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Union Of India v. M/S. Kuppuswamy Naicker .

Calcutta High Court
Sep 27, 1977
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a judgment delivered by Ghose, J. on 11 June 1970 revoking leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The Union of India (plaintiff/appellant) instituted Suit No. 39 of 1969 on 2 January 1969 against M/s M. Kuppuswamy Naicker (the defendant/respondent), a business entity carrying on business at Madras. The plaintiff sought a decree for Rs. 2,14,259.38P or, alternatively, a direction that accounts be taken of transactions between the parties and a decree passed under Order 20 Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) or in such other form as the Court may deem proper.

The plaintiff's pleaded case was that the defendant was employed as its agent to handle import and clearance at the Port of Madras of 3,338.680 long tons of steel imported under the U.S. Development Loan Fund Scheme. The defendant was alleged to have cleared, delivered and/or despatched the goods to consignees nominated by the Iron and Steel Controller and to have realised in aggregate Rs. 23,88,883.55P from those nominees, paid only Rs. 19,31,769.48P to the plaintiff and been entitled to commission of Rs. 2,42,854.69P, leaving a balance of Rs. 2,14,259.38P allegedly due to the plaintiff. The plaint averred that the written agreement was entered into at 33, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of the Court.

At trial Ghose, J. accepted for the purpose of the revocation application the plaint's allegation that the contract was made in Calcutta but held that only a minor part of the cause of action arose within that jurisdiction, that the necessary witnesses and documents lay in Madras, and, on the balance of convenience, revoked leave under Clause 12. The Union of India appealed against that revocation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent should be revoked on the basis that the greater part of the cause of action arose outside the Court's jurisdiction and the balance of convenience favours trial elsewhere.
  2. Whether, on the pleadings and documentary material (in particular letters dated 12 October 1959 and 21 July 1960), the contract between the parties was made within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Court or in Madras (i.e., where acceptance was posted).
  3. Whether, given the principal–agent relationship and the agent's duties concerning accounts and production of documents, the rendition of accounts and trial in Calcutta is appropriate despite material and witnesses being in Madras.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Union of India) Arguments

  • The plaint alleges the agreement was made at 33, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta, and relies on letters dated 12 October 1959 and 21 July 1960 (annexures A and B) filed with the plaint to support that averment.
  • The relationship was one of principal and agent; established authorities require an agent to keep accurate accounts and produce them to the principal. The principal (in Calcutta) may thus demand rendition of accounts in Calcutta.
  • The balance of convenience does not favour revocation of leave; the trial Court should not have revoked leave obtained under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
  • Practically, the Union of India informed the Court that if the defendant seeks examination of witnesses on commission and the Court allows it, the Union would bear initially the expenses of both parties for holding the commission(s) wherever necessary outside Calcutta, subject to final orders.

Respondent's (Defendant) Arguments

  • The respondent's counsel (Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghose) argued that no part of the cause of action arose within Calcutta and that leave should therefore be revoked. He contended that, although offers were made from Calcutta, the offer was accepted in Madras and the contract was completed in Madras (acceptance posted there), relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Bhagwandas v. Girdharilal & Co. (AIR 1966 SC 543) for the principle that making an offer in one place which is accepted elsewhere does not form part of the cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract.
  • Affidavit material by the defendant's sole proprietor admitted that only a negligible part of the cause of action arose within Calcutta.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal, AIR 1949 Cal 495 Doctrine of forum convenience/balance of convenience to be considered when granting or revoking leave under Letters Patent. Noted by the appellate court as the established principle ordinarily applied. The trial Judge (Ghose, J.) applied this principle in revoking leave; the appellate Court considered the trial Judge's application of the doctrine when deciding the appeal.
Bhagwandas v. Girdharilal & Co., AIR 1966 SC 543 Principle that making an offer at a place that is accepted elsewhere does not itself form part of the cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Cited by the respondent to argue the contract was made in Madras (acceptance posted there) and that no cause of action arose in Calcutta. The appellate Court concluded that this precedent was not relevant to the instant appeal on the particular facts and documentary record (letters) before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate Court proceeded step-by-step from the record and the legal principles cited in the materials before it:

  1. Standard for revocation application: The Court reiterated that, for an application to revoke leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the Court proceeds on the assumption that the plaint's allegations are true. The trial Judge applied that standard and accepted the plaint's averment that the contract was made in Calcutta.
  2. Evaluation of the respondent's argument: Respondent argued that acceptance posted in Madras completed the contract there and invoked Bhagwandas (AIR 1966 SC 543). The appellate Court examined the documentary material (the letters dated 12 October 1959 and 21 July 1960) and concluded that Bhagwandas was not relevant to the instant facts.
  3. Documentary analysis: The 12 October 1959 letter (from C.V. Ramachandran, Price and Accounts Officer, Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, Calcutta) authorised the defendant to handle specified quantities of steel and requested immediate performance and certain securities; it referred to further documents and a formal appointment letter to follow. The 21 July 1960 letter (signed by S.S. Sinha, Deputy Price and Accounts Officer "for and on behalf of the President of India") formally appointed the defendant and required acknowledgement of unqualified acceptance by returning a signed duplicate. The Court found these documents tend to support the plaint's allegation that the contract/agreement was entered into in Calcutta.
  4. Agency law and the forum: The Court relied on established authority (cited Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Ed., Art. 780, and Bowstead on Agency, 14th Ed., Art. 53) explaining the duties of an agent to keep accurate accounts, keep principal's property separate, and produce books and documents to the principal or a person named by the principal. On the facts as pleaded (a principal in Calcutta and an agent handling transactions in Madras), the Court emphasised that the principal may demand rendition of accounts in Calcutta.
  5. Assessment of the balance of convenience: The trial Judge had relied on the need to call witnesses and produce evidence from Madras. The appellate Court examined the papers and concluded that the evidence identified by the trial Judge did not appear to be material for the defendant's defence in a manner that would justify revocation. Given the principal–agent relationship and the alternative relief of accounts in the plaint, the Court found it difficult to justify revocation of leave under Clause 12 on balance of convenience grounds.
  6. Practical accommodation: To meet concerns about examining witnesses outside Calcutta, the Union of India offered to advance the expenses of both parties for any commission examination of the defendant's witnesses allowed by the Court, to be borne initially by the Union and subject to the Court's final orders.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed. The appellate Court set aside the judgment and order of the Trial Court that had revoked leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and directed that the suit shall proceed in the Calcutta Court.

Conditions and direct consequences:

  • The suit will proceed in this Court (Calcutta).
  • Condition: If the defendant makes an application for examination of witnesses on commission and the Court allows such an application, the Union of India shall pay in the first instance the expenses of both parties for holding the commission(s) wherever necessary outside Calcutta, subject to the Court's final orders.
  • Written statement and subsequent procedural timetable were directed by the Court (written statement within four weeks after reopening; discovery within a fortnight thereafter; inspection forthwith; matter to appear on the appropriate list on 14 February 1978).
  • The costs of this appeal would abide the result of the suit.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion does not announce any new legal precedent; it applies established principles concerning forum convenience and the duties of agents to the particular pleadings and documentary record in this case. The ruling's practical effect is to retain jurisdiction in Calcutta and to provide a mechanism for handling out-of-jurisdiction witness examination costs in the interim.

Show all summary ...

Sankar Prasad Mitra, C.J:— This is an appeal arising out of a judgment delivered by Ghose, J. on the 11th June, 1970 revoking leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The Union of India instituted the suit on the 2nd Jan. 1969 being Suit No. 39 of 1969 against the defendant M/s. M. Kuppuswamy Naicker, who carries on business at Madras inter alia, for a decree for Rs. 2,14,259.38P. or in the alternative accounts be taken of the transactions had by and between the defendant and the plaintiff and decree be passed under O. 20 R. 16 of the CPC or in such form as the Court may think proper.

2. The basis of the plaintiff's claim is that the defendant was employed as the plaintiff's agent to handle the import of 3338.680 long tons of steel materials which the plaintiff had imported through the Iron and Steel Controller, Calcutta under the U.S Development Loan Fund Scheme at Madras. In terms of the contract the defendant was to clear the goods at the Port of Madras, pay or incur all necessary expenses in connection with the clearing of the said goods and despatch the same to the various consignees or parties whom the Iron and Steel Controller had named. The defendant was to get a commission as per agreement between the parties on the actual tonnage of goods which the defendant had handled as such agent.

3. It is alleged that the defendant cleared all the goods imported into the Port of Madras and delivered and/or despatched the same to various persons nominated and/or named by the plaintiff through the Iron and Steel Controller as per terms of the agreement between the parties. The defendant was to realise from the said nominees or allottees of the said goods 100 per cent of bills charging base price with ‘admissible extras.’

4. According to the plaintiff the defendant realised or ought to have realised from the said nominees or allottees on account of the said goods despatched or delivered to them an aggregate sum of Rs. 23,88,883.55P. The defendant paid to the plaintiff only a sum of Rs. 19,31,769.48 P. The defendant was entitled only to a sum of Rs. 2,42,854.69P. as commission. This a balance of Rs. 2,14,259.38 p., according to the plaintiff, is due and owing by the defendant to the plaintiff. In the plaint it is alleged that the agreement between the parties was entered into at 33, Netaji Subhas Road in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court.

5. The learned trial Judge has rightly pointed out that in an application for revocation of leave granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, the Court has to proceed on the basis that the allegations made in the plaint are true. The learned trial Judge has, therefore, accepted as correct the allegation that the contract was made in Calcutta. But his Lordship is of view that only a minor part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. The most overwhelming part of the cause of action, the learned trial Judge is of opinion, arose at Madras, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Trial Judge is of the view that the defendant has to call witnesses from Madras and also bring documents from Madras to establish the defendant's case. Principally on the ground of balance of convenience, Ghose J., has revoked the leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

6. It is well settled that in giving or refusing leave or maintaining or revoking leave the Court would ordinarily take into consideration the balance of convenience and may, if the balance is definitely in favour of the defendant, apply the doctrine of forum convenience, vide Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal reported in AIR 1949 Cal 495.

7. Ghose J., has applied this principle to the facts of this case in arriving at his Lordship's decision.

8. In the affidavit in support of the summons by K. Rajendran, the sole proprietor of Messrs. M. Kuppuswamy Naicker, affirmed on the 12th Sept. 1969 it has been admitted that a negligible part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, vide paras. 2, 4 and 6 at pages 5 and 6 of the paper book. But Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghose, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has argued before us that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court and, as such, leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent should be revoked. Mr. Ghose's point is that according to the plaint the contract was made in Calcutta. That contract would be evidenced by two letters, being letters dated the 12th Oct. 1959 and the 21st July, 1960, which are annexures ‘A’ and ‘B’ to the plaint. These are letters addressed from Calcutta to the defendant in Madras containing the plaintiff's offers to appoint the defendant as handling agent. The offer was accepted in Madras and posted in Madras. As soon as the acceptance was posted the contract was complete. The contract, therefore, was entered into not in Calcutta but in Madras. And no part of the cause of action of the plaintiff's suit arose in Calcutta at all. Mr. Ghose has placed strong reliance on the Supreme Court's judgment in Bhagwandas v. Girdharilal and Co., reported in AIR 1966 SC 543 in which the Supreme Court has observed that making of an offer at a place which has been accepted elsewhere does not form part of the cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract.

9. Mr. Ghose has submitted to us that this point was not taken before the Trial Court but it is a point of law and it is open to him to urge the point in the appellate Court.

10. On the facts of this case it seems to us that the Supreme Court's judgment on which Mr. Ghosh relies has no relevance to the instant appeal. Let us read carefully the letter of the 12th Oct. 1969. It is a letter addressed by C.V Ramachandran, Price and Accounts Officer of the Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel in Calcutta to the defendant. The letter is in the following terms:—

“You are hereby authorised to handle the following quantity of steel under DLF Scheme to the Port of Madras noted against the quantities.

(As per Schedule attached)

You are requested to clear the materials immediately on arrival at the port by furnishing an indemnity Bond to the Shipper's Agent/Port Commission. The Bill of Lading and other relevant documents received in this office enclosed herewith. Further documents will be forwarded to you as and when received in this office. The formal appointment letter of Handling Agency will follow shortly. In the meantime you must furnish bank guarantee for C and F value of the materials.”

11. This letter shows that there were negotiations between the parties before the letter was addressed. By this letter the defendant was being appointed a Handling Agent subject to formal appointment in terms of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. This formal letter of appointment was addressed from Calcutta on the 21st July, 1960, which was signed by S.S Sinha, Deputy Price and Accounts Officer, “for and on behalf of the President of India” The last paragraph of this letter is:— “please acknowledge receipt of this letter by returning duly signed the enclosed duplicate copy to this office in unqualified acceptance of the terms and conditions of this Contract.”

12. Though we are not expressing any final opinion, for the purpose of disposing of this application we have to record that the two documents aforesaid tend to support the averment in paragraph 2 of the plaint, which is as follows:—

“Under an agreement in writing entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant at 33, Netaji Subhas Road within the aforesaid jurisdiction, the plaintiff authorised the defendant to handle the import of 3338.680 long tons of steel materials ……”

13. Para 2 specifically refers to the letters dated the 12th Oct. 1959 and the 21st July, 1960 and it is stated that copies of these letters are filed with the plaint and marked ‘A’ and ‘B’.

14. In these circumstances the case of the plaintiff that the contract was made in Calcutta cannot prima facie be brushed aside and the argument of Mr. Ghosh on behalf of the respondent does not appear to us, as at present advised, to be of substance. We have to add that according to the pleading in para 2 of the plaint all payments by the defendant had to be made to the plaintiff in Calcutta.

15. The learned Trial Judge has referred to the witnesses who have to be called from Madras and the evidence that has to be brought from Madras. But upon going through the papers it does not appear to us that the evidence indicated by the learned Trial Judge are materials for the purpose of defence. We have to bear in mind the relationship between the parties and the nature of the transactions as pleaded in the plaint. It was a transaction between principal and agent. A sum of money alleged to be due by the agent to the principal has been claimed in the suit. In the alternative, the agent has been called upon to render accounts of his dealings and transactions. The law on the subject appears to be clear.

16. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Article 780, at page 466 it is stated:

“It is the duty of an agent to keep accurate accounts of all his transactions and to be prepared at all times to produce them to his principal. If he fails to keep proper accounts every presumption consistent with the facts will weigh in favour of the principal. Thus, if he improperly mixes the principal's property with his own, all that he cannot show to be his own will be presumed to belong to the principal. Further, all books and documents relating to the principal's business must on demand be produced to the principal or to some person named by him, provided that such person is not one against whom the agent may have reasonable grounds of objection.”

17. In the instant case the defendant was the Handling Agent of the plaintiff. The defendant's duty was to keep accurate accounts of all its transactions and to be prepared at all times to produce them to the principal in Calcutta. All books and documents relating to the principal's business had also on demand to be produced to the principal in Calcutta or to a person named by the principal. In these premises, it is difficult for us to revoke leave under Cl. 12 of the Letters patent.

18. The same principles have been communicated in “Bowstead on Agency” 14th Edition, Article 53 at page 159. In this Article it is observed as follows:—

“It is the duty of every agent:—

(a) to keep the money and property of his principal separate from his own and from that of all other persons;

(b) to preserve and be constantly ready with correct accounts of all his dealings and transactions in the course of his agency;

(c) to produce to the principal, and to a proper person appointed by the principal all books and documents in his hands relating to the principal's affairs.”

19. In the plaint in the present appeal there is a claim for a decree for Rs. 2,14,259.38p. alleged to be due by the agent to the principal. There is an alternative prayer that accounts be taken of the transactions had by and between the defendant and the plaintiff and a decree be passed under O. 20 R. 16 of the CPC or such other form as this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper. In other words, in the plaint the principal claims that a specified amount is due by the defendant to the plaintiff. In the alternative, the principal has asked for rendition of accounts by the agent. The principal is in Calcutta and according to well settled principles we have quoted above, the principal may demand that the rendition of accounts should be in Calcutta. We cannot, therefore, hold that leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was not properly obtained and should be revoked. We cannot hold that the balance of convenience is in favour of the defendant.

20. Mr. Roy Chowdhury appearing for the appellant and on proper instructions has informed us that should the defendant make an application for examination of witnesses on Commission and should that application be allowed, the Union of India is prepared to bear in the first instance the expenses of both the parties' to hold the Commission or Commissions wherever necessary outside Calcutta.

21. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Trial Court are set aside. The suit will proceed in this Court on condition that if any application for examination of the defendant's witnesses on Commission be allowed by this Court, all the expenses of both the parties for holding the Commission or Commissions shall be paid in the first instance by the Union of India subject to final orders of the Court. The costs of this appeal would abide by the result of this suit.

22. Written Statement is to be filed within four weeks after the reopening of the Court after long vacation. Discovery within a fortnight thereafter, inspection forthwith thereafter. The suit will appear at the top of the appropriate prospective list on the 14th February, 1978.

23. S.K Datta, J.:— I agree.

24. Appeal allowed.