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Gour Gopal Dutt And Others v. Sm. Shantilata Mitra And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Contempt Application)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner moved an application for contempt against several respondents for alleged deliberate breach of a solemn undertaking given to the Court on 15 February 1966 before Mr. Justice Sankar Prasad Mitra. The respondents named include Sm. Shantilata Mitra, Samirendra Nath Mitra, Sailendra Nath Mitra, Miss Namita Mitra, Mrs. Amita Bose and Mrs. Sabita Ghose.
Background events relevant to the dispute (as stated in the opinion):
- The petitioner had granted a sub-lease of the "Paramount Cinema" (premises No. 38, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta) to Satyendra Nath Mitra for a term specified in the lease. The petitioner instituted Suit No. 1833 of 1955 for ejectment for non-payment of rent.
- On 10 July 1958 a consent decree provided that Satyendra Nath Mitra would vacate the premises on expiry of an option period in the lease.
- Satyendra Nath Mitra died on 18 July 1961; his heirs and legal representatives are the present respondents.
- In November 1962, an execution-related consent decree recorded the death and extended time to vacate to 30 December 1965.
- On 15 February 1966 a further consent order recorded a solemn undertaking by the respondents to vacate and deliver possession by 31 July 1967.
- Shortly before that date the respondents applied to be discharged from the undertaking and sought an injunction restraining eviction; litigation continued (interim orders, suits and appeals followed through the 1960s and 1970s).
- On 19 February 1968 the petitioner obtained a Rule Nisi for contempt for breach of the 15 February 1966 undertaking; subsequent interlocutory and appellate proceedings affected execution of the decree.
- The respondents (except Mrs. Sabita Ghose) pursued remedies under Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and secured, at various times, stays of execution. The application under Section 17-D was dismissed on 16 May 1975 but an appeal with interim orders remained pending at the time this contempt application was assigned to the present judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents wilfully breached the solemn undertaking given to the Court on 15 February 1966 and, if so, whether that breach constitutes civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether a statutory stay of execution of a decree under Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Rent Control) Act operates so as to prevent the Court from proceeding with a contempt application based on an undertaking to the Court.
- Whether an undertaking given to Court, once incorporated into the Court's written order, has the same effect as an order or judgment of the Court (i.e., whether breach of the undertaking is enforceable as contempt).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Dipankar Ghose)
- Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act defines civil contempt to include wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court; respondents gave a solemn undertaking and have not delivered up possession.
- An application under Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act stays only the execution of a decree (i.e., the procedural execution between judgment-creditor and judgment-debtor) and does not stay the operation or enforcement of a separate undertaking given to the Court.
- Undertakings to the Court are matters between the Court and the person making the undertaking; a stay of execution of a decree cannot override or nullify a solemn undertaking to the Court.
- Balance of convenience and equity favours the petitioner because a stay of the contempt application would only delay redress, allow respondents to retain the premises longer, and potentially render the petitioner’s remedy ineffectual if the respondents ultimately lose on appeal.
Respondents' Arguments (as presented primarily by Mr. R.C. Deb)
- The respondents' counsel argued that because an appeal was pending against the dismissal of the Section 17-D application and a stay had been obtained on execution, the Court should refrain from passing any order on the contempt application until disposal of that appeal.
- A technical point was raised about the cause title of the contempt application referring to "on or about 1st August, 1967" — an argument intended to question the clarity or framing of the alleged time of breach (this point was addressed and rejected by the Court as agenda misdirection to the cause title rather than the body of the order).
Arguments / Submissions Specific to Individual Respondents
- Mr. Anindya Mitra, for Mrs. Sabita Ghose, submitted that his client and Mrs. Amita Bose had relinquished rights in favour of their brothers, and that because they were elderly women and relatives the Court ought to be lenient; the judge accepted leniency and did not punish these ladies despite technical guilt.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Biba Ltd. v. Stratford Investments Ltd., (1972) 3 All ER 1041 | The principle that an undertaking given to the Court and embodied in the Court's written order has the same effect as a judgment or order of the Court. | The judge relied on this authority to conclude that the respondents' undertaking, once incorporated into the Court's order, operated as part of that order and was enforceable as such (supporting the finding of contempt for breach). |
| Suretennessa Bibi v. Chintaharan Das, AIR 1955 Cal 182 (Division Bench) | Authority for holding that an unconditional and unqualified undertaking to vacate premises is binding and that failure to comply is deliberate breach amounting to contempt of Court. | The judge cited and relied on this Division Bench decision to support the proposition that failure to carry out a solemn undertaking to the Court constitutes contempt; used as precedent for guilt and punitive measures. |
| Lala Shyam Sundar v. Lala Baij Nath Prasad, (1964) 68 Cal WN 148 (Division Bench) | Followed the earlier decision and treated breach of undertaking as contempt; referenced as authority for imposing imprisonment in similar circumstances. | The judge referred to this decision (and the punishment imposed therein) as justification for imposing a term of imprisonment (subject to conditional remission on compliance) on the two brothers found guilty in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded along discrete but connected lines:
- Statutory definition: The judge began by invoking Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which includes wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court within the definition of civil contempt. The factual basis (respondents had given an undertaking and did not vacate) established the prima facie element of civil contempt.
- Effect of a Section 17-D stay: The Court addressed respondents' contention that a pending appeal and an interim stay under Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act should preclude action on contempt. The judge analysed the nature of a Section 17-D stay and concluded that it operates to stay execution of a decree (i.e., the procedure of execution under the Code of Civil Procedure between judgment-creditor and judgment-debtor), and does not operate to nullify or suspend a separate undertaking made to the Court.
- Separation of matters: The Court emphasised the conceptual difference between the execution of a decree (a procedural remedy between parties) and an undertaking to the Court (a commitment made to the Court itself). Because an undertaking is a matter between the Court and the person who gives it, a statutory stay of execution does not override the undertaking.
- Characterisation of the undertaking as part of the order: Relying on precedent (Biba Ltd. v. Stratford Investments Ltd.), the judge held that once an undertaking is incorporated into a written order of the Court it becomes part of that order and has the same effect as an order or judgment—thus, breach of such an undertaking is breach of a Court order and can constitute contempt.
- Precedential support and policy considerations: The judge referred to local Division Bench authorities (AIR 1955 Cal 182 and (1964) 68 Cal WN 148) that treated failure to comply with unconditional undertakings to vacate as contempt, reinforcing the legal conclusion and the policy that undertakings to the Court must carry practical consequence.
- Application to the facts and equitable considerations: The Court found both Samirendra Nath Mitra and Sailendra Nath Mitra personally guilty of contempt for having given solemn undertakings and refused to deliver possession. The judge considered mitigation (apologies in affidavits) but noted that counsel did not press the apologies in oral argument; the judge also distinguished female respondents (who had relinquished rights and were elderly women) and declined to punish them despite technical guilt.
- Punishment principle and conditional relief: The judge fixed fines and ordered imprisonment consistent with precedent, but tempered the sentence with conditional remission: the imprisonment would not be carried out if the two guilty brothers complied with their undertaking and vacated and delivered possession within one week. The Court also ordered payment of costs and granted a seven-day stay before enforcement to allow compliance.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling):
Application allowed. Two respondents — Samirendra Nath Mitra and Sailendra Nath Mitra — were found guilty of civil contempt for wilfully breaching the solemn undertaking given to the Court.
Specific orders and immediate consequences (as given in the opinion):
- Each of the two brothers is fined Rs. 1,000.
- Each is sentenced to imprisonment for a fortnight; however, the imprisonment is ordered not to be carried out if they conform to their undertaking and vacate the premises and put the petitioner in possession within one week from the date of the order.
- The two brothers must pay the costs of the contempt application to the petitioner.
- A stay of seven days was granted before enforcement at the request of counsel, giving the respondents time to comply.
- The contempt application was allowed (final disposition in favour of the petitioner on the contempt claim).
Implications:
- Direct effect: The decision imposes punitive and coercive measures on the two principal contemnors (fine, conditional imprisonment, and costs) and requires them to vacate and deliver possession within a specified short period or face the imprisonment order.
- On the interplay between statutory stays and undertakings: The Court's reasoning makes clear that a statutory stay of execution under Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act does not, by itself, suspend or nullify an independent undertaking given to the Court; an undertaking incorporated into a Court order can be enforced separately by contempt proceedings.
- On precedent and practice: The opinion applies established authorities treating undertakings embodied in Court orders as carrying the force of an order and treating deliberate breach as contempt. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond applying these precedents to the facts of this case.
Status: The summary is confined to matters explicitly contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.
1. This is an application for contempt of Court moved by the petitioner against the respondents for deliberately violating or flouting the solemn undertaking given to this Hon'ble Court by the respondents before Mr. Justice Shankar Prasad Mitra as His Lordship then was who issued the Rule for Contempt. The relevant order in the Rule is: It is ordered that the respondents Sm. Shantilata Mitra, Samirendra Nath Mitra, Sailendra Nath Mitra, Miss Namita Mitra, Mrs. Amita Bose and Mrs. Sabita Ghose to show cause why they should not be held guilty of contempt of this Court for the breach of undertaking given to this Hon'ble Court.
2. This case has a chequered history. The petitioner granted a sub-lease of the ‘Paramount Cinema’ being premises No. 38, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta hereinafter referred to as the said premises to one Satyendra Nath Mitra, since deceased, for a term of 8 years more fully mentioned in the said lease. In July, 1955, the applicants instituted a suit being Suit No. 1833 of 1955 for ejectment against the said Satyendra Nath Mitra on the ground of default in payment of rent. On 10th July, 1958, a consent decree was passed where it was provided that the said Satyendra Nath Mitra, since deceased, would vacate and deliver up peaceful possession of the said premises to the applicants on the expiry of the period covered by the option in the terms of the said lease dated 25th September, 1952. On 18th July, 1961 Satyendra Nath Mitra died leaving behind him the respondents as his heirs and legal representatives, the respondent No. 1 being his widow and the other respondents being his sons and daughters. In November, 1962, a further consent decree was passed in execution application of the said consent decree dated 10th July, 1958, recording the death of the said Satyendra Nath Mitra and extending the time to vacate the premises till 30th December, 1965. in terms of the Deed of Settlement put in. Then on 15th February, 1966, another consent order was passed before Mr. Justice Sankar Prasad Mitra as he then was in the application for execution of the said decree dated 10th July, 1958, wherein the respondents gave a solemn undertaking to Court to vacate and deliver up possession of the said premises by 31st July, 1967. On 7th June, 1967, i.e, a few days prior to the zero hour for vacating the premises in terms of the undertaking an application was moved by the respondents for getting a discharge from the said undertaking given to this Court on 15th February, 1966, wherein they undertook to vacate on 31st July, 1967 and for an injunction restraining the applicants from evicting the respondents in execution of the said decree dated 15th February, 1966. Thereafter there was an interim order passed by Mr. Justice A.N Sen. Thereafter that interim order was vacated and the parties were relegated to a suit. Thereafter a suit was filed on 7th July, 1967 and in that suit there was, inter alia, a prayer that the said order dated 15th February, 1966, of Mr. Justice Sankar Prasad Mitra as he then was to be declared void and unnforceable. The respondents obtained an interim stay but that was dismissed by Brother A.N Sen on 18th August, 1967. Thereafter the respondents filed an appeal from the said order of dismissal of the application of stay by A.N Sen, J. On 19th February, 1968, the present Rule Nisi was obtained for contempt of Court by the petitioner against the respondents for breach of undertaking given to this Court dated 15th February, 1966. On 21st February, 1968, the appeal filed by the respondents was disposed of and inter alia the hearing of the suit was expedited and the applicants were restrained from executing the said consent decree dated 10th July, 1958, till disposal of the suit. On 21st April, 1969, R.M Datta, J., decreed the suit in favour of the respondents. The applicants thereafter appealed from the said decree of Brother Datta and on 11th October, 1974, the said appeal was allowed by the appeal court and the decree passed by my learned brother Datta, J., was set aside. From that order the respondents wanted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court which was also dismissed. Then they directly applied to the Hon'ble Supreme Court for leave and that was dismissed on 3rd February, 1975. Thereafter the respondents save and except Mrs. Sabita Ghose took out an application under Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and got a stay of execution of the decree. On 16th May, 1975 the said application of the respondents under Section 17-D was dismissed with costs; on 23rd June, 1975, the respondents preferred an appeal from the said order of dismissal dated 16th May, 1975 and have obtained an interim order and the said appeal under S. 17-D is still pending. This application for Contempt was thereafter assigned to me by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
3. Mr. Dipankar Ghosh with Mr. Mallick appeared for the petitioner. Mr. R.C Deb, Mr. T.P Das and Mr. Anindya Mitra appeared for the respondents.
4. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Section 2 (b) defines civil contempt, inter alia, as wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. In this particular case both the brothers Samirendra and Sailendra personally gave solemn undertaking to Court to vacate as aforesaid and the lady respondents through their counsel gave the undertaking. There is no question that though the undertaking was given to court to deliver up possession by the respondents, the respondents have not carried out the said undertaking and have not given up possession. The main contention of Mr. R.C Deb for the respondents was that as the appeal is pending from the order dismissing the application under Section 17-D of West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act and there is a stay the Court should not pass any order in this application in any event until the disposal of the said appeal.
5. Mr. Dipankar Ghose, appearing for the petitioner drew my attention to Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. An application under sub-section (1) of Section 17-D is for setting aside of a decree or proceeding and an execution of a decree shall remain stayed until the application is disposed of. Now the execution of a decree is between the parties, that is, between the judgment-creditor and the judgment-debtor. But an undertaking to Court is a matter between the Court and the person who gives the undertaking to Court and they are entirely different and separate. Stay of execution of a decree simpliciter will not stay the operation of the order of Court regarding the undertaking. Therefore, under Section 17-D what was stayed by that Court is the execution of the decree by the procedure laid down in Code of Civil Procedure and during the pendency of the appeal the execution of the decree has been stayed; but an application under Section 17-D cannot override the solemn undertaking given to Court. Mr. Deb's answer is that even if that be so, the petitioners themselves have waited so long and they would wait a little longer. But then the answer is that already about 20 years have gone by and the petitioner had to wait. When the suit filed by the respondents was pending in this Court, the Court stayed the operation of the orders and as such, the order regarding the contempt, for the breach of which this application is made, was also stayed. But Section 17-D of the Rent Control Act only stays the execution of the decree and so is wholly outside the scope of the order of contempt made by this Court and as pointed out by Mr. Ghose, if this application for contempt is now stayed, what will the petitioner's gain ? Only their application will not be heard for some time more. But if the respondents ultimately lose the appeal, then unnecessarily this time will be wasted though the respondents will enjoy the premises and even if the respondents win the appeal then the consequence will follow. But the balance of convenience and the equity is certainly in favour of the applicant.
6. Mr. Deb also drew my attention to the cause title of the contempt application which says “In the matter of violation and breach of the said undertaking on or about 1st August, 1967”. Mr. Ghose points out that whatever may be in the cause title, in the body of the order itself there is no ambiguity and the Court should look to the body of the order passed by the Court and not to the cause title as given by the parties. I, therefore, do not find any substance in Mr. Deb's argument.
7. The next point argued was whether an undertaking given to Court is an order of Court. To my mind, immediately an undertaking given to Court is incorporated in the order of Court, it becomes a part of the order of Court. Reliance was placed on the case of Biba Ltd. v. Stratford Investments Ltd., reported in (1972) 3 All ER 1041 which says that an undertaking given to Court and embodied in the written order of the Court had the same effect as a judgment or order of Court. In support of his contention Mr. Ghose relied on a case reported in AIR 1955 Cal 182 (Suretennessa Bibi… v. Chintaharan Das…Opposite Party.). It is a Division Bench Judgment where a tenant gave an unconditional and unqualified undertaking to vacate the premises on a certain date and on his failure it was held that he is guilty of deliberate breach of undertaking given by him to the Hon'ble Court and as such, he is guilty of misconduct amounting to contempt of Court. Similarly, in a case reported in (1964) 68 Cal WN 148 which is also a Division Bench Lala Shyam Sundar v. Lala Baij Nath Prasad.) the learned Judges followed the earlier decision and in this case also breach of undertaking was construed as contempt of Court. Mr. Ghose further argued that by giving the undertaking the respondents derived considerable benefit to the detriment of the petitioner and it will be unjust and improper if after enjoying the benefit given to them and their solemn undertaking given to Court they are allowed to resile from the same with impunity. If any one is allowed to get away so easily from solemn undertaking then undertaking to Court loses all significance.
8. Mr. Anindya Mitter, appearing for Sabita Ghose points out that his client as well as Mrs. Amita Bose have given up their rights in favour of their brothers. In that view of the matter and in view of the fact that they are sisters and old mother and are all ladies, though they are technically guilty of contempt of Court but I do not inflict punishment on them.
9. I hold that the two brothers, Samirendra Nath Mitra and Sailendra Nath Mitra are guilty of Contempt of Court. Before awarding punishment, I called both the brothers to depose before me for the purpose of assessing them and ascertaining their conditions. Both of them appeared to me to be docile, middle class Bengalee gentlemen but obviously they have a very glorified or exalted notion of their legal rights which prompted them to deliberately violate and flout, the order of this Hon'ble Court. I doubt whether these glorified ideas of the legal rights are their own ideas or inspired by someone. I need not say anything more. I must note that though in their affidavits filed by them in paragraph 25 they have tendered unqualified apology to this Court but while arguing their counsel did not point out or did not say a word that they are sorry for their conduct or that they are tendering any apology.
10. In paragraph 25 they have stated “In any event we humbly tender our unqualified apology to this Hon'ble Court”. It will be a sad day for the Court if the Court allows the solemn undertaking given to this Court to be mere papers signifying nothing. The parties and litigants must know and appreciate that they should not be allowed to treat the solemn undertaking given to this Hon'ble Court like a child's play. Undertaking to Court and legal rights are entirely different and separate matters.
11. As I have found, both Samirendra Nath Mitra and Sailendra Nath Mitra guilty of the Contempt of Court, I punish each of them with a fine of Rupees 1,000/- each and as ordered by the Division Bench in (1964) 68 Cal WN 148 similarly these two brothers Samirendra Nath Mitra and Sailendra Nath Mitra should suffer imprisonment for a fortnight each but such imprisonment will not be carried out if they conform to their undertaking given to Court and vacate the premises in suit and put the applicant in possession thereof within a week from today. In any event, the respondents Samirendra Nath Mitra and Sailendra Nath Mitra must pay the costs of this application to the applicant.
12. At the prayer of Mr. T.P Das the stay for 7 days is granted.
13. Application allowed.
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