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All India Insurance Employees' Association And Others v. Union Of India And Others
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition challenged actions of the Union of India and authorities of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (the Corporation) seeking writs in the nature of mandamus and prohibition to compel respondents to act in accordance with a settlement dated 24 January 1974 (read with an administrative instruction dated 29 March 1974). The petitioners sought recall, rescission or cancellation of impugned circulars dated 26 September 1975, 7 February 1976 and 22 March (referred elsewhere in the opinion as 2 March) 1976, and an order preventing respondents from acting on those circulars and from refusing to pay annual cash bonus to class III and class IV employees including the petitioners, together with salary for April 1976 and thereafter annually as provided by the settlement.
Background facts (as stated in the opinion): since June 1959 the Corporation paid non-profit sharing bonus under various settlements and orders made under S. 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The last such settlement was arrived at on 24 January 1974 between the Corporation and trade unions representing workmen; it was to be effective from 1 April 1973 to 31 March 1977 and was subject to approval by the Corporation's Board and the Central Government. That settlement received the required approvals and bonuses were paid for the years corresponding to April 1974 and April 1975.
Difficulties arose regarding payment of bonus for the period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976 (payable with April 1976 salary). The Corporation issued circular No. 3539.ASP/75 dated 26 September 1975 directing offices not to pay bonus in event of retirement and death while the question was under review in light of a Bonus Ordinance of 25 September 1975. Later communications included a letter/circular of 7 February 1976 from the Chief Personnel Officer informing that the Central Government had advised the Corporation not to pay bonus without specific approval, and a circular (No. 3538.ASP/76) dated 22 March 1976 (referred elsewhere as 2 March 1976) directing no payment of bonus "until further instruction".
Petitioners moved the writ jurisdiction and a rule nisi was issued. An interim order provided that payment and acceptance of April 1976 salary without bonus would not prejudice petitioners' rights; salaries for April 1976 were paid and accepted. A supplementary affidavit disclosed a demi-official confidential letter from a Government official requesting the Corporation "not to make any further payment of bonus without getting the same cleared by the Government." Subsequently, counsel for the Corporation stated in Court that there was actually no directive from the Central Government preventing bonus payment to the Corporation. The rule was thereafter heard for final disposal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the circulars and communications of the Corporation (26 September 1975; 7 February 1976; 22/2 March 1976) directing suspension/withholding of bonus payments were lawful or arbitrary and without legal authority.
- Whether the petitioners were entitled to the bonus due under the settlement of 24 January 1974 (effective 1 April 1973 to 31 March 1977) and whether that entitlement required payment with April 1976 salary.
- Whether the writ Court (under Article 226) had jurisdiction to grant relief despite submissions that rights should be agitated before the Labour Court under S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (i.e., whether an alternative remedy barred writ relief).
- Whether the Corporation, as a statutory body, acted within its statutory powers and complied with principles of natural justice before withholding payment.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as presented through Sri Chatterjee)
- The settlement of 24 January 1974 was valid, had been approved by both the Corporation and the Central Government, and remained effective for the four-year period 1 April 1973 to 31 March 1977.
- Under that settlement a year's bonus became due on 1 April 1976 and was payable with April 1976 salary; previous similar payments (April 1974 and April 1975) had been paid on the basis of approvals.
- In the absence of any directive from the Central Government (a fact conceded in Court), withholding payment on the ground that the matter was "under review" was arbitrary, mala fide and illegal.
- The writ Court can and should compel the Corporation to act in accordance with law to secure justice for the employees.
Respondent — Life Insurance Corporation (as presented through Sri Banerjee)
- Initially stated, upon instructions, that the Central Government had directed the Corporation not to make payment of bonus without Government approval; sought leave to file supplementary affidavit to disclose such directive (a demi-official letter was filed).
- At the hearing later conceded that there was no directive from the Central Government directing the Corporation not to make bonus payments, which undermined that earlier justification.
- Contended that the matter was under review and that payments were not refused but were pending final decision; also argued that rights, if any, should be agitated before the Labour Court under S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Central Government (as presented through Sri Roy)
- Mentioned a Bill pending in Parliament under which payment of bonus to Corporation employees under the settlement was being considered; argued that parliamentary action was relevant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Satwant Singh v. D.R. Ramaratnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi [A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1836 at p. 1847] | One aspect of the rule of law: "every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, must be supported by some legislative authority." | The Court relied on this principle to hold that the Corporation's executive action withholding bonus must have legal authority; absent such authority the action is arbitrary and can be corrected by the writ Court. |
| D.F.O., South Khtri v. Ram Sanehi [(1971) 3 SCC 864 : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 205] | When action of a public authority invested with statutory powers is challenged, a writ petition is maintainable even if the right to relief arises out of an alleged breach of contract. | The Court applied this principle to reject the contention that petitioners' contractual rights precluded writ jurisdiction; it held the writ jurisdiction was available to remedy arbitrary action by a statutory authority. |
| Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [1971 — I L.L.J 557] | Pension is not a bounty payable at the sweet will and pleasure of the Government; pension is a valuable right vesting on a Government servant. | The Court invoked the reasoning by analogy to hold that the bonus had accrued and was payable; non-payment without lawful cause rendered the act arbitrary (treating the bonus-right as a valuable right). |
| State of Mysore v. K.C. Adiga [(1976) 2 SCC 495 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 853] | Public authorities must not arrogate powers they do not possess; actions exceeding statutory powers are unlawful. | The Court used this authority to conclude the Corporation was exceeding its statutory powers in withholding the bonus and was acting without legal sanction. |
| State of Punjab v. Igbal Singh [(1976) 2 SCC 1 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 667] | Administrative orders affecting property or vested rights must be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that the Corporation failed to give petitioners a hearing before withholding payment, thereby violating principles of natural justice. |
| Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke [1975 — I L.L.N 1] | Principles laid down in that case (as referenced) were distinguished by the Court as not applicable to a writ application of this nature. | The Court held that the reasoning in Premier Automobiles had no application to the present writ petition, because the writ Court alone can entertain the specific reliefs sought under Article 226. |
| L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly [(1970) 2 SCC 355 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 33] | Even where an alternative remedy exists, a petition under Article 226 may be entertained if it offers quicker and more efficacious relief. | The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that alternative statutory remedies do not necessarily oust the writ jurisdiction when the public authority acts arbitrarily and writ relief is expedient. |
| Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1401] | Supports the proposition that writ jurisdiction may be appropriate notwithstanding alternative remedies in certain circumstances. | The Court relied on this precedent along with others to reject the argument that the petitioners must exclusively seek remedy under alternate statutory fora (e.g., Labour Court). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of discrete findings grounded in the facts and legal authorities cited in the opinion:
- Existence and scope of the settlement: The Court accepted that the settlement dated 24 January 1974 was valid, had received required approvals, and had operated to secure payment of bonus for prior years (paid with April 1974 and April 1975 salaries).
- Effect of the impugned circulars and letters: The Court found that the Corporation's circulars and the 7 February 1976 letter/directive effectively directed offices not to make any bonus payment for the year ending 31 March 1976 and to withhold payments for employees covered by earlier communications. The Court treated these communications as the operative acts challenged in the writ petition.
- Central Government directive — factual posture: Although a supplementary affidavit disclosed a demi-official letter requesting the Corporation not to make further bonus payments without Government clearance, counsel for the Corporation later stated in open Court that there was in fact no binding Central Government directive preventing the Corporation from making bonus payments. On that concession the Court held that the Corporation had no legitimate basis in a Central Government directive to withhold payment.
- Principle of legality and statutory limits: Applying the rule-of-law principle (Satwant Singh) and authorities on limits of public authorities' powers, the Court held that a statutory body like the Corporation must act within the scope of powers conferred by statute and cannot act arbitrarily or without legal foundation. If it acts in excess of its powers the writ jurisdiction is available to correct such excess.
- Nature of petitioner rights and availability of writ jurisdiction: Even though petitioners' rights arose out of a contractual settlement, the Court relied on D.F.O., South Khtri v. Ram Sanehi to hold that writ relief is maintainable where a public authority's statutory action is challenged. The Court therefore concluded it could entertain the writ petition under Article 226.
- Right to property and natural justice: The Court characterized the accrued bonus as a right to property under Article 31(1) (as stated in the opinion) and held that executive direction could not take that right away. The Corporation's failure to afford hearing before withholding payment was held to be a breach of natural justice principles (citing State of Punjab v. Igbal Singh), reinforcing the view that the withholding was unlawful.
- Rejection of alternative forum argument: The Corporation's submission that disputes must be taken to the Labour Court under S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was rejected. The Court explained that the writ Court's role would be to direct the authorities to act in accordance with law and that any necessary computations were for the Corporation to make; any subsequent disputes about computation could be agitated under relevant provisions. The Court also relied on authorities holding that the presence of an alternative remedy does not automatically bar writ relief when quicker and more efficacious remedy is necessary.
- Parliamentary bill: The Court noted the Central Government's reference to a Bill pending in Parliament concerning payment of bonus, but stated that until any Bill is enacted the Court must decide based on the law as it then prevailed; possible future legislation could not determine present legality.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court made the rule absolute and directed that writs of mandamus and prohibition issue in the terms prayed in the petition. The Court ordered that the relief in terms of prayer A(iii) of the petition be read with the interim order passed on 26 April 1976. There was no order as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Corporation is required to act in accordance with the 24 January 1974 settlement and may not withhold the accrued bonus for the year ending 31 March 1976 (which was due to be paid with the April 1976 salary) on the basis of the challenged circulars or purported Government instruction. The Corporation must avoid exercising powers beyond its statutory authority and must respect principles of natural justice before depriving employees of accrued entitlements.
- Scope of precedent and broader consequences: The opinion applied established principles (rule of law, limits on statutory authorities, availability of writ relief even where rights arise from contract, and requirement of natural justice) to the facts of this case. The text of the opinion does not purport to announce a novel principle of law beyond application of those authorities to the present facts; therefore the direct effect is to provide relief to these petitioners on the basis described above.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond what the opinion expressly states.
1. The rule nisi herein was directed against the Union of India and the different authorities of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, (hereinafter called the said Corporation), calling upon them to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus and a writ in the nature of prohibition should not be issued against them, commanding the said respondents and each of them to act according to law, by directing the respondents to act in accordance with a settlement, dated 24 January, 1974, read with an administrative instruction, dated 29 March, 1974, by recalling, rescinding and/or cancelling the impugned circulars, dated 26 September, 1975, 7 February and 22 March, 1976, being annexures to the petition; by not acting in any manner whatsoever on the basis of the said impugned circulars; and further by not refusing to pay the annual cash bonus to the class III and class IV employees of the respondent 2 Corporation including the petitioners herein along with their salary for the month of April 1976, and thereafter every year as provided by the said settlement.
2. The facts shortly are that, at all material time, the employees of the said Corporation had been receiving the non-profit sharing bonus since June 1959, under several agreements or settlements arrived at by and between the said Corporation and the different employees' associations of the said Corporation. This was being so done by virtue of orders made under S. 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The standardization order of 1957 was modified and/or amended from time to time for the purpose of payment of bonus to the class III and class IV employees of the Corporation and ever since 1959, the said Corporation made various settlements and/or agreements, inter alia, in respect of claim for bonus of the said class III and class IV employees of the said Corporation, the last of such settlements being arrived at on 24 January, 1974, by and between the said Corporation on the one hand and petitioners 1 to 5, being the different trade unions — representing the workmen of the Life Insurance Corporation of India on the other. It is also provided by the said settlement that the same would be effective from 1 April, 1973, and would be for a period of four years, that is, from 1 April, 1973 to 31 March, 1977. It is further provided thereunder that the terms of the said settlement would be subject to the approval of the Board of the Corporation and of the Central Government.
3. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the said settlement received the approval of the Board of the Corporation and of the Central Government and in terms thereof bonus was paid to the employees as aforesaid for the period from 1 April, 1973 to 31 March, 1974, along with their salary for the month of April 1974 and, thereafter, for the similar period which was paid along with the salary for the month of April 1975. Difficulties arose with regard to the payment of such salary for the period commencing from 1 April, 1975 to 31 March, 1976, which was to become payable along with the month of April 1976. It is to be noted that nobody disputes the legality or correctness or validity of the said settlement of 24 January, 1974.
4. The said Corporation by its circular No. 3539.ASP/75, dated 26 September, 1975, directed all its offices not to pay bonus in the event of retirement and death since the question of payment of bonus was being reviewed in the light of the Bonus Ordinance, dated 25 September, 1975. This is the first circular which is under challenge. On behalf of the employees it was, inter alia, represented to the authorities that payment of bonus was governed by the provisions of a bi-partite settlement, and directive to the contrary was violative of both the settlements and also of the employees' conditions of service and, therefore illegal and void. Accordingly, the authorities were called upon to rescind the said circular and to order payment of bonus to the employees who retired or died in harness.
5. Thereafter, by his letter, dated 7 February, 1976 (also described herein as a circular), the Chief Personnel Officer of the Corporation informed the chief secretary to petitioner 1 that although the Corporation admitted that payment of bonus to employees was covered by the settlement of January 1974, yet such payment was subject to such direction as the Central Government might issue from time to time. It was also intimated that the Central Government had advised the said Corporation sot to pay any bonus without their specific approval. Accordingly, bonus could not be paid to the employees covered by the circular, dated 26 September, 1975. The chief secretary of petitioner 1 again protested and intimated, that once the said settlement became part of the service condition, the payment of bonus according to the settlement was automatic and not subject to any fresh approval of the Central Government every year. The said authority was also reminded that the settlement of January 1974, had passed through various stages of consultation with and concurrence of the Central Government, and accordingly, its terms and conditions could not be unilaterally altered. It was further pointed out that the Payment of Bonus Act could not touch the settlement of January 1974, because the said Corporation was never covered by the said Act. It is to be noted that even though it was specifically pointed out as on 7 February, 1976, by the Chief Personnel Officer of the said Corporation that the Central Government had advised them not to make any payment of bonus without their specific approval, yet at the hearing stage it was pointed out that there was actually no directive of the Central Government to stop payment of bonus so far as the said Corporation was concerned. Accordingly, the contention raised in that letter was without any basis whatsoever. This letter, dated 7 February, 1976 (also called circular herein), is also under challenge in this writ petition.
6. Thereafter, the petitioners again made their demand by their union's letter, dated 12 March, 1976, to the Chairman of the said Corporation and ultimately on 22 March, 1976, the Executive Director (P) of the said Corporation by a circular No. 3538.ASP/76, directed all the offices of the said-Corporation that until further instruction no payment by way of bonus be made to any employee irrespective of the class to which he might belong on the ground that the question of payment of bonus to the employees of the Corporation was under review and no decision had so far been taken about the payment of bonus for the year 1975–76. The last circular, dated 2 March, 1976, is also the subject-matter of this writ petition along with the previous circular, dated 26 September, 1975, and the directions contain 3d in the said letter, dated 7 February, 1976.
7. Under those circumstances the petitioners moved the writ jurisdiction of this Court, and a rule nisi was issued as aforesaid. Thereupon by an interim order it was ordered that the payment of salary for April 1976, and the acceptance thereof by the employees without payment of bonus along with it would not prejudice the rights of the petitioners. On the basis as aforesaid the salaries for the month of April 1976, were paid to and accepted by the petitioners.
8. When the matter was moved for further interim orders several important points were urged by and on behalf of all the parties herein, but considering the importance of the matter directions were given, so that the rule itself might be heard and disposed of and, accordingly the matter has come up for final disposal of the rule.
9. Incidentally, it should be mentioned here that at the time the petition was moved for interim orders Sri Banerjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the said-Corporation upon instructions stated to the Court that by virtue of the Central Government's directive the authorities of the said-Corporation were prevented from making the payment of bonus and prayed for leave to file a supplementary affidavit disclosing therewith such directive of the Central Government. The leave, as prayed for, was granted and upon that a supplementary affidavit was filed by one Harish Chandra Pal affirmed on 10 May, 1976, therewith a demi-official confidential letter written by one D.K Singh, Director, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Insurance Wing, and addressed to the Chairman of the Corporation, whereby the said Chairman was requested.
“not to make any further payment of bonus without getting the same cleared by the Government.”
Yesterday, at the hearing of the rule, Sri Banerjee, learned counsel for the Corporation upon instructions stated in Court that he has since received instructions from his clients to state that there is no directive from the Central Government directing the Life Insurance Corporation of India not to make any payment of bonus. Under those circumstances, since it is conceded chat there is no such directive from the Central Government, the arguments made by Sri Banerjee at the time of obtaining interim orders, regarding regulation 58 of the Life Insurance Corporation's Staff Regulations, 1960, relating to payment of bonus at the time of interim orders, and its impact on the powers of the Central Government in withholding its approval in the matter of settlement, would no longer be relevant for the purpose of the Court's consideration in deciding this case.
10. Sri Chatterjee, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that by virtue of the said memorandum of settlement, dated 24 January, 1974, the petitioners received the bonus for the last two years along with the payment of salary for the months of April 1974 and April 1975, and that was so done on the basis of the approval received both from the Corporation and from the Central Government. The settlement was to remain effective for four consecutive years and by virtue of the said settlement another year's bonus was to become due on 1 April, 1976, and has since actually become due and the Corporation, accordingly, was obliged to pay the same along with the salary for the month of April 1976. It is not in dispute that such previous payments of bonus were made on the basis of the Central Government's approval. Now that it is conceded that there is no such directive of the Central Government as was sought to be made out previously, withholding such sanction, there could not be any point in withholding the payment of such bonus on the ground that the same was under review of the Central Government. Accordingly, such non-payment becomes arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and as such, this Court in its writ jurisdiction can require the authorities of the said Corporation to act in accordance with law, so that conscionable justice could be done to the employees. Sri Banerjee on the other hand contends that it is not a case where payment has been refused. Such payments are now under review and as soon as final decision would be arrived at, an action would be taken in respect thereof.
11. To my mind the said circulars and the letter, referred to above, clearly show that the offices of the said Corporation have been directed not to make any payment of bonus to any of the employees for the year ending 31 March, 1976, and also in respect of the employees covered by the circular, dated 26 September, 1975 and the letter, dated 7 February, 1976. That being the position, to my mind, without anything more, the authorities of the Life Insurance Corporation of India must be held to be acting arbitrarily, without any cause and without any legal authority. It is a statutory body corporate created under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. It is bound to act according to the law of the land and not arbitrarily and in the manner it is purporting to do. There must be legitimate foundation for the exercise of its jurisdiction and to support its action it must act within the scope of its authority vested on it. If it acts in excess of its powers then the writ Court jurisdiction can be utilized to set it right. (See also Halsbur's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, Para. 2). It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Satwant Singh v. D.R Ramaratnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi [A.I.R 1967 S.C 1836 at page 1847], as follows:
“One of the aspects of rule of law is that every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, must be supported by some legislative authority.”
12. Even though the petitioners' right arises out of a contract yet the writ Court has ample jurisdiction to give relief to the petitioners. In the case of D.F.O, South Khtri v. Ram Sanehi [(1971) 3 SCC 864 : A.I.R 1973 S.C 205], it has been held that
“where the action of a public authority invested with statutory powers is challenged, the writ petition is maintainable even if the right to relief arises out of an alleged breach of contract.”
Even though the order is an administrative order yet it has to be exercised by the statutory authority in accordance with principles of natural justice when it purports to affect the litigant's right to property.
13. In the case of Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [1971—I L.L.J 557], the Supreme Court considered the case of pension and held that pension was not a bounty pay able on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and that the right to pension was a valuable right vesting on a Government servant. In the case before me the bonus has accrued due, it has been earned and is payable forthwith in terms of the said settlement. If nothing stands in the way of such payment, the non-payment thereof becomes an arbitrary act on the part of the authorities concerned. To my mind, the right to receive the bonus along with the salary of April 1976 is a right to property under Art. 31(1) of the Constitution of India and this right cannot be taken away by an executive direction. To my mind, the authorities of the Life Insurance Corporation of India are arrogating to themselves some powers which they do not possess in withholding payment of such bonus and thereby exceeding their statutory powers [See the case of State of Mysore v. K.C Adiga ((1976) 2 SCC 495 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 853.)] Even though the petitioners are being deprived of such right to property yet respondent 2, the said Corporation, did not even think fit to give the petitioners a right of hearing before deciding to withhold payment and by doing so they have acted in violation of the principles of natural justice. That the authorities concerned are obliged to follow the said rules of natural justice has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Igbal Singh [(1976) 2 SCC 1 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 667].
14. On behalf of respondent 2, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Sri Banerjee contends that the rights, if any, of the petitioners can only be agitated before the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, because this is a case essentially coming within S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is contended that even though the said circulars are quashed, the Court cannot make any order for payment of bonus because in respect of each employee it would be a matter of computation and such matter can be agitated only under S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. To my mind, this argument cannot stand inasmuch as this Court in its writ jurisdiction would only direct, the authorities concerned, if at all, to act in accordance with law and in respect of such an order no computation would be involved. It is a matter for the department of respondent 2 Corporation to calculate. If there would be any dispute certainly that might be agitated under the relevant provisions of law. But in so far as the prayers in the petition are concerned, the same can undoubtedly be agitated only before this Court. This Court alone in its writ jurisdiction can entertain such prayers. In my opinion, the principles laid down in Premier Automobiles, Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke [1975 — I L.L.N 1], have no application in a writ application, because it is only the writ Court which can exercise this jurisdiction and the Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot entertain such prayers.
15. To my mind, in this case the authorities concerned are acting arbitrarily, in excess of their statutory powers and without due sanction of law, and, accordingly, even assuming there is an alternative remedy provided by any statute, yet a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution will give the petitioners quicker and more efficacious remedy, as is the case here, and, accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to try and to entertain this application in its writ jurisdiction. [See the case of L. Hirday Narain v. Incometax Officer, Bareilly ((1970) 2 SCC 355 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 33); Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company, Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (A.I.R 1967 S.C 1401).]
16. On behalf of the Central Government Sri Roy, referred to a Bill in the Parliament whereby the payment of bonus to the Corporation employees under the said settlement is being considered by the Parliament. To my mind until the Bill is enacted the Court has to consider the case on the basis of the law of the land as prevailing at present and it is not the Court's consideration as to which provision thereof might be passed and enacted and which provision not.
17. Under those circumstances, to my mind the petitioners are entitled to succeed in this application, and, accordingly I make this rule absolute.
18. Let a writ of mandamus and of prohibition issue, as prayed for in the petition and it is further ordered that the order in terms of prayer A (iii) of the petition be read with the interim order passed herein on 26 April, 1976.
19. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs.
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