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In Re v. Benod Ranjan Sinha
Case Summary — N.C. Mukherji, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Three applications for anticipatory bail were taken up together because they involved the same point of law. All three applications related to criminal cases that had been instituted in courts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court hearing these applications. The State, through the learned Public Prosecutor, raised a preliminary objection that this High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory bail applications connected with cases started outside its territorial jurisdiction. The matters were argued on the question of jurisdiction and on the merits of anticipatory bail.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to entertain applications for anticipatory bail where the alleged offence was the subject of proceedings in a court outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court.
- Whether Section 438 read with related provisions (including Sections 76, 78, 80 and 81 of the Code) or constitutional provisions (Articles 214 and 225) restricts the place where an anticipatory bail application may be filed.
- Whether a court may grant anticipatory bail without first obtaining local instructions or relevant papers from police authorities situated outside the court's jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Dutta)
- Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not limit the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain anticipatory bail applications in cases where criminal proceedings have been instituted outside the High Court's territorial jurisdiction.
- Sections 78, 80 and 81 (and related provisions) empower a court to release on bail a person arrested in connection with a case outside the court's territorial jurisdiction; if such courts can entertain bail applications, they should similarly be able to entertain anticipatory bail applications.
- The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 632) — including the nature of "reason to believe" and the broad discretion given to High Courts and Courts of Session in anticipatory bail matters — support the power of the High Court to entertain these applications.
- This High Court had, in prior decisions, entertained anticipatory bail applications in similar circumstances and granted relief.
State / Public Prosecutor's Arguments
- The learned Public Prosecutor raised a preliminary objection that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain applications connected with cases instituted outside its territorial jurisdiction.
- Mr. S. Mukherjee (learned Public Prosecutor) focused on Section 438(1) of the Code, arguing that the use of the definite article "the" before "High Court" and "Court of Session" indicates that the applicant must apply to the specific High Court or Session Court within whose jurisdiction the offence has been instituted, rather than to any High Court or any Court of Session in India.
- Reliance on Articles 214 and 225 of the Constitution was advanced to show the territorial organisation of High Courts; however, the Court noted these provisions did not support the narrower contention urged by Mr. Mukherjee.
- Practical difficulty: when anticipatory bail applications concern offences in another jurisdiction, the local Public Prosecutor may not have the necessary instructions or documents from the police or magistrate in that other jurisdiction, making meaningful submissions on merits difficult; Sections 76, 80 and 81 permit bail after arrest when relevant papers have been sent, but those provisions do not directly address anticipatory bail filed before arrest.
- Jurisdiction, it was argued, arises with regard to the offence (a court takes cognizance where the offence is committed) rather than the offender; Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 220) was cited to that effect, and the State submitted this principle should limit where anticipatory bail applications should be filed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 632 | Explains principles of anticipatory bail: the High Court or Court of Session has broad discretion; "reason to believe" must be founded on reasonable grounds; the court must apply its own mind to whether relief should be granted. | The court relied on these principles to emphasise that superior courts have discretion to entertain anticipatory bail applications and must consider whether grounds for relief exist; this supported the court's view on jurisdiction to entertain such applications for petitioners residing within its jurisdiction. |
| Binode Kr. Chamaria v. State of West Bengal (Criminal Misc. Case No. 2680 of 1975) | Held that "High Court" may mean the High Court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed or within whose jurisdiction the petitioners reside; residence and office within jurisdiction supports entertainability. | Cited by the court as an authority where the High Court entertained an anticipatory bail application because the petitioners resided and had offices within its jurisdiction; supported the court's conclusion that residence within jurisdiction permits entertainability. |
| Hariprosad Agarwala alias Garodia v. State of West Bengal (Criminal Misc. Case No. 2 of 1977) | Illustrative Division Bench order allowing anticipatory bail where petitioner apprehended arrest in connection with a police station in another jurisdiction. | Used as authority showing earlier Division Bench practice of allowing anticipatory bail applications even when the underlying case lay outside the High Court's territorial jurisdiction. |
| K.K. Birla v. The State (Criminal Case Nos. 871 and 872 of 1977) | Demonstrated that a petitioner giving a residential address within the jurisdiction supports the High Court's entertainability of anticipatory bail applications; factual objections (petitioner abroad, case registered at Delhi) were negatived. | Cited to support the proposition that residence within the High Court's jurisdiction confers the ability to entertain anticipatory bail applications even if the alleged offence arose elsewhere. |
| Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 | Principle that a court takes cognizance of an offence where the offence is committed; jurisdiction usually relates to the offence. | The court acknowledged this principle but distinguished it for the purposes of anticipatory bail: while cognizance may lie where an offence occurred, an application for (anticipatory) bail concerns the petitioner and may be entertained where the petitioner resides. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alongside the legal principles on anticipatory bail set out in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and prior Division Bench decisions of the same High Court. The reasoning unfolded as follows:
- The court acknowledged the State's preliminary objection that this High Court had no jurisdiction because the underlying criminal proceedings were instituted outside its territorial jurisdiction.
- The court considered the petitioners' reliance on Sections 78, 80 and 81 (and related provisions) and the Supreme Court's exposition in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia. From Gurbaksh Singh, the court took the principles that anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest, that the court must be satisfied that the applicant has reason to believe he may be arrested on an accusation of committing a non-bailable offence, and that the High Court or Court of Session has broad discretion (subject to review for error).
- The court examined prior orders of Division Benches of the same High Court (including Binode Kr. Chamaria, Hariprosad Agarwala, and K.K. Birla), which had entertained anticipatory bail applications where petitioners resided within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction even though the alleged offences were the subject of proceedings elsewhere. Those decisions were treated as persuasive of the practice that residence within the jurisdiction is a relevant and sufficient connection.
- Responding to Mr. S. Mukherjee's textual argument about the definite article in Section 438(1) and the constitutional provisions concerning High Courts (Articles 214 and 225), the court concluded that those constitutional provisions did not support the narrow construction urged. The court rejected the contention that Section 438 permits anticipatory bail applications only in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was instituted.
- Addressing the practical concern that a local Public Prosecutor may not have instructions or papers from police in another jurisdiction, the court accepted that there is "some substance" to this point but held that anticipatory bail can, in appropriate cases, be granted without such instructions. The court also recognised that where it deems necessary, it may ask for relevant papers before deciding an anticipatory bail application.
- On the point that jurisdiction ordinarily relates to the offence and not the offender (as in Baijnath), the court noted that while cognizance lies where the offence is committed, applications for bail or anticipatory bail concern the petitioner. Consequently, if the petitioner resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, that court may entertain the anticipatory bail application even if the alleged offence was registered elsewhere.
- Weighing these considerations together, and in light of the jurisprudence cited, the court concluded that this High Court has jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory bail applications filed by petitioners who reside within its territorial jurisdiction, despite the underlying cases being instituted outside that jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for anticipatory bail by a petitioner who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court, even if the criminal case is pending in a court outside that jurisdiction.
DISPOSED OF: Preliminary objection overruled; anticipatory bail granted subject to conditions described below.
Direct Consequences for the Parties
- In Re: Binod Ranjan Sinha alias B.R. Sinha v. The State — If the petitioner is arrested in connection with Case No. JC/2/463/II under Sections 23 and 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 pending before the Second Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur, Bihar, he shall be produced before the magistrate within whose jurisdiction he is arrested and shall be released on bail on the condition that within two weeks of such release he surrenders before the appropriate Court in connection with that case.
- In re: Gurdev Singh v. The State — If the petitioners are arrested in connection with Bairagura (State of Bihar) Police Station Case No. 042/81 dated 30th May, 1981 under Sections 467, 468, 420 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code pending before the Second Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur, Bihar, they shall be produced before the magistrate within whose jurisdiction they are arrested and shall be released on bail on the condition that within two weeks of such release they surrender before the appropriate Court in connection with that case.
- In re: Pulak Konti Guha v. The State — If the petitioners are arrested in connection with Case No. 160 of 1981 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, under Sections 420, 468, 471, 472 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, they shall be produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate within whose jurisdiction they are arrested and shall be released on bail on the condition that within two weeks of such release they surrender before the appropriate Court in connection with that case.
Broader Implications
The court articulated a jurisdictional position applicable to the facts before it: a High Court may entertain anticipatory bail applications of persons who reside within its territorial jurisdiction even when the alleged offences are the subject of proceedings in another territorial jurisdiction. The opinion explains the circumstances in which a court may grant anticipatory bail without seeking out-of-jurisdiction instructions or papers, while also recognising that it may, where appropriate, request those papers prior to deciding an application.
This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion. The opinion itself does not expressly state whether it intends to establish a binding new precedent beyond deciding the instant applications; it applies existing principles and earlier Division Bench decisions to reach its conclusion and disposes of the three anticipatory bail applications with the specific directions set out above.
N.C Mukherji, J.:—These three applications for anticipatory bail were taken up together for hearing as the same point of law is involved in all these three cases. At the outset, it may be said that all these applications are in connection with cases which have been started in the Courts outside the jurisdiction of this High Court. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the State by the learned Public Prosecutor that this High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain these applications as the cases have been started in the Courts outside the jurisdiction of this High Court. With regard to the merits, the learned Public Prosecutor states that besides the copies of the applications which have been served on him he has no other materials before him and as such he is very much handicapped in making his submissions with regard to the merits of the cases. Mr. Dutta who appears in the case of Binode Ranjan Sinha and in the case of Gurdev Singh submits that S. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not, in any way, restricted the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain applications in matters where criminal cases have been instituted against the petitioners in Courts outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Dutta contends that Ss. 78, 80 and 81 confer power on a Court to release on bail an accused who has been arrested in connection with a case outside the jurisdiction of that Court. If such Courts can entertain application for bail and in proper cases can release an arrested person on bail, there is absolutely no reason why appropriate orders on an application for anticipatory bail cannot be made. Mr. Dutta very much relies on the principles of law enunciated by their Lordships with regard to anticipatory bail in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, appellant v. The State of Punjab, respondent reported in AIR 1980 SC 632. Mr. Dutta with much emphasis contends that their Lordships have not found any restriction in S. 438 which debars this Court from entertaining an application for anticipatory bail in connection with a case started in a Court outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest. While granting such bail the Court is required to see whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed non bailable offence. It has been held in the case of Gurbaksh Singh that discretion has been left completely with the High Court or the Court of Session as these are superior Courts. Of course, error, if any, committed by these Courts is liable to be corrected. The words “reason to believe” has been explained by their Lordships as the ‘belief’ that the applicant ??? be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. In this connection, it has been held that if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether the case has been made out for granting such relief. Mr. Dutta in support of his contention that this Court is quite within the jurisdiction to entertain the present applications submits that in a number of cases this Court from time to time has entertained such applications and has granted anticipatory bail. Mr. Dutta first refers to us the decision in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2680 of 1975 (Binode Kr. Chamaria v. State of West Bengal). In this case, on behalf of the learned D.L.R an objection was taken that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail in a case which arises outside the jurisdiction. In the case before their Lordships, the case was of Katihar police station. Their Lordships P.C Borooah and H.N Sen, JJ. held “According to us, ‘High Court’ may mean the High Court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed or within whose jurisdiction the petitioners who apprehend arrest, reside. In this particular case, the present petitioners are residing within our jurisdiction and also have their office within the jurisdiction of this Court.” Mr. Dutta next refers to the order passed in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2 of 1977 (Hariprosad Agarwala alias Garodia v. State of West Bengal). This order was also passed by a Division Bench consisting of Anil Kr. Sen and A.P Bhattacharya, JJ. In this case, the petitioner apprehended that he might be arrested in connection with Porobandar Ranaver police station case. Their Lordships allowed the application and ordered that in the event of being arrested he would be released on bail Mr. Dutta next refers to an order passed in two other cases namely, Criminal Case Nos. 871 and 872 of 1977 (K.K Birla v. The State). The order was passed by a Division Bench consisting of A.N Banerji and A.P Bhattacharya, JJ. Two-fold objections were raised before their Lordships by the learned Public Prosecutor. Firstly, that the petitioner at the time of hearing of the application was away from India and that the case in connection with which the petitioner apprehended arrest was registered at Delhi. Both the contentions were negatived and their Lordships held that the petitioner gave his residential address within the jurisdiction of this Court and as such this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the applications.
2. Mr. S. Mukherjee, learned Public Prosecutor, in the first place, refers to S. 438 Clause (1) of the Code. It has been provided that any person…………….may apply to the High Court or to the Court of Session. With much emphasis, Mr. Mukherjee contends that the High Court or the Court of Session means only one High Court or one Court of Session and not any High Court or any Court of Session. The use of the article ‘the’ before High Court and before Court of Session can have only one meaning, namely, that the applicant is required to make an application in that High Court or in that Session Court only within the jurisdiction of which a case has been started and he apprehends arrest in connection with that case. But this Section cannot be said to have given wide choice to a person to apply for an anticipatory bail in any High Court or any Court of Session of India. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee refers to Article 214 of the Constitution of India which provides that there shall be a High Court for each State. That provision is with regard to the establishments of High Courts in the States of India. This provision of the Constitution, in our opinion, does not support the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the applicant is required to file an application for anticipatory bail only in that High Court or in that Court of Session within whose jurisdiction a case has been started. Mr. Mukherjee also in this connection refers to the provision of Article 225 of the Constitution of India. This is also with regard to the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts. It has no relevance on the point at issue. With regard to the provisions of Ss. 76, 80 and 81 of the Code Mr. Mukherjee submits that in the matter of granting bail where an accused person has been arrested and where relevant papers have been sent by the learned Magistrate any other Court can pass an order for bail on perusal of those papers. But when an application for anticipatory bail is filed the Public Prosecutor of a particular High Court cannot ask for necessary instructions from police officers who are attached to a police station outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and in the absence of such instructions it is almost impossible for the Public Prosecutor to make any submission with regard to the merits and the Court has also to pass an order simply considering the submissions made in the application filed by the petitioner. There is some substance in the submission made by Mr. Mukherjee. But, we are of the opinion that an order for anticipatory bail can be granted without asking for necessary instructions in appropriate cases. But where the Court feels that before allowing an application for anticipatory bail, relevant papers are required to be perused, the Court can certainly ask for those papers.
3. Mr. Mukherjee also contends that the jurisdiction of a Court arises with regard to the offence and not with regard to the offender. A Court takes cognizance of an offence if the offence is committed within the jurisdiction of a particular Court. The Court can take cognizance of the offence notwithstanding the fact that the accused lives outside the jurisdiction of that Court. In support of his contention, Mr. Mukherjee refers to a decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 220 (Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh). It is true that a Court takes cognizance of an offence. But in an application for bail, or anticipatory bail, the Court is concerned with the petitioner. In our view, if the petitioner resides within the jurisdiction of a particular Court his application is certainly entertainable by that court.
4. Considering the provisions laid down in S. 438 of the Code and the principles of law with regard to the anticipatory bail explained by their Lordships in Gurbaksh Singh's case and also considering the view taken by at least three Division Bench in the cases, referred to above, we are of the opinion that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain application for anticipatory bail of a petitioner who resides within the jurisdiction of this Court, though he apprehends arrest in connection with a case which has been started outside the jurisdiction of this Court.
Now, we take up the individual applications.
5. In Re: Binod Ranjan Sinha alias B.R Sinha v. The State.
After hearing the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor and considering the statements made in the application and the facts and circumstances of the case we direct that in the event of the petitioner being arrested in connection with Case No. JC/2/463/II under Ss. 23 and 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 pending before the Second Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur, Bihar, he will be produced before the learned Magistrate within whose jurisdiction he is arrested and the learned Magistrate will release him on bail on condition that within the two weeks of such release he would surrender himself before the appropriate Court in connection with the aforesaid case.
6. In re: Gurdev Singh v. The State
After hearing the learned Advocate for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor and considering the statements made in the application and the facts and circumstances of the case we direct that in the event of the petitioners being arrested in connection with Bairagura (State of Bihar) Police Station Case No. 042/81 dated 30th May, 1981 under Ss. 467/468/420/353 of the Indian Penal Code pending before the Second Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur, Bihar, they will be produced before the learned Magistrate within whose jurisdiction they are arrested and the learned Magistrate will release them on bail on condition that within two weeks of such release they would surrender themselves before the appropriate Court in connection with the aforesaid case.
7. In re: Pulak Konti Guha v. The State
After hearing the learned Advocate for the petitioners and the learned ??? Prosecutor and considering the statements made in the application and the facts and circumstances of the case we direct that in the event of the petitioners being arrested in connection with Case No. 160 of 1981 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, under Ss. 420/468/471/472 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code they will be produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate within whose jurisdiction they are arrested and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate will release them on bail on condition that within two weeks of such release they would surrender themselves before the appropriate Court in connection with the aforesaid case.
N.G Chaudhuri J.:—I agree
Preliminary objection overruled; Bail granted.
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