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I.T.C. Limited v. M.M.P. Lines Pvt. Ltd.

Calcutta High Court
Dec 15, 1977
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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was filed on 25th June, 1974 by the plaintiff, I.T.C Ltd., against seven defendants, primarily defendant No. 1, whose directors and guarantors are defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1 had borrowed money and agreed to pledge two trawlers as security for repayment. Both trawlers were insured with the National Insurance Company Ltd. (defendant No. 5). One trawler, Akashi Maru, was lost on 15th September, 1973. The plaintiff claimed that it notified defendant No. 5 of the assignment of the insurance policies in its favor and sought damages under those policies. Defendant No. 5 denied having been informed of the assignment. An injunction was issued restraining defendant No. 5 from making payments to defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 5 stated in court that payment under the policy for Akashi Maru had already been made to defendant No. 1. The plaintiff originally sought, inter alia, specific performance, declarations of lien or charge on the trawlers, and entitlement to benefits under the insurance policies.

The present application is for amendment of the plaint filed on 25th June, 1977, seeking to allege that the payment made by defendant No. 5 was fraudulent and made with knowledge of the assignment, thus illegal. The plaintiff seeks to amend the prayers to declare that the payment by defendant No. 5 did not discharge its liability and to decree payment of Rs. 5 lakhs or Rs. 3 lakhs as determined by the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proposed amendment to the plaint introduces a new cause of action barred by limitation.
  2. When the cause of action for the insurance claim arose for limitation purposes—whether from the date of loss or the date of denial of the claim.
  3. Whether the application for amendment was made within the period of limitation.
  4. The legal effect of the payment made by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 1 under the insurance policy with respect to the plaintiff's claim.
  5. The applicability of principles concerning amendments that seek to divest vested rights or introduce new causes of action.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The payment by defendant No. 5 was made with knowledge of the assignment and was therefore illegal and fraudulent.
  • The denial of the claim on the insurance policy occurred on 23rd May, 1975, when the written statement was filed, thus the limitation period began then.
  • The amendment does not introduce a new cause of action but clarifies and reformulates the claim embedded in the original pleading.
  • The application for amendment was filed within the limitation period, considering the date of denial of claim.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The amendment sought introduces a new cause of action barred by limitation under Article 44(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • The limitation period for insurance claims runs from the date of occurrence causing loss or denial of the claim, and the application is beyond this period.
  • The claim on the insurance policy was not denied but discharged by payment to defendant No. 1.
  • The amendment seeks to plead fraud, which is a new cause of action and should not be allowed.
  • Reliance on precedents that amendments divesting vested rights should be allowed only on sufficient material.
  • The application for amendment was not made until 4th July, 1977, as taking out the summons on 25th June, 1977 was a ministerial act and not an application to the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 Principles governing allowance of amendments to pleadings; amendments not foreign to original claim can be allowed. The Court found the proposed amendment was not foreign to the original claim and relied on this precedent to justify allowing the amendment.
P.H Patil v. K.S Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 Reiteration of principles on amendments and allowance thereof. The Court cited this case to support the principle that amendments clarifying claims embedded in original pleadings are permissible.
Bombay Corporation v. Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 Amendments that seek to introduce new causes of action or plead fraud should be scrutinized carefully. The respondents relied on this case to argue against the amendment; however, the Court distinguished the present facts.
Shanti Kumar v. H. Ins. Co., New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719 Amendment should not divest vested rights without sufficient material supporting the reason for amendment. The Court held that no vested rights of the defendant were divested and thus allowed the amendment.
Govind Das v. Pran Kumar, (1959) 63 Cal WN 877 Distinction between ministerial acts and judicial acts in making applications; timing of application under procedural rules. The Court applied this precedent to determine when the application for amendment was deemed to be made for limitation purposes.
Khetter Mohun Sing v. Kassy Nath Sett, (1893) ILR 20 Cal 899 Taking out summons is a ministerial act and does not constitute making an application to the Court. Used to interpret the timing of the application under the Limitation Act and procedural rules.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the date of accrual of cause of action for limitation purposes, considering the loss occurred on 15th September, 1973. It acknowledged that limitation for insurance claims runs either from the date of loss or the date of denial of claim, whichever is later. The Court found that the denial of claim occurred on 23rd May, 1975, when the written statement was filed, thus extending the limitation period favorably to the plaintiff.

The Court held that there is no strict limitation period for applications for amendment, but where the amendment introduces a new cause of action barred by limitation, this is a relevant factor to consider. Here, the amendment was not foreign to the original claim but a clarification of an embedded controversy regarding the payment by defendant No. 5 with knowledge of assignment.

Regarding the timing of the application, the Court considered prior authority that taking out a summons is a ministerial act and does not amount to making an application. However, the Limitation Act, 1963 clarified that an application by notice of motion is made when presented to the proper officer, which the Court found occurred on 25th June, 1977. Despite this, since limitation began to run from denial in May 1975, the application was within limitation.

The Court also addressed the respondents' contention that the amendment sought to plead fraud as a new cause of action, concluding that no vested rights of the defendants were divested and the amendment was permissible as it arose from the original claim.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the application for amendment of the plaint.

The amendment is to be effected within three weeks, and the plaintiff must serve copies of the amended plaint to the defendants, who may file additional written statements within a further fortnight. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs of the application and any additional written statements.

The order does not prejudice the rights and contentions of the parties, and no new precedent was established. The decision directly permits the plaintiff to clarify and extend its claim regarding the insurance payment without being barred by limitation, facilitating the continuation of the suit on these grounds.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application for amendment of the plaint. The suit in question was filed on 25th June, 1974. The Master's Summons for the application for amendment of the plaint was taken out on 25th June, 1977. The summons was made returnable on the 4th July, 1977 and on the 4th July, 1977 directions for affidavits were obtained from the Court. The suit is by the plaintiff, I.T.C Ltd. against seven defendants. The main defendant, however, is the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff alleged that the defendant No. 1, of which the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the Directors and guarantors, had borrowed some money and the plaintiff had agreed to lend and advance to the defendant No. 1 the said moneys on, inter alia, the terms that they would pledge two Trawlers to the plaintiff as security for repayment of the amounts advanced. Both the trawlers were insured with the National Insurance Company Ltd. being the defendant No. 5 herein. The material fact for the present purpose is that one of the Trawlers viz. Akashi Maru was lost on 15th Sept. 1973. It is alleged that on 30th Oct. 1973 the plaintiff wrote to the defendant No. 5 about the assignment of the policies of the insurance in favour of the plaintiff and claimed damages payable under the insurance policies. On 3rd Nov. 1973 the defendant No. 5 wrote back to say that the defendant No. 5 was not informed about the assignment of the policies, Thereafter the suit was filed, as I have mentioned before, on the 25th June, 1974 and there was an order of injunction restraining the insurance company from making any payment to the defendant No. 1. In opposition to that application on the 27th June, 1974 on behalf of the defendant No. 5 a statement was made in Court stating that in respect of Akashi Maru the amount covered by the policy had been paid to the defendant No. 1. Originally the plaintiff in the suit had claimed, inter alia, a decree for specific performance against the first defendant and a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien or charge on the Trawlers to secure the said amount of Rs. 5,22,000.and a further declaration, inter alia, that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the insurance policies mentioned in para 8 of the plaint and to any moneys payable thereunder and such moneys are charged with liability for payment of the plaintiff's claim and for other relief to which it is not necessary for me to refer for the purpose of this application.

2. In the proposed amendment, the plaintiff seeks to amend the plaint by stating that the payment made by the 5th defendant had been made with knowledge of the assignment and was therefore illegal and made fraudulently and in collusion with the first and the fifth defendants. Consequently the plaintiff has sought to amend the prayers in the plaint by asking a declaration that the payment made by the fifth defendant under the policies has not discharged the fifth defendant of its liability to pay the plaintiff and a decree to pay Rs. 5 lakhs or Rs. 3 lakhs as to be determined by this Court. On behalf of the respondents, viz., the respondents Nos. 1 and 5, it was urged that the amendments sought to introduce a new cause of action and, therefore, it should not be allowed. It was further submitted that the amendment sought to introduce a claim on cause of action which had become barred by lapse of time. Reliance in this connection was placed on Article 44 (b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. It was said that the period of limitation for a cause of action on a policy of insurance of this nature starts from the date of the occurrence causing the loss, or where the claim on policy is denied, either wholly or partly, the date of such denial, and the period of limitation is 3 years from the accrual of the cause of action.

3. Now, the question in this case is when did the cause of action arise? The loss indisputably had occurred on the 15th Sept., 1973. Therefore, the application for amendment, even if it is taken to have been made on the 25th June, 1977, was beyond the period of 3 years from the date of occurrence causing the loss. But learned advocate for the respondent No. 5 contended and, in my opinion, rightly, that the second limb of the article from which the period began to run, extends the period in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, where the claim on the policy is denied either wholly or partly, the limitation begins from the date of such denial. Now, in this case then it has to be found out when the claim on the policy has been denied. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the claim on the policy has been denied on the date when statement was made in the written statement filed on the 23rd May, 1975. On behalf of the respondent No. 1, however, it was urged that the claim on the policy has not been denied at all in this case. If one accepts this argument urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the claim on the policy has not been denied but on the other hand the claim on the policy has been discharged, then, of course, the present claim of the plaintiff cannot be said to have become barred by virtue of cl. (b) of Article 44 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, Article 58 of the Limitation Act states that for a declaration of the nature that the plaintiff has sought for, the period of limitation is 3 years when the right to sue accrues. Then again, the question would be for a suit of this nature, when can one say the right to sue accrued? Now, in this case the correct position in my opinion, is that the defendant No. 5 is denying the claim of the plaintiff to get payment, in the facts and circumstances of the case, on the policy as assigned to them. Therefore, either way one looks at it, either under cl. (b) of Article 44 or Article 58, the period of limitation would run from the time when the defendant No. 5 denies the claim of the plaintiff to get the payment of the money on the policy as assigned to them. Such would be the date because that would be the time when the claim on the assigned policy is denied to the plaintiff. That would also be the date when the plaintiff becomes entitled to obtain a declaration that the plaintiff has a right to get payment on the denial of that right by the defendant. Looked at it from that point of view, in my opinion, in this case the period of limitation would begin to run, as was urged on behalf of the petitioner, from the 23rd May, 1975. If that is the position, then of course the application, even if it is treated as an application made on the 4th July, 1977. cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. It is well known, however, that there is no limitation as such for application for amendment. But in granting an application for amendment if there is any question of the introduction of any cause of action, which would be barred by lapse of time if a new suit was instituted on that cause of action, that is a factor which the Court should and as has been enjoined take into consideration in allowing such an amendment application. But the limitation as such is not the only deciding and guiding factor. It is one of the elements that should be taken into consideration in dealing with the justice of the situation. In this connection reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357. In the instant case the present amendment sought is not foreign to the claim. It arises out of the claim originally made. The claim arises out of an attempt or payment made by the fifth defendant. The controversy is that the fifth defendant had knowledge, according to the petitioner, of such an assignment. The fifth defendant denies such knowledge of assignment. In the pleading originally framed the ingredients of this controversy were pleaded but this has now been clarified and made into a new form of action as was the case before the Supreme Court in the decision referred to hereinbefore. The Supreme Court also reiterated the same principles in the case of P.H Patil v. K.S Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363. On behalf of the respondents, however, reliance was placed on a decision in the case of Bombay Corporation v. Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 in aid of the proposition that fraud, as sought to be pleaded in the instant case, is a new cause of action and relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Kumar v. H. Ins. Co., New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719 on behalf of the respondent it was urged that where vested right was sought to be divested by allowing an amendment, the Court should not do so unless the Court found on materials the reason for doing so. In this case there is, in my opinion, looked at it from the point of view in which I have viewed the original plaint, there is no question of divesting any vested right of the defendant. Furthermore, as I said, the claim proposed to be made was embedded in the original pleading and is certainly not foreign to the claim.

4. There is another point that was taken. In this case it was stated that the limitation ran from the 23rd of June, 1974 when statement about the payment was made in Court and if that was the position, then by the 27th June, 1977, if the present amendment sought to be a new claim, would become barred by limitation. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the summons was taken out on the 25th June, 1977 and therefore, the application should be deemed to have been made on that date. In the case of Govind Das v. Pran Kumar, (1959) 63 Cal WN 877, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the Master when he discharged functions under R. 3 or R. 5 of Chapter VI of the Rules of this Court, could not be said to be doing any judicial act. These were purely ministerial acts, Taking out of a chambers summons, to which the Master had affixed his signature, did not amount to making an application to the Court. The Division Bench observed following the decision in the case of Khetter Mohun Sing v. Kassy Nath Sett, (1893) ILR 20 Cal 899, that taking out of a chambers summons, to which the Master had affixed his signature, does not amount to making an application to the Court. On this authority it was contended that the application to the Court was not made prior to the 4th July, 1977 and if the amendment sought to introduce new cause of action from the date 27th June, 1974, then that would have become barred when the application was made.

5. It however, appears that Section 3, sub-section (2) clause (c) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that an application by notice of motion is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that Court. There was prior to the Limitation Act, 1963, certain amount of controversy between the different High Courts as to when an application by notice of motion in a High Court can be treated to have been made to the Court. That was set at rest by the provisions of cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The basis upon which the Division Bench of this Court in the decision referred to (Govind Das v. Pran Kumar, (1959) 63 Cal WN 877) proceeded was the authority of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khetter Mohun Sing v. Kassy Nath Sett, (1893) ILR 20 Cal 899 and the ratio of the said decision was that an application could not be said to be made until notice was given by the summons, and therefore, the ratio upon which the Division Bench proceeded was that until notice had been given, the application could not be said to have been made. Notice by the different procedures of the High Court might be given either by notice of motion or by Chambers Summons. If that is the position, then, in my opinion, the principle of cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 would be applicable in this case and the application in this case was to be made when the notice of the summons was taken out, that is to say, on the 25th June, 1977. But in the view that I have taken on the other aspect of the matter that the time had not started to run until the statements filed in the written statements of May, 1975, I need not rest my decision in allowing this application on this aspect of the matter.

6. For the reasons aforesaid, the prayer for amendment is allowed and there will be an order in terms of prayers (i), (ii) and (iii). The amendments to be effected within 3 weeks on a signed copy of the minutes. The applicant will pay the costs of this application to the different sets of appearing respondents and also the cost of additional written statements, if any. This order however, will not prejudice the rights and contentions of the parties. The plaintiff, within a fortnight from the amendment being effected will serve upon the defendants copies of the amended plaint and the defendants will be at liberty to file additional written statements, if any within a fortnight therefrom.

7. Application allowed.