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M/S. Tide Water Oil Company (India) Ltd. v. K.D Banerjee .
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted a suit for ejectment and recovery of damages alleging ownership of the property and that the defendant, Messrs Tide Water Oil Company, occupied the front portion of the ground floor (including lawn, garden and garage) as tenant at Rs. 650 per month. The plaintiff claims that an officer of the defendant, Mr. K.L. Gupta, had persuaded him to let out the front portion with an assurance that it would be vacated when the officer was transferred or retired. The plaintiff retired and, together with his wife, suffers from ailments making access upstairs difficult; the courtyard was alleged to be used by the defendant's employees for washing and storing garbage, making access filthy and slippery. The plaintiff obtained municipal sanction for a plan to rebuild the house and contended eviction was necessary to carry out construction.
The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations, disputed the assurance, maintained the accommodation was sufficient and challenged the validity and service of the notice to quit. The trial court accepted the defendant's version and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed. The appellate court found no undertaking under S.13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and rejected the plaintiff's claim of reasonable requirement and illness, but remanded the suit for consideration of the plaintiff's claim under S.13(1)(f) (building and rebuilding) to decide whether construction could proceed without eviction or whether total/partial eviction was required. The defendant filed the present first miscellaneous appeal. The plaintiff-respondent filed a belated cross-objection seeking condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff can succeed under Section 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (i.e., whether there was a written undertaking by the tenant after creation of the tenancy to deliver vacant possession and the tenant's failure to do so).
- Whether the plaintiff's claim of reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation (Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act) is established on the record.
- Whether the notice to quit was validly served (in particular, whether receipt by Messrs Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. rebuts the presumption of proper service, especially in view of amendments to the Companies Act).
- Whether the plaintiff's case under Section 13(1)(f) (demolition/reconstruction for better economic use) is proved and, if proved, whether the proposed construction can be carried out without evicting the defendant (and consequently the application of Section 18-A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments
- Denies any written assurance by Mr. K.L. Gupta; contends the plaintiff's story is false.
- Contends the plaintiff's reasonable requirement claim is false and not bona fide; minor alterations could suffice and full eviction is unnecessary even if plaintiff intends to spend a large sum on reconstruction.
- Challenges validity of the notice to quit: although it was received by Andrewyule & Co. Ltd., that firm ceased to be the defendant's Treasurer/Secretary after amendments (S.324A Companies Act) and therefore had no authority to receive notices on behalf of the defendant after the statutory change; reliance also placed on S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Relied on authorities (including AIR 1963 SC 499 and AIR 1979 SC 1559) to argue that a landlord must act with bona fides in claiming eviction for reconstruction.
Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments
- Alleged that Mr. K.L. Gupta had persuaded him to let out the front portion with an assurance it would be vacated on transfer or retirement; the tenancy was determined by notice to quit and eviction is necessary to carry out sanctioned rebuilding plans; the accommodation is unsuitable for his medical condition.
- Filed a belated cross-objection and sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (though counsel later stated he would not press the belated cross-objection, he reserved the right to urge points because the appeal was allowed).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1963 SC 499 | Cited by appellant to show that the landlord must have bona fides/ honest intention when seeking eviction for reconstruction. | The court noted the citation but found the facts did not establish bona fide requirement; did not grant relief under S.13(1)(k) or S.13(1)(ff) to the plaintiff on that basis. |
| AIR 1979 SC 1559 | Also cited by appellant in support of the proposition that the landlord must act in good faith. | Referenced by the court in considering the bona fides argument; the court ultimately found the plaintiff's reconstruction requirement not established on the facts (on other grounds), and remitted Section 13(1)(f) issues for reconsideration. |
| Radharani v. Angurbala ((1961) 65 Cal WN 1119) | Addresses service by registered post: in absence of strong contrary evidence, acknowledgment signed on behalf of addressee is good service. | Cited to support the presumption that service by registered post acknowledged on behalf of the addressee is valid; assisted the court in holding the notice to quit valid despite receipt by Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. |
| Harihar v. Ramshashi ((1919) 23 Cal WN 77 : AIR 1918 PC 102) | Privy Council authority on service by post and presumption of delivery when acknowledgment signed on behalf of addressee. | Used as foundational precedent to uphold presumption of proper service by registered post when acknowledgment is returned. |
| Seuli v. Maydha ((1970) 74 Cal WN 647) | Confirms that registered post with acknowledgment is presumed to have reached the addressee even if the signature is given by someone who has not been proved to have authority. | Applied to hold that the notice to quit was properly addressed, posted and received and that signature on acknowledgment by Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. did not by itself invalidate service. |
| V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (AIR 1979 SC 1745) and AIR 1964 Cal 1 (Special Bench) | Addressed earlier rule about S.106 Transfer of Property Act; held that notice to quit under S.106 is not required and attention should be on Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. | Supported the court's focus on Section 27 General Clauses Act for service by post rather than S.106 T.P. Act; assisted in validating service by registered post. |
| Har Charan v. Shivrani ((1981) 2 SCC 535 : AIR 1981 SC 1284) | Explains Section 27 of the General Clauses Act: properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post raises a presumption of due service irrespective of acknowledgment. | Cited to underline statutory presumption of service under Section 27 General Clauses Act; reinforced court's conclusion that presumption of proper service was not rebutted. |
| T. Pillai v. Manicka Vasaka ... ((1917) 21 Cal WN 761 : AIR 1917 PC 6) | Holds that a party cannot withhold written evidence in his possession which throws light on contested facts; if withheld, court may infer it would have supported the opponent. | Applied to draw an adverse inference against the defendant-company for not producing its Register of letters received and issued, supporting the presumption that notice had been received. |
| Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif & Others (AIR 1968 SC 1413) | Establishes that if a party withholds best evidence in his possession, the court may draw adverse inference against that party even if onus technically lies elsewhere. | Used to justify adverse inference against defendant for non-production of their letters register, contributing to the court's finding that the notice to quit was received by the defendant-company. |
| AIR 1975 SC 1750 | Affirms landlord's right to demolish and rebuild property to improve business or returns, subject to bona fides and circumstances. | The court recognized the principle but found factual differences and remitted the issue under Section 13(1)(f) to the appellate court for fresh consideration whether reconstruction requires eviction. |
| Panna Lal v. State of Bombay (AIR 1963 SC 1516), AIR 1962 SC 779, Virdha Chalam Pillai v. Chaldean Bank (AIR 1964 SC 1425) | These authorities were cited in relation to procedural points (for example, that respondent can challenge an adverse finding without filing an appeal or cross-objection under Order 41 R.22(1) Civil P.C.). | Cited to support the proposition that the respondent may challenge adverse findings without a separate appeal or cross-objection; court relied on this to consider issues raised despite the belated cross-objection not being pressed. |
| Various older Calcutta/Bombay decisions and AIR 1919 Cal 972, AIR 1937 Bom 81 | Referenced in context of admissions by lawyers and that an admission on a wrong point of law or misapprehension does not bind the client. | Referred to support the principle that a lawyer's incorrect admission should not bind the client; the court considered letters (Ext. 6 series) and found no written undertaking to vacate. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded issue by issue, applying documentary evidence and legal principles expressly referenced in the opinion:
- S.13(1)(k): The court examined the documentary series marked Ext. 6 (letters between parties and the letting letter Ext.6(d)). The letting letter contemplated a two-year lease and thereafter on one month's notice and did not contain an undertaking to vacate by 30th June 1974. Other correspondence (including a letter of 13 Feb 1974 and the last letter dated 23 May 1974) showed only that the defendant was examining feasibility and awaited Mr. Gupta's return; there was no clear written undertaking to vacate by a definite date. On that basis the court held that the plaintiff could not rely on S.13(1)(k).
- S.13(1)(ff) - reasonable requirement: There were concurrent findings of fact by lower courts against the plaintiff concerning his medical condition and need. The plaintiff's medical proof was weak (doctor was a pathologist, not a cardiologist) and the courts below had rightly declined to rely on the plaintiff's evidence; therefore the plaintiff's claim under S.13(1)(ff) was not established.
- Validity of notice to quit and service: The court analysed the receipt of the notice by Messrs Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. in the context of statutory and case law on service by post. It relied on authorities holding that acknowledgment returned signed on behalf of an addressee ordinarily suffices and that Section 27 of the General Clauses Act raises a presumption of due service when a document is properly addressed, prepaid and posted by registered post. The defendant had not pleaded non-receipt and had not produced its Register of letters received/issued (which the defendant admitted maintaining). Applying the T. Pillai and Ketkar principles, the court drew an adverse inference from the defendant's non-production of that register and held the presumption of proper service unrebutted. Consequently, Ext. 3 (notice to quit) was held valid.
- S.13(1)(f) - demolition/reconstruction: The appellate court's remand to consider whether the proposed construction could be carried out without evicting the defendant was endorsed by the court. While recognizing Supreme Court authority that a landlord may demolish and rebuild for better return, the court found the facts of the present case different and remitted the issue back to the Additional District Judge to consider (a) whether the plaintiff's case under S.13(1)(f) was proved, and (b) if proved, whether the proposed construction necessitated eviction (total or partial) and the applicability of Section 18-A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The court set aside unwarranted observations of the appellate court and left all points on this issue open for fresh consideration.
- Procedural and remedial outcomes: Because the court found no written undertaking (S.13(1)(k)) and no established reasonable requirement (S.13(1)(ff)), and because it validated the notice to quit, it allowed the appeal in part, set aside the appellate court's judgment and decree to the extent indicated, and remitted the matter to the Additional District Judge for disposal in accordance with directions concerning Section 13(1)(f) and Section 18-A where applicable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated. The court held that:
- The plaintiff cannot rely on Section 13(1)(k) because no written undertaking to vacate by a fixed date was established in the correspondence (Ext. 6 series).
- The plaintiff's claim of reasonable requirement under Section 13(1)(ff) was not proved on the record and concurrent findings against him were upheld.
- The notice to quit (Ext. 3) was properly addressed, posted by registered post and received by Andrewyule & Co. Ltd.; the presumption of proper service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act was not rebutted and the defendant's failure to produce its letters register warranted an adverse inference.
- The question under Section 13(1)(f) (reconstruction/demolition) was remitted to the learned Additional District Judge for fresh consideration whether the proposed construction can be carried out without evicting the defendant; if established, further consideration of Section 18-A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is to follow.
- The judgment and decree of the appellate court are set aside to the extent indicated and the matter remitted for further disposal according to law.
Consequences/Implications:
- Direct practical effect: The appellate court's decree is set aside and the case is remitted for further proceedings limited to the Section 13(1)(f) issues; the plaintiff does not obtain an immediate decree for ejectment under Sections 13(1)(k) or 13(1)(ff).
- Procedural consequences: The court drew an adverse inference from the defendant's non-production of its Register of letters received/issued and upheld the validity of the notice to quit.
- Broader legal impact: The opinion primarily applies existing authorities and statutory provisions; the judgment remits factual issues for reconsideration rather than announcing a new legal precedent. No new substantive precedent was established by this decision beyond applying settled principles to the facts.
Additional orders: There will be no order as to costs; the cross-objection was rejected without costs; preparation of a formal decree was dispensed with.
B.N Maitra, J.:— The plaintiff has instituted the suit on the allegation that he is the owner of the property in question. The defendant, Messrs Tide Water Oil Company, was the tenant regarding the premises in question in the front portion of that building under him at a monthly rental of Rs. 650/- payable according to English calendar. Previously, he was posted in Bombay. At that time, one Mr. K.L Gupta, defendant's officer, was transferred to Calcutta. The latter persuaded the plaintiff to let out the front portion of the ground floor of the house including the front lawn, the garden and the garage. He had been assured by Mr. Gupta that the demised portion would be vacated after he was transferred from Calcutta or on his retirement from service, whichever was earlier. That proposal was accepted. The plaintiff has retired from service and has been residing in Calcutta. He and his wife have been suffering from various ailments and it is extremely difficult for them to go upstairs. The only passage leading to that house is a very filthy and slippery one because the courtyard is used by the defendant's employees for cleansing utensils and, storing garbage. The accommodation available to the plaintiff is not sufficient and reasonably suitable. He reasonably requires, the disputed premises for his own use and occupation and for the occupation by the members of his family. He submitted a plan to the Corporation of Calcutta for building and rebuilding of the house for properly utilising the vacant space in front of the building for its economic user. The plan has been sanctioned. Unless the defendant is evicted, it is not possible for the plaintiff to make such building and rebuilding. That tenancy was duly determined by a notice to quit. The suit is for ejectment and for recovery of damages.
2. The defendant-company has filed a written statement denying the plaintiff's allegations. It has been alleged, inter alia, that no such assurance had been given by Mr. K.L Gupta. The plaintiff's case is a false one. The accommodation available to the plaintiff is sufficient. The notice to quit is not valid in law and it was not properly served.
3. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the defendant's version and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff went up in appeal.
4. The learned appellate Court held that no undertaking had been given on behalf of the defendant to the plaintiff within the meaning of the provisions of S. 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. He found that the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation and the case of illness of his wife and of himself could not be accepted. The further finding was that a valid notice was duly sent by the plaintiff and received by the defendant-company. The further finding was that the plaintiff's case regarding the provisions of Section 13(1)(f) required further consideration. So, the suit was sent back on remand with some observations along with a direction to consider whether the plaintiff could make the proposed construction without evicting the defendant from the disputed premises and if total or partial eviction would be necessary. Against that decision, the present appeal has been filed by the defendant as first miscellaneous appeal.
5. The plaintiff-respondent filed a cross-objection beyond time, i.e, only on the 24th November, 1981, with a prayer under S. 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay and to accept the same.
6. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the learned Additional District Judge arrived at a right finding regarding the provisions of Ss. 13(1)(k) and 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Act XII of 1956. The plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement is false. No undertaking was given by or on behalf of the defendant to vacate the premises. The notice to quit, Ext. 3, was sent by registered post. It came back with an endorsement that it had been received by Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. Ext. 5. According to the amended provisions of S. 324A of the Companies Act, which was inserted with effect from 3-4-1969, the posts of Managing Agents, Secretaries and Treasurers have been abolished with effect from 3-4-1970. Previously, Messrs Andrewyule, Co., could act as the defendant's agent. But after such mandatory provisions of the Companies Act came into force, that company could no longer act as the defendant's agent. Even if the alleged notice to quit had been received by Messrs Andrewyule & Co. Ltd., that company had no authority to receive the same on behalf of the defendant. So, it was an unauthorised action. The provisions of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act have been referred to. The notice to quit was, therefore, not properly received and the same is invalid in law. The plea of building and rebuilding as envisaged by the Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 13 of the Act, does not come into the picture because the evidence on the record shows that an alteration of only a few inches can serve the plaintiff's purpose. It is not necessary to evict the defendant even if the plaintiff has the luxury of making a new construction on the vacant space in front of the building by spending a huge sum of two lakhs of rupees. The plaintiff's requirement in that respect is not a bona fide one. The case in AIR 1963 SC 499, has been cited to show that the landlord must have bona fides and honest intention in this respect. The case in AIR 1979 SC 1559 has also been referred to.
7. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent has contended that he will not press the belated cross-objection. Nevertheless, according to the provisions of law, he can urge all the points mentioned in the cross-objection because the appeal was allowed.
8. There is an observation by the learned Additional District Judge that the point regarding the provisions of S. 13(1)(k) of the Act was not argued before him. But an admission by a lawyer on a wrong point of law or on a misapprehension of the position of law cannot bind the client. The cases in (1899) 3 Cal WN 222, (1900) 4 Cal WN 274(PC), (1907) 11 Cal WN 340, (1918) 27 Cal LJ 447 : (AIR 1919 Cal 972) and AIR 1937 Bom 81, have been cited. The learned Courts below did not properly consider the letters, Ext. 6 series, by which a clear undertaking was given on behalf of the defendant to vacate the disputed premises by 30th June, 1974. So, the Court will hold that since the defendant gave an undertaking in writing to vacate the disputed premises within 30th June 1974, a decree for eviction can be passed. There is no difficulty in this respect because S. 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act says that notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, no suit for ejectment on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1), except the grounds mentioned in Cl. (j) and (k) shall be filed by the landlord unless he has been given by the tenant one month's notice expiring with a month of the tenancy. Since the case is squarely covered by the provisions of S. 13(1)(k), no notice to quit is necessary. The defendant did not state in the written statement that the notice to quit was not received by them. The plaintiff is partially paralytic and his wife is also seriously ill. The two rooms in the ground floor were used as a godown and so, a man of the plaintiff's status cannot be expected to live in those rooms in the ground floor. The notice to quit was properly addressed and registered. It was received by Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. The defendant did not produce its Register of letters received and issued to show that, in fact, no such notice to quit was actually received by it.
9. It has already been indicated that the cross-objection has not been pressed at present. Nevertheless, law is well-settled on this because of the provisions of Order 41 R. 22(1) of the Civil P.C The decision of the Privy Council in the case of Lala Gourisunker v. Janki in (1890) ILR 17 Cal 809(PC), the cases in AIR 1962 SC 779, AIR 1963 SC 1516 (Panna Lal v. State of Bombay) and AIR 1964 SC 1425 (Virdha Chalam Pillai v. Chaldean Bank) at page 1438 may be referred to show that the respondent can challenge an adverse finding without filing an appeal or a cross-objection.
10. The first question is, whether the plaintiff can succeed according to the provisions of S. 13(1)(k) of the Act. This clause read with sub-sec. (6) thereof will show that a decree for ejectment can be passed without serving any notice if subsequent to the creation of the tenancy, the tenant agreed in writing with the landlord to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlord and he had failed to do so. Ext. 6(d) is the letter by which the premises in question was let out by the plaintiff to the defendant-company. The agreement was that the defendant-company was prepared to take lease of the premises for a period of two years and thereafter on the basis of one month's notice. It is, therefore, clear that in that letter, there was no undertaking to vacate the premises by 30th June, 1974. The letter, Ext. 6(a), dated 13th February, 1974, shows that the Chairman of the defendant-company wrote to the plaintiff that the feasibility of vacating the disputed premises by the company was only being examined. No written undertaking was given by the defendant in this respect. The last letter addressed by the defendant-company is dated 23rd May, 1974, vide Ext. 6(a). It shows that while the defendant-company was eager to co-operate with the plaintiff, the latter was requested to appreciate that unless Mr. Gupta was in a position to find out an alternative accommodation, no question of vacating the premises would arise. The last sentence shows that Mr. Gupta was out of Calcutta. He would return on the 10th June, 1974, or so and then the defendant-company would discuss the matter with the plaintiff and advise him on the same. There was no further correspondence by the defendant on this.
11. The aforesaid discussion clearly shows that no definite date was given by the defendant-company to vacate the premises in question. Hence it is of no consequence if this point was not argued in the court of appeal. No written undertaking was given by the defendant, as alleged. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiff cannot avail of the provisions of S. 13(1)(k) of the Act.
12. Then about the question of reasonable requirement, within the meaning of the provisions of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Act. In this respect, there is concurrent finding of fact by the courts below against the plaintiff. The trial court did not state anything about the plaintiffs physical condition when he was in the dock. Of course, according to the latest amendment, the present appeal cannot be treated as a second appeal and it has to be considered only as a first misc. appeal. Nonetheless, there is concurrent finding of fact on this against the plaintiff.
13. It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiff that he is partially paralytic and he has been suffering from heart trouble. This has been stated by P.W 2, Kalidas Banerjee, (plaintiff). He examined Dr. Bata Krishna Ghosh, P.W 3, to support his version. But the evidence of this last witness shows that he is a pathologist and not a cardiologist. In such circumstances, the courts below rightly refused to place any reliance on the plaintiff's evidence in this respect. The submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant on this cannot be accepted. We, therefore, find that the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement for the purpose of his own use and occupation and for the occupation by the members of his family cannot be accepted, within the meaning of the provisions of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Act.
14. Then about the question of notice. In the plaint, it has been clearly stated that the notice to quit was properly addressed, registered and sent to the defendant. It was received by Andrewyule & Co. Ltd., Ext. 5. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent has pointed out that the notice of the suit, which was instituted in 1976, i.e long after the amendment of the aforesaid S. 324A of the Companies Act, was received by Messrs Anderwyule & Co. Ltd., on behalf of the defendant-company. When the appeal was filed, a registered notice was issued and that was also received by Messrs Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. The postal acknowledgment receipt Ext. 5, of the notice to quit was received by Messrs Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. So the question has to be considered whether the receipt of the notice to quit by Messrs Andrewyule & Co. Ltd. and not by the defendant-company itself would make the same invalid in law and if the presumption of proper service has been rebutted.
15. Two bench decisions of this Court may be referred to. The first case is of Radharani v. Angurbala, reported in (1961) 65 Cal WN 1119 at pp. 1123 and 1124. Following the famous Privy Council case of Harihar v. Ramshashi in (1919) 23 Cal WN 77 : (AIR 1918 PC 102) it has been stated that in the abr sence of very strong evidence to the contrary, when in the matter of service by registered post, as acknowledgement comes back, signed or purported to be signed by some persons on behalf of the addressee, it is good service under the law. The next case is of Seuli v. Maydha in (1970) 74 Cal WN 647. There also a Bench of our Court has stated that the notice had been properly directed and posted under registered post with acknowledgment due and it was addressed to the defendant No. 3 being at Titagarh, where the cinema house was located. The acknowledgment due with regard to three notices came back to the sender. It was held that the notice had been properly directed and posted per registered post because they were presumed to have reached defendant No. 3. It has been further held that even if the signatures in the acknowledgment receipt have been subscribed on behalf of the defendant No. 3 by somebody who was not proved to have any authority from defendant No. 3 to receive the same, still the service would be a good one. In the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal in AIR 1979 SC 1745, the Special Bench case in AIR 1964 Cal 1 was overruled. It was held that at present no notice to quit under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was required. So now only the provisions of S. 27 of the General Clauses Act, and not of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, have to be considered. In the latest case of Har Charan v. Shivrani, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 535 at p. 542 : (AIR 1981 SC 1284 at p. 1288) it has been stated that Section 27 of the General Clauses Act deals with the topic “meaning of service by post” and says that where any Central Act or regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing prepaying and posting it by registered post and that section raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgment due is received from the addressee or not.
16. The notice was only sent by registered post, Ext. 4. There is no whisper in the written statement that the notice to quit was not received by the defendant.
17. The evidence of D.W 1, Bejoy Kumar Tandon, employee of the defendant-company, shows that he looks after the suit on the defendant's behalf. He has stated in his cross-examination that prior to 1971, Andrewyule & Co. Ltd., were the Treasurer and Secretary of the defendant-company. The office of Andrewyule & Co., is at 8, Clive Row. He also says that he has not filed any paper to show that Andrewyule & Co. has ceased to be the Treasurer and Secretary of the defendant-company.
18. The address of appellant-company (defendant) is 8, Clive Row D.W 1, Bejoy Kumar Tandon, has made a very significant statement that Mr. R. Lall is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of their Company and also the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Andrewyule & Co. He has further admitted that in their office, they maintain a Register of letters received and letters issued. That Register has not been produced.
19. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the Register for letters received and issued was not called for by the plaintiff and hence, the defendant was not bound to produce the same. But in the case of T. Pillai v. Manicka Vasaka Desika Gana Sambandha in (1917) 21 Cal WN 761 : (AIR 1917 PC 6) Lord Shaw has stated that regarding the parties to the suit those desiring to rely on a certain state of facts are not justified in withholding written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition, merely because the onus of proof may be on the other side. When it is so withheld, the Court is free to conclude that if the same had been produced, they would have supported the case of the opponent. In the case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif & Others in AIR 1968 SC 1413 at page 1415, it has been stated if a party to a suit is in possession of best evidence which will throw light on the issue in controversy and withholds it, the Court should draw an adverse inference against him though the onus of proof does not lie on him. It has been further stated that Court cannot rely on mere onus of proof and say that there is no onus on him or he was not called upon to produce the document. Thus, there will be an adverse inference against the defendant-company for not producing its Register of letters received and issued. The submissions made on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted. We, therefore, hold that the notice to quit, Ext. 3, was properly addressed and registered and it was duly received by the defendant-company and it is valid in law. We further find that the presumption of proper service has not been rebutted by the defendant-appellant.
20. Lastly about the provisions of S. 13(1)(f) of the Act. The learned Court of appeal has pointed out that in the case reported in AIR 1975 SC 1750 it has been stated that the landlord has a right to demolish his property to build a new one with a view to improving his business or for getting better return on his investment. But he has made an observation that the facts of the instant case are entirely different from those of the aforesaid Supreme Court case. After considering the submissions made by both the sides, we are of opinion that the matter must be remitted to the learned appellate Court for considering whether the plaintiff's case under Section 13(1)(f) has been proved and whether the proposed construction can be carried out without evicting the defendant from the premises. If that Court finds that the plaintiff's case in this respect has been established, then he will consider the provisions of Section 18-A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and pass necessary orders. We make it clear that the unwarranted observations made by the learned Appellate Court on this are set aside. All the points on this are left open.
21. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The judgment and decree of the appellate Court be set aside. The matter is remitted to the learned Additional District Judge for disposal according to law in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment.
22. There will be no order as to costs. The cross-objection is rejected without costs.
23. Preparation of formal decree is dispensed with.
Banerjee, J.:— I agree.
Order accordingly.
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