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Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal-I v. Shyam Narain Mehrotra.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 7, 1978
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee (an individual) in assessment year 1962–63 (previous year 1961–62) sold 1,150 shares of Bharat Woollen Mills Ltd. to his brother, Sri P.N. Mehrotra, at Rs. 10 per share (total Rs. 11,500). On the date of transfer, the break-up value of those shares according to the company's balance-sheet was Rs. 50,209. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) applied s. 52(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and treated the difference in value (Rs. 46,126) as arising from the transfer for purposes of capital gains. The assessee had already declared Rs. 7,417 as capital gains and the ITO included the remaining Rs. 38,709 in the assessment.

The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC), who upheld the ITO's addition. The assessee then appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not decide whether s. 47(iii) of the Income-tax Act contemplated the definition of "gift" in the Gift Tax Act (G.T. Act) or the Transfer of Property Act, but allowed the appeal on the ground that the transaction had already been treated as a deemed gift for that year under the G.T. Act and gift-tax had been paid; the Tribunal considered it would be unjust to permit the revenue to impose capital gains tax additionally. The Tribunal's order was referred to this Court under s. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, framed by the question whether the Tribunal was right in holding that Rs. 38,709 was not liable to tax as capital gains.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rs. 38,709 was not liable to tax as capital gains (the specific reference question under s. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961).
  2. Whether the expression "gift" in clause (iii) of s. 47 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, means "gift" as defined in the Gift Tax Act, 1958, or is to be understood in the ordinary sense (including the meaning in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882).
  3. Whether, having suffered taxation under the Gift Tax Act, 1958, in respect of the same transaction, the assessee was nonetheless liable to pay tax under s. 45 (capital gains) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The transaction was a "deemed gift" and, under s. 47(iii) of the Income-tax Act, a gift is not regarded as a transfer of a capital asset for the purposes of s. 45, and therefore not assessable as capital gains.
  • The transaction fell within the definition of "gift" under s. 4(1)(a) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 (i.e., transfer for inadequate consideration where the excess of market value over consideration is deemed a gift); accordingly it had been taxed under the Gift Tax Act for that year and gift-tax paid.

Revenue / ITO's Position

  • The ITO applied s. 52(1) of the Income-tax Act because the transferee was directly connected to the assessee and the Officer had reason to believe the transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of liability under s. 45; the full value of consideration should be taken as the fair market value (leading to inclusion of the difference as capital gains).
  • The AAC agreed with the ITO and upheld the addition of Rs. 38,709 to the assessee's income as capital gains.

Tribunal's View (explained by the opinion)

  • The Tribunal did not resolve whether s. 47(iii) should be read with the Gift Tax Act or the Transfer of Property Act; instead it allowed the assessee's appeal because the department had treated the transaction as a deemed gift under the Gift Tax Act and the assessee had paid the gift tax, and it considered it would be unjust to permit re-taxation by way of capital gains.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Stevens v. Durban-Roodepoort Gold Mining Co. Ltd., [1909] 5 TC 402 (KB) Illustration that double taxation can arise if Parliament clearly intends it; used in discussion of double taxation principles. Quoted as authority that double taxation may lawfully arise where legislature plainly so provides; used to show no constitutional prohibition against double taxation.
Jain Brothers v. Union of India, [1970] 77 ITR 107 Discussed in relation to double taxation principles. Cited for the proposition that the Constitution contains no prohibition against double taxation; supports legal analysis distinguishing multiple taxable events.
Reid's Trustees v. IRC, [1929] 14 TC 512 Principle that the same sum may be subject to different taxes though not to the same tax twice. Quoted (Lord President Clyde) to support the point that it is not inconsistent with taxation principles to make the same sum subject to different taxes.
Barkar v. Edgar, [1898] AC 748 (PC) Each enactment must be construed on its own subject-matter and terms. Relied upon (via later authorities) to support careful statutory construction of taxation statutes on their own terms.
Probhat Chandra Barua v. Emperor, AIR 1924 Cal 668 Approval of the principle in Barkar v. Edgar. Referenced to show prior judicial reliance on the Barkar principle in Indian decisions.
Rajnit Prasad Singh v. CIT, [1929] 4 ITC 264 (Pat) [FB] There is no presumption that assessment under one statute creates immunity from another statute. Used to support the Court's view that having been assessed under the Gift Tax Act does not prevent assessment under the Income-tax Act.
ITO v. K.P. Varghese, [1973] 91 ITR 49 (Ker) (Full Bench) Majority held that "gift" in s. 47(iii) of the Income-tax Act should be understood in ordinary sense and in light of Transfer of Property Act, not confined to Gift Tax Act definition. The Court noted and said it was in respectful agreement with the majority view of the Full Bench on this aspect; used as supporting precedent for construing "gift" in a general sense.
Shiv Shankar Lal v. CIT, [1974] 94 ITR 433 (Delhi) Interpreted "gift" in s. 47(iii) in the light of the Gift Tax Act; where transaction had been treated and taxed as gift under Gift Tax Act, it was not assessable under s. 45. Noted as an authority to the contrary (Delhi High Court’s approach); the Court recorded the decision but did not adopt it.
Addl. CIT v. M. Ranga Pai, [1975] 100 ITR 413 (Karnataka) When "gift" not defined, ordinary meaning applies; transfers without valuable consideration would not generate capital gains, and deemed gifts under Gift Tax Act should also be excluded. Referred to and discussed; the Court noted the Division Bench’s reasoning though it also pointed out the potential consequences for s. 52 if "gift" were confined only to the Gift Tax Act.
CIT v. Rikadas Dhuraji, [1976] 103 ITR 111 (Madras) Words "full value of the consideration" in s. 48 refer to factual receipt of consideration; difference in inadequate consideration is treated as gift by s. 4 of Gift Tax Act. Cited as authority supporting the view that the deemed-gift fiction in s. 4 of the Gift Tax Act treats the shortfall as gift; the Court stated agreement with the Chief Justice of Kerala on this aspect.
ITO v. Buragadda Satyanarayana, [1977] 106 ITR 333 (AP) Division Bench held that because of the clear expression in s. 47(iii) of the Income-tax Act, it could not apply only to gifts as contemplated by the Gift Tax Act. The Court expressed respectful agreement with the Andhra Pradesh Division Bench and relied on its reasoning in forming its conclusion on interpretation of "gift" in s. 47(iii).
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 SCR 603 Principle that statutory fictions are limited to the purposes for which they are created. Applied to explain that the definition of "gift" in the Gift Tax Act and the deemed-gift in s. 4(1) are fictions created "for the purposes of this Act" and therefore confined to that Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the matter around two central interpretative questions: (1) whether the word "gift" in s. 47(iii) of the Income-tax Act should be read as the narrower, statutory definition in the Gift Tax Act, 1958, or in the ordinary/general sense (including the meaning given in the Transfer of Property Act), and (2) whether payment of gift-tax under the Gift Tax Act precludes imposition of capital gains tax under s. 45.

Key statutory provisions examined included:

  • s. 2(47) of the Income-tax Act (definition of "transfer");
  • s. 45 and s. 47(iii) of the Income-tax Act (chargeability of capital gains; exclusion for transfer by gift);
  • s. 52 of the Income-tax Act (taking fair market value where transferee is connected and transfer intended for avoidance of s. 45 liability);
  • Definitions and provisions of the Gift Tax Act (s. 2(xii) defining "gift", s. 4(1)(a) deeming excess market value over consideration to be a gift);
  • Transfer of Property Act provisions defining "gift" (s. 122).

The Court emphasized established principles of statutory construction:

  • Definitions in a statute (and fictions created "for the purposes of this Act") are generally limited to that statute; a deemed-gift under s. 4(1) of the Gift Tax Act is a statutory fiction limited to the Gift Tax Act (citing Bengal Immunity).
  • When interpreting general taxation words, they should, if possible, not be construed so as to impose double taxation unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention (authorities such as Stevens and Jain Brothers were cited). Nonetheless, there is no constitutional prohibition on double taxation; where statutory language is clear, multiple taxation may lawfully arise.
  • There is a distinction between the same tax being imposed twice and different taxes being imposed on the same sum; the latter is legally permissible (citing Reid's Trustees).
  • Each taxing enactment must be interpreted in its own terms (Barkar v. Edgar and related authorities).

Applying these principles, the Court reasoned:

  • The definition of "gift" in the Gift Tax Act is intended for that Act and its statutory fiction in s. 4(1) is likewise limited; therefore, one cannot automatically import that definition into the Income-tax Act simply because it exists in a cognate statute.
  • The definition of "transfer" in s. 2(47) of the Income-tax Act is broad and indicates that the transfers contemplated for capital gains purposes are not confined to transfers as defined in the Gift Tax Act.
  • Parliament had used similar language in prior tax law (Indian I.T. Act, 1922) before the Gift Tax Act existed, supporting a construction of "gift" in s. 47(iii) in the general sense (including the Transfer of Property Act meaning).
  • The Tribunal's decision, based on avoiding perceived injustice because the transaction had been taxed under the Gift Tax Act, lacked a sound juristic principle for displacing the clear operation of the Income-tax Act and the proper statutory construction; while hardship may result, the court must apply the law as enacted.

On balance and considering the line of judicial decisions surveyed (including Full Benches and Division Benches of various High Courts), the Court concluded that clause (iii) of s. 47 was not intended to be limited to gifts purely as contemplated by s.4 of the Gift Tax Act, but was meant to cover gifts understood in the ordinary/general legal sense (as in the Transfer of Property Act). Therefore, where s. 52 applies (connected parties and belief of tax avoidance), the Income-tax Officer may treat the full value of the consideration as the fair market value and proceed to assess capital gains.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The reference question was answered in the negative; the Tribunal was not right in holding that the sum of Rs. 38,709 was not liable to tax as capital gains. The Court decided in favour of the revenue.

Immediate implications (direct effect on the parties and case):

  • The sum of Rs. 38,709 (the portion of the difference in value treated by the ITO under s. 52) can be subjected to assessment as capital gains under s. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • The Tribunal's allowance of the assessee's appeal, based on the fact that gift-tax had been paid under the Gift Tax Act, was set aside by answering the reference in favour of the revenue.
  • In the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court made no order as to costs.

The opinion explains that payment of gift-tax under the Gift Tax Act does not, by itself, preclude assessment under the Income-tax Act when the statutory language and circumstances (including the operation of s. 52) permit taxation under both statutes as distinct taxable events.

Note: Mr. Justice Guha concurred with the reasoning and conclusion of Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.

Show all summary ...

Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.:— In this reference, we are concerned with the assessment year 1962–63 relevant to the financial year 1961–62. The assessee is an individual. During the relevant year, he sold 1,150 shares of Bharat Woollen Mills Ltd. to his brother, Sri P.N Mehrotra, at the rate of Rs. 10 per share for a sum of Rs. 11,500. The break-up value of those shares, on the basis of the balance-sheet, would have been Rs. 50,209 on the date of the transfer. The ITO was, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of s. 52(1) of the I.T Act, 1961, were applicable. It was contended on behalf of the assessee that under s. 47(iii) of the Act, a gift was not regarded as transfer of a capital asset and was not assessable to capital gains and the transaction was a deemed gift within the meaning of the definition of the G.T Act, 1958. The ITO did not accept this contention. He, therefore, treated the difference of a sum of Rs. 46,126 in the value of those shares on the basis of the balance-sheet of the company and the price charged as capital gains, which amounted to Rs. 7,417 already declared by the assessee and included the remaining amount of Rs. 38,709 in the assessment. The assessee preferred an appeal to the AAC. The AAC agreed with the ITO and upheld the addition. The assessee, thereafter, preferred a second appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not go into the question as to whether s. 47(iii) of the I.T Act, 1961, contemplated a gift as defined in the Transfer of Property Act or a deemed gift as provided in the G.T Act, because in its opinion, the assessee was entitled to the relief on the ground that he had been taxed on this very amount in the proceedings: under the G.T Act for that year. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the department in respect of that transaction had treated it as a deemed gift. The assessee had paid the amount of gift-tax so determined. In the opinion of the Tribunal, therefore, it would not be proper, in the interest of justice, to allow the revenue to impose any capital gains tax on that transaction and, in that view of the matter, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal.

2. In the premises, under s. 256(1) of the I.T Act, 1961, the Tribunal has referred the following, question to this court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rs. 38,709 was not liable to tax as capital gains?”

3. In order to consider this question, it would be proper to refer to the relevant sections. Section 2(47) of the I.T Act, 1961, defines “transfer” for the purpose of the I.T Act as follows:

“2. (47) ‘transfer’, in relation to a capital asset, includes the sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset or the extinguishment of any rights therein or the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law.”

4. Section 45 of the I.T Act, 1961, provides that any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall, save as otherwise provided in ss. 53, 54, 54B and 54D, be chargeable to income-tax under the head “Capital gains”, and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place. Under sub-el. (iii) of s. 47 nothing contained in s. 45 shall apply to” any transfer of a capital asset under a gift or will or an irrevocable trust”. Section 52, so far as material for our purpose, provides as follows:

“52. Where the person who acquires a capital asset from an assessee is directly or indirectly connected with the assessee and the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that the transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee under section 45, the full value of the consideration for the transfer shall, with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, be taken to be the fair market value of the capital asset on the date of the transfer.”

5. In this connection, it would be necessary in order to appreciate the question, to refer to certain provisions of the G.T Act, 1958. Section 2(xii) defines gift as under:

“2. (xii) ‘Gift’ means the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration in money or money's worth, and includes the transfer or conversion of any property referred to in section 4, deemed to be a gift under that section.”

6. Section 2(xxiv) defines transfer of property as follows:

“2. (xxiv) ‘Transfer of property’ means any disposition, conveyance, assignment, settlement, delivery, payment or other alienation of pro-perty and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes—

(a) the creation of a trust in property;

(b) the grant or creation of any lease, mortgage, charge, easement, licence, power, partnership or interest in property;

(c) the exercise of a power of appointment of property vested in any person, not the owner of the property, to determine its disposition in favour of any person other than the donee of the power; and

(d) any transaction entered into by any person with intent thereby to diminish directly or indirectly the value of his own property and to increase the value of the property of any other person.”

7. Section 4(1)(a) is to the following effect:

“4. Gifts to include certain transfers.—(1) For the purposes of this Act,—

(a) where property is transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration, the amount by which the market value of the property at the date of the transfer exceeds the value of the consideration shall be deemed to be a gift made by the transferor.”

8. Two questions, therefore, arise in this case, namely, whether the expression “gift” used in cl. (iii) of s. 47 means gift as contemplated under the G.T Act, 1958, or indicates gift as understood generally or in the light of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. If the expression “gift” is understood in the light of the G.T Act, 1958, only then the transaction in question being one which will be covered by the definition of s. 4(1)(a) of the G.T Act would be outside the provisions of s. 45 of the I.T Act, 1961, in this case. If, however, the expression “gift” is understood in the general sense, then in terms of s. 47 read with s. 52 of the I.T Act, 1961, the transaction would come under the purview of s. 45 of the Act in the instant case. The second question that arises for consideration in this case is, whether having suffered taxation under the G.T Act, 1958, in respect of the transaction in question, the assessee was liable to pay tax in respect of the same transaction under s. 45 of the I.T Act, 1961. The Tribunal seems to have proceeded on the view that after having suffered taxation under the G.T Act, 1958, it was not in the interest of justice that the assessee should be made to suffer taxation again.

9. It is, however, difficult to appreciate on what juristic principle this approach of the Tribunal was made. We, however, appreciate the attitude of the Tribunal that this decision was taken to avoid injustice in a particular case. But we are concerned here with the application of law. We agree that a certain amount of hardship will arise if a transaction is made to suffer taxation twice. But that fate, in our opinion, cannot be avoided if it logically follows as a result of the provisions of the particular enactment. It is well-known that when income is earned that income suffers taxation. If out of that income a gift is made by the person concerned, then that gift again suffers taxation. These are two different taxable events. Therefore, one transaction may attract different taxable events under the different taxing laws. In such a case, no question of double taxation arises. As certain amount of doubt both on this aspect of the matter as well as on the theory of double taxation has arisen, it is better to remind ourselves of the principles that are applicable in deciding this question. There can be double taxation if the Legislature has distinctly enacted it. This is well-settled. (See the observations in Stevens v. Durban-Roodepoort Gold Mining Co. Ltd., [1909] 5 TC 402 (KB) and see also the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Jain Brothers v. Union of India, [1970] 77 ITR 107 at page 112). The Constitution does not contain any prohibition against double taxation. But it is also well-settled that when there are general words of taxation and these have to be interpreted, then these should not be so interpreted if possible as to tax the subject twice over to the same tax. This proposition, however, will have to be applied with caution in case where the language used by the appropriate Legislature is clear on this point. If the Legislature has clearly expressed an intention to tax twice the subject to the same tax, then such impositions cannot be considered to be illegal. But in construing, in case of doubt, presumption would be to avoid taxing the subject twice over to the same tax. But where one transaction is made subject to different taxable events under different statutes, though cognate in nature, this concept of double taxation has no application. In the case of Reid's Trustees v. IRC, [1929] 14 TC 512 at page 521 of the report, Lord President Clyde observed as follows:

“There is a certain appearance of hardship in making the interest subject first to Estate Duty as capital, and then to income-tax as income; but, while the same sum cannot be subject to the same tax twice, there is nothing inconsistent with the principles of taxation in making the same sum subject to different taxes.”

10. In Barkar v. Edgar, [1898] AC 748 (PC), Lord Hobhouse observed that each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and on its own terms. The aforesaid observation of Lord Hobhouse was relied on with approval by Mr. Justice Rankin, as the learned Chief Justice then was, in the case of Probhat Chandra Barua v. Emperor, AIR 1924 Cal 668 at page 678. In the case of Rajnit Prasad Singh v. CIT, [1929] 4 ITC 264 (Pat) [FB] at page 278, Mr. Justice Das quoting the aforesaid observations stated that though there was a presumption that the same sum should not be assessed twice on the same person yet there was ho presumption that because a person has been assessed under the one statute, he was immune from taxation under another statute. Therefore, the fact that the assessee had suffered taxation under the G.T Act, 1958, in respect of the transaction in question, does not, in our opinion, affect the question though we agree with the Tribunal that it causes a certain amount of hardship and perhaps in an appropriate case it may be that the Legislature should give some relief, as has been done in the case of the Estate Duty Act under ss. 50A and 50B of the said Act and other Acts.

11. So far, however, the first aspect of the question is concerned, the matter has been examined by several High Courts. In the case of ITO v. K.P Varghese, [1973] 91 ITR 49, a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court has considered this question. The majority of the judges held that the expression “gift” in cl. (iii) of s. 47 of the I.T Act, 1961, should be understood in the ordinary sense and in the light in which it is understood in the Transfer of Property Act and should not be confined to gift as understood in the G.T Act, 1958. The learned Chief Justice, who was in the minority, held to the contrary. For our present purpose, we may refer to one factor, in the views of the majority of the judges, which is important, that a similar expression was there like cl. (iii) of s. 47, in the old s. 12 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and even before the G.T Act, 1958, had come into effect. The first proviso to s. 12B of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, excluded distribution, inter alia, of any capital asset “under a deed of gift”‘from the mischief of capital gains tax. Therefore, this is a factor which has to be borne in mind in considering whether the expression “gift” should be understood in the special meaning, that is to say, the meaning given under the G.T Act, 1958, a factor which was taken into consideration by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which we shall notice later. In the case of Shiv Shankar Lal v. CIT, [1974] 94 ITR 433, the Delhi High Court had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. The Delhi High Court observed that the transaction in question to the extent of the amount which was sought to be assessed under s. 45 in that case had already been treated as a gift and was assessed under the G.T Act. The same amount, therefore, according to the Delhi High Court, was exempt from assessment under s. 45 of the Act. In other words, it seems to us that the Delhi High Court proceeded on the view that the word “gift” in s. 47(iii) of the I.T Act, 1961, should be understood in the light of the G.T Act, 1958, which is a definition in a cognate statute, rather than in the light of the definition given in the Transfer of Property Act. In the case of Addl. CIT v. M. Ranga Pai, [1975] 100 ITR 413, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court had occasion to consider this question. At page 423 of the report, the Division Bench observed that when the word “gift” was not defined in the Act, one had to look to the ordinary meaning and not to any definition given in the G.T Act or any other Act. According to Websters' International Dictionary, the word “gift” means a “voluntary transfer of real or personal property without any consideration or, more strictly, without a valuable consideration”. According to the Division Bench, when the capital asset was transferred without any valuable consideration, there was no question of any capital gains accruing or arising by the transfer, because capital gains had to be computed under s. 48 by deducting from the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset, the cost of acquisition of the said asset. To a case of transfer made without valuable consideration, there was no question of capital gains tax being attracted at all and, as such, there was no purpose served in providing for the exclusion of such transfer from the operation of s. 45. If the contention of the learned counsel for the department and the reasons of the majority judgment in the Varghese's case, [1973] 91 ITR 49 (Ker) [FB] were accepted as sound, according to the Division Bench, the provisions of s. 47(iii) excluding gifts from the purview of s. 45 would become otiose, according to the Division Bench. What then were the transfers intended to be excluded by s. 47(iii)? The Karnataka High Court observed that the class of transfers involving understatement of consideration did not come under the class of gifts pure and simple. Therefore, the transfers, for inadequate consideration, which are considered to be deemed gifts in the light of the G.T Act, 1958, should also be excluded. With respect it may, however, be pointed out that there may be gifts, apart from the gifts which are contemplated under cl. (a) of s. 4(1) of the G.T Act. It appears to us that if the expression “gift” in cl. (iii) of s. 47 is construed as meaning gift under the general law, this exclusion by that sub-clause would not become otiose. On the other hand, if the expression “gift” is confined to the gift contemplated by the G.T Act then s. 52 of the I.T Act, 1961, would really become surplus or otiose for the purpose of application of s. 45 in this case.

12. Gift essentially is one parting with the property and another taking the same gratuitously. It is in that light gift is generally understood. In Mozley & Whitley's Law Dictionary, 9th edn., page 149, “gift” is said to be as follows:

“Gift.—A conveyance which passes either land or goods. As to things immovable, when strictly taken, it was said to be applicable only to lands and tenements given in tail. This limitation of the word is, however, quite obsolete. Blackstone distinguishes a gift from a grant in that a gift is always gratuitous, without binding considerations, and therefore void in certain cases, whereas a grant is made upon some consideration or equivalent (Donatio Mortis Causa; Grant)”

13. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, defines gift as under:

Section 122:

“‘Gift’ is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.

Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving.

If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.”

14. The question was considered in the case of CIT v. Rikadas Dhuraji, [1976] 103 ITR 111 by the Madras High Court. There, at page 119 of the report, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed that the words “full value of the consideration” referred to in s. 48 related to the factual receipt of the consideration and had no reference to the adequacy or inadequacy of the consideration. In the case of a transaction for inadequate consideration, the difference between the adequate consideration and the consideration actually received or accrued, though not received or accrued, was deemed by s. 52 as consideration. The Division Bench observed that s. 4 of the G.T Act, 1958, treated that portion as a gift. In other words, a person might transfer his property for less than adequate consideration instead of writing two separate documents, one for adequate consideration and the other as a gift; so far as the portion of the gift was concerned, no consideration was received or accrued. Their Lordships, therefore, agreed with the view of the learned Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court in the case of ITO v. K.P Varghese, [1973] 91 ITR 49 [FB] on this aspect of the matter. The question was again considered exhaustively by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of ITO v. Buragadda Satyanarayana, [1977] 106 ITR 333. There, the learned Chief Justice had pointed out that because of the clear expression in cl. (iii) of s. 47 of the I.T Act, it could not apply to gift as contemplated by the G.T Act.

15. The following points, in our opinion, should be borne in mind. The definition of “gift” in s. 2(xii) of the G.T Act, 1958, is only for the purpose of that Act and not for the purpose of any other Act. This is normally so even without any specific mention and the definition clause says so clearly. So does the deemed gift in cl. (a) of s. 4(1) because s. 4(1). prefaces the different clauses with the expression “for the purposes of this Act”. Section 4(1) creates a legal fiction. The fiction is limited only for the purpose for which it is created. It is a well-known principle of construction in matters of statutory fiction that the fiction is limited only for the purpose for which it is created. See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 SCR 603 at 646 : [1955] 6 STC 446. Secondly, in the Indian I.T Act, 1922, similar expression was used as we have noticed and Parliament has continued to use the same expression as it did in s. 12B in the I.T Act, 1961. As we have noted that in taxing a transaction over again there would not be any question of double taxation. Furthermore, we have noted that the definition of transfer, as defined in s. 2(47) of the I.T Act, 1961, is an indication that the transfer contemplated in s. 45 and onwards cannot be confined to transfers as contemplated by the G.T Act, 1958. We are in respectful agreement with the learned Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the views expressed on this aspect of the matter in the case of ITO v. Buragadda Satyanarayana, [1977] 106 ITR 333 (AP). The other aspect of the matter adverted to in that case, namely, whether s. 52 was confined to a bona fide transaction or not, we are not called upon to decide in this case. We are therefore, of the opinion that the expression given in cl. (iii) of s. 47 of the I.T Act, 1961, is not only to exclude gift as contemplated under cl. (a) of s. 4 of the G.T Act, 1958, but is meant to cover a transaction as understood generally and in the light of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In that view of the matter, the question must be answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will, however, be no order as to costs.

Guha, J.:— I agree.