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Sibapada Roy Chowdhury v. Sudhangsu Kumar Sen Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Rule challenges Order No. 97 dated 27-1-79 made by the learned Munsif, 6th Court at Alipore, which dismissed a Miscellaneous Case arising from an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) by the tenant-judgement-debtor (the petitioner). The underlying litigation began around 1960 when the decree-holder (opposite party No. 1) sued for eviction of Nalini Bhushan Roy Chowdhury (predecessor-in-interest and father of the petitioner) and others on grounds including rent default from September 1958, the plaintiff's need for the premises for personal use/building, and unauthorized subletting. In February 1963 the trial court decreed eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement. An appeal was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. A second appeal from the Court of Appeal led to a Rule being issued by this Court on condition that the tenant vacate certain rooms within one month. The tenant petitioned that in obedience to this order part of the premises was delivered; the decree-holder denied this.
During the proceedings the original defendant died in 1973 leaving heirs including the petitioner. A second appeal was dismissed for default in January 1971; subsequent applications for restoration and substitution were filed but the Rules issued on those applications were discharged. The petitioner filed an application under Section 47 CPC contending that (a) possession of part of the premises had been delivered as per this Court's order, (b) a fresh tenancy at Rs. 50 per month was created for the remainder, and (c) Rs. 1,000 was paid as advance to the decree-holder, such that execution was not maintainable. The decree-holder denied those averments and alleged the Section 47 application was to harass him. The learned Munsif disbelieved the petitioner's account and dismissed the Miscellaneous Case. The petitioner then challenged that dismissal by the present Rule.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Munsif erred in disposing of the Miscellaneous Case under Section 47 CPC by not considering material on record (specifically this Court's prior order recording delivery of possession of part of the premises) such that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.
- Whether non-compliance with provisions of Section 13 (including Sub‑Section (4) of Section 13 and the amendments to Clause (f) and insertion of Clause (ff) by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969) rendered the decree sought to be executed a nullity for want of inherent jurisdiction of the court that passed the decree.
- Whether, in light of the above statutory amendments and relevant case law, the Executing Court is entitled to go behind the decree to determine if the decree is a nullity for want of inherent jurisdiction and thereby refuse execution.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments
- The learned Munsif failed to consider important material on record — specifically, this Court's earlier order which recorded that possession of about half the tenancy had been delivered pursuant to this Court's direction; this omission materially affected the decision and required reconsideration. (Relied on Sambhu Dayal v. Pt. Basudeo Sahai.)
- Contravention of Sub‑Section (4) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act meant the decree was a nullity.
- Because Clause (f) of Section 13(1) was amended by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act (XXIV of 1969) and Clause (ff) was added, the landlord was required to prove non‑possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation before obtaining a decree; absence of such proof meant the court which passed the decree lacked inherent jurisdiction and the decree is therefore void.
Decree-Holder's (Opposite Party's) Arguments
- The decree-holder denied delivery of possession of the first floor to any agent of his and denied creation of any fresh tenancy at the alleged rent of Rs. 50 per month and the payment of Rs. 1,000 as advance.
- The decree-holder contended that the Section 47 application was filed to harass him and should be rejected.
- Before this Court the opposite party argued that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass the decree and that the executing court cannot examine the legality of the decree except in cases where the decree is a nullity for want of inherent jurisdiction.
Learned Munsif's Findings (as recorded in the impugned order)
- The learned Munsif disbelieved the petitioner's account of creation of a new tenancy and of delivery of possession of the first floor pursuant to this Court's order, and therefore dismissed the Miscellaneous Case arising out of the Section 47 application.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sambhu Dayal v. Pt. Basudeo Sahai, AIR 1970 All 525 (FB) | Principle that if a court omits to consider material on record having a vital bearing on the question to be decided, it acts illegally or with material irregularity. | The Court considered this principle but found it inapplicable because the earlier order recording delivery of possession did not have a bearing on the distinct question whether a fresh tenancy was created. Thus the omission did not amount to illegality or material irregularity warranting remand. |
| B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan (Smt), (1975) 1 SCC 166 : AIR 1975 SC 1146 | Held that Section 13 of the Amending Act of 1969 is applicable to pending actions; amendments effected are effective in suits and appeals pending at commencement of the amending Act, and the new clauses (f) and (ff) impose more severe restrictions on landlords. | The Court applied this authority to acknowledge that the 1969 amendments applied to the pendency of this litigation and to frame the question whether the decree‑granting court had the required findings under the amended statute (i.e., whether it had jurisdiction). |
| Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash, (1977) 2 SCC 662 | Reiterates the exception to the rule that an executing court cannot go behind a decree: where the decree is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction, the executing court may examine and refuse execution. | The Court relied on this precedent to support the proposition that if the trial court lacked inherent jurisdiction (for example, by failing to record the necessary finding under Section 13(1)), the Executing Court may refuse execution. This supported remittal to the Executing Court for inquiry. |
| Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, (1969) 2 SCR 432 | Support for principle that where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction, the decree is a nullity and cannot be enforced. | The Court cited this case as additional support for the view that absence of inherent jurisdiction renders a decree unenforceable and justifies scrutiny by the Executing Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the petitioner's three principal contentions sequentially and with reference to facts on record and relevant legal principles:
- On the contention that the learned Munsif omitted to consider material (this Court's prior order recording delivery of possession of about half the tenancy): the Court held that the recorded fact of delivery of possession (if accepted) did not bear on the specific question before the Executing Court — namely whether the parties had entered into a fresh arrangement creating a new tenancy. The decree-holder contested the claim of delivery and there were factual disputes (including the decree-holder's absence or lack of instructions to counsel at the earlier hearing). Therefore the earlier order was not material to proving a new tenancy. The Court concluded Sambhu Dayal (the principle that omitting material is illegal) did not apply here and there was no need to remit the matter to the Executing Court on that ground.
- On the argument based on Sub‑Section (4) of Section 13 (the requirement for partial eviction where the Court is of opinion the landlord's need may be satisfied by ejecting the tenant from part only of the premises): the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the court must in all cases investigate partial eviction. The statutory provision requires a decree for partial eviction only where the court is itself of the opinion that partial eviction would suffice. In the present record there was no indication that the court which passed the decree formed such an opinion; therefore the contention failed.
- On the contention arising from the 1969 amendments to Clause (f) of Section 13(1) and the insertion of Clause (ff) (requiring proof that the landlord is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation): the Court acknowledged the binding effect of B. Banerjee that the amendments apply to pending matters. The Court analyzed the legal position that Sub‑Section (1) of Section 13 bars recovery of possession unless one or more statutory grounds are proved. If the court passing the decree did not record the requisite finding (for example, that the landlord was not in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation), the decree could be a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction. The Court emphasized the general rule that an Executing Court ordinarily cannot go behind a decree, but recognized the exception where the decree is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction (supported by Sunder Dass and Bahadur Singh). Because the question whether the decree contained the necessary finding had not been raised earlier in the second appeal (dismissed for default), in Letters Patent Appeals, or before the Executing Court, the Executing Court had not had the opportunity to examine the original records. The parties failed to produce the trial judgment and pleadings before the Court hearing the Rule, and the decree itself did not make it manifest whether the necessary finding had been recorded.
- Based on these circumstances, the Court concluded that the appropriate course was to set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the Executing Court with specific directions: the Executing Court is to examine the original suit records to determine whether the trial (or appellate) court recorded the finding required by Section 13(1) (as amended). If such a finding is present, execution should proceed; if not, the Executing Court may refuse execution on the ground that the decree was passed without inherent jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Rule is made absolute; the impugned order of the learned Munsif is set aside and the case is remitted to the Executing Court for fresh determination whether the court which passed the decree had inherent jurisdiction to do so.
Direct consequences and implications:
- The Executing Court is directed to inspect the original suit records (including the judgment and pleadings) to decide solely whether the court that granted the decree recorded the necessary finding under Section 13(1) (as amended) that the landlord was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation.
- If the Executing Court finds that the decree was passed by a court having inherent jurisdiction (i.e., the required statutory findings are recorded), the Executing Court must proceed to execute the decree.
- If the Executing Court finds that no such finding was recorded and the decree was passed without inherent jurisdiction, it is entitled to refuse execution on the ground that the decree is a nullity.
- No order as to costs was made by this Court.
Broader precedent: The opinion applies and cites established authorities about (a) the limits of an Executing Court's power to go behind a decree and (b) the consequence where a decree is rendered by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction. The opinion did not purport to set a novel legal principle beyond applying these authorities and directing remittal for factual/legal inquiry; it therefore primarily affects the parties by ordering a fresh inquiry rather than announcing a new legal rule.
1. This Rule is directed against order No. 97 dated 27-1-79 made by the learned Munsif, 6th Court at Alipore on an application made by the tenant-judgement-debtor under Section 47 of the CPC. By the said order the learned Munsif dismissed the Miscellaneous Case arising out of the said application under Section 47 of the CPC.
2. The facts leading to the present application, stated succinctly, are as follows:—
Sometime in 1960, the decree-holder opposite Party No. 1 brought a suit for eviction against one Nalini Bhushan Roy Chowdhury, the predecessor-in-interest and the father of the petitioner and the opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 on the grounds that said tenant defaulted in payment of rent since September, 1958, that the plaintiff required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and for purposes of building and re-building and at the tenant sublet a portion without the knowledge and consent of the landlord. In February, 1963, the suit was decreed on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises of the plaintiff for his own use and occupation. The appeal preferred from the decisions of the trial Court was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge 7th Court at Alipore. There was a second appeal filed from the decision of the Court of Appeal below and a Rule was issued calling upon the landlord decree-holder to show cause as to why further proceedings in the Title Execution Case No. 42 of 1964 arising out of the said decree should not be stayed. The said Rule was issued on condition that the tenant-petitioner would vacate 3 rooms together with a kitchen and a bath room within a period of one month from the date of the Rule.
3. The case of the tenant-petitioner is that in obedience to the said order of this Court delivery of possession of a portion of the suit premises was made. The truth of this fact was denied by the landlord-decree holder. While making the said Rule absolute this Court directed that as the possession of about half the tenancy was delivered in pursuance of the order of this Court the tenant was to deposit Rs. 35/- instead of Rs. 70 p.m and that he should go on depositing the rent every month at the rate of Rs. 35/- per month as aforesaid month by month in the trial Court within 15th of each following month and that in default the Rule would stand discharged. The original defendant-appellant died intestate on January 13, 1973 leaving behind the petitioner and opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 as his heirs and legal representatives, On January 25, 1971, the aforesaid second appeal was dismissed for default. Sometime in 1973, the present petitioner Sled two applications - one for restoration of the said second appeal and the other for substitution - and the Rules which were issued on the basis of those two applications were ultimately discharged.
4. In the said application under Section 47 of the CPC, the case that was sought to be made out by the petitioner was as follows:
The tenant in pursuance of the order of the Hon'ble High Court delivered possession of the first floor of the suit premises to the authorised agent of the plaintiff and a fresh tenancy at a rental of Rs. 50/- per month was created on October 10, 1964 in respect of the rest of the premises. The judgement-debtor further paid a sum of Rs. 1000/- as advance to the decree-holder and permitted him to construct a privy in the ground floor and as the decree was already satisfied by delivery of possession of the first floor of the suit premises in pursuance of the order of this Court, the Execution Case was not maintainable.
5. The decree-holder opposite party denied the material averments made in the application under Section 47 of the CPC. His case was that he did not authorise anyone to take delivery of possession on his behalf of the first floor and that the possession of the first floor was not delivered to his agent. He further denied that in pursuance of any agreement any fresh tenancy in respect of the ground floor at the alleged rental of Rs. 50/- was created. He also denied that the alleged sum of Rs. 1000/- was paid to him. It may also be noted that two Letters Patent Appeals which were preferred from the decision of this Court on the application for restoration and the application for substitution referred to above were dismissed by this Court. In the circumstances, the decree-holder opposite party asserted that the application under Section 47 of the CPC was made with a view to harassing the decree-holder and ought to be rejected.
6. The learned Munsif who disposed of the said application under Section 49 disbelieved the story of creation of a new tenancy as also the contention of the petitioner that the possession of the first floor of the suit premises was delivered in pursuance of the order of this Court referred to above. In this view of the matter the learned Munsif dismissed the Miscellaneous Case arising out of the said application under Section 47 of the CPC.
7. In the present Rule the decision of the learned Munsif on the said application under Section 47 of the CPC was challenged.
8. When the present Rule was takes up for hearing an application was Sled praying for the amendment of the application under Section 47 of the CPC. The application cannot be considered and ought to be dismissed outright as the decree-holder opposite party No. 2 was not given earlier notice of such application. A copy of that application was served at the time when the application was filed and that was when the present Rule was taken up for hearing. That application is accordingly dismissed.
9. In support of the present Rule Mr. S.P Roy Chowdhury the learned Advocate, for the petitioner, raises three questions. His first contention is that the matter should go back to the learned Munsif for reconsideration inasmuch as the learned Munsif did not take into consideration important materials on record. Mr. Roy Chowdhury draws my attention to the fact that while making absolute the Rule requiring the judgement-debtor opposite party to show cause why further proceedings in the connected Execution Case should not be stayed, the Court made the following observation:
“The Rule is made absolute with the following directions:
(i) that because possession of about half of the tenancy has been delivered in pursuance of this Court's order dated 11-9-64, the rent which the petitioner is to deposit per month will be Rs. 35/- (Rupees Thirty Five) instead of Rs. 70/- (Rupees Seventy). The petitioner would go on depositing the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 35/- month by month in the trial Court within the 15th of next following month. In default the Rule will stand discharged………”
10. And submits that this order recording the fact that possession of about half of the suit premises was delivered in pursuance of this Court's order was not taken into consideration by the learned Munsif while hearing the Miscellaneous case arising out of the application under Section 47. This omission, according to Mr. Roychowdhury, vitally affects the decision of the learned Munsif and the learned Munsif cannot be said to have duly exercised his jurisdiction. In this regard Mr. Roychoudhury places reliance on the following lines appearing in Sambhu Dayal v. Pt. Basudeo Sahai, AIR 1970 All 525 (FB);
“If a Court omits to consider a material on record having a bearing (in this case the material had a vital bearing) on the question to be decided by it or fails to apply its mind to or to record a finding of a crucial aspect of the case which cannot be ignored in the determination of the controversy before the Court, it certainly acts illegally or at least with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction.”
11. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I find no substance in this contention of Mr. Roychowdhury. Firstly, because the said order of this Court recording the fact that the possession of the first floor was delivered has no bearing on the question raised on behalf of the petitioner before the Executing Court to the effect that there was a fresh arrangement between the parties giving rise to a new tenancy. Even if it be accepted that the possession of a part of the premises in question was delivered to the decree-holder or his agent in obedience to an interim order by this Court that in no way proves or has any bearing on the question as to whether there was a new tenancy created by the parties concerned. Further it is the case of the decree-holder that there was no such delivery of possession of the first floor as alleged by the petitioner. It is the further case of the decree-holder that at the time of the hearing of the Rule wherein the said order was made recording delivery of possession of the first floor the decree-holder was not present and the learned lawyer appearing for him did not have the instruction from the landlord decree-holder indicating that there was delivery of possession of the first floor as alleged. Under the circumstances, it cannot but be said that the order of this Court recording delivery of possession was not at all material for the purpose of establishing the alleged case of creation of new tenancy. Accordingly, the proposition laid down in the Allahabad case referred to above has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. This contention of Mr. Roychowdhury fails and I find no necessity for requiring the Executing Court to reconsider the application under Section 47.
12. The second contention of Mr. Roychowdhury is that because of the contravention of the provisions of Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act the decree which was sought to be executed was a nullity. The relevant part of the provisions of Sub-Section (4) of Section 18 is as follows:—
“Where the landlord requires the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (f) or clause (ff) of Sub-Section (1), and the Court is of opinion that such requirement may be substantially satisfied by ejecting the tenant or a sub-tenant from a part only of the premises and allowing the tenant or the sub-tenant to continue in occupation of the rest, then, if the tenant or a sub-tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly and fix the proportionate rent for the portion remaining in the occupation of the tenant or the sub-tenant”.
13. I find it difficult to agree with Mr. Roychowdhury's contention that it is obligatory on the part of the Court in all cases where the landlord seeks to evict a tenant on the ground mentioned in clause (f) or (ff) to investigate the question whether the landlord's requirement may be substantially satisfied by ejecting the tenant from a part of the premises. The provisions op Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 require the Court to pass a decree for partial eviction only in cases where the Court is of opinion that the requirement of the Landlord may be satisfied by ejecting the tenant from a part only of the premises in his occupation. In the present case there is nothing to indicate that it Court which passed the decree was the opinion that the landlord's requirement would be met if there is a decree for partial eviction of the tenant. Accordingly, this contention of Mr. Roychowdhury also fails.
14. The last contention of Mr. Roychowdhury is that in view of the amendment of Clause (f) of Section 13(1) by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendments Act (XXIV of 1969) no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against the tenant unless the landlord succeeds in proving that he is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation in terms of clause (ff) of Section 13(1) in a case where the ground taken by the landlord is that the premises in question are reasonably required by him for his own occupation. In the circumstances of the present case, Mr. Roychowdhury contends that the Court while passing a decree for eviction was lacking in inherent jurisdiction inasmuch as the landlord did not prove that he was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation as required by said clause (ff) of Section 13 of the said Act.
15. Mr. Roychowdhury in regard places reliance on the decisions in B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan (Smt), (1975) 1 SCC 166 : AIR 1975 SC 1146 : 1976 (1) SCJ 274, Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash ., (1977) 2 SCC 662 and Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, (1969) 2 SCR 432, In B. Banerjee's case (supra) the Supreme Court took the view that Section 13 of the said Amending Act of 1969 makes the amendments effected in the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act by Sections 4, 7, 8 and 9 of the said amending Act expressly applicable to pending actions. The amendments referred to above shall be effective in respect of suits including appeals pending at the commencement of the said amending Act. It is further held in the said case of B. Banerjee (supra) that although the old clause (f) is substantially similar to the present clauses (f) and (ff), the latter impose more severe restriction protecting the tenants and much more has to be proved by the landlord now before he could get eviction than when he was called upon to prove under the earlier corresponding provisions of the basic Act. In the present case, admittedly during the pendency of the second appeal in this Court the said amendments were effected in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Now the question that arises for consideration is whether the Court which passed the decree which is sought to be executed had no inherent jurisdiction to pass the same or whether the Court passing the decree had inherent jurisdiction to pass the same but the decree was illegal on the ground of contravention of any rule of law. In the present case Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the ground stated in clauses (a) to (h) of that Sub-Section. Thus, Section 13(1) prohibited the Court from passing an order or decree for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord against the tenant unless the Court was satisfied about the existence of any one or more grounds referred in clauses (a) to (h) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 13. In other words, it may very well be said that unless the landlord succeeds in proving the existence of any one of the grounds referred to above the Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order or decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises in favour of the landlord against the tenant. In such circumstances, the decree or order, as the case may be, will be a nullity and cannot be enforced in execution. This view finds support from the decision in said Bahadur Singh's case (supra).
16. Generally the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. To this general rule there is an exception furnished by cases where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity on the ground of want of inherent jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree. If the Court passing the decree lacks in inherent jurisdiction to pass the same, the judgement-debtor may before the Executing Court challenge the executability of the decree. This is the legal position as laid down in the case of said Sunder Dass (supra).
17. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 intended that in the circumstances of the present case it could not be urged that the Court passing the decree in question was lacking in inherent jurisdiction. His contention is that the Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree in question and even though the decree that is passed may not be legal, the Executing Court cannot refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the decree was passed in violation of any law. In view of the clear provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, to which I have already referred. I find it difficult to agree with Mr. Mukherjee that if a decree is passed by the Court even though the requirements of clause (ff) of Section 13(1) be not proved to the satisfaction of the Court, such decree may at best be illegal and can be challenged in appeal or in second appeal but not before the Executing Court on the ground of its illegality. If a decree is passed by a Court in violation of any rule of law where the Court did have inherent jurisdiction to pass it, such a decree, the executing Court would be bound to execute, for, it is not for the executing Court to see whether the decree was according to law or not. But when a Court passing the decree has no inherent jurisdiction to pass it the decree would be a nullity and the Executing Court is within its powers to take note of the fact that the decree is a nullity wad to refuse to execute the same.
18. In the present case, if there be no finding recorded by the Court passing the decree that the landlord was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation, the decree would be bad for want of inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
19. It is significant to note here that the question which was raised by Mr. Roychowdhury before me and which is now being discussed by me was not raised in the said second appeal, for the second appeal was dismissed for default. Further the question was not even raised before the Court hearing Letters Patent Appeals from the decision of this Court rejecting the application for restoration of the second appeal and the application for substitution. The question was also not raised even before the executing Court. The executing Court did not have therefore any opportunity to go into the question whether the decree was a nullity on the ground now urged before me by Mr. Roychowdhury. Further at the time of the hearing of this Rule, I wanted the parties to produce before me the judgement on the basis of which the decree is question was passed and also the respective pleadings of the parties. The parties failed to produce the judgement and a type-written plain copy of the pleading which was furnished by Mr. Mukherjee also does not indicate that there was any amendment effected in the pleadings after the passing of the said amending Act. Further, on the face of the decree in question it is difficult to say whether the Court passing it was lacking in inherent jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the Executing Court would be justified to go into the original records of the suit in question and to ascertain whether the trial Court did have jurisdiction to pass the decree in question. If the Executing Court on a consideration of the materials before the trial Court is of opinion that the trial Court did record a finding to the effect that the landlord in the present case was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation, the Executing Court cannot refuse to execute the decree. If, on the other hand, the Executing Court finds that there was no such finding recorded by the trial Court or any of the appellate Courts and that without any such finding the decree was passed, the Executing Court would be justified in refusing to execute the decree the ground that the decree was passed by a Court having no inherent jurisdiction to pass the same.
20. In the circumstances aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside and the case is sent back to the Executing Court which is to ascertain only in the light of the observations aforesaid whether or not the Court passing the decree had inherent jurisdiction to do so.
21. If the Executing Court finds that the decree was passed by a Court having inherent jurisdiction it will proceed to execute the decree. But if it be found that the decree was passed by a Court having no inherent jurisdiction it would refuse to execute the decree as being one passed without jurisdiction.
22. The Rule is accordingly made absolute, the impugned order is set aside and the case is sent back to the Executing Court for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made above. There will be no order as to costs.
23. Rule made absolute.
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