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Nirmal Kumar Banerjee v. Panihati Co-Operative Bank Ltd. And Others Opposite Parties.
Structured Summary of the Judgment (Salil Kumar Datta, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Rule challenges an order dated 20-7-1972 of the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 24-Parganas (North) acting as the Co-operative Tribunal, which rejected the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The underlying facts (as set out in the opinion) are:
- There were disputes between the petitioner, others and the co-operative bank.
- An award was passed by a Board of Arbitrators in dispute case No. 342 of 1969–70 on 11-12-1971 and communicated to the petitioner on 21-12-1971.
- The petitioner filed an appeal against the award on 16-2-1972.
- The Co-operative Tribunal rejected the appeal as barred by limitation, applying Section 134 of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 read with the Fourth Schedule (which, as applied by the Tribunal, required appeals within one month of communication of the award).
- After dismissal by the Tribunal, the petitioner filed a review petition to the Government of West Bengal; that review was rejected on March 30/31, 1973 by the Deputy Secretary, Co-operative Department. Both orders are challenged in this Rule.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, and specifically Section 12(2) (exclusion of time taken for obtaining certified copies), apply to an appeal under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 brought before the Co-operative Tribunal.
- Whether the time taken by the petitioner to obtain certified copies of the award and the reasons (applied for 27-12-1971 and supplied on 24-1-1972) must be excluded in computing limitation under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the Tribunal was correct in rejecting the memorandum of appeal as barred by limitation when the period excluded for obtaining certified copies is taken into account.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner) Arguments — submitted by Mr. Sinha
- The petitioner applied for certified copy of the reasons of the award on 27-12-1971 and received copies on 24-1-1972; that period should be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 for computing limitation.
- There is no dispute that if the time for obtaining the copy is excluded, the appeal would have been filed within the prescribed period.
Respondent's (Co-operative Bank) Arguments — submitted by Mr. Mitter
- The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to proceedings under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act; he relied on precedents that treat special statutes as complete codes excluding the Limitation Act.
- There was no rule requiring certified copies of the reasons to be annexed to the memorandum of appeal; accordingly the petitioner should not be allowed exclusion for time taken to obtain those copies.
- Reasons of the award do not form part of the award, so time taken to obtain reasons should not be excluded; an aggrieved party can file an appeal simply stating he is aggrieved without reference to reasons.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| K. Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddy, AIR 1969 SC 872 | Held that the Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings like election petitions where the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self-contained code (reference to Section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act). | Referred to illustrate that some special statutes exclude the Limitation Act; the Court considered it in discussing circumstances in which Limitation Act provisions are inapplicable. |
| Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 SC 209 | Held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 contemplates applications before the court (Third Division of the Schedule); Sections 4 and 5 are inapplicable to certain applications before Labour Courts—scheme of Limitation Act deals with applications to courts. | Used to show that the Limitation Act primarily governs proceedings before courts and to frame limits of applicability to tribunals/authorities. |
| Bando Banaji v. Bhaskar Balaji, AIR 1972 Mys 311 | Held that, to attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, proceedings under a special or local law must be such as are legally capable of being instituted before a court only. | Referred to explain the requirement for Section 29(2) to operate and to emphasize that applicability depends on whether proceedings are court-type proceedings. |
| Capstan Meter (India) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 Raj 63 | Held that Section 12(2) has no application to an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act because that application was neither an appeal nor an application for review. | Referred to as part of the survey of authorities limiting the scope of Section 12(2) to appeals/reviews and to distinguish cases where Section 12(2) does not apply. |
| R.T. Chinnavenkatesh v. Senior Regional Transport Officer and Licensing Officer of Mysore, AIR 1976 Kant 69 | Held that Section 29(2) does not state that Limitation Act provisions would be applicable to appeals under a taxing statute; Limitation Act applies only if the relevant statute states so. | Used to underscore that Limitation Act provisions are not universally applicable to all statutory appeals and depend on the special statute's language. |
| Lakshmi Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1976 Raj 197 | Held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to appeals and applications filed in a court of law in the strict sense and cannot be invoked for tribunals which are statutory bodies performing quasi-judicial functions. | Referred to demonstrate authorities that restrict the application of Limitation Act provisions to courts as distinct from tribunals. |
| Maloji Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1969) 2 SCC 723 : AIR 1969 SC 953 | Condoned delay in filing appeal by excluding time taken to obtain copy of the judgment; held that in hearing an appeal under the relevant Act the court must guide itself by the Limitation Act for extension and computation of limitation. | Relied on by the Court as a leading authority supporting the application of Section 29(2) and the Limitation Act to tribunals like the Board of Revenue; used to support that Section 12(2) exclusion can apply to such appeals. |
| D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma, (1970) 2 SCC 369 : AIR 1970 SC 1477 | Held that a period of limitation in a special statute (Representation of the People Act) is a special law within Section 29(2) and court closure periods could be excluded in computing limitation for appeals. | Referred to illustrate how special statutes can be treated under Section 29(2) and how courts have excluded certain periods in limitation computation under such statutes. |
| Magnuram v. Delhi Municipality, (1976) 1 SCC 392 : AIR 1976 SC 105 | Held that under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless expressly excluded, Section 5 could be availed of to extend limitation in a special or local law if sufficient cause existed. | Used to support the proposition that Section 5 (and thereby other provisions) of the Limitation Act may be applied to special/local laws unless expressly excluded. |
| Sunit Paramanik v. Santipur Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd., AIR 1973 Cal 364 (77 Cal WN 118) | Held that by reason of sub‑section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation prescribed by the Co-operative Societies Act is to be deemed the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act and Sections 4 to 24 would apply. | Directly cited by the Court as a controlling local precedent holding that Section 29(2) applies to the Co-operative Societies Act; the Court relied on it to conclude that Limitation Act provisions apply to appeals under the Co-operative Societies Act unless expressly excluded. |
| Treasury Building Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sukumar Ganguly, (1975) 79 Cal WN 573 | Held that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the period of limitation prescribed under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act and that Sections 4 to 34 of the Limitation Act will be applicable in computing limitation. | Referred to support the proposition that Limitation Act provisions, including Sections 4 to 24 (and cited as 4 to 34 in the case), apply to the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act for computing limitation. |
| Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar, 32 Cal WN 845 : AIR 1928 PC 103 | Privy Council held that Section 12 of the Limitation Act is unrestricted in scope and that time for obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree must be excluded in computing limitation whether or not those documents are required to be annexed to the memorandum of appeal. | Relied upon by the Court to reject the contention that exclusion under Section 12(2) depends on whether certified copies must be annexed; held that time for obtaining certified copies must be excluded irrespective of annexation rules. |
| Joshi's case | This decision is referred to in the opinion as having been relied upon in a cited judgment (contextual reference; the opinion does not state the full citation or the specific principle beyond that reliance). | Mentioned as a precedent relied upon in the course of other decisions cited in the opinion; the Court referenced it only in that contextual manner. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a step‑by‑step legal analysis, confined to the material and authorities relied upon in the opinion:
- The Court first examined whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to proceedings before tribunals constituted under special statutes. It set out the text of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and interpreted it to mean that where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the Limitation Act's Schedule, that period shall be deemed the period prescribed by the Schedule; furthermore, Sections 4 to 24 shall apply to those special‑law periods only insofar as they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law.
- Reviewing the authorities, the Court acknowledged that the Limitation Act's provisions are principally directed at proceedings before courts. However, it held that these provisions may be applied to tribunals and authorities other than courts if the special or local law (expressly or impliedly) extends them to such proceedings. The Court relied on prior decisions (including Maloji Rao and Sunit Paramanik) to show that Section 29(2) has been applied to tribunals like the Board of Revenue and to Co‑operative Societies Acts.
- The Court examined Section 133‑A(2) of the Bengal Co‑operative Societies Act, 1940 which provides that the Tribunal shall hear appeals as specified in Schedule 4 and exercise the powers conferred upon appellate courts by Order 41 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. On that basis the Court reasoned that, insofar as the Tribunal exercises powers of an appellate court, it is governed by the Limitation Act provisions applicable to appellate courts unless the Bengal Co‑operative Societies Act expressly excludes those Limitation Act provisions.
- The Court addressed the specific contention that the petitioner could not claim exclusion for time taken to obtain certified copies because certified copies of the reasons were not required to be annexed to the memorandum of appeal. The Court relied on Jijibhoy N. Surty (Privy Council) to conclude that Section 12(2) is unrestricted; exclusion for time to obtain certified copies is not made dependent on any rule requiring annexation of those documents. Consequently, the time taken to obtain the certified copy of the award and its reasons must be excluded.
- The Court rejected the argument that reasons of the award do not form part of the award such that time for obtaining them should not be excluded. It held that an aggrieved person is entitled to know the findings and reasons against him to decide whether to appeal, and therefore time to obtain certified copy of the entire award (including reasons) should be excluded under Section 12(2) when computing limitation for an appeal under the Bengal Co‑operative Societies Act.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found (and noted there was no dispute) that if the exclusion for time taken to obtain the certified copies is allowed, the petitioner's appeal (filed 16-2-1972) was within time under Section 134 read with the Fourth Schedule, Item 7 of the Bengal Co‑operative Societies Act, 1940.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The impugned order of the Assistant Registrar rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation is set aside, and the Rule is made absolute.
The Court directed that the appeal be registered and disposed of in accordance with law, set aside other consequential orders which were founded upon the order rejecting the Memorandum of Appeal, ordered that there be no order as to costs, and directed the records to be sent down at once.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the petitioner's memorandum of appeal shall no longer be treated as barred by limitation; it must be registered and adjudicated on the merits.
- The Court held as a matter of law (on the authorities cited and reasoning given) that the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to appeals under the West Bengal Co‑operative Societies Act, 1940 unless expressly excluded, and that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act requires exclusion of time taken to obtain certified copies of awards and reasons for the purpose of computing limitation in such appeals.
- The decision instructs tribunals exercising appellate court powers under the Co‑operative Societies Act to apply the Limitation Act provisions (including exclusion under Section 12(2)) unless those provisions are expressly excluded by the special statute; the tribunal in this case had erred in summarily rejecting the appeal on limitation without allowing the exclusion.
- The opinion applies existing precedents and interprets statutory provisions; it does not purport to create a novel rule beyond the reasoning and authorities expressly discussed in the opinion.
Judgment delivered by Salil Kumar Datta, J.; H.N. Sen, J. agreed. The Rule was made absolute. No costs were awarded.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Salil Kumar Datta, J.:— This Rule is directed against order dated 20-7-1972 passed by the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 24-Parganas (North) as the Co-operative Tribunal rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation. It appears that there were certain disputes between the petitioner and others and the co-operative bank and an award was passed by a Board of Arbitrators in dispute case No. 342 of 1969–70 in respect of the said dispute. The award was made on 11-12-1971 and was communicated to the petitioner on 21-12-1971. The appeal petition against the award was filed on 16-2-1972. The appellate authority, the Co-operative Tribunal, was of the opinion that under Section 134 of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 read with the Fourth schedule thereof an appeal was to be filed within a month from the date of communication of the award to the person aggrieved. As this appeal was filed out of time beyond one month from date of communication, it was barred by limitation and was summarily rejected. This Rule is against this order. After the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed a review petition against the order to the Government of West Bengal and the same was also rejected on March 30/31, 1973 by the Deputy Secretary, Co-operative Department of the Government. Both these orders are the subject-matter of the challenge in this Rule.
2. Mr. Sinha appearing for the petitioner submitted that the appellate authority was in error in dismissing the application on the ground of limitation as the petitioner had applied for certified copy of the reasons of the award on 27-12-1971 and the copies were available to him on 24-1-1972. Accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to an exclusion of the time so taken under provision of Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act, 1963. There is no dispute that if the time for copy is taken into account, the appeal would be in time.
3. The first consideration is whether the provisions of Lim. Act, 1963 apply to proceedings before tribunals under the Act. Mr. Mitter appearing for the cooperative bank has referred to various decisions in support of his contention that the provisions of Lim. Act have no application to the proceeding under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. He has referred to the decision in K. Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddy reported in AIR 1969 SC 872 in which the court held that the Lim. Act cannot apply to proceedings like an election petition in the High Court inasmuch as the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self contained Code which does not admit of the introduction of the principles or the provisions of law contained in the Lim. Act. Lim. Act, 1963 states in its preamble that the Act is for consolidation and amendment of the law of limitation of suits and other proceedings and for other purposes connected therewith. Section 29(2) of the Act is in the following terms:
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
4. On perusal, the section would indicate that where a provision of the period of limitation prescribed in any special or local law was different from the period under the Lim. Act, such period shall be deemed to be the provision for the purpose of limitation as if such period was the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Act. It further provides that for the purpose of determining any period prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, Ss. 4 to 24 inclusive shall apply, only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Accordingly, if there is any specific provision excluding the operation of those sections in any local or special law those sections will cease to apply to matters in connection therewith. It was accordingly held in the decision of K.V Rao that in view of the provisions of Section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, the provisions of the Lim. Act would not be applicable.
5. Mr. Mitter relied on the case of Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 SC 209 where the Court was considering the scope of Article 137 of the Lim. Act, 1963. It was laid down there that this Article only contemplated applications before the court as it was included in the Third Division of the Schedule to the Lim. Act of 1963 which related to applications only before the Court. Accordingly, provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Lim. Act were inapplicable to such applications before Labour Courts and the Scheme of the Lim. Act is that it only deals with applications to Courts. Mr. Mitter also referred to the decision in Bando Banaji v. Bhaskar Balaji, AIR 1972 Mys 311 in which it was held that in order to attract S. 29(2), the proceedings initiated under a special or local law must also be those which are legally capable of being instituted before a court only. In coming to this decision, the court relied on the decision in Joshi's case, we have just referred to. The next case referred to is Capstan Meter (India) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1974 Raj 63, in which it was held that, in an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, provisions of S. 12(2) have no application because it was neither an appeal nor an application for review. In R.T Chinnavenkatesh v. Senior Regional Transport Officer and Licensing Officer of Mysore-4, AIR 1976 Kant 69, it was held that Section 29(2) of the Lim. Act does not say that the provisions of the Lim. Act would be applicable to appeals filed under a taxing statute. Hence it is not possible to apply by analogy the principle underlying Section 5 of the Lim. Act to appeals filed under Section 15 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (35 of 1957). In this decision, the court found that the provisions of the Lim. Act would be applicable only if it was stated in the relevant section that it would apply to taxing statute. In Lakshmi Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1976 Raj 197, it was held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Lim. Act would be applicable only to appeals and applications filed in a court of law within the strict sense of the term and cannot be invoked in cases of applications and appeals presented before the Tribunals which are not courts of law but are statutory bodies performing quasi-judicial functions.
6. Mr. Sinha referred us to the decision in Maloji Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1969) 2 SCC 723 : AIR 1969 SC 953 in which the court condoned the delay in filing the appeal on exclusion of the time taken for obtaining the copy of the judgment. It was provided in Section 34 of the Ryotwari Act provisions whereof were applicable to the case that subject to the provisions of Lim. Act in force at the time, no appeal shall be filed before the Board after the expiry of 90 days. It was held that in hearing an appeal under the Act, the court must guide itself by the provisions of the Lim. Act in force for extension and computation of the period of limitation. The Court considered the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Lim. Act, 1908 and held that this section goes to show that unless excluded by the Jagirs Act or Ryotwari Act, Section 12 of the Lim. Act would be applicable to appeals filed before the Board of Revenue under any of the provisions of these Acts. Mr. Sinha also referred to the case of D.P Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma, reported in (1970) 2 SCC 369 : AIR 1970 SC 1477 in which the court was considering a case under the Representation of the People Act. It was held there that the period of limitation provided therein was a special law within the meaning of S. 29(2) and the period when the court was closed could be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed in S. 177-A when the High Court is to hear the appeal as an appeal from original decree. In the case of Magnuram v. Delhi Municipality, reported in (1976) 1 SCC 392 : AIR 1976 SC 105, it was held that under Section 29(2) of the Lim. Act, 1963, unless there is express exclusion S. 5 could be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation by special or local law, if there was sufficient cause for not presenting the application in Court within the period of limitation. In Sunit Paramanik v. Santipur Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd., 77 Cal WN 118 : (AIR 1973 Cal 364) a bench decision of this Court considered Section 29(2) of the Lim. Act, 1963. It was held that by reason of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of Section 29 of the Lim. Act, 1963, the period of limitation prescribed by the Co-operative Societies Act is to be deemed to be the period of limitation prescribed by the Lim. Act and the provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 would apply to the said period. In Treasury Building Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sukumar Ganguly, (1975) 79 Cal WN 573, it was held that provisions of Section 29(2) of the Lim. Act, 1963 would apply to the period of limitation prescribed under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act and the provisions of Sections 4 to 34 of the Lim. Act will be applicable for computing the period of limitation in maintaining a suit under the Co-operative Societies Act.
7. A review of the decisions indicate that the provisions of the Lim. Act, 1963 are applicable to suits, appeals and applications before the courts. These provisions in respect of the period of limitation can be modified by any special or local law for such proceedings before any court and unless expressly excluded, the provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 inclusive will be applicable in all these proceedings. In respect of proceedings before the Tribunals and authorities other than courts, the provisions of the Lim. Act would be applicable if they are expressly or impliedly extended to such proceeding by the special or local law. Under Section 29 (2) of the Lim. Act, 1963, the provisions of S. 3 will apply with such modifications as may be provided in such special or local law and unless expressly excluded the provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 inclusive shall also apply to such proceedings.
8. Under the provisions of Section 133-A (2) of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 the Tribunal shall hear the appeals under the Act as specified in its Sch. 4 and shall exercise all the powers conferred under the appellate court by O. 41 in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. In respect of such appeals the Tribunal called the Co-operative Tribunal, in exercising the powers of the appellate court, will be governed by the provisions of the Lim. Act which are applicable to courts and accordingly Section 29(2) of the said Act in respect of the provisions relating to appeals will be applicable when such application has not been expressly excluded by the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act save as regards the period of limitation for filing the appeal. The Tribunal accordingly will have the power to and will entertain an appeal subject to the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act, 1963 excluding the period for obtaining copy of the award and its reasons sought to be appealed from. The Supreme Court also held that when the Lim. Act has been made applicable, the provisions under Section 29(2), unless otherwise excluded, shall be applicable to tribunals like the Board of Revenue as was held in the decision in Maloji Rao's case reported in (1969) 2 SCC 723 : AIR 1969 SC 953. For all these reasons, we accept the contention raised by Mr. Sinha and hold that the provisions of S. 29(2) would be applicable to appeals under the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 also as held in Sunit Pramanik's case (AIR 1973 Cal 364).
9. Mr. Mitter has next contended that there was no rule that certified copy of the reasons of the award was to be annexed with the Memorandum of Appeal. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to avail of the time that was required for obtaining the certified copy. It may be that the certified copy is not required to be filed along with the appeal. But when reasons for the award have been given, a person aggrieved is entitled to know the findings against him to consider his future course of action whether to file an appeal or other steps should be taken and, for such purpose, copy of the reasons was necessary to him which could only be obtained from the certified copy thereof. It was held Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S Chettyar, 32 Cal WN 845 : (AIR 1928 PC 103), by the Privy Council that Section 12 of the Lim. Act is unrestricted in its scope and is a positive enactment. It does not make the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree dependent upon these documents being required to be annexed to the Memorandum of Appeal by the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure or the rules as amended by the High Court. In computing the period of limitation therefore such time shall always be excluded whether these documents are necessary to the presentation of the appeal or not. This ruling conclusively lays down that whether it is necessary that certified copies of the reasons of the award should be annexed to the Memorandum of Appeal or not, time requisite for obtaining the certified copies of these documents shall have to be excluded as plainly provided in S. 12 (2).
10. Mr. Mitter has further contended that reasons of the award do not form any part of the award and, accordingly, the time taken for obtaining the certified copy thereof should not be excluded from computation of the period of limitation. According to Mr. Mitter, it was not necessary for an aggrieved party to look into the reasons that might be the basis of the award. He could simply file an appeal by stating that he was aggrieved by the award. This contention in our opinion, cannot be accepted by us, as it should always be open to the aggrieved party to know the reasons on which some findings are arrived at against him.
11. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we are of the view that the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the entire award should be excluded for computing the period of limitation under Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act in respect of an appeal under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940.
12. As we have already indicated, there is no dispute that if such time is taken into consideration, the appeal is well within time, as provided in S. 134 read with 4th Schedule, Item 7 of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940. The appellate authority was, therefore, in error in exercise of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appeal on the ground of limitation.
13. For all these reasons, the impugned order of the Assistant Registrar rejecting the appeal cannot be sustained and is set aside. The other consequential orders are also set aside as they are based on the order rejecting the Memorandum of Appeal.
14. The Rule is, accordingly, made absolute. We direct that the appeal be registered and be disposed of in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down at once.
15. H.N Sen, J.:— I agree.
16. Rule made absolute.
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