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Sashi Bhusan Mitra And Others v. Ramlal Mitra .

Calcutta High Court
Sep 1, 1976
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Judgment delivered by N.C. Mukherji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a mortgaged property at 75 Chakraberia North, Calcutta (10 cottahs with two-storied buildings) which was sold in execution for Rs. 41,600 to the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor (appellant) filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to set aside the sale; a Miscellaneous Case was instituted but dismissed for default. The appellant then filed an application under Section 151 of the CPC to set aside that dismissal; that application was dismissed as well.

The appellant obtained an order under Section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act staying execution proceedings until disposal of that application, and preferred an appeal (F.M.A.T. 2827 of 1974) against the dismissal dated 16th June 1973. On 11th January 1975 the appellant filed an application under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC and deposited Rs. 19,625 (for decretal amount, costs and interest) plus 5% of the purchase money on Rs. 41,600. The earlier application under the Bengal Money Lenders Act was not pressed and was dismissed for non-prosecution in view of the Order 34, Rule 5 application.

The Court below (Shri M.M. Das, 4th Subordinate Judge, Alipore) dismissed the appellant's application under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC on the ground that the sale had been deemed confirmed on 16th June 1973 when the application under Order 21, Rule 90 had been dismissed (although no formal order confirming the sale had been recorded), and on the further ground that there was no appeal from the dismissal dated 16th June 1973 and no stay. The present appeal challenges that order dated 5th May 1975.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal to this Court is maintainable given the valuation of the original suit and the rules determining the appropriate forum for appeal (i.e., whether valuation places the appeal within District Judge jurisdiction or before this Court).
  2. Whether dismissal (including dismissal for default) of an application under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC operates automatically as confirmation of the sale under Order 21, Rule 92 CPC even when no formal, separate order confirming the sale is recorded.
  3. Whether, even if the Order 21, Rule 90 application is dismissed and the sale is confirmed, the sale remains not "absolute" until the disposal of any appeal and therefore whether relief under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC (right to redeem by paying decretal dues) remains available until final disposal of the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Dr. Das)

  • The application under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC was maintainable because, although the application under Order 21, Rule 90 was dismissed, the court below did not pass any formal order confirming the sale — therefore the sale had not become absolute.
  • Even if an order confirming the sale was to be regarded as passed, the sale would not become absolute until disposal of the appellant's appeal; accordingly the right to redeem under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC would remain open until the sale becomes absolute.
  • The appellant deposited the decretal amount, costs and interest and 5% of the purchase money, and so his application under Order 34, Rule 5 should have been entertained.
  • Relied on several authorities suggesting that in some circumstances a sale does not become absolute while appeals are pending or where formal confirmation has not been passed.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee)

  • Preliminary objection: the appeal is not maintainable in this Court because the original mortgage suit was valued at Rs. 13,000; hence proceedings relating to that suit should be valued similarly and the proper forum for appeal is the District Judge (valuation determines forum of appeal).
  • Substantive objection: dismissal of the application under Order 21, Rule 90 (even for default) operates as confirmation of the sale under Order 21, Rule 92 CPC — such confirmation is automatic and does not require a formal recorded order or a separate application by the auction-purchaser.
  • Cited authorities to support the proposition that absence of a distinct recorded order confirming the sale is immaterial and that confirmation in substance is sufficient to vest title in the purchaser.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1954 SC 340 — Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan Principle about decrees passed without jurisdiction and the limited circumstances in which appellate courts may interfere where over-/under-valuation prejudicially affected disposal. The Court stated that the principle in this case does not apply to the facts of the present appeal (i.e., it did not help the respondent's objection on valuation).
AIR 1923 Cal 405 — Harihar Das Chowdhury v. Raj Kumar Mukherjee When Section 21 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act refers to value of the original suit, reference is to the valuation as made by the plaintiff (subject to trial court amendment), not the real market value. The Court considered this authority in addressing forum/valuation questions and found it relevant to show plaintiff's valuation is generally decisive; ultimately the Court held the present appeal was rightly valued for this Court.
AIR 1942 Cal 60 — Priya Nath Roy v. Sridhar Chandra Ray In partition suits, the trial court's decision as to valuation is final for determining right of appeal under Section 21. The Court found this principle inapplicable to the present mortgage/execution context and did not apply it.
AIR 1958 Pat 430 — Deonath Missir v. Chandraman Missir For Section 21 forum determination, plaint valuation (if unchallenged and accepted) is decisive. The Court found this principle did not apply to the present case and noted that the appeal was properly valued by the appellant.
AIR 1933 Cal 311 — Chhogan Lal Bagri v. Behari Lal Saha Ray Deals with limitation period for application to set aside sale after confirmation and refers to orders under Section 47 wherein appeal may lie. The Court observed this case was not an authority on whether dismissal of an O.21 R.90 application makes the sale automatically absolute without a formal order.
(1896) 23 Ind App 45 — Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Singh Held that sale was not final/conclusive while confirmation question was in litigation (facts concerned Commissioner and Board of Revenue). The Court noted factual differences and considered the authority not applicable to the present facts.
(1934) 38 Cal WN 901 / AIR 1934 PC 134 — Chandra Mani Saha v. Sreemati Anarjan Bibi When appeal is taken from order under O.21 R.92 disallowing application to set aside sale, sale does not become absolute until disposal of the appeal; relevant to computation under Article 180 (limitation). The Court treated this as a limitation-related decision and did not accept it as supporting the appellant's position here concerning formal confirmation.
AIR 1941 Cal 411 — Mandi Mia v. Sekander Mea In absence of order setting aside sale, it is the duty of the court to confirm the sale; Code does not provide for an application by the auction-purchaser for confirmation. The Court noted that this authority indicates the court's duty to confirm and observed that their Lordships did not require a formal recorded confirmation; the Court found it did not help the appellant's case.
AIR 1967 SC 608 — Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh Sale must be confirmed notwithstanding reversal of decree after sale; title of purchaser relates back to date of sale, not confirmation. The Court observed this authority did not assist the appellant's contention but reinforces that confirmation operates despite later events.
AIR 1956 Cal 510 — Sm. Priti Rekha Mitra v. Narayan Chandra Dutta In mortgage sale the equity of redemption survives until the sale is confirmed under O.21 R.92; redemption can be claimed while purchaser's confirmation application is pending. The Court noted this proposition and recorded that it was not disputed by the respondent; it did not alter the Court's conclusion on the present facts.
(1934) 38 Cal WN 924 / AIR 1934 Cal 822 — Baruram Kalwar v. Upendra Nath Das If judgment-debtor pays into Court after disallowance under O.21 R.90 and before confirmation (e.g., because record not yet returned), sale must be set aside under O.34 R.5. The Court observed the present facts did not show it became impossible to confirm the sale; therefore the authority did not support the appellant.
AIR 1963 Mad 423 — Chellappa Chettiar v. T.P. Kalyanasundaram The right under O.34 R.5 CPC is substantive and should not be reduced by considerations of delay caused by judgment-debtor. The Court noted the principle but observed it was not required to decide the question of delay in the present case.
(1897) ILR 24 Cal 682 — Khetter Nath Biswas v. Faizuddin Ali Discussion of Sections such as Section 312 CPC and the requirement for confirmation unless sale set aside under certain sections. Cited by the respondent to support the proposition that sale confirmation follows unless set aside; Court considered it amongst authorities favouring automatic confirmation.
AIR 1925 Cal 510 — Narendra Nath Chatterjee v. Rakhal Das Tarafdar Dismissal (even for default) of application under O.21 R.90 operates to confirm the sale under R.92 and an appeal lies against that order. The Court accepted this principle as supporting the respondent's position that dismissal confirms the sale.
AIR 1927 Cal 881 — Mt. Rehela Khatun v. Amburennessa Choudburani Absence of a sale certificate or formal recorded confirmation does not affect purchaser's title where the court in substance confirmed the sale. The Court found this case factually similar and relied on it to support the respondent's argument that formal recording is immaterial.
AIR 1929 Cal 407 (2) / ILR 1929 56 Cal 969 — Ansarali… v. Bhim Sankar Dutta Where O.21 R.90 application is dismissed for default and no formal order confirming sale is recorded, the dismissal is open to appeal; the distinct order confirming sale is immaterial. The Court relied on this authority (and treated it as supportive) to hold that the character of the dismissal suffices and absence of a separate confirmation entry is immaterial.
AIR 1958 Mad 317 — Veda Goundar v. Arunachalam Chettiar Confirmation under O.21 R.92 is a statutory obligation of the court and does not require an application by the auction-purchaser. The Court cited this authority in support of the proposition that confirmation flows by operation of law when conditions are met; it strengthens the respondent's position.
AIR 1968 SC 86 — Hukumchand v. Bansilal Under O.21 R.92 the Court is bound to confirm sale when it dismisses an O.21 R.90 application. The Court referenced this Supreme Court authority as supportive of the automatic confirmation rule when O.21 R.90 is dismissed.
(1931) 35 Cal WN 381 / AIR 1931 PC 33 — Privy Council decision Technical absence of recorded confirmation does not permit sale to be set aside; purchaser acquires a vested interest; when appropriate provisions are not availed of, the sale shall be confirmed (R.92); distinct order not recorded is immaterial. The Court found this Privy Council authority very persuasive and helpful to the respondent; it relied upon its reasoning to conclude that absence of a formal recorded confirmation is immaterial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal stages: (A) the preliminary/maintainability objection on valuation and forum; and (B) the substantive question whether dismissal of the O.21 R.90 application operated as confirmation of sale and whether the sale remained non-absolute pending appeal.

A. Maintainability (valuation/forum)

The respondent contended that because the original mortgage suit was valued at Rs. 13,000 any proceedings connected to that suit must be similarly valued and the proper appellate forum would therefore be the District Judge. The Court reviewed the authorities relied upon by the respondent (including Kiran Singh, Harihar Das Chowdhury, Priya Nath Roy and Deonath Missir) and analysed the rule that, in many contexts, the plaint valuation governs the forum of appeal. The Court observed the factual matrix here: the total decretal amount and costs exceeded Rs. 13,000; the appellant had deposited Rs. 19,625 and 5% of the purchase money and had valued the present appeal at Rs. 16,000. Considering these facts and the precedents, the Court concluded that the present appeal had been rightly valued and that the appeal was maintainable in this Court. The preliminary objection was therefore negatived.

B. Merits — confirmation of sale; availability of O.34 R.5 relief

On the merits the appellant contended that because no formal order confirming the sale had been recorded after the dismissal of the O.21 R.90 application, the sale was not confirmed and the application under O.34 R.5 CPC was maintainable. The Court reviewed numerous authorities cited by both sides.

The Court emphasised a line of authorities (including Narendra Nath Chatterjee; Mt. Rehela Khatun; Ansarali v. Bhim Sankar Dutta; Veda Goundar; Hukumchand; and the Privy Council decision in AIR 1931 PC 33) establishing that dismissal of an application under O.21 R.90 (even for default) operates to confirm the sale under O.21 R.92 and that confirmation is, in many circumstances, automatic by operation of the Code and does not require the recording of a separate formal order or a separate application by the auction-purchaser. The Court explicitly relied on the Privy Council reasoning that the absence of a technically recorded confirmation is immaterial and that the purchaser acquires a vested interest once the appropriate remedies are not availed of by the judgment-debtor.

The Court considered authorities urged by the appellant that suggested sale might not become absolute while appeals were pending or while confirmation procedures remain incomplete (e.g., Chandra Mani Saha; Baruram Kalwar). The Court differentiated those authorities on facts (limitation questions, or where it was impossible to confirm because records were absent or other procedural barriers existed) and concluded they did not assist the appellant's position in the present circumstances.

On the question whether a sale remains non-absolute until disposal of an appeal, the Court rejected the appellant's contention and held that dismissal of the O.21 R.90 application made the sale absolute; the Court therefore negatived the argument that the sale did not become absolute until final disposal of the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED and the order passed by the Court below (dismissing the appellant's application under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC) is confirmed.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Court held that dismissal of an application under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC (including dismissal for default) operates to confirm the sale under Order 21, Rule 92 CPC; a separate, formal recorded order confirming the sale is not a necessary condition for confirmation where the dismissal operates in substance as confirmation.
  • The appellant's contention that the sale remains non-absolute until disposal of an appeal was negatived; the Court treated the sale as having become absolute after the dismissal of the O.21 R.90 application in the circumstances of the case.
  • The preliminary objection on maintainability (valuation/forum) was rejected: the appeal before this Court was held to be properly valued and therefore maintainable.
  • The Court confirmed the order below but did not award costs; the operation of the order was stayed for two weeks from the date on the prayer of the appellant's counsel.

Note: The summary above is confined to the statements, reasoning and results expressly set out in the provided opinion. No additional facts or legal conclusions beyond those contained in the opinion have been asserted.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.C Mukherji, J.:— This is an appeal against an order dated 5th May, 1975 passed by Shri M.M Das, 4th Subordinate Judge, Alipore in Title Execution Case No. 1 of 1971 dismissing the application filed by the appellant under O. 34, R. 5 of the CPC.

2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated as follows:—

The property in suit is 75. Chakraberia North, Calutta, comprising 10 cottahs of land with two storied (buildings. The propetry was sold at Rs. 41,600 to the decree-holder in execution of a mortgage decree. The appellant, who is the judgment-debtor filed an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code for setting aside the sale. A Miscellaneous Case was started and the same was dismissed for default. Thereafter the appellant filed an application under Section 151 of the Code for setting aside the order of dismissal. That application was also dismissed. The appellant also filed an application under Section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act and obtained order staying execution proceedings till the disposal of the case. The appellant preferred an appeal to this Court against order dated 16th June, 1973 by which the application under O. 21, R. 90 was dismissed. The appeal was numbered at. F.M.A.T 2827 of 1974. On 11th January, 1975 the appellant made an application under O. 34, R. 5 of the Code and deposited Rs. 19,625 for decretal amount, costs and interest and also 5% of the purchase money on Rs. 41,600. The application under the Bengal Money Lenders Act was not pressed and the same was dismissed for non-prosecution in view of the application under O. 34, R. 5 of the Code. The application under O. 34, R. 5 was dismissed by the Court below on the ground that the sale was deemed to be confirmed on 16th of June, 1973 when the application under O. 21, R. 90 was dismissed although the court omitted to pass an order confirming the sale, and also on the ground that there was no appeal from the order of dismissal dated 16th of June, 1973 and there was no order of stay. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the judgment-debtor has preferred the present appeal.

3. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, raises a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the appeal. Mr. Mukherjee submits that the suit for the enforcement of the mortgage decree and recovery of dues was valued at Rs. 13,000, and that being so. any proceeding in connection with that suit should be similarly valued and as such the learned District Judge was the proper court where the appeal ought to have been filed. As the valuation of the subject-matter falls within the jurisdiction of that court the appeal has been wrongly filed in this Court. Mr. Mukherjee submits that the valuation of the suit determines the forum of the appeal. In support of his contention he refers to several decisions. He first cites a case reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 (Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan). In this case it was held that the decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. It was further held “The words unless the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits' in S. 11 clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are liable to be interfered with in an appellate court, not in all cases and as a matter of course, but only if prejudice such as is mentioned in the section results and that the prejudice contemplated by the section is something different from the fact of the appeal having been heard in a forum which would not have been competent to hear it on a correct valuation of the suit as ultimately determined”. We do not see how the principle laid down in this case applies to the fact of the present case.

4. Mr. Mukherjee next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1923 Cal 405 (Harihar Das Chowdhury v. Raj Kumar Mukherjee). In this case it has been held that “When Section 21 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act refers to the value of the original suit, the reference is to the valuation as made by the plaintiff, subject to such amendment as may have been made under the orders of the trial court. The Legislature did not intend that the expression ‘the value of the original suit’ in S. 21 means the real value of the subject-matter of the original suit, regardless of what may have happened in the trial court.” In this case the plaintiff filed a suit for redemption and valued the same at Rs. 3,600. The plaintiff got a decree. The defendant at the trial did not challenge the valuation. After the defendants have been defeated they sought to change the forum of appeal by the assertion that the value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeds Rs. 10,000. It was held that the defendants should not be permitted to take recourse to such a procedure. In the present case the suit was valued at Rs. 13,000. But the total decretal dues and costs were much higher and the appellant deposited a sum of Rs. 19,625 for decretal amount, costs and interest and also 5% of the purchase money on Rs. 41,600. The judgment-debtor previously filed F.M.A.T No. 2827 of 1974 in this Court against the order dismissing his application under S. 151 of the Code. The present appeal has been valued by the appellant at Rs. 16,000. Dr. Das contends that though the original suit was for Rs. 13,000 as the decretal amount was much higher he has rightly filed the appeal in this Court. It is submitted by Dr. Das that in a mortgage suit the valuation for the purpose of the suit and the valuation for the purpose of an appeal may vary.

5. Mr. Mukherjee also refers to a decision reported in AIR 1942 Cal 60 (Priya Nath Roy v. Sridhar Chandra Ray). In this case it was held “In a suit for partition the decision of the trial court as to valuation of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction must be taken as final and conclusive during all the stages of the suit irrespective of what the parties might agree later on to be the actual market value of the suit properties and must determine the right of appeal under S. 21”. The principle laid down in this case does not apply to the facts of the present case.

6. The last case referred to by Mr. Mukherjee on this point has been reported in AIR 1958 Pat 430 (FB) (Deonath Missir v. Chandraman Missir). In this case a suit for partition was valued at Rs. 5,000. It was held that “For the purpose of determining the forum of the appeal under Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act, the value of the suit as given in the plaint, not challenged by the defendants and accepted by the trial court, must be deemed to be the only value of the suit, and the appeal against the final decree in the suit would lie to the District Judge”. This principle also does not apply to the facts of the present case. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that though the mortgage suit was valued at Rs. 13,000 the present appeal has been rightly valued and that being so, this appeal is maintainable. The abjection raised by Mr. Mukherjee is negatived.

7. Now with regards to the merits of the appeal. Dr. Das submits that after the judgment-debtor's application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code was dismissed for default no order was passed by the court confirming the sale, and as such the judgment-debtor's application under O. 34, R. 5 was maintainable. The learned Judge wrongly dismissed the application holding that the sale was confirmed on 16th June, 1973 when the application under O. 21, R. 90 was dismissed for default although it is the admitted position that no order was passed by the learned Judge confirming the sale. In support of his contention Dr. Das has placed before us several decisions. The first case referred to by Dr. Das has been reported in AIR 1933 Cal 311 (Chhogan Lal Bagri v. Behari Lal Saha Ray). This case dealt with the period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside a sale after the same was confirmed. It was further held in that case that the order was passed by the court under S. 47 rejecting the application for delivery of possession by the decree-holder auction-purchaser and as such the appeal was competent. This is not an authority on the point whether when an application under O. 21, R. 90 is dismissed the sale automatically becomes absolute or the sale cannot be considered to be absolute when a formal order was not passed by the court.

8. The next case relied on by Dr. Das has been reported in (1896) 23 Ind App 45 (PC) (Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Singh). In this case their Lordships were of the opinion that there was no final, conclusive and definitive order confirming the sale while the question whether the sale should be confirmed was in litigation or until the order of the Commissioner became definitive and operative by the final judgment of the Board of Revenue. The facts of this case are completely different from the facts of the present case.

9. The next case referred to by Dr. Das has been reported in (1934) 38 Cal WN 901: (AIR 1934 PC 134) (Chandra Mani Saha v. Sreemati Anarjan Bibi). In this case it was held “When an appeal has been taken from an order made under O. 21, R. 92 disallowing an application for setting aside a sale, the sale does not become absolute within the meaning of Article 180 of the Limitation Act until the disposal of the appeal, even though the first court may have confirmed the sale”. In this case their Lordships were deciding the question of limitation and it was held “The period provided for in Article 180 for an application for delivery of possession should be computed, when there has been an appeal from an order refusing to set aside the sale, from the date of the final disposal of the appeal”.

10. Dr. Das next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1941 Cal 411 (Mandi Mia v. Sekander Mea). In this case it has been held that “In the absence of an order setting aside a sale, it is the duty of the Court to confirm the sale and there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for an application to be made by the auction purchaser for confirmation of the sale”. At page 412 it has been observed “Under O. 21, R. 92 of the CPC, the sale has got to be confirmed when there is no application under O. 21, Rr. 89. 90 or 91 of the CPC or when such application is made and disallowed: in the absence of an order setting aside a sale, it is the duty of the court to confirm the sale and there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for an application to be made by the auction purchaser for confirmation of the sale. We do not see how this decision helps the appellant. It has been clearly laid down that when an application is made and disallowed it is the duty of the court to confirm the sale. Their Lordships have not laid down that it is necessary for the court to pass a formal order confirming the sale. Dr. Das also relies on a decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 608 (Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh). In this case in execution of an ex parte money decree a house property was sold. The judgment-debtor did not apply for setting aside the sale but applied for setting aside the decree, but the decree was reversed. After reversal, the auction-purchaser filed an application under O. 21, R. 92 for confirmation of sale. It was held that the sale must be confirmed notwithstanding reversal of decree after sale. Title of purchaser related back to date of sale and not to that of its confirmation. This case also, in our opinion, does not help the appellant. Dr. Das next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1956 Cal 510 (Sm. Priti Rekha Mitra v. Narayan Chandra Dutta). In this case it has been laid down that “In a mortgage suit for sale the equity of redemption can be claimed by the mortgagor when an application by the purchaser himself is pending for confirmation of the sale. The equity of redemption in such cases is not extinguished by the final decree for sale nor by the actual sale itself but survives until the sale is confirmed and made absolute under O. 21, R. 92 of the CPC”. This proposition of law is not disputed by Mr. Mukheriee appearing on behalf of the respondent.

11. The next case cited by Dr. Das has been reported in (1934) 38 Cal WN 924 : (AIR 1934 Cal 822) (Baruram Kalwar. Auction-purchaser v. Upendra Nath Das). In this case it was held “Under O. 34, R. 5 of the CPC. if the judgment-debtor pays into Court the amount due from him after the disallowance of an application under O. 21, R. 90 and before it has been possible to confirm the sale (as when the record has not arrived to the Court which held the sale from the Appellate Court which dealt with the application for setting the sale aside), the sale must be set aside, although such payment may be long after the sale and although the delay may have been caused by action of the judgment-debtor”. The facts of the present case are not such that it can be said that it became impossible to confirm the sale. The contention of Dr. Das is that in the absence of an order passed by the Court for confirmation of the sale, the sale was not made absolute while Mr. Mukherjee contends that rejection of the application under O. 21, R. 90 is confirmation of the sale. In such cases the confirmation is automatic and no formal order need be passed. Dr. Das also refers to a decision reported in AIR 1963 Mad 423 (Chellappa Chettiar v. T.P. Kalyanasundaram). In this case it was held “The right conferred by O. 34, R. 5 is a substantive right and it should not be whittled down by any considerations of the judgment-debtor being responsible for the delay in passing the order of confirmation of the sale”. We are not required in the present case to come to a decision about the question of delay caused by the judgment-debtor.

12. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, very strongly contends that when an application for setting aside a sale under O. 21, R. 90 is dismissed, the automatic consequence is that the sale becomes confirmed and that being so, it is not at all necessary that a formal order need be passed by the court confirming the sale. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee cites before us several authorities. The first case cited has been reported in (1897) ILR 24 Cal 682 (Khetter Nath Biswas v. Faizuddin Ali). In this case the court below set aside the sale upon payment by the applicant of the mortgage due with interest and costs. It was held by this court that “lnasmuch as under Section 312 of the CPC the auction-purchaser was entitled to have an order confirming the sale unless the sale were set aside under Section 310A or Section 311 of the CPC and as the sale was not set aside under either of these sections, the court below had no jurisdiction to set aside the sale upon payment by the applicant of the mortgage money with interest and costs”.

13. Mr. Mukherjee next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1925 Cal 510 (Narendra Nath Chatterjee v. Rakhal Das Tarafdar). In this case though the point before their Lordships was whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in revision with an order dismissing an application under O. 21, R. 90 for default, their Lordships held that “The effect of the dismissal of an application under O. 21, R. 90 even for default is to confirm the sale under R. 92 and hence an appeal lies against the order and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order in revision”.

14. Mr. Mukherjee next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1927 Cal 881 (Mt. Rehela Khatun v. Amburennessa Choudburani). In this case it has been held by a Division Bench that “The sale certificate is no more than evidence of title. Absence in the record of a sale certificate or of a formal order confirming the sale, does not affect the purchaser's title when in substance and in fact the Court did confirm the sale”. In this case there was no formal order by the court confirming the sale and that being so, the facts are similar to the facts of the present case, Reference has also been made by Mr. Mukherjee to a decision reported in AIR 1929 Cal 407 (2) (Ansarali… v. Bhim Sankar Dutta Tnwari…Opposite Party.). In this case their Lordships have laid down “When no formal order has been recorded confirming the sale and the application under O. 21, R. 90 has been dismissed for default for non-appearance of both parties to the proceeding, the order of dismissal passed under those circumstances is open to appeal”. It has been further held that “It is the disallowing of the application made under O. 21, R. 90 which corresponds to the order refusing to set aside a sale. The fact that a distinct order has not been recorded confirming the sale does not alter the character of the order disallowing an application under O. 21, R. 90.”

15. Mr. Mukherjee next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1958 Mad 317 (Veda Goundar v. Arunachalam Chettiar). It has been held in this case that “Confirmation of sale under O. 21, R. 92 does not require an application by the auctionpurchaser. Confirmation is a statutory obligation imposed on the court, if the requirements of O. 21, R. 92 are satisfied”. Mr. Mukherjee also draws our attention to the findings of their Lordships in the case reported in AIR 1968 SC 86 (Hukumchand v. Bansilal). Their Lordships found that “Under O. 21, R. 92 the Court was bound to confirm the sale at once when it dismissed the application under O. 21, R. 90”. We find that a Privy Council decision reported in (1931) 35 Cal WN 381 : (AIR 1931 PC 33) very much helps the respondent. At page 383 it has been observed by Lord Macmillan that “It would be idle to contend that because in this case there was, technically, no confirmation of the sale, it could be set aside. It could not be set aside except on payment of 5% under R. 89. The purchaser has an absolutely vested interest in the property, although there is a divesting power in the Court under Rr. 89 and 90. But if a party fails to avail himself of the appropriate provision the sale shall be confirmed; see R. 92. The fact that in this case a distinct order has not been recorded confirming the sale, is quite immaterial”. In order to come to this decision their Lordships relied on the case reported in (1929) ILR 56 Cal 969 at p. 974 : (AIR 1929 Cal 407 (2)) (Ansarali… v. Bhim Sankar Dutta Tnwari…Opposite Party.). Relying on the decision referred to above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case we negative the contention raised by Dr. Das that an express order for confirmation of sale is absolutely necessary. We also negative the argument advanced by Dr. Das that an application by the auction-purchaser for an order for confirmation of sale is necessary.

16. Dr. Das next contends that even if the order is passed confirming the sale, the sale will not be absolute until the disposal of the appeal. The right to redeem mortgage under O. 34, R. 5 will remain open till the sale becomes absolute.

17. As we have held that the sale has already become absolute after the application under O. 21, R. 90 was dismissed we negative this contention of Dr. Das. We also negative the contention that the sale does not become absolute till the disposal of the appeal.

18. For all the reasons stated above this appeal is dismissed. The order passed by the court below is confirmed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we, however, do not pass any order for costs.

19. B.C Ray, J.:— I agree.

20. On the prayer of the learned Advocate for the appellant let the operation of the order remain stayed for a period of two weeks from date.

21. Appeal dismissed.