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Srish Chandra Guha v. Food Corporation Of India
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from an application for a stay of Suit No. 75 of 1973 (Food Corporation of India v. Srish Chandra Guha), filed in this Court on February 24, 1973, under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The plaint discloses that the subject matter of the suit is covered by an arbitration clause in the contract between the parties.
The petitioner in the stay application is Srish Chandra Guha, who carried on business as "Guha Rice Co." Under a contract with the President of India (represented by the Regional Director (Food), Calcutta), Guha undertook reconditioning and handling of damaged and mixed foodgrains stored on Government account; he was responsible for safe custody, milling, packing and delivery as authorised.
The Food Corporation of India (FCI) alleges that Guha hypothecated various quantities of grains to the Central Bank of India and that the Central Bank obtained advances/overdraft facilities secured by those grains. The Central Bank filed Suit No. 248 of 1970 seeking recovery and appointment of a Receiver; the Receiver obtained a sale of the grains. FCI made an application pro interesse suo in the Central Bank's suit for delivery of certain goods and an order was made on July 31, 1970 directing delivery/realisation and directing FCI to sell the goods and hold proceeds in a separate account. Pursuant to that order, FCI sold the goods for Rs. 1,24,918.72 and has been holding that sum pending further orders; the pro interesse suo application was directed to be tried on evidence and remains pending.
FCI then filed Suit No. 75 of 1973 against Srish Chandra Guha to recover the said sale proceeds of Rs. 1,24,918.72 and damages amounting to Rs. 38,852.97, together with a declaration and decree. Guha applied for a stay of that suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Court considered (1) whether the applicant had sufficiently averred and proved readiness and willingness to refer the dispute to arbitration, and (2) whether the pending related proceedings made it appropriate to refuse a stay to avoid multiplicity and conflict of proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the applicant for stay had, by adequate averments and evidence, shown that he was "ready and willing" to refer the dispute to arbitration at the date of commencement of the legal proceedings and up to the date of the hearing of the application, as required for the exercise of the Court's discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
- Whether, in the circumstances of pending related proceedings (including Suit No. 248 of 1970 and the pro interesse suo application in that suit), the Court should exercise its discretion under Section 34 to refuse a stay in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, duplication of evidence and possible conflicting decisions.
Arguments of the Parties
Food Corporation of India's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Jayanta Mitter)
- The averment in paragraph 9 of the petition purporting to show the applicant's "readiness and willingness" was verified as submissions rather than by proper affidavit evidence; because readiness and willingness is a question of fact, verification in that form is inadequate and the applicant has failed to discharge the onus.
- The applicant must plead and prove that he was ready and willing at the date of commencement of the legal proceedings; that proof should, the argument ran, show that the applicant evinced an intention to go to arbitration before the date legal proceedings were commenced (for example by replying to a demand letter indicating willingness to arbitrate).
- The Court should refuse a stay because other proceedings are pending on the same subject-matter (the Central Bank's suit and FCI's pro interesse suo application), and granting a stay would lead to duplication of proceedings, two sets of evidence, possible conflicting decisions and greater delay and expense. The balance of convenience therefore favours allowing the suit to proceed in Court rather than staying it and sending the matter to arbitration.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the applicant (Srish Chandra Guha)'s full legal arguments in support of the stay application; the Court's discussion focuses on the adequacy of the applicant's averments/evidence and the consequences of concurrent proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sitaram Gupta v. Bijoyesh Mukherjee ((1959) 63 Cal WN 175) | Relied upon by a party concerning amendment/verification issues (related here by counsel to verification of averments). | The Court held this case inapplicable: it related to amendment of verification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and therefore did not apply to the question of readiness and willingness under Section 34. |
| Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Omprokash Singhania (AIR 1967 Cal 372) | Used by counsel to argue that correspondence prior to proceedings (e.g., no reply to a demand letter) can show lack of willingness to arbitrate. | The Court acknowledged the decision but observed that a later decision by the same judge cast doubt on the proposition that silence before proceedings necessarily shows lack of readiness and willingness; the Court did not treat Shalimar Paints as decisive for the present case. |
| Arbitration Union of India v. Kailash Nath Ray (Award Case No. 166 of 1967; Dated 20-4-1968; unreported) | The judge observed: "Mere inaction prior to the commencement of the legal proceedings may not be construed to amount to any lack of such readiness and willingness." | The Court expressly approved and followed this observation, treating it as supporting the view that silence prior to commencement of proceedings does not automatically prove lack of readiness to arbitrate. |
| N.C. Padmanabhan v. S. Srinivasan (AIR 1967 Mad 201) | A single bench Madras decision cited by counsel to support the proposition that silence may indicate lack of readiness. | The Court stated it differed from that view and preferred the unreported Calcutta judgment cited above. |
| Punjab State v. Moji Ram (AIR 1957 Punj 223) | Authority on the view that mere silence prior to commencement of proceedings should not be treated as lack of readiness to arbitrate. | The Court noted that the Punjab High Court holds the same view as the Court was adopting here and cited it in support of its conclusion. |
| Middle East Trading Co. Bombay v. New National Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad (AIR 1960 Bom 292) | Authority from the Bombay High Court consistent with the view that prior silence does not prove lack of readiness. | The Court cited this decision as consistent support for the proposition that silence before proceedings does not necessarily disprove readiness and willingness to arbitrate. |
| Central Bank of India v. Srish Chandra Guha (Suit No. 248 of 1970; reported in AIR 1972 Cal 345) | Pleaded and relied upon in the factual narrative as the suit in which a Receiver was appointed and in which FCI's pro interesse suo application was heard; relevant for the question of multiplicity of proceedings and title to the foodgrains. | The Court set out the facts and orders in that earlier case (e.g., directions to the Joint Receivers and FCI's sale and custody of proceeds) to explain why multiplicity and possible conflict of decisions were real concerns weighing against a stay. |
| Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn, Vol. 2, Article 566) | Cited for the general principle that the balance of convenience may be taken into account and that a stay may be refused to avoid plurality of proceedings. | The Court relied on the cited passage as supporting the proposition that courts may refuse stays to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflict of decisions. |
| Halifax Overseas Freighters Ltd. v. Rasno Export ((1958) Vol. 2 Lloyd's Rep. 146) | English authority where the consideration of conflicting decisions and savings in time/expense supported refusal of a stay. | The Court referenced McNair, J.'s approach in this case as persuasive on the point that the Court may refuse a stay to avoid conflicting decisions and duplication of effort. |
| Taunton Ceilings v. Cromie ((1964) 2 All ER 332) | English Court of Appeal decision holding it undesirable for two tribunals to reach inconsistent findings and approving refusal of stay in special circumstances. | The Court cited this decision (and Lord Denning M.R.'s approval of Halifax) as further authority for exercising discretion against granting a stay where multiplicity and inconsistency of decisions are likely. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) the legal and evidential requirements for establishing "readiness and willingness" to refer disputes to arbitration under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940; and (B) the exercise of judicial discretion in light of pending related proceedings and the balance of convenience.
(A) Readiness and Willingness — legal and evidential approach
- The Court held that "readiness and willingness" is a question of fact and the Court must be satisfied about such conduct on the part of the applicant before exercising its discretion under Section 34 in favour of granting a stay.
- The applicant must state the factual basis from which the Court can conclude that he was, at the time proceedings commenced and up to the date of the hearing, ready and willing to take all steps necessary for the proper conduct of arbitration. Whether the applicant was ready and willing at the material time is therefore a factual inquiry.
- Typically the applicant learns of the legal proceedings only when served with the writ of summons, and therefore the primary evidence of readiness and willingness available to the Court is affidavit evidence sworn by the applicant recounting his state of readiness and willingness from the date of institution (or from the date he became aware) up to the hearing. The Court accepted that it must act on such affidavit evidence where it is satisfactory.
- Accordingly, the Court held that averments of readiness and willingness cannot be verified merely as "submissions" — such a mode of verification is insufficient for the Court to rely on when exercising its discretion. Because the petition in the present case contained no proper averment capable of supporting a finding of readiness and willingness, the Court found the applicant had failed on this essential point and dismissed the application on that ground.
- The Court rejected the submission that the applicant must prove readiness and willingness as existing prior to the commencement of legal proceedings; the language of Section 34 does not require proof of an attitude of mind before the plaintiff actually commences suit. In absence of contrary documentary or pleading evidence, the Court can, if satisfied, rely on affidavit evidence to establish readiness and willingness.
- The Court addressed conflicting authorities: it found Sitaram Gupta inapplicable, expressed doubt about relying on silence before proceedings as proof of lack of willingness (distinguishing Shalimar Paints, and preferring a later unreported Calcutta decision), and accepted that mere inaction prior to commencement of proceedings does not necessarily indicate lack of readiness to arbitrate.
- The Court explicitly stated it did not consider the precise legal effect of an express pre-suit statement refusing arbitration (i.e., where an applicant had definitely declared he would not go to arbitration), and declined to express an opinion on that hypothetical situation in the present application.
(B) Multiplicity of proceedings and balance of convenience
- The Court set out the relevant facts of the related proceedings (Central Bank's suit, the joint receivership, the order of July 31, 1970, the sale by FCI of the goods for Rs. 1,24,918.72 and the pending pro interesse suo application directed to be tried on evidence) to assess whether a stay would produce undesirable multiplicity or conflicting decisions.
- Counsel for FCI urged that staying the present suit would produce duplication of proceedings and evidence and a significant risk of conflicting decisions; he argued that permitting the suit to proceed would allow the Court to decide all matters connected with the same subject-matter in an orderly fashion.
- The Court accepted the general principle (supported by Halsbury and the cited English authorities) that the balance of convenience is relevant and that stay applications may be refused where refusal avoids plurality of proceedings, saves time and expense, and prevents conflicts between tribunals.
- Applying that principle to the facts before it, the Court held there were sufficient reasons to exercise its discretion by refusing the stay: the risk of multiplicity and conflict and the convenience of dealing with the whole controversy in the Court supported dismissal of the stay application.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application for stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was dismissed. The dismissal was made with costs.
Implications / Direct effects:
- The immediate effect is that Suit No. 75 of 1973 (Food Corporation of India v. Srish Chandra Guha) will not be stayed and may proceed in this Court; the applicant's request to refer the dispute to arbitration was refused on the grounds set out by the Court.
- The Court concluded that the applicant had failed to aver and provide satisfactory evidence of readiness and willingness to arbitrate in the form required for the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of a stay.
- The Court also held that, given the pendency of related proceedings and the risk of multiplicity/conflicting decisions, the balance of convenience favoured refusal of the stay.
Broader precedent or legal change:
The opinion articulates and applies existing principles about (a) the evidential nature of "readiness and willingness" (as a factual matter typically established by affidavit) and (b) the discretion to refuse stays to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The Court expressly preferred certain authorities (including an unreported Calcutta judgment and decisions from Punjab and Bombay) over contrary single-judge authority from Madras. The Court did not indicate that it was laying down a novel rule of law beyond the application of those principles to the facts before it.
1. This is an application for stay of suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act X of 1940. It is quite apparent from the plaint that the subject-matter of the suit being Suit No. 75 of 1973 (Food Corporation of India v. Srish Chandra Guha) filed in this Court on February 24, 1973 is covered by the arbitration clause in the contract entered into by and between the parties herein.
2. Mr. Jayanta Mitter, counsel for the Food Corporation of India, contends that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the discretion of the Court should be exercised in refusing to stay the suit because of the following grounds. It is contended that the averment relating to readiness and willingness on the part of the applicant made in paragraph 9 of the petition have been verified as submissions and this being a question of fact and the verification being in that form it should be held that the applicant for stay has failed to discharge the onus of proving the readiness and willingness and the application should be dismissed on this ground alone. On this point it is also argued that the applicant for stay must plead and prove that he was ready and willing at the date of the commencement of the legal proceedings and in order to prove that, the applicant would be in a position to show that he evinced his intention to go to arbitration even before the date of the commencement of the legal proceedings. The next point urged by Mr. Mitter is that the discretion should be exercised in refusing to stay because the facts and circumstances of this case disclose that there is every possibility of there being conflict of decisions and plurality of proceedings if the suit is stayed and in order to avoid such situation the stay should be refused in the exercise of the Court's discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
3. As regards the first point, in my opinion, readiness and willingness is a question of fact and the Court has to be satisfied about such conduct on the part of the applicant. Accordingly, the applicant for stay has to state all facts from which the Court would be in a position to come to the finding that the said applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced and upto the date of the bearing or the order to be made in the application, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration. It follows that whether the applicant was, at the material time, ready and willing or not would be a question of fact. The applicant is not expected to know when the legal proceedings commenced. He usually comes to know of it after the writ of summons is served on him. It is at that stage only that he gets an opportunity to make the application for stay and usually the only evidence before the Court, as to the applicant's readiness and willingness at and from the date of the institution of the legal proceedings upto the date of the knowledge thereof by service of the writ of summons, is his affidavit evidence which is verified as true to his knowledge and the Court has to act on such affidavit evidence. Accordingly, such averment as to the readiness and willingness cannot be verified as submissions. This readiness and willingness is one of the most vital factors on the basis whereof the Court has to exercise its discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Hence, if such averment would be verified as submission then the Court cannot rely thereon and cannot be in a position to exercise its discretion in favour of granting stay.
4. Reliance was placed on the case of Sitaram Gupta v. Bijoyesh Mukherjee, reported in (1959) 63 Cal WN 175 but in my opinion the said case has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. That was a case relating to the amendment of verification in a matter under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. That being the position, I hold that there is no averment relating to readiness and willingness on the part of the applicant and as such the application should be dismissed on this point.
5. The contention of Mr. Mitter however, that such readiness and willingness must be proved to have existed even prior to the date of the commencement of the legal proceedings, in my opinion, has no substance. No such intention can be gathered from the language used in the said section. It is contended that in order to ascertain that the applicant was ready and willing at the date of the commencement of the legal proceeding of which he had no knowledge, he must show his state of mind from before the commencement of the legal proceeding. In other words, he must be in a position to show that when the plaintiff threatened to take legal action against him he replied saying that he was ready and willing to go to arbitration. He must prove that he insisted on going to arbitration instead of going to suit and that in the event of his remaining silent at that stage, the Court would hold that the applicant was not ready and willing at the commencement of the legal proceeding to go to arbitration. To my mind, the language used in Section 34 does not envisage any such readiness or willingness on the part of the applicant. As observed above, for the purpose of proving that he was ready and willing to go to arbitration at the date of the commencement of the legal proceeding in the absence of any contrary intention appearing in any of the documents or in the pleadings the Court can rely on the affidavit evidence if the Court is satisfied about the same and can use its discretion in granting or refusing stay. In support of the point taken by him Mr. Mitter relied on the case of Shalimar Paints Ltd.… v. Omprokash Singhania…., reported in AIR 1967 Cal 372 where Sen, J. analysed the correspondence exchanged between the parties prior to the commencement of the legal proceedings and took into consideration the fact that no reply to the demand letter had been given by the applicant for stay and on that basis held that the applicant did not evince his willingness and preparedness to go to arbitration.
6. In my opinion, the observation in that judgment has been very much shaken by reason of a later decision by the same learned Judge where the learned Judge held a contrary view by making the following observation:
“Mere inaction prior to the commencement of the legal proceedings may not be construed to amount to any lack of such readiness and willingness.”
7. That observation was made in a later unreported judgment D/- 20-4-1968 passed in the Award Case No. 166 of 1967 (Cal), (Re: Arbitration Union of India v. Kailash Nath Ray). I respectfully agree with the above observation and hold that silence on the part of the applicant prior to the commencement of the legal proceeding cannot go to prove that the applicant was not ready and willing to go to arbitration. The other case cited by Mr. Mitter on this point is a single bench judgment of Madras High Court in the case of N.C Padmanabhan v. S. Srinivasan, reported in AIR 1967 Mad 201. With respect I differ from the view taken by the learned Judge on this point and I am inclined, as indicated above, to follow the above unreported judgment of this Court. The Punjab High Court holds the same view as taken by me in the case of Punjab State v. Moji Ram, reported in AIR 1957 Punj 223. The Bombay High Court also holds to the same effect in the case of Middle East Trading Co. Bombay v. New National Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad, reported in AIR 1960 Bom 292 at p. 294.
8. That being the position, I hold that the application should be dismissed on the ground that there is no sufficient averment in the petition wherefrom the Court can be satisfied that the applicant was ready and willing to go to arbitration at the date of the commencement of the legal proceeding. I further hold that even if the applicant for stay remains silent prior to the commencement of the legal proceeding by not replying to the letter of demand threatening to institute legal proceedings the said conduct on the part of the applicant would not be a material consideration for the Court to hold that the applicant for stay was not ready and willing at the date of the commencement of the legal proceeding. Of course the question as to what would be the effect on the question of readiness and willingness if the applicant would express his definite intention not to go to arbitration in the correspondence prior to the commencement of the legal proceeding has not been considered by me in this application and I do not propose to express my opinion thereon.
9. The next point which is argued before me is that stay should not be granted because of the pendency of the other legal proceedings in this Court in connection with the subject-matter of the dispute and in which legal proceeding the question of title relating to the foodgrains in suit are directly involved. The relevant facts in connection therewith are necessary to be set out for the purpose of deciding this point.
10. Srish Chandra Guha the petitioner herein, carries on business under the name and style of “Guha Rice Co.” By an agreement with the President of India represented by the Regional Director (Food), Calcutta Guha undertook the work relating to reconditioning of damaged foodgrains sweepings including remilling and cleaning of rice, other grains and mixed grains, etc. on various terms and conditions contained in the said contract. Under the terms of the said contract the defendant was to handle such sweepings of grains, damaged and mixed grains etc. as might accumulate at the Government of India Godown at Calcutta or at Calcutta Port on Government of India account. Guha was to be responsible for the safe custody of the sweepings of such foodgrains and was to pack the same after milling, polishing and/or reconditioning in bags to be provided by the Government and to weigh them upto a prescribed weight. Upon receipt of advice from Guha the Government would arrange to take delivery from Guha's custody or would authorise Guha to give delivery according to his instruction direct to the recipient.
11. The Food Corporation of India alleges that Guha wrongfully hypothecated various quantities of grains with the Central Bank of India and obtained advances and/or loans in his overdraft account. The Central Bank filed suit in this Court and sought to realise its dues by appointment of Receiver over the said foodgrains and proceeded to obtain a sale with respect thereto.
12. The said Food Corporation of India made an application pro interesse suo, inter alia, for direction on the Joint Receivers appointed in the said Bank's suit being Suit No. 248 of 1970 : (reported in AIR 1972 Cal 345), (Central Bank of India v. Srish Chandra Guha) for direction on the Joint Receivers to deliver the said goods and other articles to the Bank. On July 31, 1970 an order was made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties, directing the Joint Receivers, inter alia, to realise and deliver to the Food Corporation of India the foodgrains mentioned in Ex. B and Ex. C to the petition thereto after making proper inventories as and when delivery would be given. By the said order the Food Corporation of India was directed to sell the said foodgrains at the prescribed rates at which the Food Corporation sold similar Foodgrains and was directed to maintain a separate account for the said sale proceeds and to hold the same subject to further orders of this Court. Pursuant to the said order the Food Corporation of India sold the said goods at a price of Rs. 1,24,918.72 paise and has been holding the said sum in a separate account until further orders of this Court. The said pro interesse suo application of the Food Corporation of India was directed to be tried on evidence and the same is pending in this Court.
13. The plaintiff Food Corporation of India has filed this suit only against Srish Chandra Guha as the sole proprietor of Guha Rice Co., inter alia, claiming to recover the said sale proceeds being the said sum of Rs. 1,24,918.72 Paise as also damages on account of the difference between the value of the goods entrusted with the defendant and the value received by such sate amounting to a sum of Rs. 38,852.97 P. and has asked for a declaration to that effect and a decree for the said several sums.
14. It is now contended by Mr. Mitter that in view of those pending proceedings namely, the suit filed by the Central Bank of India and the pro interesse suo application made by the Food Corporation of India in the said Central Bank of India's suit in respect whereof a trial on evidence has been ordered and pending before this Court, this suit should be allowed to be proceeded with along with other said pending proceedings so that all matters connected with the same subject-matter might be decided and there might not be any multiplicity of proceedings and conflict of decisions.
15. It is contended that under such circumstances the Court is to exercise its discretion against any order for stay of suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It is argued by Mr. Mitter that if the said suit is stayed then there will be duplication of proceedings, there is possibility of two sets of evidence being taken one before this Court and another before the Arbitrators. There is every possibility of there being conflicting decisions. On the contrary, if the suit is allowed to be proceeded with then all these matters might be taken up one after another and be disposed of conveniently with least possible delay. Accordingly, the balance of convenience is in favour of the suit being proceeded with in this Court instead of the suit being stayed. Mr. Mitter refers to a passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition Vol. 2, page 292, Article 566 which runs as follows:—
“Generally the balance of convenience is taken into account and stay has been refused in order to avoid plurality of proceedings.” In the case of Halifax Overseas Freighters Ltd. v. Rasno Export, reported in (1958) Vol. 2 Lloyd's Rep. 146, McNair, J. in a stay of proceedings matter not only took into consideration the possibility of conflicting decisions but also the fact that time and expense would be saved if the whole of the disputes would be disposed of in one set of proceedings which would take place in Court and on that basis dismissed the application for stay. In the case of Taunton Ceilings v. Cromie, reported in (1964) 2 All ER 332 the Court of Appeal in England also took the view that it was undesirable that two different Tribunals who might reach two inconsistent findings should try two proceedings and held that there were special reasons for the exercise of the discretion refusing stay of execution. The Court of Appeal presided over by Lord Denning M.R, approved of the decision of McNair, J., in the above case on this point.
16. I accordingly hold that there is sufficient reason why discretion should be exercised in refusing to stay this suit. In my opinion, the applicant for stay has failed on both the main points urged on his behalf and, accordingly, this application is bound to be dismissed. The application is dismissed with costs.
17. Application dismissed.
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