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Laxmi Narayan Sana v. Durgapada Karmakar And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The landlord instituted an ejectment suit in the 2nd Court of the Munsif, Katwa, seeking eviction of the present petitioner (the defendant-tenant) inter alia for default in payment of rent from Magh, 1375 B.S. to Shravan, 1385 B.S. under Section 13(1)(i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and also on grounds of reasonable requirement and for building/rebuilding under Clauses (f) and (ff) of Section 13(1).
The defendant-tenant entered appearance on 19 December 1978 and filed a combined application under Section 17(2) and Section 17(2-A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. He alleged that part of the arrears was barred by limitation and sought (a) determination of the dispute as to the total arrears and (b) permission to pay any amount found due by monthly instalments. The plaintiff-landlord opposed the application.
The learned Munsif (2nd Court, Katwa) rejected the tenant's application by Order No. 26 dated 12 November 1979. The tenant obtained the present Rule under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging that order.
The High Court found that the Munsif committed an error apparent on the face of the record in holding that the application was time-barred (the application had in fact been filed on 19 December 1978 and was made within one month of service of summons, a concession made by the plaintiff). The High Court set aside the finding that the S.17(2)/(2-A) application was barred by limitation.
However, the High Court also held that the trial Court was correct to reject the S.17(2) prayer (determination of rent payable) in limine because the tenant had not deposited in Court, within the time prescribed by Section 17(1), the amount admitted by him as due and not barred by limitation. The High Court found it was illegal and a material irregularity for the trial Court to dismiss the tenant's prayer under Section 17(2-A)(b) for payment by instalments merely because the S.17(2) prayer could not be entertained.
The High Court made the Rule absolute in part: it set aside the trial Court's order, rejected the S.17(2) prayer, allowed the S.17(2-A)(b) prayer and directed the trial Court to (i) calculate the amount in terms of the proviso to S.17(2-A)(b) within one month of receipt of record and (ii) direct payment or deposit by suitable instalments within six months of that order. The trial Court was directed to expeditiously dispose of the suit. There was no order as to costs. Revision was allowed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendant-tenant's combined application under Section 17(2) and Section 17(2-A)(b) was filed within the time specified by Section 17(1) and thus competent.
- Whether a tenant is required to deposit or pay, under Section 17(1) and (2), arrears of rent which had become time-barred (i.e., not legally recoverable) at the date of institution of the ejectment suit.
- Whether the Court must entertain an application under Section 17(2-A)(b) for payment by instalments even if an application under Section 17(2) for determination of the amount payable cannot be entertained because the tenant failed to deposit the admitted and not time-barred arrears.
- What is the scope and effect of the proviso to Section 17(2-A)(b) regarding calculation of the total amount payable up to the month previous to the order under Section 17(2-A).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant-Tenant's Arguments
- The tenant contended that part of the arrears of rent had become barred by limitation and therefore he was only liable to deposit or pay arrears for a period of three years preceding institution of the suit.
- The tenant sought a determination by the Court of the dispute about the total arrears under Section 17(2) and alternatively prayed for permission to pay any amount found due by monthly instalments under Section 17(2-A)(b).
Plaintiff-Landlord's Arguments
- The landlord opposed the application under Section 17(2) and Section 17(2-A) of S.17. The landlord conceded (through Mr. Mitter) that the tenant had in fact filed the application within one month of service of summons (i.e., the limitation point admitted), but maintained opposition to the substantive reliefs sought.
- Mr. Mitter specifically relied upon the Division Bench decision in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindra Nath Dutta & Anr. and drew attention to its ratio on interpretation of S.17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
- Mr. Mitra (for the landlord-opposite party) submitted that disposal of the ejectment suit had been considerably delayed and suggested the High Court should finally dispose of the instalment application rather than remitting the matter.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindra Nath Dutta & Anr., (1980) 1 Cal LJ 80 : AIR 1980 Cal 114 | Held (by Division Bench) that earlier authorities (including Raghunath Singh) were by implication overruled by the Supreme Court in Khadi Gram; and held that S.17(1) requires deposit/payment for the entire period of default irrespective of whether part was time-barred. | The High Court considered this decision but distinguished it: the Division Bench confined itself to interpretation of S.17(1) and did not discuss the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (2-A); the present case required consideration of the proviso to S.17(2-A)(b), so Central Coalfields' ratio was held not to apply to the present facts. |
| Raghunath Singh v. Messrs. Patel & Co., (1961) 65 Cal WN 1093 | Applied principles (including Daya v. Chapala) and held that time-barred amounts of rent were not required to be paid or deposited under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. | The High Court treated Raghunath Singh as still binding unless overruled by a larger Bench or the Supreme Court; the Court noted and relied on its view (consistent with Raghunath) that under S.17(1) and (2) a tenant is required to pay or deposit only sums legally recoverable as rent. |
| N.N. Ghosh Chowdhury v. Tripti Rani Chakraborty, ILR (1976) 2 Cal 359 | Single Bench decision mentioned as one of the earlier authorities. | The High Court noted Central Coalfields treated such Single Bench decisions as by implication overruled; the present Court did not accept that Central Coalfields' conclusion necessarily governs the interpretation of S.17(2-A)(b). |
| Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Sri Ramchandraji Virajman Mandir, AIR 1978 SC 287 | Interpreted Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act: the Supreme Court held that “entire amount of rent and damages due” in S.20(4) could include arrears even if recovery was time-barred; equitable considerations (Section 114 T.P. Act) were applied. | The High Court distinguished Khadi Gram: S.20(4) of the U.P. Act is not in pari materia with S.17(1) read with sub-ss. (2) and (2-A) of S.17 of the West Bengal Act; Khadi Gram did not interpret S.17 and thus did not decide the present questions. |
| New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1976 SC 1637 | Held that “arrears of rent payable” refers to amounts that should be paid; if recovery barred by limitation, the officer could not insist on such amount being payable. | The High Court cited this authority to support the proposition that recoverability (i.e., whether amount is legally payable) matters in deciding if deposit is required. |
| Siddeshwar v. Prakash, (1964) 68 Cal WN 30 : AIR 1964 Cal 105 (Full Bench) | Observed that receipt by the landlord of amounts paid or deposited under S.17(1) would not amount to waiver or create a fresh tenancy; payments under S.17 protect tenant from being in default for the periods paid. | The High Court relied on these observations to explain that S.17 payments secure the tenant against being treated as in default for the paid period irrespective of the suit outcome. |
| Nasiban v. Parul Bala, (1958) 62 Cal WN 778 | Held that payment or deposit under S.17(1) is in respect of all arrears of rent legally recoverable. | Used to support the statement that deposit/payment under S.17(1) relates only to sums legally recoverable as rent. |
| Daya v. Chapala, (1959) 63 Cal WN 976 : AIR 1960 Cal 378 | Held that when the landlord transfers his interest, a tenant under S.17(1) is not required to deposit arrears which had become due to the ex-landlord even if the claim had been assigned to the transferee. | Referred to as antecedent authority relied upon in Raghunath Singh and as support for the view that time-barred or non-recoverable sums need not be deposited under S.17(1). |
| Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidator, Dehradun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co., (1933) 60 Ind App 13 : AIR 1933 PC 63 | One of the authorities referred to in Raghunath Singh (cited as part of the jurisprudential background). | The High Court noted that Raghunath Singh had referred to this and other authorities; no separate substantive reliance beyond that reference is made in the opinion. |
| Gurudas Biswas v. Charu Panna Seal, AIR 1977 Cal 110 (Full Bench) | Held that even if a defence is struck off under S.17(3), a decree for eviction does not automatically follow; the Court must be satisfied on evidence that grounds in Section 13(1) are established. | The High Court cited this Full Bench to emphasize that striking off a defence under S.17(3) does not dispense with the landlord's burden to prove grounds for eviction under Section 13(1). |
| Subodh Ch. Singba v. Santosh Kr. Srimani, (1964) 68 Cal WN 184 | Earlier authority referenced and approved in Gurudas Biswas; concerned the requirement to prove grounds for eviction notwithstanding payments under relevant sections. | Referred to as part of the line of authority confirming the landlord's continuing burden to prove Section 13(1) grounds. |
| Kalu Ram v. Baidyanath, AIR 1965 SC 1909 | The Supreme Court left open the question regarding the precise character of payment or deposit under S.17(1) of the West Bengal Act. | The High Court noted that the Supreme Court left the question open; thus that aspect remained unresolved at the Supreme Court level. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in identifiable steps, each tied to provisions of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and to the facts as they stood on the record:
- Error on limitation point: The Court first addressed the procedural error by the learned Munsif who had held the tenant's application was barred by limitation. The Court accepted the plaintiff's concession that the application was filed within one month of service (it was in fact filed on 19 December 1978) and set aside the finding that it was time-barred.
- Application under Section 17(2): The Court examined S.17(2), which requires the trial Court to determine disputes as to the amount of rent payable when such a dispute is raised. The Court held that a tenant raising such a dispute must, within the time specified in S.17(1), deposit in Court the amount admitted to be due that is not barred by limitation. Because the defendant failed to deposit the admitted and not time-barred amount within the prescribed time, the S.17(2) prayer to determine the arrears was rightly rejected in limine by the trial Court.
- Independence and scope of Section 17(2-A)(b): The Court then analysed sub-section (2-A) (and specifically Clause (b)) and concluded that S.17(2-A) operates "notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)". Consequently, the Court held that an application under S.17(2-A)(b) for payment by instalments is not automatically defeated by the fact that the S.17(2) application cannot be entertained for want of deposit. Where an application under S.17(2-A)(b) has been made within the time specified in S.17(2-B), the Court is under a statutory duty to consider the tenant's and landlord's circumstances and to calculate the total sum (inclusive of interest) required to be deposited under S.17(1), and may permit payment by instalments as the Court may fix.
- Calculation under proviso to S.17(2-A)(b): The Court stressed that when the trial Court permits instalment payments under the proviso to S.17(2-A)(b), it must make calculations of the amount payable up to the month previous to that in which the order under S.17(2-A) is made. Thus, until such calculation is made by the Court under S.17(2-A)(b), it is not appropriate to require the tenant to deposit or pay the arrears admitted by him.
- Precedential analysis and distinction: The Court reviewed relevant authorities. It distinguished the Division Bench decision in Central Coalfields (which confined itself to S.17(1)) and the Supreme Court's Khadi Gram decision (which interpreted S.20(4) of the U.P. Act and applied equitable principles) on the ground that those decisions did not address the specific scope and proviso of S.17(2-A)(b). The Court reaffirmed the continued relevance of Raghunath Singh and related Calcutta High Court authorities to the proposition that under S.17(1) and (2) a tenant is required to deposit only sums legally recoverable as rent (i.e., not time-barred).
- Statutory rather than equitable scheme: The Court emphasised that S.17(1), (2) and (2-A) form a statutory scheme to secure payment or deposit of arrears and current rent during pendency of an ejectment suit, and do not in themselves constitute an equitable relief akin to Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act. The Court noted that Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to suits under the West Bengal Act in the context addressed, and thus equitable considerations that applied in Khadi Gram are not directly transferable to S.17.
- Conclusion on reliefs: Putting the foregoing together, the Court concluded (a) the S.17(2) prayer was rightly rejected because of failure to deposit admitted and not time-barred arrears; but (b) the S.17(2-A)(b) prayer must be heard on merits and relief under S.17(2-A)(b) can be granted by fixing instalments after making the calculation required by the proviso.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Revision allowed in part; the Rule is made absolute in part. Concretely:
- Order of the trial Court rejecting the S.17(2)/(2-A) application on limitation grounds was set aside insofar as the limitation finding was concerned (the application was filed within time).
- The tenant's prayer under Section 17(2) was rejected because the tenant had not deposited in Court, within the time specified by the statute, the arrears he admitted and which were not barred by limitation.
- The tenant's prayer under Section 17(2-A)(b) was allowed: the trial Court was directed to calculate the amount in terms of the proviso to S.17(2-A)(b) within one month from receipt of record and to permit payment/deposit by suitable instalments within six months of that order; the trial Court was directed to expeditiously dispose of the ejectment suit.
- There was no order as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The tenant's claim for determination under S.17(2) remains rejected (for failure to deposit admitted and not time-barred arrears), but the tenant is entitled to have his application under S.17(2-A)(b) considered and, if appropriate, to pay the sums due by instalments after the trial Court carries out the statutory calculation required by the proviso. The landlord is to receive the benefit of any instalment directions and the trial Court will proceed to decide the ejectment suit on the merits.
- Interpretive guidance: The opinion clarifies that S.17(2-A)(b) is independent and can be considered even where S.17(2) cannot be entertained; the proviso to S.17(2-A)(b) requires a judicial calculation up to the month preceding the order before instalments may be fixed; and deposits/payments under S.17 relate only to sums legally recoverable as rent (i.e., time-barred sums need not be deposited under S.17(1)/(2)).
- Precedential stance: The Court distinguished decisions that interpreted different statutory schemes (e.g., Khadi Gram under the U.P. Act) and reaffirmed the continuing relevance of Raghunath Singh and other Calcutta High Court authorities on questions of recoverability under S.17. The opinion does not purport to overrule those authorities; rather it refines application of S.17(2-A)(b) in the circumstances presented.
- No novel broad equitable doctrine was created: the Court emphasized the statutory character of Section 17 and reiterated that equitable provisions applied in other statutes (such as S.20(4) of the U.P. Act) are not automatically applicable to S.17 of the West Bengal Act.
The landlord opposite party has instituted a suit against the present petitioner in the 2nd Court of the Munsif, Katwa for ejecting him from the suit premises, inter alia, on the allegation that the defendant-petitioner had committed default in payment of rents from Magh, 1375 B.S to Shravan, 1385 B.S and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. He has also prayed for eviction of the defendant tenant on the ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and also for building and rebuilding within the meaning of Clauses (f) and (ff) of Section 13(1) of the said Act.
2. After entering appearance in the said suit on December 19, 1978, the defendant tenant made a combined application under sub-sections (2) and (2-A)(b) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. He, inter alia, alleged that a part of the arrears of rent had already become barred by limitation and that he was only liable to deposit or pay arrears of rent for a period of three years preceding the date of the institution of the suit. He prayed that the said dispute about the total amount of arrears of rent may be determined by the Court. He also prayed that he may be allowed to pay by monthly instalments the amount which may be determined as due and payable by him. The plaintiff landlord opposed the said application of the defendant tenant under sub-sections (2) and (2A) of S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Katwa by his Order No. 26 dated 12th November, 1979 has rejected the aforesaid application of the defendant tenant under sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
3. The defendant tenant has obtained the present Rule under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the said order of the trial Court dated 12th November, 1979. The learned Munsif had committed an error apparent on the face of the record by holding that the defendant tenant's application under Section 17(2) and (2-A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was not filed within the time specified in sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act. Mr. Mitter, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party, has fairly conceded that the defendant tenant had in fact made the aforesaid application within one month of the date of the service of summons upon him. The learned Munsif clearly committed an error apparent on the face of the record by observing that the defendant tenant had filed the application in question on 12th December, 1979 whereas the learned Munsif disposed of the said application on 12th November, 1979. In fact, the said application was filed on December 19, 1978. I accordingly set aside the finding of the learned Munsif that the defendant tenant's aforesaid application under Section 17(2) and (2-A) of the Act was barred by limitation. But the learned Munsif, however, was not in error when he held that as the defendant tenant did not deposit or pay the arrears of rent not barred by limitation and which were admittedly due, his prayer under S. 17(2) for determination of the dispute about the amount of arrears of rent was bound to be rejected in limine.
4. The defendant tenant had no doubt raised a dispute as to the amount of rent payable by contending that a portion of the arrears of rent due from him had become barred by limitation and therefore were irrecoverable. The defendant tenant admitted that the plaintiff was his landlord and that he was a defaulter in payment of rents at the rate mentioned in the plaint. But within the time specified in sub-section (1) of Section 17, he did not deposit in Court the amount which was admitted by him to be due from him and was not barred by limitation together with his application under Section 17(2) of the Act for determination of the rent payable. When he was disputing that as the rent barred by limitation was not payable by him, the defendant tenant was not required to deposit rent for the said disputed period pending the determination under Section 17(2) of the Act. But without depositing the amount admitted by him to be due and not time barred, his prayer for determination of the rent payable was not maintainable in law.
5. The learned Munsif was patently wrong when he held that as the defendant tenant's prayer under Section 17(2) could not be enteretained, his other prayer under Section 17(2-A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act must also fail. As already observed, it is now conceded by the plaintiff opposite party that the application of the defendant tenant under Section 17(2) and (2-A) was in fact filed within the time specified in sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act. The sub-section (2-A) of Section 17 provides, inter aha, “notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) on the application of the tenant, the Court may by order”— (a) extend the time for deposit or payment of any mounts referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of S. 17 and (b) permit the tenant to deposit or pay such amount in such instalments and by such dates as the Court may fix. In other words, irrespective of the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17, a defendant tenant may apply either for extension of the time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 17 for deposit or payment of the amount referred to therein or pray for instalments of the total sums required to be deposited or paid under sub-section (1) of Section 17. The Section 17(2-B) only prescribes the time limit for making applications under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 17(2-A) of the Act. Thus, sub-section (2-A) of Section 17 overrides the provisions in sub-sections (1) and (2) relating to the time specified for making deposits or payments When an application under Section 17(2) is not entertained on the ground that the defendant tenant did not deposit the amount admitted by him to be due, his other prayer under Section 17(2-A)(b) of the Act cannot be automatically dismissed. In the event such a prayer under Section 17(2-A)(b) has been made within the time as specified in Sec. 17(2-B), the Court is under a statutory duty to consider the circumstances of the tenant and also that of the landlord and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited or paid under sub-section (1) on account of default in payment of rent and to permit the tenant to pay or deposit the total sum due by such dates as the Court may fix. When the trial Court permits the tenant to pay by instalments, under the proviso to Clause (b) of Section 17(2-A) it is required to make the calculations of the amount payable up to the month previous to that in which the order under S. 17(2-A) is made. Therefore, until the Court under Section 17(2-A)(b) calculates the total amount to be deposited, there could be no question of the tenant depositing or paying the arrear rents admitted by him to be due.
6. In the above view, the trial Court acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by rejecting in limine the defendant tenant's prayer for allowing him to pay or deposit by instalments the amount of arrear rents payable by him under Section 17(1) of the Act.
7. I have already mentioned that in his aforesaid application the defendant tenant had raised a plea that a part of the arrear rent had become barred by limitation and, therefore, he was not required to deposit or pay the said time barred portion of the arrear rent. The learned Munsif has neither decided whether or not at the date of the institution of the suit any part of the arrear rent had become barred by limitation, nor has made any calculations in terms of the proviso to Section 17(2-A)(b) of the Act. Mr. Mitter, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party has drawn my attention to the decision of Anil Kumar Sen and B.C Chakravarti, JJ. in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindra Nath Dutta & Anr., (1980) 1 Cal LJ 80 : (AIR 1980 Cal 114). The said Division Bench, inter alia, held that the decision of Bachawat and Chatterji, JJ. in Raghunath Singh… v. Messrs. Patel & Co.…Opposite Party., (1961) 65 Cal WN 1093, and also the Single Bench decision in N.N Ghosh Chowdhury v. Tripti Rani Chakraborty, ILR (1976) 2 Cal 359, by implication stand overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Khadi Gram Tjdyog Trust v. Sri Ramchandraji Virajman Mandir, AIR 1978 SC 287. Their Lordships further held that sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act quite clearly requires the tenant to deposit or pay the rent for the entire period for which he may have made default irrespective of whether any part of it was irrecoverable being barred by law or not.
8. In my view, the ratio of the decision in the Central Coalfields ltd.'s case (supra), does not apply to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, I am required to consider the provisions of Clause (b) of sub-section (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Although the Central Coalfields Ltd.'s case (supra), arose out of an application made under sub-ss. (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the Division Bench did not discuss the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 and did not expressly lay down that in the event of a determination under Section 17(2) the Court is bound to direct the tenant to deposit the time-barred arrear rents. The Division Bench also did not decide whether in making a calculation under proviso to Section 17(2-A)(b), the Court ought to include those amounts which had become time barred at the date of the institution of the suit Their Lordships in the Central Coalfields Ltd's case (supra), confined their decision to the interpretation of Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. But, in the present case, I have to ascertain the scope and effect of Section 17(2-A)(b) proviso of flie Act of 1956.
9. The Supreme Court in the Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case (AIR 1978 SC 287) (supra), had considered the provisions of Section 20(4) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The Supreme Court in the said case had no occasion to interpret sub-ss. (1), (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Naturally, the Supreme Court did not examine the correctness of the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in Raghunath Singh's case (1961) 65 Cal WN 1093) (supra). Therefore, unless by necessary implication the decision in Raghunath Singh's case (supra), stands overruled, the said Division Bench decision in Raghunath Singh's case (supra), still continues to be a binding precedent until it is overruled by a larger Bench of this Court or by any decision of the Supreme Court expressly or by necessary implication.
10. In my view, the decision in The Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case (AIR 1978 SC 287) (supra) is distinguishable because the pronouncements in the said case were made in the context of Section 20(4) of U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972 which is not in pari materia with Section 17(1) read with sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Kailasam, J. at page 288 of the reports has set out the substance of the different sub-sections of Section 20 of the U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act The sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972 provided:
“In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with the interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground.”
The said Supreme Court appeal was preferred against the judgment of Satish Chandra, J. of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1977 All 399, where the full facts have been set out. The landlord had filed an ejectment suit under S. 20(2)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972 against the tenant, the Khadi Gram Udyog Trust in the Court of the Small Causes on the ground of non-payment of rent in spite of service of a notice of demand. The trial court decreed the suit for ejectment, inter alia, upon the finding that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent from January, 1963 to December, 1970. A notice demanding payment of rent as well as to quit the accommodation was served upon the tenant but the tenant did not make any payment towards the arrear rent. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant-tenant had deposited rent from 1st May, 1973 to 28th February, 1975. Satish Chandra, J. dismissed the revision case preferred by the tenant. The Supreme Court affirmed the said decision. In the Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case (supra), the question was whether the expression in S. 20(4), “the entire amount of rent and damages….. due from him”, included arrears of rent, the recovery of which had become barred by time. The Supreme Coprt agreed with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court that the S. 20(4) of U.P Urban Buildings Etc. Act, 1972 provided the basis for preventing the tenant's eviction or in other words, the said provision afforded relief against liability for eviction subject to the condition that the tenant paid “the entire” amount of rent due. Thus, it was held that S. 20(4) of the said Act conferred an equitable benefit on the tenant to avoid eviction decree by complying with the requirements of S. 20(4) of the Ad. In other words, in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case (supra), the equitable principles of S. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act were applied in interpreting S. 20(4) of the U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972.
11. But the scheme of sub-sections (1), (2) and (2A) of S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is somewhat different. Unlike S. 14 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, sub-sections (1), (2), (2A) and (3) of S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act apply to all suits and proceedings instituted by the landlord for eviction of his tenant on any of the grounds referred to in Section 13 of the 1956 Act. After institution of a suit or proceeding, a tenant who does not raise any dispute is required to make payment or deposit of arrear rent with interest as prescribed and also current rent so long as an ejectment suit remains pending in the trial Court. When a tenant raises a dispute regarding “amount of rent payable”, the trial Court under Section 17(2) of the 1956 Act shall determine the same. A defendant tenant under Clause (a) of sub-section (2-A) of S. 17 may pray for extension of time to deposit the amount specified in sub-sections (1) or (2) of S. 17. He may also under Cl. (b) of Section 17(2-A) pray for granting instalments to pay the amounts specified in sub-section 17(1) of the Act. The time limit for making the prayer for such extension or for granting instalments has been specified in Section 17(2-B) of the Act.
12. The effect of a failure on the part of a tenant to pay or deposit the amount as specified in the above sub-sections of Sec. 17 as the case may be, has been provided in sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act: the Court shall order his defence against delivery of possession to be struck off and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. But it is now well-settled that even in case the defence of a defendant tenant is struck out, a decree for eviction does not automatically follow. The trial Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment against a tenant protected under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act except on the landlord establishing any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 13(1) of the Act. In this connection, reference may be made to the recent Full Bench decision of this Court in Gurudas Biswas v. Charu Panna Seal, AIR 1977 Cal 110 which approved the decision of P.N Mookerjee and D. Basu, JJ. in Subodh Ch. Singba v. Santosh Kr. Srimani, (1964) 68 Cal WN 184 and held, inter alia, that whether an ejectment suit which is governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is defended or not, the Court must be satisfied that it has been established on evidence that the grounds alleged in the plaint take away the tenant's special protection conferred by Section 13(1) of the Act.
13. There is another aspect of the matter. Only in case of a suit for ejectment on the ground of default under Section 13(1)(i), if a tenant makes the deposit or payment as required by sub-sections (1), (2) or (2-A) of Section 17 be can get the benefit of protection against eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. Such right to obtain benefit of protection against eviction on the ground of default is subject to the proviso to Section 17(4) of the Act. In case an ejectment suit is filed on any other ground referred to in Section 13(1) of the Act by complying with the requirements of the aforesaid sub-sections of Section 17, a tenant defendant does not become eligible for protection against eviction but he is granted only the right to contest the ejectment suit in the trial Court. Even when a tenant defendant has made deposits or payments as required by sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) as the case may be of Section 17, a decree or order for delivery of possession of the suit premises to the landlord may be made on any of the grounds referred in Section 13(1) except on the ground of default in payment of rent. Thus, the aforesaid sub-sections of Sec. 17 do not provide a basis for preventing a tenant's eviction except in an ejectment suit brought on the ground of default in payment of rent. Unlike sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972, Section 17(1), (2) and (2-A) provides the foundation for the landlord's right to recover arrears and current rent during the pendency of the ejectment suit in the trial Court and for the discharge of the tenant's liability to pay arrear and current rent.
14. I am not unmindful of the position that in relation to a suit for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent, Section 17(4) provides a relief against the liability for eviction and the said provision has some similarity with that of Section 20(4) of the U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972. But there are also material differences between the two provisions.
15. The view that sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act primarily provide modes for discharging a tenant's liability for payment of arrear and current rent during the pendency of an ejectment suit finds support from the observations of Bose, C.J and D.N Sinha, J. in Siddeshwar v. Prakash, (1964) 68 Cal WN 30 : (AIR 1964 Cal 105) (SB). D.N Sinha, J., at pages 54 and 56 (of Cal WN): (at pp. 117, 118, 119 of AIR) summarised the legal position and observed that the receipt by the landlord of all the amounts paid or deposited under Section 17(1) would not amount to waiver or create a fresh tenancy. If a tenant makes such payment or deposit in terms of Section. 17 he can never be said to be in default in payment of rents for the period for which such payments or deposits have been made irrespective of the results of such suit or proceeding.
16. It may be also pointed out that there appears to be some difference of opinion in this Court regarding the character of payment or deposit under S. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and the said question was left open by the Supreme Court in Kalu Ram v. Baidyanath, AIR 1965 SC 1909. But it has been uniformly and consistently held that a tenant under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act is required to deposit only those amounts which are recoverable as rent. I may refer to the decision of Banerjee, J. in Nasiban v. Parul Bala, (1958) 62 Cal WN 778, holding that the payment or deposit under S. 17(1) of the Act would be in respect of alt arrears of rent legally recoverable in payment of which the tenant may have made default. A Division Bench in Daya v. Chapala, (1959) 63 Cal WN 976 : (AIR 1960 Cal 378) similarly held that when the landlord transfers his interest, the tenant under Section 17(1) is not required to deposit or pay the arrears which had become due to the ex-landlord even if the claim for the said unpaid amount had been assigned to the transferee landlord.
17. Bachawat and Cbatterjee, JJ. in Raghunath Singh's case (1961-65 Cal WN 1093) (supra), applied the principles as laid down in the decision in Daya v. Chapala (supra), and held that time-barred amounts of rent were not required to be paid or deposited under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Their Lordships were fully cognizant of the fact that the expression “legally recoverable” which appeared in Section 14(1) of 1950 Act had not been retained in sub-section (1) of S. 17 of 1956 Act. But. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the time-barred amounts were not liable to be deposited or paid under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act. The Division Bench in Raghunath Singh's case (supra) considered the provisions of sub-section (2) of S. 17 which, inter alia, provided “if …… …… there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant”, and therefore, with respect, it would not be fair to observe that the Division Bench had introduced on their own construction any restrictive clause. The Court under sub-section (2) has been given a statutory duty to determine disputes as to “the amount of rent payable”. The Division Bench in Raghunath Singh's case (supra), had referred to a large number of authorities including the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidator, Dehradun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co., (1933) 60 Ind App 13 : (AIR 1933 PC 63). The Supreme Court also in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1976 SC 1637, held that in Section 7(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act the expression “arrears of rent payable” means that what should be paid. If recovery of any amount is barred by limitation, the Estate Officer could not insist that such amount was still payable. In fact, Satish Chandra, J. of Allahabad High Court in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case (AIR 1977 All 399) (supra), had distinguished the said two decisions on the ground that S. 20(4) of the U.P Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972 conferred upon the tenant a right to relief against eviction on condition that the rent due must be paid. The Supreme Court had approved the said view that on equitable considerations a tenant under S. 20(4) of the U.P Act of 1972 was bound to deposit the entire rent due from him. My attention has been drawn to several decisions of other High Courts which have laid down that under other respective tenancy legislations considered therein the tenants were not required to deposit time-barred rents; I need not discuss these decisions because Bachawat, J. in Raghunath Singh's case (supra) rightly observed:
“But the question in each case is whether the particular statute requires the debtor to pay the time-barred debt.”
18. I have already observed that Section 17(1), (2) and (2A) does not provide any equitable relief. It is, also well settled so far as this Court is concerned that even in case of a suit for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent, Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable because such a suit cannot be considered as one on the ground of forfeiture on account of non-payment of rent. Section 17(1) imposes a statutory obligation. When a tenant complies with the sub-sections (1), (2) or (2A) of Section 17 of the 1956 Act, a tenant cannot be considered to be a defaulter within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i) and the Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent except in a case covered by the proviso to sub-section (4) of Sec. 17 of the Act. It may be pointed out that the Division Bench in Raghunath Singh's case (1961-65 Cal WN 1093) (supra), had pointed out the distinction between the provisions of S. 17(1) and (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and those of S. 6 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (since repealed) which required the thika tenant to pay the arrear of rent due to the landlord as the condition precedent for stay of ejectment. Thus, the said Section 6 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act provided an equitable relief and therefore, the section contemplated the deposit of all arrears including time-barred amounts of rent.
19. Thus, it has been the consistent view of this Court that sub-sections (1), (2) of Section 17 have imposed a statutory obligation upon a tenant to deposit or pay anear and current rent during the pendency of the ejectment suit in the trial Court otherwise his defence against delivery of possession is liable to be struck out. The said provisions also enable the landlord to receive rent from a tenant without waiving his right to proceed with the ejectment suit against such tenant. I have already observed that the said sub-sections (1) and (2) do not confer benefit of protection against eviction except in case of ejectment under Section 13(J)(i) of 1956 Act. So far as this High Court is concerned, it is now stare decisis that both under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act a tenant is under a statutory obligation to pay or deposit only the sums which are legally recoverable as rent.
20. Accordingly, the application under Section 17(2A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act filed by the defendant-tenant ought to be heard on merits. Mr. Mitra, learned Advocate for the landlord-opposite party has submitted that, the disposal of the ejectment suit brought by his client on the grounds of reasonable requirement and default has been already considerably delayed and therefore, instead of remitting the matter back this Court may finally dispose of the defendant-tenant's application for the instalments. Questions regarding circumstances of the parties have not been raised before me. I, accordingly, make this Rule absolute in part, set aside the order complained of. The defendant-tenant's prayer under S. 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is rejected. I allow the defendant-tenant's prayer under S. 17(2A)(b) of the Act in the following manner:
21. Within one month from the date of the arrival of the record in the trial Court, the Court below will calculate the amount in terms of the proviso to S. 17(2A)(b) and direct the defendant-tenant to pay or deposit by suitable instalments the said amount within six months from the said order of the trial Court. The trial Court will expeditiously dispose of the suit in accordance with law.
22. There will be no order as to costs.
23. Let a copy of this order and the records be sent down as early as possible.
Revision allowed.
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