Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Satyanarayan Kamal Kumar v. Birendra Pr. Singh

Calcutta High Court
Jan 24, 1979
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued under a hire-purchase agreement dated 24-7-1967 in respect of a 1962 Willys Jeep (Reg. No. WBB 9796) against Defendant No. 1 (hirer) and Defendant No. 2 (guarantor), seeking recovery of arrears of hire, interest and damages, and possession of the vehicle or, in lieu, its market value of Rs. 6,498. The plaintiff alleged the defendants removed the vehicle to Tarwa in Varanasi District and failed to pay agreed hires. The plaintiff terminated the agreement by notices dated 4-12-67 and 19-12-67.

Only Defendant No. 2 contested. In his written statement he pleaded that (a) prior to 24-7-67 there was an oral purchase/loan agreement between the plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 (of which Defendant No. 2 was not a party); (b) Defendant No. 2 subsequently signed the written agreement of 24-7-67 as guarantor but on certain alleged oral terms; (c) the real transaction was a loan within the meaning of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and the plaintiff was an unlicensed money-lender making the hire-purchase agreement null and void; (d) the plaintiff breached an oral term by allowing removal of the vehicle without the guarantor's written permission thereby discharging the guarantor; and (e) the transaction was below the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court. The Court framed eight issues for trial.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the plaintiff a registered firm as alleged in the plaint?
  2. Did the plaintiff carry on business as money-lender and financier as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement of Defendant No. 2?
  3. Did the defendant fail and neglect to pay the instalments in terms of the agreement dated 24-7-67 despite demands as alleged in the plaint?
  4. (a) Was there any oral agreement between the plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 as alleged in paragraph 3(d)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the written statement?
    (b) If so, did it amount to a condition precedent as alleged in paragraph 3(d)(iv) of the written statement?
  5. Did the defendants remove the vehicle from Calcutta without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint?
  6. Was the notice of termination invalid or insufficient as alleged in paragraph 7 of the written statement?
  7. Has this Court jurisdiction to entertain, try and determine this suit as alleged in paragraph 11 of the written statement?
  8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The suit is based on a hire-purchase agreement dated 24-7-67 and seeks recovery of Rs. 10,671 (arrears of hire Rs. 1,239; market value Rs. 6,498; mesne profits Rs. 2,880), making the suit maintainable in this Court as a commercial suit and/or a money suit.
  • The Court's jurisdiction must be determined from the averments in the plaint; allegations in the written statement cannot oust jurisdiction where the plaint itself shows jurisdiction (relying on AIR 1967 SC 369).
  • The plaintiff denied that it carried on money-lending business in the regular course and denied the alleged oral tripartite agreement and condition precedent relied upon by Defendant No. 2.
  • The plaintiff relied on notices (20-11-67 and 4-12-67) purportedly terminating the agreement; receipt of those notices was not denied in the pleadings.

Defendant No. 2's Arguments

  • The transaction was really a loan of Rs. 5,500 (a financial transaction) and therefore below the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court; the hire-purchase form was a sham.
  • The plaintiff carried on money-lending business without obtaining a licence under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, rendering the agreement null and void.
  • There was an oral tripartite agreement imposing conditions precedent to Defendant No. 2's liability as guarantor; in particular, Defendant No. 2 alleged the plaintiff breached that oral term by permitting removal of the vehicle without the guarantor's written permission, which discharged him.
  • The written notices of termination were invalid or insufficient; hence no cause of action arose.
  • Relied on provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act (including Section 2 sub-sections and Sections 40(1) & (4)) to contend certain documents are void/unenforceable and that the guarantee should be treated as a "promise to pay" within the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vasudev Gopalkrishna Tambwekar v. Board of Liquidators, Happy Home Co-operative Society Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 369 Jurisdiction: where the plaint shows jurisdiction, a defendant cannot oust the ordinary court by alleging a relation (e.g., landlord/tenant) in the written statement; exclusive jurisdiction arises only if pleaded by the party invoking it. The Court relied on this authority to hold that jurisdiction must be assessed from the plaint and therefore this Court had jurisdiction to try the suit; the written statement's allegations on jurisdiction were held irrelevant to defeat jurisdiction shown by the plaint.
Dugar and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1976) 37 STC 231 (Mad) On substance: whether a transaction is a sale/hire-purchase or a financial transaction; court can characterize transaction based on terms and circumstances. The Court cited this decision to support the conclusion that similar transactions were held to be financial (not true sales/hire-purchase) and used it as persuasive authority in determining the nature of the present transaction.
Shyamsunder Bubna v. Manindra Nath Ghosh, AIR 1967 Cal 256 Held a transaction recorded as hire-purchase to be in substance a financial agreement, entitling the creditor to a money decree. Used as precedent that under similar facts a transaction may be treated as financial rather than hire-purchase; supported the Court's view that the present agreement was financial.
Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1178 Courts may go behind the form of documents to determine the true effect of a transaction in the light of surrounding circumstances; the true nature of a transaction is determinable notwithstanding its formal label. The Court quoted and followed this principle to justify looking beyond the hire-purchase label and finding that the transaction was in substance a financing transaction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded issue by issue, applying statutory definitions, evidentiary findings and established authorities strictly as presented in the record.

Jurisdiction (Issue No. 7): The Court accepted the plaintiff's submission that jurisdiction is to be determined from the plaint. Relying on AIR 1967 SC 369, it held the plaint showed this Court had jurisdiction (plaintiff's claim amount and nature of the suit), and the defendant could not displace that jurisdiction by allegations in the written statement. Therefore, the objection that the suit was below pecuniary jurisdiction because the transaction was a Rs. 5,500 loan was rejected.

Money-lender question (Issue No. 2): The Court examined the relevant definitions from the Bengal Money-Lenders Act as cited (Sections 2(9), 2(13), 2(14) as set out in the opinion). It noted the statutory distinction between a "lender" (one who advances a loan) and a "money-lender" (one who carries on money-lending as a business). The plaintiff's witness admitted two loans had been advanced, but the Court found no evidence that the plaintiff carried on money-lending in the regular course of business. The defendant had not suggested this to the plaintiff's witness nor proved regular money-lending activity. Consequently, the plaintiff was held to be a "lender" not a "money-lender," and no licence under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act was required for the plaintiff on the record before the Court. The issue was decided against the defendants.

Oral tripartite guarantee and Section 40 argument (Issues No. 4(a) & (b)): The defendant alleged an oral tripartite agreement made the guarantor's liability conditional. However, in his evidence the defendant admitted that the terms of the guarantee were in writing and were incorporated in the written agreement of 24-7-67, effectively abandoning the oral plea. The attempt to raise, at argument, that the guarantee was void under Section 40(1) and (4) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act (on the basis that the guarantee constituted a "promise to pay" or a prohibited document) was rejected for two reasons stated by the Court: (1) it was a new case raised at argument and was not pleaded; and (2) the guarantee was conditional/collateral in nature and did not fall within the list of documents in Section 40(1) (which, per the Court's analysis, targets unconditional "promises to pay" such as promissory notes). The Court relied on the statutory definition of a contract of guarantee (as a collateral engagement) to hold that Section 40(1) did not include guarantees. Accordingly, the Section 40 attack failed and the Court declined to deal further with authorities on that point.

Removal of the vehicle and notices (Issues Nos. 5 & 6): The Court noted both parties admitted the vehicle was removed from Calcutta and that correspondences (Ext. A) recorded mutual blame about who connived in the removal. Because Defendant No. 2 had admitted in evidence that the guarantee's terms were in the written agreement (or that he signed on the representation that they were), the alleged oral condition precedent regarding written permission for removal lost force. Clause 2(c) of the agreement required the hirer to inform the plaintiff of change of address/place where the vehicle was kept; the plaintiff's letter dated 4-12-67 demonstrated plaintiff's knowledge of the vehicle's removal (and implicitly that the removal was not with consent). The Court held the real cause of action was nonpayment of agreed hire. Regarding termination notices, the Court observed that the pleadings admitted receipt of the notices (20-11-67 and 4-12-67) even where validity was disputed; because receipt was not denied in the pleadings, it was for the defendant to establish invalidity, which he did not do satisfactorily. The Court therefore rejected the defendant's challenge to sufficiency/validity of the termination notices.

Nature of the transaction and liability (Issue No. 3): Evidence (including admission by plaintiff's witness Todi) showed that the defendant had received an admitted loan of Rs. 5,500 at the time of the agreement and that the prior purchase price had been paid under an earlier agreement; the new agreement treated the loan as the purchase price under a fresh document. The Court analysed authorities (Dugar and Co.; Shyamsunder Bubna; Sundaram Finance) and concluded that, on the facts and surrounding circumstances, the transaction was in substance a financial transaction secured by the vehicle rather than a genuine hire-purchase. Nonetheless, the admitted loan of Rs. 5,500 remained unpaid; the defendant did not dispute non-payment. Consequently, the Court found the plaintiff entitled to a money decree for the unpaid loan.

Other findings: The plaintiff proved it was a registered partnership (Issue No. 1). The Court declined to accept late procedural/argument-stage points not pleaded or proved in evidence (e.g., the Section 40 attack raised only at argument).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 5,500 with interest and costs.

Specific consequences ordered by the Court:

  • Decree for Rs. 5,500 in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants.
  • Interim interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
  • Interest on the judgment at the rate of 6% per annum until realization.
  • Costs awarded to the plaintiff.

Broader implications: The Court held (following cited authorities) that courts may look beyond the form of documents to determine the true nature of transactions, and on the facts here treated the agreement as a financing transaction rather than a genuine hire-purchase. The opinion does not purport to create new legal precedent; it applies existing authorities and statutory definitions to the facts and reaches a decree for the unpaid loan.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff's suit is on a hire-purchase agreement dated 24-7-67 in respect of a 1962 model Willys Jeep bearing registration No. WBB 9796 against the defendant No 1 as the hirer and against the defendant No. 2 as the guarantor, for recovery of arrears of hire, interests and damages. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, in breach of the terms of the said agreement had removed the vehicle to Tarwa, in the District of Varanashi and failed to pay the agreed hires. The agreement was terminated by the plaintiff by notices dated 4-12-67 and 19-12-67. In this suit, the plaintiff also claimed possession of the said vehicle or in lieu the present market value of Rs. 6498/-.

2. Only the defendant No. 2 contested the suit. In the written statement he alleged that prior to 24-7-67, there was an oral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 for purchase of this vehicle and the plaintiff had given loan to the defendant No. 1 in that connection. These alleged oral terms were set out in the written statement. The defendant No. 2 was not a party in that agreement. The defendant No. 2, however, admitted having signed the written agreement dated 24-7-67 subsequently as a guarantor but on certain oral terms mentioned in paragraph 3(d) of the written statement. According to him the real transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 was a loan transaction within the meaning of Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The plaintiff is carrying on money lending business without holding any Money-Lending Licence. Hence the hire-purchase agreement in suit is null and void. He further alleged that in breach of the oral terms of guarantee, the plaintiff allowed the defendant No. 1 to remove the vehicle from Calcutta without the guarantor's written permission and as such he was discharged from all liabilities under the guarantee agreement. The last defence was that the real transaction being loan transaction below the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. It has been alleged that plaintiff is not a registered firm and the notice of termination was invalid and insufficient. Following issues were raised:—

ISSUES:

1. Is the plaintiff a registered firm as alleged in the plaint?

2. Did the plaintiff carry on business as money-lender and Financier as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement of the defendant No. 2?

3. Did the defendant fail and neglect to pay the instalments in terms of the agreement dated 24th July, 1967 in spite of demands as alleged in paragraph 6 of the plaint?

4. (a) Was there any oral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 as alleged in paragraph 3(d)(i), (ii) and. (iii) of the written statement?

(b) If so, does it amount to a condition precedent as alleged in paragraph 3 (d)(iv) of the written statement?

5. Did the defendants remove the vehicle from Calcutta without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint?

6. Was the notice of termination invalid or insufficient as alleged in paragraph 7 of the written statement?

7. Has this Hon'ble Court jurisdiction to entertain, try and determine this suit as alleged in paragraph 11 of the written statement?

8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

Issue No. 7

3. It has been submitted on behalf of the defendant, that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit because the transaction in suit was not a commercial transaction relating to buying or selling of goods as alleged in the suit. The transaction in suit was a loan of Rs. 5500/- below the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court and as such the suit should be dismissed on that ground. On behalf of the plaintiff it has been submitted that the suit is on a hire-purchase agreement and the claim in the suit is for Rs. 10671/- consisting of arrears of hire of Rs. 1239/-, market value of the vehicle of Rs. 6498/- and the mesne profit of Rupees 2880/-. The suit is maintainable both as a commercial suit for buying and selling of goods as well as pure money suit. In 1968, the pecuniary limit was over Rs. 10000/- so far as this court is concerned. Mrs. Chowcharia, appearing for the plaintiff has submitted that whether a court has jurisdiction to try a suit or not should be ascertained from the averments of the plaint only. If the plaint shows that the court trying the suit has jurisdiction, the defendant is not entitled to dispose the jurisdiction on the basis of the allegations in the written statement. In support, she relied on AIR 1967 SC 369 (Vasudev Gopalkrishna Tambwekar v. Board of Liquidators, Happy Home Co-operative Society Ltd.). In this case the society in an Arbitration Proceeding claimed that the respondent had ceased to be a member on account default of payment of loan and demanded vacant possession. The respondent therein alleged before the Arbitrators that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and as such only the Small Cause Court was competent to adjudicate on the dispute between the parties in view of the provisions of Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. The Arbitrators did not accept the contentions of the respondents and made the Award in favour of the society. A decree followed that Award after certain proceedings. At the stage of execution, the respondents took out a chamber application for stay of execution on the ground that the Award was made without jurisdiction and obtained an order in his favour. The society preferred an appeal and the order appealed from was set aside by the appeal Court, holding there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The matter came up to the Supreme Court and at para. 10 of this report at p. 374 it was held:—

“The exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes arises only if the person invoking the jurisdiction of the Court alleges that the other party is a tenant or a landlord and the question is one which is referred to in Section 28. Where the person so invoking does not set up the claim that the other party is a tenant, or a landlord, the defendant is not entitled to displace the jurisdiction of the ordinary Court by an allegation that he stands in that relation qua the other and on that ground the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit or proceeding or an application.”

4. The plaint in the suit proceeds on the basis of one hire-purchase agreement dated 24-7-67. Reading the plaint as it is, nobody can say that this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit. I humbly agree with the observation in AIR 1967 SC 369 and hold that this court has jurisdiction to try this suit. The allegations in the written statement are irrelevant for determining existence of jurisdiction.

Issue No. 2

5. On behalf of the defendant No. 2 it has been submitted that the plaintiff is a money-lender and is carrying on money-lending business without licence. In support of his contention, the counsel for the defendant No. 2 relied an Section 2 Sub-Sections (2), (8), (9), (12), (13), (14) and (22) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. It would be significant to note that Section 2 Sub-Sections (2), (8), (12) and (22) have nothing to do with the definition of “money-lender”. Section 2(9) defines the word “lender” which includes a “money-lender” and the words ‘Money-lender’ and ‘money-lending business’ have been defined in Sections 2(13) and (14) which are as follows:—

2(9) “Lender” means a person who advances a loan and includes a money-lender;

2(13) “Money-lender” means a person who carries on the business of money-lending in (West Bengal) or who has a place of such business in (West Bengal), and includes a pawnee as defined in Section 172 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872;

2(14) “Money-lending business” and “business of money-lending” means the business of advancing loans either solely or in conjunction with any other business;

6. The above definitions clearly establish that “money-lender” is a person who carries on business of money lending in the regular course of business but mere “lender” is not so. It has been submitted that the plaintiff's witness Todi has admitted in his evidence that the plaintiff had given two loans to the defendant No. 1 on two separate occasions. Even then, the plaintiff cannot come under the definition of money-lender as there is no evidence on record that it carries on business of money-lending in the regular course of its business. The persons who have entered into one or two isolated transaction or transactions of advancing money will come under the definition of “lender” as defined under Section 2(9) of the Act. In my view, the plaintiff also comes under the definition of “lender”. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff as a ‘lender’ is not required to obtain a money-lending licence as the same is required for those money lenders who carry on money lending business regularly. The case that the plaintiff has been carrying on business of money lending without obtaining a money lending licence has not been suggested to the plaintiff's witness Todi by the defendant when he was in the witness box. The defendant also failed to prove that the plaintiff carries on money lending business in regular course. This issue is, therefore, decided against the defendants.

Issue No. 4(a) and (b)

7. In paragraph 3(c)(d) and (e) of the written statement, the defendant No. 2 alleged that he had agreed to sign the agreement dated 24-7-67 as a guarantor on the basis of a tripartite oral agreement set out in paragraph 3(d)(i) to (iv) of the written statement and those terms were the conditions precedent to the attachment of his liability or obligation under the said guarantee. In his evidence, however, the defendant No. 2 admitted that all the terms of guarantee were in writing and were incorporated in the written agreement of 24-7-67 (Q. 18-23). In view of this evidence of the defendant No. 2 it is clear that the defendant No. 2 abandoned and/or departed from his pleadings in paragraphs 3(c)(d) and (e) of the written statement. The defendant No. 2 failed to prove the oral agreement alleged in the written statement and tried to set up a case that Todi had represented to him that all the terms were recorded in the agreement of 24-7-67 and he had signed on that basis. This alleged “representation” has not been pleaded in the written statement and it is an absolutely new case set up for the first time at the hearing. Finding this difficulty, the counsel for the defendant No. 2 has submitted that the plaintiff is a “lender” within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act and as such the provisions of Section 40(1) and (4) of the Act will apply in this case. The said provisions are as follows:

Section 40(1) : No lender shall take from a borrower or intending borrower any note, promise to pay, power of attorney, bond or security which does not state (the address of the borrower, the date and place of the transaction,) the actual amount of the loan, the rate of interest charged and the time, if any, within which the principal is stipulated to be regard in full, or which states any of such particulars incorrectly, nor shall he take from, any borrower or intending borrower any instrument in which any entry is left blank for completion at a later date.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, any note, promise to pay, power of attorney, bond, security or document referred to in Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (3) shall be void and unenforceable.

8. According to the counsel for the defendant No. 2 the agreement of guarantee is a promise to pay. He has also submitted that the agreement dated 24-7-67 does not contain the correct figure of loan or interest and as a result the document has become void due to the operation of the provisions of Section 40(4) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. This is an absolutely new case set up for the first time at the stage of argument. This case does not find any place in the written statement. In any event, it is clear from the document itself that even if the plaintiff is a “lender” within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Act, the plaintiff has not taken any of the documents mentioned in Sub-Section (1) of Section 40 of the B.M Act. The words “promise to pay” may mean a promissory note under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Under Section 4 of the said Act a promissory note means an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker to pay a certain sum of money. But in this case, the guarantee agreement is alleged to be conditional on fulfilment of certain conditions precedent. Hence this guarantee cannot be construed as a promissory note or an allied document and/or unconditional undertaking. The words “promise to pay” are also found in Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act where a time barred debt can be revived by virtue of such express promise to pay. The guarantee agreement in suit is certainly not an agreement of that nature. A guarantee is a collateral engagement to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person. Section 125 of the Indian Contract Act defines the contract of guarantee as follows:—

Section 126 : A “contract of guarantee” is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge of liability of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the “surety”; the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the “principal debtor”, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the “creditor.” A guarantee may be either oral or written.

9. The liability of the guarantor is conditional upon the default committed by the principal debtor. This conditional liability does not come under the expression “promise to pay”. In my opinion, Section 40, Sub-Section (1) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act does not include a “guarantee”. By accepting this guarantee the plaintiff has not accepted any document within the meaning of Section 40(1) of the B.M Act from the defendant No. 2. Moreover, this being an absolutely new case set up at this stage of argument for the first time I am unable to accept this submission on behalf of the defendant No. 2. Under the circumstances I am also not dealing with the cases cited by the counsel for the defendant No. 2 on this point. These issues are also answered against the defendants.

Issues Nos. 5 and 6

10. It is an admitted position that the defendant had removed the vehicle from Calcutta. According to the plaintiff, removal of the vehicle by the defendant No. 1 was with the connivance of the defendant No. 2, and according to the defendant No. 2, it was with the connivance of the plaintiff. These mutual allegations have been recorded in the correspondences which passed between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 and are part of Ext. A. The main object, so far as the defendant No. 2 is concerned is to prove that by allowing the defendant No. 1 to remove the vehicle from Calcutta, without the written permission of the defendant No. 2, the plaintiff has committed breach of one of the vital terms of the oral agreement of guarantee which is a condition precedent to the attachment of any liability under the said agreement. But I have already held that the defendant No. 2 has failed to prove this alleged oral agreement of guarantee and/or the condition precedent by admitting in his evidence that all terms agreed between the defendant No. 2, the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 were incorporated in the agreement dated 24-7-67 and/or at least, the defendant No. 2 signed the said agreement on that representation. In view of the above, the fact of removal of the vehicle out of Calcutta, by the defendant No. 1 has lost all its force, so far as this case or defendant No. 2 is concerned. Under clause 2 (c) of the agreement dated 24-7-67, the defendant No. 1 was under the obligation to keep the plaintiff informed about his change of his address as also the change of the place where the vehicle is kept. The plaintiff's letter dated 4-12-67 (page 9 of Ext. A) proved that the plaintiff had full knowledge that the defendant No. 1 had removed the vehicle to his native place without paying the agreed hire. It appears from the said letter although the plaintiff came to know of this fact, the removal was not with plaintiff's consent as otherwise, the defendant No. 1 would not have been able to remove the vehicle without paying the hires due. However, this fact of removal of the vehicle has hardly any importance any more as already held by me. The real cause of action in the suit is nonpayment of agreed hire. Under clause 5 of the agreement dated 24-7-67, the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the agreement with or without notice on the ground inter alia, default of payment of hire. The plaintiff alleged in paragraph 10 of the plaint that this agreement was terminated by a written notice dated 4-12-67 addressed to the defendant No. 2. This notice was not disclosed nor proved by the plaintiff. It was submitted on behalf of the defendant No. 2 that there was no such notice, the agreement was not terminated and as such there was no cause of action for filing this suit. It should be noted that in paragraph 9 of the written statement while dealing with the allegation of notice of termination dated 4-12-67, the defendant No. 2 relied on the said notice. Hence it cannot be said that the defendant No. 2 challenged the existence or receipt of the notice, what he has denied is the validity and sufficiency of the document. Moreover, in paragraph 8 of the plaint, the plaintiff had alleged service of notice dated 20-11-67 on the defendant No. 1 terminating the said agreement. In dealing with the same, the defendant No. 2 in paragraph 7 of his written statement, denied the plaintiff's right to terminate the same and challenged the validity and sufficiency of the said notice. The existence of this document or receipt of this notice by the defendant No. 1 was not denied. The receipt of both the notices dated 20-11-67 and 4-12-67 having been admitted in the written statement, it was for the defendant No. 2 to establish the invalidity or insufficiency of the said notices. No submission was made on that point on behalf of the defendant No. 2 excepting denial of receipt of the same which is contrary to the pleading in the written statement. I am unable to accept this submission of the counsel for the defendant No. 2.

Issue No 1

11. The plaintiff has proved that it is a registered partnership.

Issue No. 3

12. In the written statement, the defendant No. 2 alleged that the plaintiff has advanced Rs. 5500/- to the defendant No. 1 and the hire-purchase agreement dated 24-7-67 is in fact a financial transaction and not a genuine hire-purchase. The plaintiff's witness Todi admitted in his evidence that at the time of agreement dated 24-7-67, the defendant No. 1. had paid the entire price in respect of the vehicle due under a prior hire-purchase agreement. Only the overdue interest and collection charges were outstanding when the defendant No. 1 approached the plaintiff for advance of Rs. 5500/- for repair of the vehicle. The plaintiff granted the said loan but it was agreed that the same would be treated as the purchase price under the fresh agreement dated 24-7-67. This loan of Rs. 5500/- is admitted by the defendant No. 2. The evidence of both the parties makes it quite clear that the transaction in fact was a financial one with the vehicle as a security and not a real hire-purchase or sale. In a case reported in (1976) 37 STC 231 (Mad). Dugar and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu the question arose whether the transaction was a sale or a hire-purchase. In that case Dugar and Co. advanced loan against the security of motor cars to a customer who signed a sale note in respect of the said vehicle in favour of Dugar and Co. Thereafter a hire-purchase agreement was executed recording Dugar and Co as the owner and the borrowers as the hirer wherein the money advanced were to be repaid by instalments. Registering Authorities under Motor Vehicles Act endorsed the agreement to the effect that the registration of the vehicle was subject to a hire-purchase agreement. This transaction was treated by the Revenue Authorities as ‘sale’ and sales tax as well as penalty were levied. The order was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. On Revision, the Madras High Court held that the transaction was not of sale but was a financial agreement Under almost similar circumstances, in AIR 1967 Cal 256 (Shyamsunder Bubna v. Manindra Nath Ghosh), this High Court held that it was not a hire-purchase agreement but a financial agreement and passed a decree for money only. On almost similar facts, the Supreme Court held in AIR 1966 SC 1178 at p. 1179 (Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. State of Kerala) as follows:—

“The true effect of a transaction may be determined from the terms of the agreement considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances. In each case, the Court has unless prohibited by statute, power to go behind the document and to determine the nature of the transaction, whatever may be the form of the document”.

13. As per majority Judgement it was further held at p. 1180:

“That the intention of S in obtaining the hire-purchase and the allied agreements was to secure the return of loans advanced to their customers, and no real sale of the vehicle was intended by the customer to S and consequently, there was no re-sale by S to the customer, at the termination of the arrangement. The transactions were merely financing transactions. They were not thus eligible to sales tax.”

14. I respectfully agree with the aforesaid cases and hold that the real transaction between the parties was a financial transaction repayable by agreed instalments.

15. The counsel for the defendant No. 2 submitted that the agreement dated 24-7-67 being void in view of the provisions of Section 40, Sub-Sections (1) and (4) of the B.M Act, nothing is due and payable by the defendants to the plaintiff.

16. He, however, does not deny that the admitted loan of Rs. 5,500/- remained unpaid. The plaintiff's witness Todi has given evidence that the defendant No. 1 has not paid any instalment. In the premises, the issue No. 3 is answered in favour of the plaintiff.

17. There will be a decree against the defendants for Rs. 5500/- with interim interest at the rate of 6% per annum, interest on Judgement at the rate of 6% per annum until realisation and costs.

18. Order accordingly.