 3???2], was case of an employee for pensionary benefit of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Their Lordships in Paras. 40 and 41 at page 36 of the said judgment held as follows:
“40. The conclusion is impeccable that if the corporate body is but an ‘instrumentality or agency’ of Government, then Part III will trammel its operations. It is a case of quasi-governmental beings not of non-State entities. We have no hesitation to hold that where the chemistry of the corporate body answers the test of ‘State’ above outlined it comes within the definition in Art. 12. In our constitutional scheme where the commanding heights belong to the public sector of the national economy, to grant absolution to Government companies and their ilk from Part III may be perilous. The Court cannot connive at a process which eventually makes fundamental rights as rare as ‘roses in December, ice in June,’ as Lord Byron lamented in English Berds and Scottish Reviewers. Article 12 uses the expression ‘other authorities’ and its connotation has to be clarified. On this facet also Airport Authority case [1981 — I L.L.N 270], supplies a solution in Para. 28, at page 271:
‘… If a statutory corporation, body or other authority is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it would be an ‘authority’ and, therefore, ‘State’ within the meaning of that expression in Art. 12’.”
41. The decisions are not uniform as to whether being an instrumentality or agency of Government ipso jure renders the company or other similar body ‘State.’ This again involves a navigation through precedents and Bhagwati, J., in Airport Authority case [1981 — I L.L.N 270] (vide supra), has spoken for the Court after referring to Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal [(1967) 3 S.C.R 377], Sukhdev v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366], Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Manual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R 1969 S.C 1306], Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar [(1969) 1 SCC 765 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 82], Dr S.L Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd.† , Ltd. [(1970) 1 SCC 177 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1150] and Sabhajit Tewari v. Union India [1975 — I L.L.N 362]:
“We may point out here that when we speak of a corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government, we do not mean to suggest that the corporations should be an agent of the Government in the sense that whatever it does should be binding on the Government. It is not the relationship of principal and agent which is relevant and material but whether the corporation is an instrumentality of the Government in the sense that a part of the governing power of the State is located in the corporation and though the corporation is acting on its own behalf and not on behalf of the Government, its action is really in the nature of State action.”
9. In the case reported in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1981 — II L.L.N 613], the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be held to be an “authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 and hence, subject to the same basic obligation to obey the fundamental rights as the Government. It has been further held that it is immaterial for determining whether a corporation is an authority whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is, whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be, not as to how the juristic person is born, but why it has been brought into existence. The corporation may be a statutory corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an “authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute, but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression “authority” in Art. 12. A juristic entity which may be “State” for the purpose of Parts III and IV would not be so for the purpose of Part XIV or any other provision of the Constitution. In that case the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar, is one of the fifteen engineering colleges in the country sponsored by the Government of India, The college was established and its administration and management are carried on by a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898. Having regard to the memorandum of association and the rules of the society, it was held that the society is an instrumentality or the agency of the Stat; and the Central Government and it is an “authority” within the meaning of Art. 12.
10. On consideration of the case hereinbefore stated, it can be said for the present moment that, it is not required that the authority to be “State” should be created by a statute or under a statute. Juristic personality coming into existence by registration of the Companies Act and Societies Registration Act, Government company or any other organization so registered can be agency or instrumentality of the Government if the relevant fact on being considered it is found that they are agency or instrumentality of the Government.
11. In the present case, we are concerned whether Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd., is an agency or instrumentality of the Government. It appears that all the shares of the company are held by the President of India, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Transport and Aviation, New Delhi, Managing Director, Rivers Steam Navigation Company, Ltd., Joint Director, Ministry of Transport and Aviation and Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Transport and Aviation. It is found that the powers of the directors are reserved for the consideration of the President in respect of any proposal to borrow at a time exceeding Rs. 15 lakhs, nay proposal to borrow at a rate of interest exceeding the Reserve Bank rate by more than 1 per cent per annum, if the managing director considers that such a rate of interest is unduly high. Any proposal for investment in a particular type of security or shares, if such investment exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs. Issue of debentures. Acquisition, construction or sale of vessels involving an amount exceeding Rs. 10 lakhs. Voluntary winding up of the company. Any important matter relating to the company's establishment. Any other matter which in his opinion involves an important issue of general policy. No action shall be taken by the company in respect of any matter reserved for the consideration of the President as aforesaid until his approval to the same has been obtained. In a matter of appointment of persons who have already attained the age of fifty-eight years whether they are from public or private sector to posts carrying the pay scale of Rs. 2,500-3,000 and above the prior approval of the President of India should be required. Appointment of any foreign national except foreign technical personnel to any post in the company and disposal of any property having an original book value of Rs. 10 lakhs, etc., the prior approval of the President of India should also be obtained. It has been further provided under S. 14(a) that subject to the provisions of S. 252 of the Companies Act, 1956, the President shall, from time to time, determine in writing the number of directors of the company which, however, shall not be less than two and more than twelve. Likewise under S. 27(a) the President, so long as he is a shareholder of the company, may from time to time, appoint one or more persons (who need not be a member or members of the company) to represent him at all or any meetings of the company.
12. From all these provisions, it is quite clear, that the company actually is being carried on by the President and the officers of the Government are the authority and the members of the board of directors. The President of India has control over the function and financial dealings by the company and, therefore, in our opinion, the company is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government and, therefore, is an authority and, therefore, “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution.
13. Sri Bose, appearing for the appellant, however, contended that no writ lies against such company and no writ can go as against Corporation. In a case between the company and the employee, application under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not the proper remedy. Sri Bose relied upon the case reported in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union, Sindri v. Union of India [1981 - I L.L.N 288], in particular Para. 38, where the Supreme Court held at page 299:
“Lest there should be misapprehension, we wish to keep the distinction clear between the fundamental right to enforce fundamental rights and the interest sufficient to claim relief under Art. 226 and even under other jurisdictions. The learned Attorney-General almost agreed, under pressure of compelling trends in the contemporary law of procedure, that Art. 226 may probably enable the petitioner to seek relief if the facts suggested by the Court hypothetically existed. Sri A. K Sen also took up a similar position. I will put aside Art. 32 for a moment and scan the right under Art. 226. There is nothing in the provision (unlike under Art. 32) to define ‘person aggrieved’, ‘standing’ or ‘interest’ that gives access to the Court to seek redress.”
14. Sri Bose also relied upon the case reported in Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Teills (Smt.) [1973-I L.L.N 226] (vide supra). It has been held by the Supreme Court that the dismissal by the municipality is in violation of rule 143 and the dismissal order is ultra vires.
15. In a case reported in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366] (vide supra), the Supreme Court held at Para. 33 that an ordinary individual in a case of master and servant contractual relationship can enforce breach of contractual terms. The remedy in such contractual relationship of master and servant is damages, because personal service is not capable of enforcement. In cases of statutory bodies, there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies.
16. In the case of statutory bodies, it bas been said that the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observance of rules and regulations. Failure to observe statutory regulation by statutory bodies is enforced by Courts by declaring dismissal in violation of rules and regulations to be void. This Court has repeatedly observed that whenever a man's rights are affected by decision taken under statutory powers, the Court would presume the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute.
17. It is argued by Sri Bose, therefore, that even though the appellant is the State within the meaning of Art. 12, Art. 309 is not applicable and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner should have been discharged. In our opinion, however, though the appellant is an authority and, therefore, a State within the meaning of Art. 12, still in a matter of master and servant, the rule of natural justice must be followed.
18. In our opinion, in the present case, the rules of natural justice have not been followed, firstly, on the ground that the Hon'ble single Judge held that the appellate authority itself and the disciplinary authority were the same. The disciplinary authority was one who sat to hear out the appeal of the respondent.
19. It appears that there are number of documents which were relied upon by the enquiry officers. But were not supplied to the respondent, namely, the preliminary report on which the charge was framed, was not given to him. The deposition of Sri Bhowmick was also not given to him so that when Sri Bhowmick came to depose, the delinquent could not effectively cross-examine him on his previous statement. It will further appear that the chargesheet is vague because in the chargesheet there are mention of “various irregularities” which have not been enumerated in the statement of allegation accompanying the charge but even then the petitioner was found guilty of the charge levelled against him. The enquiry officer held “not guilty” to the allegation, namely, the allegation that
“it is not possible for two contractors to work on the same boiler at the same time for works relating to the fire side and another on the water side.”
It is also held that there is no scope for division of work but still the petitioner was found guilty of the charges because he has not put up the matter to the Gm/Fa/CMD. It is curious to know how the financial loss of Rs. 61,028.47 can be fastened on the petitioner-respondent because he has given note to give contract to one contractor not to two such contractors as it is not possible to carry out the work in one boiler by two contractors at the same time. Moreover, M.M Mondal and Company's proprietor Sri S.P Roy were not called as witnesses though in the list of witnesses Sri Roy's name appeared. It appears to us that this is the case of violation of the principles of natural justice which must go to the benefit of the respondent and his order of dismissal cannot be sustained.
20. We have made it clear that we have not decided whether Art. 309 of the Constitution of India is applicable. In a case where the respondent is an authority, therefore, “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, we are of the opinion, that in a matter of dispute between the company and its officers it must follow the rules of natural justice and must act fairly and justly. It appears to us that the regulation has been framed being Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. Conduct Rules, 1970, in rule 1. In S. 33 onwards provisions have beer? made for the procedure to be followed in the matter of punishment of its officers. It appears to us that though this may not be statutory it is provided for the officers concerned to give evidence in reply to the show-cause notice and in reply to the chargesheet and the rule embodies all the principles of natural justice.
21. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that for the grounds stated hereinbefore the appeal must stand dismissed without any order as to costs.
22. The operation of the order will remain stayed for a period of four weeks from today.
23. Maitra, J.:— I agree.
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