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Mahabir Saha v. Haripada Saha And Others

Calcutta High Court
Aug 24, 1981
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs allege title to a disputed property that originally belonged to Abdul Sobhan Khan and, after his death, came into the hands of multiple persons. The family tree relevant to the dispute: Gopal Chandra Saha (deceased in 1928) was the father of defendant No. 1 (Mahabir), and grandfather of plaintiff No. 1. Gopal Chandra's children included Mahabir, Haralal (son), and Milan Bala (wife of predeceased son Krishnalal). Haralal later died leaving a widow and a son (plaintiff No. 1, Haripada Saha).

Gopal Chandra owned multiple premises in Dacca Municipality. Because Milan Bala was not an heir of Gopal Chandra, he provided for her maintenance by gifting two rooms of his residential house and a monthly sum of Rs. 6. After the partition of Bengal, the plaintiffs and the defendants migrated to West Bengal. Defendant No.1 acted as Karta of the Hindu joint family. An arrangement was reached with the Muslim co-owners for an exchange of properties: the Dacca property valued at Rs. 17,000 and the Dum Dum (Calcutta) property valued at Rs. 22,000. Powers of attorney were exchanged and, in September 1950, possession was delivered in terms of those powers of attorney.

Defendant No.1 realised rents and, on 26 November 1956, a permanent deed of lease (Ext. 2) was executed concerning the Calcutta property at 23/1B, Dum Dum Road. The plaintiffs say plaintiff No.1 was a minor and plaintiff No.2 was an illiterate/pardanasin woman and that the deed was obtained by fraud to declare plaintiffs' share as 1/3 and Mahabir’s as 2/3, although plaintiffs assert their rightful share was one moiety (8 annas each). Plaintiffs sought partition; the learned Subordinate Judge accepted the plaintiffs' version and passed a preliminary decree directing accounts. Defendant No.1 appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disputed permanent deed of lease (Ext. 2) executed on 26 November 1956 is binding on the parties.
  2. Whether the deed of mortgage (regarding a Dacca property) required registration under Section 17(1)(c) of the Indian Registration Act and whether the endorsement (Ext. A) falls under clause (xi) of sub‑section (2) as an exception.
  3. Whether the admission in Ext. 2 (and related admissions by plaintiff No.2) has probative value as substantive evidence and what weight it should carry.
  4. What are the respective shares of the parties in the disputed premises and whether any fraud or collusion vitiated the deed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant No. 1)'s Arguments

  • The deed of lease (Ext. 2) is binding on the plaintiffs and on defendant No.1; it establishes the plaintiffs' share as 1/3 and defendant No.1's share as 2/3.
  • Plaintiff No.2 (mother of plaintiff No.1) is not an illiterate or pardanasin woman; she executed the lease with full knowledge after the document was prepared by a lawyer and read over to her.
  • Defendant No.1 expended substantial sums (more than Rs. 4,000 personally and Rs. 5,000 cash to Muslim co-owners) in furtherance of the arrangement and paid mortgage dues (Rs. 1,000) incurred by Haralal; such expenditures justify the greater share claimed by Mahabir.

Respondent (Plaintiffs)' Arguments

  • Counsel for the plaintiffs relied on authorities (including Hannuman Persuad) that a guardian can alienate a minor's share only for the benefit of the estate or legal necessity; there was no such necessity or benefit to justify the deed of lease.
  • When dealing with a pardanasin or illiterate woman, the person asserting validity must show the contents were read over and explained; there is no certificate in Ext. 2 showing the deed was read and explained to plaintiff No.2.
  • Defendant No.1, as Karta, had no personal fund and therefore could not have paid Rs. 5,000 from his own funds, implying impropriety in the asserted consideration and thereby challenging the lease's validity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hannuman Persuad (1856) 6 MIA 393 That a guardian can alienate a minor's share or deal with his interest only for the benefit of the estate or for legal necessity. Referred to by the plaintiff-respondent. The court considered the principle but did not find facts showing legal necessity or benefit; moreover the court relied on other reasons (no pleading of fraud and admissions) and did not apply this authority to invalidate Ext. 2.
Chinta Desya v. Bhalku Das (1930) 51 Cal LJ 465; AIR 1930 Cal 591 Authority on protection of pardanasin/illiterate women and requirement to show documents were read over and explained. The court held these Calcutta decisions inapplicable because plaintiff No.2 was found not to be a pardanasin or illiterate woman (she testified and signed the deed).
Sm. Sonia Parshini… v. Sheikh Moula Baksha… (AIR 1955 Cal 3.7 / AIR 1955 Cal 17) Cases applying the principle that when dealing with a pardanasin/illiterate woman the person asserting validity must show the deed was explained/read over. The court found this line of authority inapplicable on the facts because plaintiff No.2 was neither pardanasin nor illiterate and thus these protections did not apply.
A.E.G. Carapiet… v. A.Y. Derderian… (AIR 1961 Cal 359) Another decision on the safeguards in transactions involving pardanasin or illiterate women. The court declined to apply this precedent because plaintiff No.2 was not pardanasin or illiterate and had participated in the execution and acted under the deed.
Mohini Mohan v. Southern Bank Ltd. (1954) 94 Cal LJ 39 Referenced with other Calcutta cases on the protection of pardanasin/illiterate women and the requirement of explanation/read-over. The court stated that this authority did not apply to the present facts for the same reason — plaintiff No.2 was not pardanasin or illiterate.
Bharat Singh v. Mst. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405 Statement that an admission is substantive evidence; weight to be attached is a separate question. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to treat the admission in Ext. 2 (and related statements) as substantive evidence supporting the genuineness of the deed of lease.
Sitaram v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1977 SC 1712 Contains a dissenting note regarding admission and the requirement to confront a witness with previous statements. The court distinguished Sitaram as involving a certified copy of a witness statement and noted it was distinguishable on its facts; the court observed other Supreme Court decisions that held confronting the witness is not necessary for admitting an admission.
AIR 1977 SC 409; AIR 1974 SC 117 (at p. 119) Supreme Court decisions stating that when there is an admission, it is not necessary to confront the person concerned with his previous statement before admitting it. The court relied on the principle from these authorities to support admitting the admission as evidence without prior confrontation and thereby treating Ext. 2 as genuine.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step by step, addressing the issues raised by the parties and how the available evidence and legal provisions applied:

  1. Binding nature of Ext. 2 (Deed of Lease): The court observed there was no specific averment in the pleadings that Ext. 2 was not binding on the plaintiffs, nor was there a specific pleading that the document was obtained by fraud or collusion. The Muslim co‑sharers (other parties to the exchange) were not made parties to the suit. Given the lack of pleadings challenging the validity of the deed, the court treated the question of bindingness in light of the evidence, including admissions and conduct.
  2. Status of plaintiff No.2 and applicability of pardanasin/illiteracy protections: The court found that plaintiff No.2 had appeared in court to give evidence and had signed the deed for herself and her son, and thus she was neither a pardanasin nor an illiterate woman. Consequently, the Calcutta decisions cited by the respondents (which protect pardanasin/illiterate women and require proof that the document was read and explained) were held inapplicable to the facts of the case.
  3. Registration and mortgage dues on Dacca properties: Regarding a mortgage executed by Haralal for Rs. 1,000, the court noted Section 17(1)(c) of the Indian Registration Act requires registration to extinguish a mortgage of that amount, but clause (xi) of sub‑section (2) provides an exception. The endorsement Ext. A was proved to show the mortgage dues were paid; the court held Ext. A admissible and that, in view of clause (xi) of S.17(2), registration was not necessary because the mortgage dues were not extinguished by registration but shown by endorsement. The court also observed defendant No.1's statement that he would satisfy Haralal's mortgage dues.
  4. Effect of timing and nature of exchange: Although the parties had contracted for exchange in 1950, the court held that title would accrue only upon execution of the deed in 1956. The court treated the instrument as a permanent lease and observed that the deed recorded plaintiffs' share as 1/3 and Mahabir's as 2/3.
  5. Admissibility and weight of admissions: The court held admissions are substantive evidence, relying on Bharat Singh v. Mst. Bhagirathi (AIR 1966 SC 405). It considered a line of Supreme Court decisions (including those cited) to conclude that an admission need not be excluded merely because the person was not confronted with a previous statement; Sitaram was distinguished on its facts. The court found no proof that the admission was erroneous and therefore treated Ext. 2 as genuine.
  6. Evidence of conduct and absence of fraud: The court relied on testimony (P.W.1 and others) showing that after execution of the lease Mahabir paid 2/3 share of cess and taxes and plaintiffs paid 1/3 for about ten years without objection. The court regarded this conduct, together with corroborative evidence that the deed had been explained by the lawyer and signed in the presence of witnesses, as supporting the genuineness of Ext. 2 and as inconsistent with a case of fraud. The court therefore ruled out fraud.
  7. Allocation of rooms and rights of Milan Bala: On the evidence regarding the Dacca residence, the court accepted that Milan Bala had been given two rooms for life and Rs. 6 per month for maintenance; after her death those rooms would revert to the donors. The court accepted the division of rooms as six rooms to defendant No.1, three to the plaintiffs and one small room, consistent with the factual pleadings and evidence.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The court declared that the plaintiffs have a one‑third (1/3) share and defendant No.1 (Mahabir) has a two‑thirds (2/3) share in the disputed property.

The declaration is subject to the rights of defendant No.2 (Milan Bala): she retains a right of residence in respect of the two rooms allotted to her and is entitled to Rs. 6 per mensem for her maintenance out of the income of the property for her life. The earlier judgment and decree were modified accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. agreed with this disposition.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is modification of the subordinate court's decree to reflect the 1/3 — 2/3 division and to preserve Milan Bala's life rights to two rooms and maintenance of Rs. 6 per month.
  • The opinion does not purport to set out any novel legal principle or broad precedent beyond applying existing authorities on admissions, the protection of pardanasin/illiterate women (which it found inapplicable here), and the statutory provisions on registration and transfer; the decision is fact‑specific.
Show all summary ...

B.N Maitra, J.:— The plaintiffs allege that the disputed property originally belonged to one Abdul Sobhan Khan and after his death that property was acquired by many persons. Gopal Chandra Saha was the father of defendant No. 1, Mahabir, and grandfather of plaintiff No. 1. In 1928, Gopal expired leaving Mahabir, Haralal (son) and one Milan Bala, defendant No. 2, who is the widow of his predeceased son, Krishnalal Saha. Haralal died in 1354 B.S leaving his widow and son (plaintiff No. 1), Haripada Saha, Gopal Chandra was the owner of premises No. 55, Subal Das Road, 35, Nawabgunj Road, 50/1, Subal Das Road and 47, Nawabgunj Das Road within the Dacca Municipality. Since Milan Bala was not an heir of Gopal Chandra, he made provision for her maintenance by making a gift of 2 rooms of his residential house for her and also providing for a sum of Rs. 6 per month for her maintenance. After partition of Bengal the plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 and defendant No, 2 migrated to West Bengal. Defendant No. 1 was the Karta of the Hindu joint family. An arrangement was made with the heirs of Abdul Sovan Khan that an exchange would be made. The valuation of the Dacca property was assessed at Rs. 17,000 and of the Dum Dum property in Calcutta at Rs. 22,000. Powers of Attorney were executed. The plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 executed a power of Attorney in favour of the Muslim co-owners. The latter also executed a power of Attorney in favour of defendant No. 1 because the plaintiff No. 1 was a minor and plaintiff No. 2 an illiterate woman. In September, 1950, the parties delivered possession of the respective properties in terms of the power of Attorney. Then defendant No. 1 realised the rents of the disputed property on his behalf and on behalf of the plaintiffs. Then on the 26th Nov. 1956, a document of lease was executed regarding the disputed property at 23/1.B, Dum Dum Road, Calcutta. Since the plaintiff No. 1 was then a minor and his mother an illiterate pardanasin woman, they had to depend entirely on Mahabir in the matter of execution of the lease. The said plaintiff and defendant No. 1 had moiety share in the Dacca property and consequently they acquired 1/2 share each in the Calcutta property on the footing of the document of such lease. It appears that taking advantage of the minority of the plaintiff No. 1 and illiteracy of the plaintiff No. 2, Haripada committed fraud and it was recited in the Deed of Lease that the plaintiffs had only 1/3rd share and Mahabir had 2/3rd share therein and sum of Rs. 5000 had been paid by him from his own fund. In fact, Mahabir had no much money. That sum was paid by him from the profits of the joint property. The plaintiffs experienced difficulty and they asked for partition. But Mahabir did not comply with the demand. Hence the suit for partition on the allegation that the plaintiffs had 8 annas share in the property in question.

2. Defendant No. 2 Milan Bala filed a written statement supporting the plaintiff's assertions.

3. Defendant No. I filed a written statement denying the plaintiffs' allegations. His case is that after the death of Gopal Chandra, Haralal sold his undivided 1/2 share in the premises No. 50, Subal Das Road to a stranger, Haralal also mortgaged premises No. 55, Subal Das Road for Rs. 1000. Defendant No. 1 paid that debt and obtained the deed of mortgage from the mortgagee. Hence Haralal had the liability to pay this dues. After that arrangement for exchange was made, defendant No. 1 spent more than Rupees 4000 from his personal fund. He also paid Rs. 5000 in cash to the Muslim co-owners when the aforesaid deed of leasa was finally executed.

4. The learned Subordinate Judge believed the plaintiffs' version and passed a decree in a preliminary form giving a direction for necessary accounts. This appeal is by the defendant No. 1.

5. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the deed of lease, Ext. 2, is binding on the plaintiffs and also on the appellant defendant No. 1. Plaintiff No. 2, mother of plaintiff No. 1, is not an illiterate or pardanasin woman. The permanent deed of lease, Ext. 2, was executed by her with full knowledge of its purport and contents. Both the documents were prepared by a lawyer and the lease in question was read over to plaintiff No. 2. Hence the plaintiffs cannot get any decree for 8 annas share in the property. Their share is 1/3rd and hence the decree should be modified accordingly. Plaintiff No, 1 clearly accepted the document of lease, Ext. 2, and admitted therein that the plaintiffs had only 1/3rd share and for the remaining 2/3rds share of the property belonged to him.

6. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent has referred to the well-known case of Hannuman Persuad in (1856) 6 MIA 393. It has been stated there that the guardian can alienate the minor's share or deal with his interest only for the benefit of the estate or legal necessity. There is no such legal necessity or any element of benefit of the minor plaintiff No. 1 when the deed of lease was executed. Reference has also been made to the cases of Chinta Desya v. Bhalku Das in (1930) 51 Cal LJ 465 3 (AIR 1930 Cal 591), Sm. Sonia Parshini… v. Sheikh Moula Baksha…. in AIR 1955 Cal 3.7 and A.E.G Carapiet… v. A.Y Derderian…. in AIR 1961 Cal 359 and Mohini Mohan v. Southern Bank Ltd., reported in (1954) 94 Cal LJ 39. It has been urged that when a person is dealing with a pardanasin illiterate woman, it is for him to show that the contents of the deed were read over and explained to her. It has also been stated that the privilege extended to a pardanasin lady will apply to an illiterate woman, though not pardanasin. Moreover there is no certificate in Ext. 2 that the documents were read over and explained. The omission of giving a certificate that the document was read over and explained to her cannot be lightly treated. If the document is not read over and explained to the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 cannot claim moiety share in the property due to such defects. Defendant No. 1 was the Karta at the relevant time. He had no personal fund when the disputed lease, Ext. 2, was executed.

7. The first question arises, whether the disputed lease, Ext. 2, is binding on the parties. It may be pointed out that there is no averment that the document of lease is not binding on the plaintiffs. The Muslim co-sharers of the Dacca properties have not been made parties to the Suit. Plaintiffs did not make appropriate prayer that such document of lease was obtained by practising fraud or collusion.

8. It appears that plaintiff No. 2 is not a pardanasin woman because she appeared before the learned Subordinate Judge and gave evidence. She also signed the document of lease on her behalf and also oil behalf of her son and was not an illiterate woman. So the aforesaid cases of Chinta Dasya v. Bhalku Das (AIR 1930 Cal 591) (supra), Sm. Sonia Parshini… v. Sheikh Moula Baksha…. (AIR 1955 Cal 17) (supra), A.E.G Carapiet… v. A.Y Derderian…. (AIR 1961 Cal 359) (supra) and Mohini Mohan v. Southern Bank Ltd. (1954-1994 Cal LJ 39) (supra) have no application to the facts of this case. The reason is simple because the plaintiff is not a pardanasin or illiterate woman. This discussion is sufficient for the disposal of the appeal because there is no appropriate prayer in the plaint in this respect.

9. Then about the Dacca properties. It has been pointed out on behalf of the appellant that Haralal executed a mortgage for Rs. 1000 regarding one of the Dacca properties and defendant No. 1 satisfied the dues of the mortgage. According to the provisions of S. 17(1)(c) of the Indian Registration Act, registration is necessary to extinguish a mortgage for Rs. 1000. But there is an exception, which has been engrafted in cl. (xi) of sub-sec. (2). The endorsement, Ext. A, has been proved in this case to show that the dues of the mortgage were paid. This is admissible in evidence and no registration thereof is necessary in view of cl. (xi) of S. 17(2) of the Indian Registration Act and cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) thereof does not apply as the mortgage dues were not extinguished by that endorsement, Ext. A. Moreover, the statement coming from the defendant No. 1 was that the mortgage dues payable by Haralal would be satisfied by defendant No. 1.

10. Then about the next stage of the case. The contract for exchange was arrived at in 1950, but document of lease was executed on 26th November, 1956, vide Ext. 2. Hence title will accrue only on the execution of the document of lease, though in fact they were documents of exchange within the meaning of provision of Section 118 of the Transfer of Property Act. A permanent lease was executed and it appears from the document of lease that the plaintiffs had 1/3rd share and Mahabir was the owner of the remaining 2/3rds share of the property.

11. It is now to be seen whether such admission made by the plaintiff No. 2 has any probative value in the eye of law. Law is that an admission is a substantive piece of evidence. This was stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh v. Mst. Bhagirathi reported in AIR 1966 SC 405 at page 410. It has been stated in that case that an admission is substantive evidence even though the parties are not confronted with such statement, but what weight should be attached to it is a different matter. Of course there id a dissenting note in the judgment of Sitaram v. Ram Chandra reported in AIR 1977 SC 1712. That case is distinguishable because in that case a certified copy of a statement of the witness was sought to be uses as his admission. In that view of the matter it has been stated in that case that an admission cannot be admitted in evidence unless the previous statements made be first put to him and liberty is given to him to explain the same. It may be pointed out that in that case of Sitaram, the Supreme Court decisions reported in AIR 1977 SC 409 and in AIR 1974 SC 117 at page 119 were not considered. It has been clearly stated in those cases that when there is an admission, it is not necessary to confront the person concerned with his previous statement. This admission has not been proved to be erroneous. In that view of the matter it must be held that the document of lease, Ext. 2, is a genuine document.

12. The last point is what are the shares of the parties regarding the disputed premises. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that Milan Bala's father-in-law, Gopal Chandra, made provision for her residence in Dacca town by making gift of two rooms to her. This arrangement was upheld by the parties by giving her two rooms, one by the plaintiffs and another by defendant No. 1. The provision is that after her death these rooms would be returned to the donors respectively.

13. This is common ground that there are 10 rooms in the house. Defendant No. 1 acquired six rooms and plaintiffs three rooms and there was another small room. So there is no difficulty in this respect.

14. P.W 1 Subhasini Saha, plaintiff No. 2, has stated in her evidence that she was present when their deed of lease was executed. P.W 3, Santosh, has stated that he was present when the documents were executed. The lawyer Rama Ranjan Chakraborty drafted both the documents. He knows that Rs. 5000 was paid in excess by Mahabir for which he got more share. At once a question was put to him why he did not raise any objection. He stated in evidence that was their family matter and he did not object to the excess share of Mahabir.

15. P.W 2, Milan Bala, defendant No. 2, stated that Rs. 5000 was paid. The defence is that both the deeds were read over and explained by the lawyer Ranjan Chakraborty. This version has been corroborated by D.W 2, Biswanath Paul, who says that the parties signed in the documents in their presence.

16. P.W 1, Suhasini, has stated in her cross-examination that after the execution of the Deed of Lease, Mahabir had been paying 2/3rds share and plaintiffs 1/3rd share towards cess and taxes. They did not raise any objection to the same for the last 10 years. This conclusively shows that the version given by the defendant No. 1 is true and the terms of Ext. 2, Deed of Lease, were accepted by the plaintiffs and they were acted upon-So the question of fraud is ruled out. Had there been any fraud, plaintiff No. 2 would not have accepted possession of only the four rooms and paid Municipal taxes to the extent of 1/3rd share. The defendant No. 2 has stated that plaintiffs had 1/3rd share. Hence the submissions made on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted. The decree must, therefore, be modified.

17. The appeal is allowed. It is hereby declared that the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 have 1/3rd share and 2/3rds share respectively in the disputed property subject to the right of residence of defendant No. 2 with respect to two rooms allotted to her, as well as her right to get Rs. 6 per mensem for her maintenance out of the income of the property for her life. The judgment and decree appealed against be modified accordingly.

18. There will be no order as to costs.

Banerjee, J.:— I agree.

Appeal allowed.