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Walford Transport, Ltd. v. State Of West Bengal And Others
Summary of Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Walford Transport Ltd. (the company), operated a workshop at 21/1 Darga Road, Calcutta, which the company described as having two wings: a paying section for repairs for outside customers and a servicing section for scooters. The company maintained that the workshop was running at a loss. It issued notices regarding the situation: a notice dated 17 April 1972, a notice dated 4 September 1972 proposing either retrenchment or voluntary retirement for employees aged fifty on 1 April 1972, and ultimately a statutory notice of intention to close part of the paying section dated 11 December 1972 (rectified by another notice dated 12 December 1972) served under S. 25FFA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The statutory notice was received by the labour department on 14 December 1972.
After the notices, many employees accepted voluntary retirement or statutory compensation, but a group of about twenty-one employees (led by Automobiles Sales Staff Association of West Bengal, respondent 3) engaged in demonstrations and other disturbances. The company filed Title Suit No. 217 of 1973 in the City Civil Court seeking injunctions against those employees and office-bearers of respondent 3; interim relief was granted in modified form and an appeal by respondent 3 was pending.
Respondent 3 raised an industrial dispute about the closure. The labour department, by order dated 12 July 1973, made a reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, asking: "Whether the closure of the Darga Road workshop of the company is real, what relief are the workmen entitled to?" The Tribunal (respondent 2) heard the parties, considered written statements and evidence, and on 17 December 1974 rejected the company's preliminary objection to the maintainability of the reference, finding respondent 3 had representative capacity and that the reference was properly made.
The company challenged the Tribunal's order by way of the present rule (writ) before the Court. The Court, after hearing the parties, discharged the rule and refused the prayer for stay of the operation of the Tribunal's order. The Court also declined to enter into merits of other contentions, leaving those to the Tribunal, and requested expedition of adjudication given the age of the reference (1973).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appropriate Government's inaction (neither granting nor refusing permission) within sixty days of receipt of the notice under S. 25FFA prevents the Government from subsequently making a reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act to decide whether the closure was bona fide or real.
- Whether the reference under S. 10 was maintainable where only part of an undertaking (a branch/section) was sought to be closed.
- Whether respondent 3 (Automobiles Sales Staff Association of West Bengal) had representative capacity to espouse the cause of the affected employees and thus justify the reference.
- Whether a dispute raised and referred by a union espousing the cause of a fractional minority of the workforce (and including supervisory staff) was sufficient to sustain a reference under S. 10.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner (Walford Transport Ltd.) / Sri Das Gupta
- Submitted that S. 25FFA fixes an outer limit of sixty days for the Government to accept or refuse the proposed closure and that the Government's failure to act within sixty days should be taken as implied satisfaction with the bona fides of the closure (i.e., deemed acceptance), thereby precluding a later reference under S. 10.
- Argued that permitting a reference after the statutory period would render S. 25FFA nugatory and meaningless.
- Contended that respondent 3 raised the dispute first to the Government (not to the company), so the dispute as referred was not an industrial dispute maintainable for adjudication.
- Argued that respondent 3 represented only twenty-one employees out of about two hundred (and included supervisory staff drawing more than Rs. 500), so respondent 3 lacked representative capacity and had lost authority to espouse the cause of the workforce; a fractional minority should not be able to unsettle a satisfactorily settled dispute.
- Relied on case law (Kalinga Tubes; Indian Leaf Tobacco; Workers and Staff Association, Soap Factory; State of Punjab v. Gondhara Transport) to support objections to the reference or to contest representative capacity and competence of the reference.
Respondent (Automobiles Sales Staff Association of West Bengal / respondent 3)
- Maintained that the company had mooted voluntary retirement as a reorganization scheme and, when it was not accepted, the company effected a lockout from 13 February to 14 June 1973 and thereafter refused work to the twenty-one workmen; asserted there was never a real closure and that the company's plea of closure was unreal, motivated and mala fide.
- Contended before the Tribunal that respondent 3 was authorized to espouse the cause of the employees and that the dispute was properly raised and referred for adjudication.
- Denied the factual assertions made by the company regarding the bona fides and necessity of the closure.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1617] | Held that S. 25F is not a condition precedent to valid retrenchment (i.e., breach of the notice provision does not render retrenchment invalid). | The Court applied this principle by analogy to S. 25FFA, concluding that breach of S. 25FFA's notice requirement, though serious and punishable, does not make a closure illegal or non est and does not bar the Government from making a reference under S. 10. |
| Kalinga Tubes Ltd. v. Their Workmen [A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 90] | Relied on by the petitioner to argue that a reference should not have been made after Government inaction. | The Court noted the petitioner's reliance but held that the factual record before it and before the Tribunal did not permit consideration of that authority at this stage; the determination in Kalinga Tubes was not required to be considered by the Court in the present writ proceeding. |
| Workmen of Indian Leaf Tobacco Co. Ltd., Guntoor v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Co. Ltd., Guntoor [A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 860] | Relied on by the petitioner to contend that a reference would be incompetent where only a branch of a workshop was sought to be closed. | The Court stated that the view expressed in Indian Leaf Tobacco would apply but that it was not required to determine that point at the writ stage; no decision on that ground was made by the Court. |
| Workers & Staff Association, Soap Factory v. State of Mysore [A.I.R. 1971 Mys. 22] | Relied upon to argue that a fractional minority of employees cannot justify a reference to adjudication. | The Court observed the reliance but held it need not decide the point in the present proceeding; the question must be determined on evidence before the Tribunal. |
| State of Punjab v. Gondhara Transport Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. [(1975) 4 SCC 838 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 531] | Relied on regarding the determination of representative capacity of unions and their authority to espouse employees' causes. | The Court indicated that this is a question for the Tribunal to decide on relevant evidence and that it was not appropriate for the writ court to make that determination in the absence of the full record of evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court engaged in a step-by-step analysis addressing the central legal question of the effect of the Government's inaction after receipt of the S. 25FFA notice, and related preliminary objections.
- Nature and purpose of S. 25FFA: The Court examined the object of S. 25FFA (inserted by Act 72 of 1972 and modeled after measures adopted earlier by West Bengal), explaining that the requirement to give sixty days' notice and to state reasons is intended to enable the appropriate Government to examine the motive, implications and consequences of a proposed closure and, if possible, to avert it or to assist the employer or to mediate industrial relations difficulties.
- S. 25FFA does not prohibit closure: The Court held that S. 25FFA does not purport to take away the employer's right to carry on business (Art. 19(1)(g)); it requires notice but does not prohibit closure. Failure to comply attracts penal consequences but does not render the closure illegal or non est.
- Analogy with S. 25F and precedent: By analogy to the Supreme Court's decision in Bombay Union of Journalists concerning S. 25F (which requires notice before retrenchment), the Court concluded that breach of S. 25FFA, though serious and punishable, does not make an act of closure void. Accordingly, the Government's power under S. 10 to refer disputes to a Tribunal is not limited or abridged by the sixty-day period in S. 25FFA.
- Government inaction does not amount to deemed acceptance precluding reference: The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the Government's failure to act within sixty days should be treated as acquiescence in the bona fides of the closure. The Court found no textual basis in S. 25FFA to circumscribe the Government's power subsequently to make a reference under S. 10 to examine whether the closure was bona fide or real.
- Evidence and findings as to representative capacity and bona fides: The Tribunal had considered evidence and found respondent 3 had representative character and that the reference was properly made. The Court emphasized that such findings were factual, based on evidence, and not perversely reached; therefore, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, the Court would not re-examine those factual findings in absence of a full evidentiary record.
- On petitioner’s reliance on precedent and other arguments: The Court noted the petitioner's reliance on several authorities (including Kalinga Tubes and Indian Leaf Tobacco) but concluded that the relevant facts were not before the Court or the Tribunal in a manner that permitted determination of those issues at the writ stage; therefore those contentions were not decided by the Court.
- Conclusion of analysis: Having held that S. 25FFA does not deprive the Government of power to make a reference under S. 10 and that the Tribunal's factual findings on representative capacity and bona fides were not to be disturbed on writ, the Court found the petitioner's preliminary objections to the reference unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The petition (rule) is discharged. The application for stay of the operation of the Tribunal's order is refused. There will be no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The reference made by the appropriate Government under S. 10 to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, remains competent and may proceed to adjudicate whether the closure of the Darga Road paying section was real and what relief the workmen are entitled to.
- The Court ruled that S. 25FFA's sixty-day notice requirement does not, by its silence, preclude the Government from subsequently making an adjudicatory reference under S. 10; failure by the Government to act within sixty days does not automatically deem the closure bona fide or otherwise shut off adjudication.
- The Court declined to re-open or re-evaluate the factual findings (such as the union's representative capacity) made by the Tribunal on evidence; such matters are to be decided by the Tribunal on the record.
- The Court did not finally decide merits of other contentions raised by the company (including points based on other precedents or the contention about partial/branch closure); those remain open for adjudication by the Tribunal on evidence.
- There is no affirmative order creating new substantive law beyond the conclusions summarized above; the direct effect is procedural and limited to the dismissal of the writ and the clearance for the Tribunal to proceed with adjudication.
Note: The foregoing summary is faithful to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that opinion.
JUDGMENT
1. In this rule, an order made by the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, respondent 2, on a preliminary point being raised by the petitioner-company, against a reference under S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), has been impeached.
2. The petitioner, Walford Transport, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the said company), is a public limited company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act and is a dealer and distributor of motor vehicles, having branches in West Bengal and other States. For such business, the said company maintains more than one workshop, one of which is located at 21/1, Darga Road, P.O Beniapukur, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the said workshop). It has been contended by the said company that the said workshop had two wings, one for repairs of used motor vehicles of outside customers known as paying section, and the other for servicing of scooters. It has been contended by the said company that there are two registered trade unions, one under the name and style of Automobiles Sales Staff Association of West Bengal (respondent 3) and the other under the name and style of Walford Transport Workers' Association.
3. The said company has alleged that for some time the said workshop was running at a loss and as such, the said company by a notice, dated 17 April, 1972, informed all concerned about the said facts and also requested that unless the employees concerned would work hard to make the said workshop viable, they would have no way out but to close down the workshop. Admittedly, a copy of the said notice was sent to the appropriate Labour Commissioner. It has further been alleged that as the position did not improve, the said company again issued another notice on 4 September, 1972, and by that, they informed all concerned, that to avoid a complete closure of the said workshop, a drastic cut in the establishment was indispensable and two courses were open, viz.,
(1) retrenchment of staff on payment of statutory compensation; and
(2) voluntary retrenchment of those employees who were aged fifty on 1 April, 1972.
By the said notice, the employees concerned were requested to elect their choice and to exercise necessary option. The employees, according to the said company, did not accept the said voluntary retirement scheme and as such the loss which was being sustained by the said company continued and as a result thereof, they decided to retrench workmen in the said workshop following the principle of last come first go, and on that basis another notice, dated November/6 December, 1972, was issued. This was also without any effect and as no solution could be evoked for the purpose of avoiding the circumstances as mentioned hereinbefore, the said company in terms of S. 25 FFA of the said Act, which is to the following effect:
25 FFA. Sixty days' notice to be given of intention to close down any undertaking.— (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking shall serve, at least sixty days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, a notice, in the prescribed manner, on the appropriate Government stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking;
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to—
(a) an undertaking in which—
(i) less than fifty workmen are employed; or
(ii) less than fifty workmen were employed on an average per working day in the preceding twelve months.
(b) An undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work or project.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub sec. (1), the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that provisions of Sub-sec. (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order.”
sent the required notice of sixty days under registered post to the Labour Commissioner. The said notice was, dated 11 December, 1972, and was intended to close down a part of the said company's paying section of the said workshop. A copy of the said notice was also sent to the said respondent 3 union and the notice in question was admittedly received by the labour department on 14 December, 1972.
4. In their petition, the said company has further alleged that after the notice, as aforesaid, about 90 per cent of the employees of the said workshop retired on accepting the voluntary retirement scheme or the statutory benefits and since 6 February, 1973, twenty-one employees, of whom some were supervisory staff, led by respondent 3 started holding demonstrations, with vituperative slogans against the management and more particularly against the manager of the said company. That apart, it has been alleged that these employees were guilty of creating other types of disturbances as mentioned in Para 9 of the petition. It appears that as a result of such action on the part of such employees, a suit being Title Suit No. 217 of 1973, was filed in the City Civil Court at Calcutta, against the employees concerned and the office-bearers of respondent 3, for permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with the activities of the said company and creating any disturbance so far the existing employees of the said company are concerned. An order was also asked far against the employees concerned and respondent 3 from coming within one hundred yards of the said company's two premises at 71 and 117, Park Street. Calcutta, excepting during office hours. It appears that the interim orders, some particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore, was issued by the learned Judge of the Fourth Bench of the City Civil Court at Calcutta, in a modified form, viz., instead of one hundred yards, the employees concerned and the office-bearers of the said respondent 3 were restrained from coming within fifty yards of the footpath by the side of the two premises as mentioned hereinbefore on Park Street. Against the said order, admittedly an appeal has been preferred by respondent 3 and the same is still pending. It has further been alleged by the said company that for the purpose of fulfilling their statutory obligations arising out of the closure in question, they had sent cheques by registered post for the due amount including statutory compensation to all the discharged employees of the said workshop. It has also been alleged that out of twenty-one employees concerned, fourteen have accepted such payments without any objection and out of the remaining have seven, four have accepted the payments with objection. It has also been stated that of the balance three, two of the employees belong to supervisory staff and one is employed as a clerk.
5. In the meantime, respondent 3 purported to raise an industrial dispute over the issue of the closure in question and on such, the said company was asked by an officer of the labour department on 7 March, 1973, to be present in a joint conference at the chamber of the Additional Labour Commissioner. The said company has stated that they duly informed the authorities concerned their inability to be present, as after the service of the statutory notice for closure on the Government as enjoined in law, and after the expiry of sixty days from the date of service of the notice on the Government, there was no scope for such joint conference. Again on 29 March, 1973, the said company was served with another notice from the Labour Directorate of the Government of West Bengal for a separate discussion over the said matter, but a reply similar to the one above was also sent.
6. On such failure of the said company to attend to the discussions as mentioned hereinbefore, the appropriate authorities by order No. 4937 — IR/1R/101-266/71 (pt), dated 12 July, 1973, made a reference under S. 10 of the said Act to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, for adjudication of the following issue:
“Whether the closure of the Darga Road workshop of the company is real, what relief are the workmen entitled to?
The said reference was made between Walford Transport, Ltd. of 71, Park Street, Calcutta-16, and their workmen (clerical) represented by Automobiles Sales Staff Association of West Bengal, 7-D, S.R Das Road, Calcutta-26. On such reference, the parties to the dispute filed their respective written statements. It has been contended by the union concerned (respondent 3) that the said company mooted a scheme of voluntary retirement in the name of reorganization of the said workshop and as the scheme was not acceptable to the workmen, the said company as a retaliatory measure and to pressurize the workmen, effected a lockout from 13 February to 14 June, 1973. They have further stated that the said company resumed its work with effort from 25 June, 1973, and the twenty-one workmen concerned, were refused work and six were shown out of employment. It was also contended by respondent 3 that there was never a closure of the said workshop and the plea of the said company about the said closure was unreal, motivated, mala fide and a mere pretence. The said company on the other hand reiterated their case as mentioned hereinbefore, and contended that because of the recurring heavy loss over years, it became impossible for the management to run the said workshop and with a view to save the situation, a scheme of voluntary retirement of workmen aged fifty years or more was formulated. Since there was no response to such scheme, they under the circumstances had no alternative but to serve a notice of closure, dated 11 December, 1972, which was subsequently rectified by another notice of 12 December, 1972, and pursuant to such notice, the paying section of the said workshop, was closed on and from 13 February, 1973. They contended the closure to be real and genuine and was necessitated by the circumstances beyond their control and due to the attitude of a section of the workmen.
7. Before the respondent-Tribunal, the said company raised a preliminary objection as to validity and maintainability of the order of reference contending that since the Government did not take any steps like conciliation proceedings or reference to the Tribunal within sixty days from the date of receipt of the said company's notice under S. 25 FFA of the said Act, it should be deemed that the Government had accepted the fact that the closure of the said workshop was real and in any event the Government should have at least been deemed to have waived its lawful rights to have the matter agitated over and or to refer the same to the respondent-Tribunal. On such facts, it was submitted that when the Government had not acted on the basis of the notice, which was duly received by then and that too within sixty days, it should be presumed that they were satisfied about the bona fides of the closure and furthermore, if they are allowed to interfere with the fact of closure after their inaction as aforesaid, that would make the provisions of S. 25 FFA of the said Act nugatory and meaningless. It was also submitted by the said company that when admittedly respondent 3 raised the dispute over the matter of closure of the said work shop by its letter, dated 6 February, 1973, first to the Government and not to them, the dispute as raised and as referred to for adjudication, was not an industrial dispute and it was also contended that when admittedly there were 200 workmen in the said workshop and respondent 3 espoused the cause of twenty-one employees only, of whom five belong to the supervisory capacity drawing more than Rs. 500 per month, viz., who were not workmen and whose cases cannot be a matter for industrial adjudication, respondent 3 had lost its representative capacity or character and as such, was not authorized to espouse the cause of the fractional minority of the workmen and thus unsettle a satisfactorily settled dispute.
8. The respondent-Tribunal, by its order, dated 17 December, 1974, after hearing both the parties, as mentioned hereinbefore, rejected the preliminary objection as raised. It has been held by the respondent-Tribunal that on consideration of the provisions of Ss. 25 FFA and 10 of the said Act, that the outer limit of sixty days as prescribed or mentioned in S. 25 FFA, would not circumvent or put a restraint on the power of the appropriate Government to make a reference under S. 10 of the said Act. On consideration of the evidence on record, it has further been found by the respondent-Tribunal that respondents in the instant case, was authorized to espouse the cause of the concerned employees and the dispute was raised and referred duly and property. That apart, it has also been found by the respondent-Tribunal on evidence that respondent 3 had representative character and capacity.
9. Sri Das Gupta appearing in support of the rule, first placed reliance on the provisions of S. 25 FFA and also to those of S. 10 of the said Act. He submitted that when S. 25 FFA has fixed an outer limit of sixty days for the grant of sanction or quoting a refusal of the action of closure as taken by the company, and the appropriate authority has not refused to accord the necessary sanction, it should be presumed that they were satisfied about the bona fide of the action of closure as proposed to be taken and as such the subsequent reference or exercise of power to refer the dispute as in the instant case, under S. 10 of the said Act, was improper and unauthorized because the effect of such act, being taken after the expiry of the statutory time under S. 25FFA, would be that those provisions of S. 25FFA would become nugatory and redundant. He further submitted that the effect of such action of the Government in not prohibiting the intended closure, would be that they were satisfied about the bona fides of the same and as such the closure was genuine and so also the reference was incompetent. He also submitted that the entire business of the said company not being closed and only a branch of a section having admittedly been closed, the reference was incompetent. Apart from this Sri Das Gupta contended that since a majority of the workmen concerned have accepted the fact of closure, the espousing of the cause for a small fraction of the employees by respondent 3 was inappropriate for making a reference and the more so when the said union had not had the representative capacity so far the majority of the employees were concerned. Those contentions of Sri Das Gupta were of course denied on facts by respondent 3 on filing an affidavit in-opposition and appearing through Sri Halder.
10. So far the representative capacity of the union or their authority to espouse the cause of the employees concerned and whether the appropriate authority under the said Act had exercised their jurisdiction in accordance with the law or with authority, have been decided on evidence by the respondent-Tribunal. Those findings of the said Tribunal have of course been sought to be impeached on further facts by the said company. I am afraid that at this stage and the more so when the subsequent facts were not before the respondent-Tribunal, this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, would not be entitled to investigate into such facts. The respondent-Tribunal was satisfied on available evidence about the representative character of respondent 3 and the bona fides of the making of reference and such findings, I am not inclined to interfere with, as there is no perversity in such findings and that too on the evidence as led.
11. The question, therefore, is what would be the effect of the Government's inaction in not either granting or refusing necessary permission on receipt of the statutory notice under S. 25FFA on their part to make a reference under S. 10 of the said Act subsequently.
12. The said S. 25FFA was inserted by Act 72 of 1972. The closure of industrial undertakings naturally entails loss of production and unemployment of large number of workmen. This problem became acute in this State and consequently a President's Act., viz., Industrial Disputes (West Bengal) Amendment Act, 1971, was enacted on 28 August, 1971, providing that an employer who intended to close down an undertaking should serve at least sixty days' notice on the State Government stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking. Since the problem of closure was or is not peculiar to this State alone but was found in varying degrees in other States as well, the Central Government considered it desirable to promote Central legislation on the subject. The matter was, therefore, referred to the Union Labour Conference which generally endorsed the proposal for central legislation after considering all the questions in its meeting on 22/23 October, 1971.
13. The provisions of the said section require an employer, who intends to close down an undertaking to served a notice on the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking. The requirement of stating reasons has been engrafted with a view to enable the appropriate Government to note as to what actually is the reason or motive foe which the employer intends to close down the undertaking and than to find out ways and means, if possible, to avert such action. If the Government, from the reasons finds that the closure is due to trade exigencies, it may try to help the employer through its various agencies to overcome the difficulties and continue the undertaking. But if the Government come to the conclusion that the closure in question is on account of bad and uncompromising industrial relation between the employer and employees, it may use its goods offices by promoting harmony to bring out amity between the parties and failing that the Government may also use coercive pressure on the parties to come to some workable terms and thus to avoid the catastrophe of closure. The notice in question is required to be served on the appropriate Government at least sixty days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective. In short, the Government must have sixty clear days' notice before the date on which the closure is to become effective, so that it may have sufficient time to examine the motive, implications and the consequences of the proposed closure and, if possible, to try to avert it.
14. The said section does not purport to take away the right of an employer to carry on his business as guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, as it does not seek to prohibit the closure. The section only requires that before the closure, the intending employer should intimate the appropriate Government by means of a notice, at least sixty days before the day on which the closure is to take effect, stating the reasons for the closure of the undertaking. The failure of the employer to comply with this requirement entails stringent penalty of imprisonment upto a term of six months or fine upto Rs. 5,000 or both. But the question arose whether the failure of the employer to comply with those requirements would make the closure illegal or non est. The answer appears to be in the negative because from the language of the section, no prohibition of the closure is discernable. If law does not prohibit closure, the closure thus does not become illegal. The provision in S. 25FFA is somewhat analogous to provision in S. 25F, which also requires the employer to serve a notice in the prescribed manner on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the official gazette, before retrenching any workmen employed in any industry carried on by him. The breach of such provision also entails a penalty of imprisonment for a term exceeding upto six months or fine extending upto Rs. 1,000 or both under S. 31(1) of the said Act. In the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617], the Supreme Court has held that the clause of S. 25F is not a condition precedent to valid retrenchment though its breach no doubt would be a serious matter. On a parity of reason, though the breach of the requirements of S. 25FFA (1) would be a serious matter entailing the penalty under S. 30(A), it would not, however, make the act of closure illegal or non est. Under S. 10 of the said Act there is no express or implied restriction on the Government to make or refuse to mike a reference within sixty days. The outer limit as prescribed in S. 25FFA, thus in my opinion, would not create any restrictions or abridge the power of the State Government to make a reference in a muter like this and on the question whether the closure was bona fide or real. The service of the required notice under S. 25FFA is only required for the protection employers from prosecution under S. 30(A) of the said Act or on non-service of such notice. It should be remembered that the giving of notice of closure under S. 25FFA does not prove the fact of closure and even if the said notice is given, the appropriate Government under the said Act would have retained its jurisdiction to find out or to try to have the fact of closure or bona fide thereof by a reference to an appropriate authority under the said Act established. Admittedly, the said company was not a public utility concern and as such the reference in the instant case would also have been made even without conciliation proceeding and that too in terms of the requirements of S. 19(1) of the said Act.
15. Sri Das Gupta in support of his contentions that because of the inaction of the Government in the instant case the closure should have been deemed to have been bona fide, submitted that in terms of the determination of the Supreme Court in the case of Kalinga Tubes, Ltd. v. Their workmen [A.I.R 1969 S.C 90], the reference in the instant case should not have been made. In the instant case only a reference has been made, for the purpose of finding out whether the closure was bona fide or not and no final determination has been made in that aspect. Whether the closure was bona fide or not, would be a question of fact, to be decided on evidence and as such at this stage, the said determination of the Supreme Court, is not required to be considered by me. As the relevant fact was not available either before the respondent-Tribunal and before this Court, I am of the view that the said determination is not required to be considered now. In support of his submissions that since a branch of the said workshop of the said company has been sought to be closed down, Sri Das Gupta submitted that in terms of the determination of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of Indian Leaf Tobacco Company, Ltd, Guntoor v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Company, Ltd., Guntoor [A.I.R 1970 S.C 860], the order of reference should be deemed to be incompetent. The view I have expressed in support of the case in Workmen of Indian Leaf Tobacco (vide supra), apply to this case also and as such at this stage, I am not required to make any determination on that point. Sri Das Gupta then relied on the case of Workers and Staff Association, Soap Factory v. State of Mysore [A.I.R 1971 Mys. 22], in support of his submissions that when a majority of the section of the employees concerned have accepted the position, so the dispute at the instance of a fractional minority section of the employees, would not be enough or would not entitle the Government to make a reference under S. 10. This case also, in view of my observation as above, is not required to be decided or has got any application at this stage. I am not required to make any determination unless the appropriate evidence in the proceeding is available. Thereafter, reliance was placed by Sri Das Gupta on the case of State of Punjab v. Gondhara Transport Company (Private), Ltd. [(1975) 4 SCC 838 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 531], on the question of representative capacity of respondent 3 in the instant case, their power to espouse the cause of the employees concerned and submitted that on the determination as made by the Supreme Court, in the instant case, the reference was also incompetent. This is also a question which will have to be decided by the respondent-Tribunal on relevant and necessary evidence and as such at this stage, I am not required to make any determination on the basis of the observations as made by the Supreme Court.
16. In view of the above the arguments advanced by Sri Das Gupta fail, so also the application and the rule is thus discharged. There will be no order for costs.
17. I make it clear that save as aforesaid, I have not gone into the merits of other contentions as raised by the said company and this will not preclude or prohibit the respondent-Tribunal from entertaining such points which have not been decided or adjudicated by me.
18. Respondents 1 and 2 have not filed any return to the rule which was made ready on 4 September, 1975, but Sri Sen Gupta produced the records. Be that as it may, since the reference is one of 1973, it would be highly appreciated if the respondent-Tribunal takes appropriate step to have the adjudication completed at an early date.
19. Stay operation of the order as prayed for is refused.
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