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Naima Bibi v. Lodhne Colliery Co. (1920) Ltd. .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an order passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, on April 21, 1972, dismissing a compensation claim filed by the wife of a deceased workman. The Commissioner held that the fatal accident, caused by an assault by unknown assailants on the workman within the employer's premises, did not arise out of the workman's employment, although it occurred in the course of such employment. The workman was attacked as he came to the surface of the colliery after completing his duty and was going home. The appellant challenges the propriety of this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the fatal accident that occurred to the workman arose out of and in the course of his employment.
- Whether the employer is liable to pay compensation for the death of the workman caused by an assault by unknown persons within the employer’s premises.
- Whether the burden of proof regarding the accident arising out of employment was discharged by the applicant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The accident occurred within the employer’s premises and in the course of employment, establishing a causal connection between employment and the fatal injury.
- The workman was at the place of assault due to his employment duties and did not add to or extend the peril that caused his death.
- Direct evidence from a fellow workman supports that the assault causing death occurred within the colliery premises.
Respondent's Arguments
- The accident did not arise out of the workman’s employment, despite occurring in the course of employment.
- The death was suggested to be due to inter-union rivalry and not related to employment.
- The employer contended that the burden of proof to establish death within premises was not duly discharged by the applicant.
- No relevant police records or competent evidence were produced by the employer to substantiate their defense.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gouri Kinkar Bhakat v. Messrs Radha Kissen Cotton Mills, A.I.R 1933 Cal. 220 | Definition of "arising out of the employment" includes nature, conditions, obligations, incidents, and special risks of employment. | The Court relied on this broad interpretation to assess if the accident was linked to employment conditions. |
| Lancashire and York-shift Railway v. Highly, 1917 A.C 352 | Test whether the injured person was required by employment to hazard or suffer what caused the injury. | Used to determine if the accident was part of the risks inherent in employment. |
| A.A Thaver Bros. v. Muthu, A.I.R 1933 Rangoon 208 | Accidents during recognized travel routes related to employment are considered arising out of employment. | Supported the view that accidents during travel in course of employment may qualify for compensation. |
| Ma Hmove Yin v. Burma Oil Co. Ltd., A.I.R 1935 Rangoon 173 | Fatal accidents occurring during reasonable travel between residence and workplace arise out of employment. | Reinforced the principle of reasonable extension of employment to travel time and route. |
| Central Glass Industries Ltd. v. Abdul Hussain, A.I.R 1948 Cal. 12 | Employment must be considered broadly, including character, conditions, incidents, and special risks involved. | The Court applied this to consider the circumstances of the assault within the employer’s premises. |
| Shrimati Bhagubai v. The General Manager, Central Railway, A.I.R 1955 Bom. 105 | Requirement of proximate causal connection between accident and employment; peril must be incidental to employment and not self-induced. | Used to establish that the assault was a peril incidental to employment and not caused by the workman’s own act. |
| Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Velu Raja | Employment generally excludes journeys to and from work but allows for notional extension of employer’s premises in time and place. | Applied to determine if the location of the accident fell within the notional extension of employment premises. |
| General Manager, B.E.S.T Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs Agnes | Extension of notional employment to employer-provided transport facilities for employees travelling to and from work. | Supported the concept of extending employment coverage to areas and times reasonably connected to work. |
| Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. P. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohommad | Burden of proof lies on the workman to show accident arose out of and in course of employment; inference can be drawn from proved facts. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that the applicant discharged the burden of proof. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the facts in light of established legal principles regarding accidents "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment. It noted that the deceased was assaulted within the employer’s premises immediately after completing his duty and while going home, a place he had to pass due to his employment. The Court applied the doctrine of notional extension of employment premises to include the area where the assault occurred.
Referring to precedents, the Court emphasized that the expression "arising out of employment" encompasses the nature, conditions, incidents, and special risks of employment, not merely the work performed. The Court found a proximate causal connection between the employment and the fatal accident, as the workman was at the spot solely due to his employment and did not contribute to or increase the peril.
The Court further considered the burden of proof and held that the applicant discharged it through direct evidence of a fellow workman witnessing the assault. The employer failed to produce rebuttal evidence or relevant police records to counter the claim. Consequently, the Court set aside the Commissioner’s finding that the accident did not arise out of employment and remanded the case for determination of compensation amount.
Holding and Implications
The Court set aside the order dismissing the compensation claim and held that the fatal accident arose out of and in the course of the deceased workman’s employment.
The employer is liable to pay compensation to the widow of the deceased. The case is remanded to the Commissioner for determination of the compensation amount in accordance with law. No costs were imposed on the parties. This decision clarifies the application of the notional extension doctrine and the proximate cause test in workmen's compensation cases involving assaults within employer premises, but does not establish a new precedent beyond the principles cited.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Salil Kumar Datta, J.:— This is an appeal by the wife of the deceased workman against the judgment and order passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, on April 21, 1972. By that order, it was held that the accident in which the workman met his death by reason of the assault by some unknown assailants, did not arise out of his employment though it took place in course of such employment. The application for compensation was accordingly dismissed.
2. The facts, as found by the learned Commissioner, are that on September 3, 1969 as the workman came to the surface on a lift of the colliery on completion of his duty, and was going home he was assaulted by some unknown persons and as a result died on the spot. It has been also found that the accident took place within the colliery, i.e, the premises of his employer. As however, it was held, the accident did not arise out of the employment of the workman, the claim was not entertained. The propriety of the decision is the subject-matter of the appeal. Learned counsels appearing for the parties have referred to some decisions in support of their respective contentions which we shall now consider.
3. In Gouri Kinkar Bhakat… v. Messrs Radha Kissen Cotton Mills… . A.I.R 1933 Cal. 220. Rankin, C.J speaking for the Division Bench, cited and followed the following proposition of law laid down by Lard Shaw in Simpson v. Sinclair . 1917 A.C 127.,
“…the expression ‘arising out of the employment’ is not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to the employment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of these the workman is brought within the zone of special danger and so injured or killed…the broad words of the statute ‘arising out of the employment’ apply. If the peril which he encountered was not an added peril produced by the workman himself… then a case for compensation under the statute appears to arise.”
4. Lord Summer in Lancashire and York-shift Railway v. Highly . 1917 A.C 352. observed:
“…there is one test which is always at any rate applicable…. It is this: Was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused his injury? If yes, the accident arose out of his employment if nay, it did not, because what was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, to do cannot well be the cause of an accident arising out of employment.”
5. In A.A Thaver Bros. v. Muthu . A.I.R 1933 Rangoon 208., it was held following above principles in a case when the deceased a porter, was on his way back to his wharf where his day's employment would end, in a recognised way for porters to travel without any added risk the accident caused by capsize of the sampan whereby the workman was drowned and met his death, was to be regarded as one arising out of as well as in course of his employment. In another decision of the Special Bench of the same High Court in Ma Hmove Yin v. Burma Oil Co. Ltd. . A.I.R 1935 Rangoon 173., the C.J held other Judges concurring, that where a person with permission lived at some distance from the place of work, and in the course of proceeding in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner from the place where he resided to the place where he worked he met with a fatal accident then that fatal accident would be held to arise out of and in the course of his employment.
6. In Central Glass Industries Ltd. v. Abdul Hussain . A.I.R 1948 Cal. 12., another Division Bench of this Court observed:
“…Workman who is injured in the course of his employment would be entitled to compensation only if his employment had given rise to the circumstance of injury by accident, and in testing the case from that point of view the word ‘employment’ is not to be defined in a narrow manner by reference only to the duties of the workman but the character, conditions, incidents and special risk involved would have to be taken into consideration.”
7. In Shrimati Bhagubai…(Original Applicant) v. The General Manager, Central Railway…(Original Opponent)* . A.I.R 1955 Bom. 105., Chagla, C.J laid down the following proposition:
“…there must be a causal connection between the accident and the employment in order that the Court can say that the accident arose out of the employment of the deceased. It is equally clear that the cause contemplated is the proximate cause and not any remote cause. The authorities have clearly laid down that if the employee in course of his employment has to be in particular place and by reason of his being in that particular place he has to face a peril and the accident is caused by reason of that peril which he has to face, then a causal connection is established between the accident and the employment. It is now well-settled fact that the employee shares that peril with other members of the public is an irrelevant consideration. It is true that the peril which he faces must not be something personal to him. The peril must be incidental to his employment. It is also clear that he must not by his own act add to the peril or extend the peril. But if the peril which he faces has nothing to do with his own action or his own conduct, but it is a peril which would have been faced by any other employee or any other member of the public then if the accident arises out of such peril, a causal connection is established between the employment and the accident.”
8. In this case, the employee in the course of his employment found himself in a spot where he was assaulted and stabbed to death. He was in the place where he was murdered by reason of his employment. The Court observed:
“He would have been safely in his bed but for the fact that he had to join duty, and he had to pass this spot in order to join his duty. Therefore, the connection between the employment and the accident is established. There is no evidence in this case that the employee in any way added to the peril. There is no evidence that he was stabbed because the assailant wanted to stab him and nobody else”
9. In Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Velu Raja, the Court observed as follows:
“As a rule the employment of a workman does not commence untill he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however, that this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area in which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises. The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in course of the employment of the workman, keeping in view at all times the theory of notional extension.”
10. In General Manager, B.E.S.T Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs Agnes , the above principle of notional extension of employment was extended to cases where the employer offered the facility of bus service to its drivers for them to come to their depots and going back to their homes, as employees as of right and in interest of efficiency of service. Accordingly it was held by a majority judgment that when a driver when going home from the depot or coming to the depot uses the bus provided as a means of transport any accident in such bus that happens to him is an accident in course of his employment.
11. The ratio of the decisions cited above appear to be as follows:
(i) The expression ‘arising out of employment’ applies to the nature, conditions, obligations, incidents and special risks of the employment and not merely to the nature of employment.
(ii) As a rule the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the employment.
(iii) As a rule journey to and from the place of employment is not included within expression in the course of employment.
(iv) The aforesaid two propositions are subject to the theory of notional extension of employer's premises so as to include the area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and a workman may be regarded as in course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises.
(v) There must be a causal connection between the accident and the employment and such cause must be proximate and not remote cause. If the employee in course of his employment has to be in particular place and by reason of his being in particular place, he has to face a peril and accident is caused by reason of that peril, and that such peril is not added or extended by him, a causal connection is established between the accident and the employment.
(vi) The facts and circumstances of each case is to be examined to determine if the accident arose in course and out of employment of the workman in the light of the above propositions of notional extension of the time and place of employment.
12. Coming to the facts of the case it appears the deceased workman was assaulted inside the colliery as he came out to the surface and was going home. There is no dispute that the workman had to pass and repass by the area where he was assaulted in going to the pithead and in leaving the same. The workman, on the basis of propositions cited must be held to be within his employment when he was passing through the said area and met his death by assault by unknown people. But for his employment he would not have been at the spot where the accident happened and as such it must be held that there was a causal and proximate connection between the accident and the employment. There is no evidence to indicate that the unfortunate workman by any action on his part added to the peril or extended the peril. In this state of affairs it is held that the personal injury that was caused to the workman by an accident arose out of and in course of his employment under the respondent No. 1 which became liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
13. The learned Commissioner in respect of issue No. 2 has held that the applicant was the widow of the deceased and was to be presumed to be dependent on the deceased and relevant issue No. 2 was accordingly decided in favour of the applicant. The learned Commissioner has further found that the accident happened within the very premises of the employer who must be presumed to have knowledge of the accident. The issue No. 3 on service of notice of the accident was also decided is favour of the applicant. These findings are affirmed by us. On the issue No. 1 a point was raised by Mr. Ganguli, learned counsel for the respondent employer contending that the onus of proof in respect of the death of the workman within the premises was not duly discharged by the applicant. In the written statement death of the workman was admitted, but it was suggested that death was due to inter union rivalry and real facts might be known from records of Jamaria Police Station. No attempt was made by the employer to produce relevant records to prove its specific defence and on the other hand the compounder of its dispensary was produced who was not the competent person to state in evidence about the relevant facts. On the question of burden of proof, in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. P. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohommad the Court observed:
“In the case of death caused by accident the burden of proof rests upon the workman to prove that the accident arose out of employment as well as in course of employment. But this does not mean that a workman (applicant) who comes to Court for relief must necessarily prove it by direct evidence. Although the onus of providing that the injury by accident arose both out of and in course of employment rests upon the applicant these essentials may be inferred when the facts proved justify the inference. On the one hand the Commissioner must not surmise, conjecture or guess; on the other hand, he may draw an inference from the proved facts so long as it is a legitimate inference. It is of course impossible to lay down any rule as to the degree of proof which is sufficient to justify an inference being drawn, but the evidence must be such as would induce reasonable man to draw it.”
14. In the case before us there is a direct evidence of a fellow workman. Applicant's witness No. 2, who testified having seen the assualt on the deceased workman, which led to his death, within the premises of the employer. There is no rebuttal evidence on the part of the employer to disprove the applicants case. The learned Commissioner was accordingly justified in holding that the deceased workman was killed by some unidentified persons in the premises of the opposite party when the workman was going away after completion of duty. The finding of the learned Commissioner that the accident did not arise out of the employment of the deceased workman, in view of what is stated above is set aside. We also set aside the order dismissing the applicants application for compensation. In the circumstances we send the case back on remand to the learned Commissioner for determing in accordance with law the amount of compensation payable to the applicant on account of the death of the workman which as we have held, arise out of and in course of his employment under the respondent. There will be no order for costs in this appeal.
15. Let the records be sent down at once.
Sankar Prasad Mitra, C.J:— I agree.
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