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Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw

Calcutta High Court
Jul 14, 1981
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit property as a trespasser and for recovery of Rs. 1,09,600 by way of mesne profits. The plaintiff alleged that the parties had entered into an agreement for lease under which the plaintiff agreed to let the suit property to the defendant for 86 years; the defendant deposited Rs. 1,00,000 as salami to be forfeited if he failed to execute the lease. Possession had been delivered to the defendant pursuant to the agreement, and the plaintiff alleged the defendant failed to execute the lease, leading to forfeiture and institution of the suit.

The defendant denied failure to execute the lease and claimed prior possession as a thika tenant. The defendant filed a cross-suit (Suit No. 2740 of 1968) for specific performance. After evidence was closed and several adjournments, on 2-2-1981 the court inquired about settlement; counsel for both parties negotiated in open court, certain terms were agreed and the judge dictated a consent decree consolidating the two suits.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a petition (supported by an affidavit of Mr. R.C. Deb affirmed 6-3-1981) to set aside or amend that consent decree. Mr. Deb averred he had been under a mistaken apprehension that the dictated terms were for further negotiation and that he had not consented to entry of decree; he also pointed out the consent was not in writing or signed. The defendant denied these allegations and relied on annexed documents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit is the proper proceeding to set aside a consent decree, or whether review or an application under Section 151, Civil P.C. is the appropriate remedy in the present circumstances.
  2. Whether the consent decree obtained on 2-2-1981 (based on an oral agreement in court) was lawful under Order 23, Rule 3 and Rule 3A of the Civil P.C., as amended in 1976, which require agreements to be in writing and signed.
  3. Whether the application filed by the managing shebait (on behalf of the deity) is maintainable despite questions about authority.
  4. Whether the application is barred by limitation and, if so, what limitation rule applies.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Mr. R.C. Deb (on affidavit) stated he was under a mistaken apprehension that the dictated terms would be a basis for further negotiation, and that he never consented to a decree being passed.
  • The consent decree was not in writing nor signed by the parties, contrary to the requirements of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Civil P.C., and therefore was not binding.
  • Because the consent decree was not in writing/signed, it falls within the Explanation to Rule 3 (agreements void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act are not lawful) and a suit to set aside such a decree would be barred by Rule 3A; thus a suit is not maintainable and the correct procedure is an application under Section 151 or a review.
  • The application is governed by the residuary article of the Limitation Act (i.e., it is not expressly provided for elsewhere) and therefore not time-barred under a specific provision.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant contended that a suit is the proper proceeding to set aside a consent decree and that a review under Order 47, Civil P.C. or an application under Section 151 would not lie; counsel relied on earlier precedents to that effect.
  • The defendant denied the petitioner's allegations that the counsel did not consent to the decree and produced documents in support of the contention that the consent decree had been passed by agreement with the knowledge of Mr. R.C. Deb.
  • The defendant contended the application was irregular because it was not filed by the deity itself (this point was later considered on maintainability).
  • The defendant raised a limitation objection that the application was time-barred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1909) 13 Mussammat Gulab Koer…Plaintiff, v. Badshah Bahadur (Minor)…Defendant, . Relied upon by the defendant's counsel for the proposition that a suit is the proper proceeding to set aside a consent decree (i.e., that review/Section 151 would not lie). The court recorded that the defendant's counsel relied on this authority, but ultimately resolved the matter by reference to the amended provisions of Order 23, Rules 3 and 3A of the Civil P.C., and did not accept the proposition that a suit was maintainable in the present facts.
AIR 1929 Cal 470 (J.C Galstaun v. Pramatha Nath Roy) Relied upon by the defendant's counsel to support the position that a suit is the proper remedy to set aside a consent decree. The court noted reliance on this case but proceeded to apply the 1976 amendment to Order 23 (Rules 3 and 3A) to conclude that the consent decree based on an oral agreement was unlawful and could not be sustained; thus the earlier authorities were not applied to uphold the decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the matter primarily by reference to the amended provisions of Order 23, Rules 3 and 3A of the Civil P.C.:

  1. Rule 3 (as amended) requires that where a suit is adjusted by agreement or compromise, that agreement must be "in writing and signed by parties" for the court to record it and pass a decree in accordance therewith. The Explanation excludes agreements void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act from being "lawful" within the meaning of the rule.
  2. Rule 3A expressly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.
  3. The court found that on 2-2-1981 the parties had reached only an oral agreement in open court and the court dictated the consent decree on that basis. The 1976 amendment was intended to exclude oral agreements from forming the basis of consent decrees.
  4. Because the decree was founded on an oral agreement (not in writing and not signed), the court held it had no jurisdiction under Order 23, Rule 3 to pass such a consent decree — the decree was therefore unlawful under the express terms of the rules as amended.
  5. Given that finding of unlawfulness, the court concluded the proper remedy was not a fresh suit to set aside (which Rule 3A bars in such circumstances) but an application under Section 151 of the Civil P.C. or a review — and thus that the petition before the court (seeking setting aside/amendment) was appropriately entertained as an application rather than a suit.
  6. On procedural points the court held the application was maintainable even though filed by the managing shebait (who has power to manage the state of the deity and is a party to the suit), and accepted the petitioner's submission that the application is governed by the residuary article of the Limitation Act.
  7. Because the court concluded the consent decree was unlawful for want of the written and signed agreement required by Rule 3, it did not go into the merits of the underlying suit or cross-suit; it set aside the consent decree as invalid for lack of jurisdiction to pass it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The consent decree dated 2-2-1981 is set aside.

Implications:

  • The court found the consent decree unlawful because it was based on an oral agreement; Order 23, Rule 3 (as amended in 1976) requires a written and signed agreement for a court to pass a consent decree.
  • The court held that, in the circumstances alleged, a fresh suit to set aside the decree would be barred by Rule 3A; accordingly, relief should be sought by review or an application under Section 151 of the Civil P.C. The court accepted the petition as maintainable on those grounds.
  • The court declined to enter into the merits of the underlying dispute because the consent decree was invalid on its face for lack of jurisdiction; there will be no order as to costs.
  • The decision produced the direct effect of vacating the consent decree and restoring the parties to the position where the merits of their claims remain to be determined by proper proceedings; the opinion does not purport to lay down any broader novel precedent beyond applying the amended statutory provisions.
Order accordingly.
Show all summary ...

The above suit was instituted by the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant from the suit property as a trespasser and a decree for Rupees 1,09,600/- by way of mesne profit etc. The plaintiff alleged that pursuant to an agreement for lease by and between the parties, the plaintiff agreed to let out the suit property to the defendant for 86 years on terms and conditions contained in the draft approved lease and the defendant deposited Rupees 1,00,000/- with the plaintiff by way of salami to be forfeited on failure of the defendant to execute the lease. The possession of the suit property was delivered to the defendant pursuant to the said agreement. The defendant failed and neglected to execute the lease. Therefore the said deposit was forfeited by the plaintiff in terms of the agreement and the suit was instituted for recovery of possession. In the written statement the defendant alleged that he was in possession of the suit property as a thika tenant prior to the agreement for lease. It was denied that there was any failure or negligence on the part of the defendant to execute the lease. A cross suit was filed by the defendant against the plaintiff, being Suit No. 2740 of 1968 for specific performance of the said lease. This suit was also ready for hearing. The evidence in the above suit was closed and the matter was adjourned for argument. After several adjournments, the above matter was taken up on 2-2-1981 when I enquired of the counsel for both the parties whether any settlement was possible. Thereafter discussions were held between Mr. R.C Deb of G.C Chunder and Co., the Advocate on record of the plaintiff and Mr. P.K Roy, senior counsel for the defendant in open Court. The junior counsel of the plaintiff Mr. Prabir Roy Chowdhury also was present. Certain terms were agreed between the parties and on that basis I dictated the said agreed terms and a consent decree was passed by consolidating the two suits.

2. The present petition has been taken out on behalf of the plaintiff in the above suit for setting aside or amending the said consent decree and this petition is supported by the supporting affidavit of Mr. R.C Deb affirmed on 6-3-1981. The case made out in the petition was that Mr. R.C Deb was under a mistaken apprehension that the dictated terms would be the basis of further negotiation between his client and the defendant. Mr. Deb never consented to a decree being passed. Another point taken by the petitioner in his affidavit-in-reply was that the consent decree was not in writing nor the same was signed by the parties. Therefore it was not binding. In the affidavit-in-opposition, the defendant categorically denied the petitioner's allegations and alleged that a consent decree was passed by agreement between the parties of which Mr. R.C Deb had full knowledge and in proof thereof, several documents were annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition.

3. According to Mr. P.K Roy, the counsel for the defendant, a suit is the proper proceeding for setting aside a consent decree and a review under Order 47. Civil P.C or an application under Section 151 of Civil P.C would not lie. In support of his contention he relied on (1909) 13 Mussammat Gulab Koer…Plaintiff, v. Badshah Bahadur (Minor)…Defendant, .) and AIR 1929 Cal 470. (J.C Galstaun v. Pramatha Nath Roy). Mr. N.C Roy Chowdhury, counsel for the petitioner submitted, that law had since been changed due to the amendment of the Civil P.C in 1976. Under O. 23 R. 3A, of C.P.C no suit will lie to set aside a consent decree if the same is unlawful. To appreciate his argument it is necessary to look into the amended provisions of O. 23, Rr. 3 and 3A:—

“Rule 3. Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:)

Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

Explanation: An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.

Rule 3A. No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”

4. According to the petitioner's counsel, the present consent decree was not in writing or signed by the parties as required under Order 23 Rule 3 of the C.P.C Hence it was against the express provisions of law and was unlawful. The consent decree was passed due to the mistake or misapprehension of the Advocate-on-record of the petitioner. This allegation will bring the case within the scope of the explanation to Rule 3 and would be deemed to be unlawful. If so, a suit for setting aside a consent decree would be barred under the provision of Rule 3-A. I accept this submission on behalf of the petitioner that on the basis of the facts alleged in the petition no suit could be filed for the relief claimed in the petition. An application under Section 151 of the Civil P.C or a review is the proper procedure.

5. The next point urged by the counsel for the defendant is that this application was not by the deity and should be dismissed on that ground alone. The present application was taken out by the managing shebait, who has the power to manage the state of the deity. He is also a party to the suit. Hence this irregularity if any, is not material and I hold that the application is maintainable.

6. The third point taken on behalf of the defendant is that the application is barred by the law of limitation. According to the counsel for the petitioner, the application is governed by the residuary article of the Limitation Act as there was no express provision for the same. I accept this submission on behalf of the petitioner.

7. The provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Civil P.C should be considered carefully. It appears that the Court's jurisdiction to pass the consent decree under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil P.C would depend on the satisfactory proof of the agreement between the parties to the suit and such agreement must be in writing and signed by the parties. This express provision has been incorporate by amendment in 1976 with the object to exclude the oral agreements. What had happened on 2-2-1981 was that an oral agreement was entered into between the counsel for both the parties, in Court, and on the basis of that oral agreement the Court dictated the consent decree. On careful consideration of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 it appears, that Court has no jurisdiction to pass a consent decree on the basis of an oral agreement between the parties. In this view of the matter, the consent decree dated 2-2-1981 was bad being unlawful and should be set aside. In the premises aforesaid the question of going into the merit of the case does not arise. The consent decree dated 2-2-1981 is therefore, set aside. There will be no order as to cost.

Order accordingly.