Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Khagendra Nath Sen v. University Of Calcutta And Others

Calcutta High Court
Feb 14, 1974
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three Rules challenged a Resolution of the Syndicate of the University of Calcutta (meeting of 14 December 1973) that superseded the governing bodies of three colleges — Asutosh, Jogmaya and Shyama Prasad — and appointed an ad hoc committee to reconstitute those governing bodies. The petitioner is the Secretary of the superseded managing committee of the three colleges and moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, obtaining these Rules on 28 December 1973.

Background facts in the record include: Asutosh College was registered as a society in about March 1927; Asutosh Mukherjee Memorial Institute was registered in 1929; Jogmaya Debi College and Shyama Prasad College originated as sections of Asutosh College and, in 1958, were granted affiliation by the University subject to separate governing bodies for each college. By letter dated 26 August 1970, the Deputy Inspector of Colleges informed the petitioner that the three colleges came within the purview of Statute 100 of the Calcutta University Act, 1966. In 1973 the Inspector of Colleges sought particulars from the petitioner, and a sequence of correspondence followed (requests for documents, extensions of time, a show cause notice of 22 November 1973 and replies requesting further time).

By memo dated 15 December 1973 the Inspector of Colleges informed the petitioner that the governing bodies had been superseded by the Syndicate’s resolution of 14 December 1973 and an ad hoc committee had been appointed; respondents numbered 5 to 13 were appointed as members of that committee. The petitioner asked for a copy of the Syndicate resolution and, being aggrieved, filed the writ proceeding which culminated in the judgment summarized here.

The University filed an Affidavit-in-opposition (affirmed by Amitesh Chandra Banerjee) asserting among other things that no amendments to Asutosh College rules had been submitted to the Registrar of Societies, that no effective revised scheme of constitution had been produced, and that the Syndicate acted under statutory powers to dissolve the governing bodies and appoint an ad hoc body for administration and reconstitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner (the Secretary of the society) had locus standi to challenge the Syndicate’s Resolution of supersession.
  2. Whether the Syndicate/University had the power to supersede the governing bodies under Section 4(11) of the Calcutta University Act, 1966, and whether the provisions of Paragraph 64 of the 1st Ordinance, Statute 93 or Statute 100 applied for reconstitution.
  3. Whether the show cause procedure followed and the notice issued complied with the principles of natural justice (i.e., whether the petitioner was adequately informed of the charges and the proposed action).
  4. Whether the College Committee had validly exercised powers delegated by the Syndicate (Section 55(2)(b)(iii)) and whether any delegation or committee report justified the University's actions.
  5. Preliminary procedural objections raised by the University: (a) petitioner’s lack of legal right or locus standi because other members of the superseded governing bodies did not join; (b) necessity to join all Syndicate members as parties; (c) absence of a demand for justice; (d) challengeability of a purely administrative decision by writ.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Chakraborty)

  • The ground relied upon for supersession could not justify supersession under the Calcutta University 1st Ordinance, 1966; the conditions in Paragraph 64 were not satisfied.
  • Where Statute 100 applied to governing bodies, Statute 93 had no application; since the University had earlier intimated (26 August 1970) that the colleges were within Statute 100, the Syndicate could not supersede them under Section 4(11) for reconstitution under Statute 93.
  • The show cause notice failed to inform the petitioner what had been found against him or what proposed action was contemplated; this omission deprived the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to defend and thus violated principles of natural justice.
  • The College Committee had no authority to pass the resolution relied upon and its report was not made known to the petitioner.

University's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Dey)

  • No amendments to the Asutosh College rules had been submitted to the Registrar of Societies; no effective scheme for reconstitution had been produced to University authorities or the Registrar of Societies.
  • The Syndicate (through the College Committee) issued the show cause notice and, finding no validly constituted governing bodies, acted under statutory power to dissolve and appoint an ad hoc committee under Section 4(11) read with other provisions (including Section 4(ii) read with Section 23 and Section 55(2)(b)(iii)).
  • The phrase “may be prescribed” in Section 4(11) could refer also to Statute 93; accordingly the Syndicate’s action for reconstitution under Statute 93 was within its powers.
  • Substance should prevail over technicalities: taking the entire correspondence together, the petitioner knew the charges and was given opportunity to defend; absence of formal framing of charges in the show cause notice was not fatal if the petitioner was aware of the case to meet (relying on Slaney, Burn & Co., Guru Bachan Singh).

Ad hoc Committee's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Dipankar Gupta)

  • Statute 100 preserves the terms and conditions required by the memorandum and articles of the registered society, but the University is entitled to ascertain whether a governing body is in fact continuing in accordance with those terms.
  • If the University found that a governing body was not functioning in accordance with the registered society’s terms, it could exercise powers under Section 4(11) to dissolve and reconstitute the governing body pursuant to Statute 93.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116 Courts should act with a broad vision, look to substance not technicalities; assess whether accused knew what they were tried for and had a fair chance to defend. The principle of substance over form was noted, but the Court held that the specific observations in Slaney had no application to the facts of the present case.
Guru Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 623 Followed the broad-vision approach articulated in Slaney regarding prejudice and substance over technicalities. Referred to as a supporting authority for the proposition that substance matters; relied upon by the University but not decisive for the present facts.
Burn and Co. v. Their Employees, AIR 1957 SC 38 Absence of a formally drawn charge-sheet does not vitiate punitive action if the person knew the charges and had an opportunity to explain. The Court noted the principle but found the Burn & Co. facts distinguishable from the present case, where the petitioner was not informed of the proposed consequence and thus was taken by surprise.
Kesava Mills Co. v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCC 380 : AIR 1973 SC 389 Natural justice is not rigid: the essential point is that the person should have a reasonable opportunity to present his case and the authority must act fairly, impartially and reasonably. The Court relied on the flexible concept of natural justice to assess whether the petitioner received reasonable opportunity; it weighed the facts and found a violation of natural justice in this case.
Kraipak's case, (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 Rules of natural justice apply to administrative enquiries where necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice; the exact content of natural justice depends on facts and circumstances. The Court applied the proposition that observance of natural justice depends on circumstances and used it to determine whether such observance was necessary here; it concluded that it was and that a breach occurred.
Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P v. Kumari Chitra Srivastava, (1970) 1 SCC 121 : AIR 1970 SC 1039 Affirms the importance of natural justice as part of the rule of law; the burdensomeness of natural justice is a small price for adherence to rule of law. The Court cited this case to underscore the centrality of natural justice and to justify quashing the impugned administrative action for lack of fair procedure.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed preliminary objections first:

  1. On the objection that the Syndicate is not a body corporate requiring all its members to be parties, the Court relied on Section 3 of the Calcutta University Act, 1966, which makes the University a body corporate; the Syndicate is part of the University, and naming the University as a respondent sufficed. Consequently, it was unnecessary to make individual Syndicate members parties.
  2. On locus standi, the Court referred to Section 19 of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, which permits a society to sue or be sued in the name of the Secretary; since Asutosh College is a registered society, the petitioner as Secretary was competent to move under Article 226.
  3. Regarding the nature of the writ, the Court observed that while a Writ of Mandamus could fail for lack of a demand for justice, the petitioner also sought certiorari and the appropriate remedy here was certiorari to quash the Syndicate's resolution; thus lack of a demand for justice did not dispose of the case.
  4. The Court accepted that administrative decisions can be challenged under Article 226 where jurisdiction is attacked or principles of natural justice are alleged to be violated.

On the statutory power issue, the Court analyzed Section 4(11) of the Calcutta University Act, 1966 and the meaning of "prescribed" (i.e., by statutes, ordinances or regulations). Paragraph 64 of the 1st Ordinance was noted as specifying conditions under which the Syndicate may issue directions and, if not complied with, may temporarily take over management and appoint an administrator or ad hoc governing body.

The petitioner argued Paragraph 64 conditions were not satisfied and that Statute 93 could not be applied where Statute 100 governed the colleges. The University countered that Section 4(11) could be read with Statute 93 to reconstitute governing bodies and that it had the power to determine whether a governing body continued in accordance with the registered society’s memorandum and articles.

The Court held that the University was not precluded from calling for documents to verify whether the governing bodies continued under Statute 100, and that if a governing body previously given recognition under Statute 100 was found not to be continuing as such, the University could dissolve it under Section 4(11) and reconstitute under Statute 93. No estoppel arose from the earlier letter of 26 August 1970.

On natural justice and the sufficiency of the show cause notice: the Court found that although a show cause notice had been issued, it did not specify what was found against the petitioner nor did it specify the proposed action or consequences of non-compliance. The earlier letter of 26 August 1970, indicating the colleges were within Statute 100, had led the petitioner reasonably to expect Statute 93 would not apply or that the University would not take steps to dissolve the governing bodies for reconstitution under Statute 93 while that letter stood unrecalled.

Because the petitioner was not told the consequence of failing to comply with the show cause notice and was taken by surprise by the supersession, the Court concluded there had been a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court examined the authority relied upon by the University (including Slaney, Burn & Co., Kesava Mills and Kraipak) and distinguished some on facts or applied their general principles about natural justice; ultimately the Court found those precedents did not justify permitting the impugned action to stand in the present circumstances.

On the delegation point, the Court noted that no material was placed before it to show valid delegation of powers to the College Committee or that the Committee's report had been produced. Consequently the Court could not decide whether the Syndicate had validly delegated powers or whether action could be taken on the basis of a committee resolution not shown in the record.

The Court also observed surprise at the timing: the University had notice of the amended rules in February 1970 but did not pursue the matter until three years later; when the colleges requested time until 2 January 1974, immediate action (within 19 days) was taken without satisfactory explanation. While the Court disapproved the petitioner’s failure to supply particulars, it concluded that the University and the Syndicate had not acted fairly or reasonably in the process leading to supersession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court made the Rules absolute and quashed the impugned resolution of the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate dated 14 December 1973 by a writ of certiorari. In the judgment’s words, the impugned Resolution (Annexure 'O') is quashed.

Core Ruling: The resolution of supersession dated 14-12-1973 is quashed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the supersession order of 14 December 1973 is set aside; the superseded governing bodies are restored insofar as the quashing permits until such time as lawful action is taken.
  • The University and the Syndicate are at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings to dissolve and reconstitute the governing bodies of the three colleges, but only after giving the petitioner reasonable opportunity and in accordance with law (i.e., ensuring proper procedure and observance of natural justice).
  • No broader novel precedent was announced beyond the application of established principles: the Court applied existing authorities on natural justice and procedural fairness to the facts and required that future action comply with fair procedure. The judgment emphasizes that administrative power to dissolve may be exercised lawfully but must be accompanied by fair notice and opportunity to the affected parties.
  • There will be no order for costs.

Disposition: Rules made absolute; no costs. The University may proceed afresh in conformity with the law and after affording reasonable opportunity.

Show all summary ...

1. These three Rules are directed against the Resolution of supersession of the governing body of the three colleges — Asutosh, Jogmaya and Shyama Prasad and appointing an ad-hoc committee for the purpose of re-constituting the governing bodies according to the provisions of the law. The said Resolution was passed by the Syndicate of the University of Calcutta; in its meeting held on December 14, 1973 The petitioner, the Secretary of the superseded managing committee of the aforesaid three colleges, challenges the said Resolution of the Syndicate.

2. In or about March, 1927, Asutosh College was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act (Act XXI of 1861) so that its governing body was to be formed in accordance with its rules. In 1929 Asutosh Mukherjee Memorial Institute was also registered as a Society under the said Act Jogmaya Debi College was originally started as the morning section for women students and Shyama Prasad College as the evening section for Arts and Commerce students of the said Asutosh College. In 1958, the said two splinter colleges created out of the said Asutosh College, were granted affiliation by the University subject to the condition that there would be three separate governing bodies of the three colleges. The Asutosh College governing body was a registered society and the other two colleges, being units of the same parent body, had their governing bodies constituted on the same lines as that of the Asutosh College, Deputy Inspector of Colleges by his letter dated 26-8-1970 informed the petitioner that the said three colleges, namely, Asutosh, Jogmaya and Shama Prasad had come with-in the purview of the Statute 100 of the Calcutta University Act, 1966. The said intimation was made according to the direction of the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate. Thereafter, the Inspector of Colleges by his letter dated September 10, 1973, requested the petitioner to furnish certain particulars in view of the fact that the petitioner in his letter dated 3-2-1970 referred to the subsequent amended rules. The petitioner replied to the said letter on 18-9-1973 where-in he requested the Inspector of Colleges to allow sufficient time to give a considered re-port Thereafter, a reminder was sent by the Dy. Inspector of Colleges by his letter dated 24-9-1973 requesting the petitioner to forward the necessary documents on or before November 5, 1973. By a letter dated 3-11-1973 time was extended till 15-11-1973. Thereupon on November 22, 1973, a show cause notice was issued by the Inspector of Colleges to the petitioner calling upon him to establish with relevant materials the validity of the composition of the governing bodies of three colleges. The petitioner replied to the said show cause on 2941-1973 wherein the petitioner prayed for time till January 2, 1974, to give his reply. A resolution of the governing bodies of the three colleges held at the meeting on 25-11-1973 was also forwarded along with the said letter wherein it is stated that the Calcutta University be moved for extension of time for compliance with the requirements indicated in the letter under reference at least till 2-1-1974 and that the Secretary be, requested to write to the Inspector of Colleges, Calcutta University, to that effect. Thereafter on the 7th December, 1973, another letter was sent by the petitioner to the Inspector of Colleges in reply to the said show cause notice dated 22-11-1973. By a memo dated 15-12-1973, the Inspector of Colleges informed the petitioner that governing bodies of the said three colleges had been superseded by the Syndicate of the Calcutta University in its meeting held on December 14, 1973, and appointed an ad hoc committee for the administration of the said three colleges and requested the petitioner to make over charge of the said three colleges to the Chairman and the Secretary of the said ad hoc committee. Respondents Nos. 5 to 13 were appointed as the members of the said ad hoc committee. On receipt of the said letter, the petitioner wrote a letter on the 17th December, 1973, to the Registrar, Calcutta University, requesting him to furnish the said college authorities with a copy of the resolution passed by the Syndicate in its meeting held on 14-12-1973. On the 24th December, 1973, the petitioner was served with a copy of the resolution of the Syndicate dated 14-12-1973. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said resolution dated 14-12-1973, passed by the University and the Syndicate moved this Court in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained these Rules on December 28, 1973.

3. In the Affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Amitesh Chandra Banerjee and filed on behalf of the University of Calcutta, the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar, wherein it is stated that investigation revealed that at no material time had any of the authorities of Asutosh College or any of the other two colleges submitted any alleged amendment of rules of Asutosh College in., the Society, to the Registrar of Societies. The authorities of the group of colleges claimed that in July, 1946, the then governing body of the said Asutosh College adopted a comprehensive scheme for the reconstitution of the governing body of the said colleges, but no such effective scheme for the revised constitution of the governing body of the said college has ever been produced before the University authorities or the Registrar of Societies. For years matters were allowed to drift The authorities of the University learned on representation made on behalf of the said three colleges and believed that each of the said three colleges had a valid constitution which would permit each of them to avail of the privilege of the Statute 100. The University had by virtue of its statutory powers dissolved the governing bodies of the said three colleges and appointed an ad hoc governing body for the said colleges for administration of the three colleges and to reconstitute their governing bodies according to law. It is further stated that by its resolution dated 21-11-1973 the college committee of the University of Calcutta which is a committee constituted from the members of the Syndicate in terms of Section 55(2)(b) (iii) of the Calcutta University Act, 1966, and is delegated with the powers and duties of the Syndicate to deal with the affairs of affiliated colleges, directed the issue of show cause notice on the said three colleges, requesting them to establish their authority of the composition of the governing bodies of the said three colleges on or before 30-11-1973. The ad hoc committee was constituted by the Syndicate in exercise of its powers under Section 4(ii) read with Section 23 of the Calcutta University Act, 1966, inasmuch as there was no validly constituted governing bodies of the said three colleges and a such the said three colleges were being managed by incompetent governing bodies to the detriment of the said three colleges. The consideration upon the Syndicate and the Calcutta University to supersede the governing bodies of the said three colleges was that as members of the governing bodies of the said three colleges were not validly appointed and as such they had no authority or competence in accordance with law to act as members of the governing bodies of the said 3 colleges and to administer the affairs of the said colleges.

4. Four preliminary objections were raised by the respondent, the University of Calcutta, viz., (1) The petitioner has no legal right nor has any locus standi to move this application in this Court to challenge the decision of the Syndicate superseding the governing bodies of the three colleges as the members of the superseded governing bodies have not joined as petitioners in making this application, (2) The Syndicate is not a body corporate, so all the members of the Syndicate should have been made parties, (3) There was no demand of justice, (4) The decision complained of is purely an administrative decision of the University and an administration decision cannot be challenged in a writ petition.

5. I will first deal with the second objection. Under Section 3 of the Calcutta University Act, 1966, the 1st Chancellor, and the Vice-Chancellor of the University and the 1st members of the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council, and all persons who may hereafter become such Officers, so long as they continue to hold such office or membership, shall constitute a body corporate by the name of the University of Calcutta. Under sub-section (2) of Section 3, the University shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued by the name of the University of Calcutta. So it appears that the Syndicate is a part of the University and if one of the respondents is University of Calcutta, it include the Syndicate also. So, it is not necessary to make members of the Syndicate as party respondents. In the instant Rules the University has been made a party. In my view, it is not necessary that either the Syndicate or all the members of the Syndicate are required to be made parties in order to challenge the Resolution passed by the University and the Syndicate.

6. Under Section 19 of the West Ben-[gal Societies Registration Act, 1961, every society may sue and may be sued in the name of the President, Secretary or any of the office-bearers authorised by the governing body in this behalf. Asutosh College is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act Therefore, the petitioner, being the Secretary, is competent to move this Court in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution.

7. Where only writ prayed for is, a Writ of mandamus and if there is no demand for justice in that case the application may fail on that ground, but in the instant case the petitioner also prays for a writ of certiorari and in the instant case the appropriate writ is a writ of certiorari and not mandamus. Therefore, in absence of a demand for justice, these Rules cannot fail on that ground.

8. In the instant case the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the Syndicate to supersede the governing bodies and the petitioner also complains violation of the principles of natural justice. It is well settled that in such cases even the administrative orders can be challenged in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.

9. In my opinion there is no substance in any of the preliminary objections raised by the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in these Rules.

10. Mr. Chakraborty, appearing on behalf of the petitioner in support of the Rule, contended that the purported ground on the basis of which the said impugned order of supersession was made, could not be a ground for supersession of the governing body of a college under the Calcutta University 1st Ordinance, 1966. Under Section 4(11) of the Act powers have been conferred upon the University to dissolve the governing body of any affiliated college in such manner as may be prescribed. ‘Prescribed’ has, been defined in sub-section (13) of Section 2 of the Act which means prescribed by statutes, ordinances or regulations; Paragraph 64 of the 1st Ordinance, 1966, lays down two conditions, namely, where proper standards of teaching are not being maintained or the affairs of the college are being managed improperly and to the detriment of the college or institution as an educational institution, the Syndicate may issue to the governing body of the college such direction as it may think fit including direction for re-constitution of the governing body of the college. Under paragraph 2 of Section 64, if such directions of the Syndicate are not complied with within a specified period, then the Syndicate may call upon the governing body of the college on whom such directions were issued to show cause and after considering cause showed by the governing body of the college, the Syndicate may by order temporarily take over the management of the College and for that purpose appoint an administrator or ad hoc governing body consisting of such number of members as it may deem fit In the instant case the condition precedent for assumption of powers under Section 4(11) of the Act have not been fulfilled

11. Mr. Banerjee, appearing on behalf of the University, contended that pro-visions of paragraph 64 of the Ordinance have got no application to the present case The resolution of the University was made under Section 4(11) of the Act for the purpose of reconstitution of the governing body under Statute 93. Mr. Debi Dey who supplemented the arguments of Mr. Banerjee, contended that “may be prescribed” contained in Section 4(11) of the Act referred also to the Statute 93 of the Calcutta University Ist Statute 1966.

12. Mr. Chakraborty on the other hand contends that Statute 93 has got no application with respect to governing bodies where provisions of Statute 100 are applicable. In the letter dated 26th August, 1970, the University and the Syndicate intimated to the petitioner that the 3 colleges had come within the purview of the Statute 100 of the Calcutta University Act, 1966. That being so, supersession, could not be done by the Syndicate under Section 4(11) of the Act for the purpose of re-constitution of the governing bodies as provided in Statute 93.

13. Mr. Dipankar Gupta, appearing on behalf of the ad hoc Committee contends that Statute 100 provides that in case of a college managed by registered society, the constitution of the governing body shall in so far as the terms and conditions of Articles and Memorandum of Association of such registered society as the case may be so required to continue as such. According to Mr. Gupta, the letter dated 26th August, 1970, only indicated that the governing bodies of the said colleges might continue in terms and conditions of the registered society, but even then the University is competent to ascertain whether a particular governing body of a college is continuing in terms of the registered society or not and if it is found that the governing body of a particular college has been functioning not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the registered society, the University has got powers under Section 4(11) of the Act to dissolve the governing body for the purpose of re-constituting the said Body in accordance with Statute 93.

14. Where a statute provides that in particular circumstances the governing body of a college shall continue in terms of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the registered society, that letter dated 26th August, 1970, did not confer any additional privilege inasmuch as the privilege was statutory. Even without that letter, the governing body could enjoy the privileges contained in Statute 100, provided the constitution of the governing body was in accordance to the terms and conditions laid down in the Articles and Memorandum of Association of the registered society. In my view the University of Calcutta or the Syndicate is neither precluded nor prevented to call for the documents or materials from the Secretary to the governing body in order to satisfy that the governing bodies of the colleges have been constituted in accordance with Statute 100 and continue as such. Accordingly, I hold that the University and the Syndicate have powers to dissolve the governing body under Section 4(11) of the Act, if it is found that the governing body of the colleges, even once given recognition under Statute 100, is not continuing as such. No question of estoppel does arise in this case.

15. Mr. Chakraborty next contended that in the show cause notice the petitioner was not told what has been found against him. The petitioner was only requested to inform when and how the governing bodies of the colleges were framed and he was called upon to establish with relevant materials the validity of the composition of the governing bodies of the colleges concerned. The proposed action was not mentioned in the show cause notice. The petitioner had been deprived of making any representation against the impugned order of supersession of the governing bodies and as such there has been violation of the principles of natural justice.

16. In reply, Mr. Banerjee contended that the Court should act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to the technicalities. Taking into account the entire correspondence, it has been clearly established that the petitioner was told what had been found against him and he was given full and fair chance to defend his case. In support of his contentions Mr. Banerjee relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court, Willie (William) Slaney v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh , AIR 1956 SC 116, which has been followed in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Guru Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 623.

17. In that case the Supreme Court observed that in judging a question of prejudice, as of guilty, Courts must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities and their main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given full and fair chance to defend himself.

18. In Slaney's case, AIR 1956 SC 116 two accused R and W were charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. There was no separate alternative charge under Section 302 against W. The Court below held W guilty under Section 302 Penal Code while the other accused R was acquitted for absence of evidence against him. The Supreme Court held that having regard to the nature of the charge framed the admission to frame a separate charge under Section 302 against W was only a curable irregularity which in the absence of prejudice could not affect the legality of conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code. In the context of the above facts the Supreme Court made the above observations. In my view that observation has got no application to the facts of the present case.

19. Next case referred to was Burn and Co. v. Their Employees, AIR 1957 SC 38. My attention was drawn at page 49 of the report wherein the Supreme Court observed:

“It is true that no charge-sheet was formally drawn up against him, but that would not vitiate the order of dismissal if he knew what the charges against him were and had an opportunity of giving his explanation.” Mr. Banerjee submitted that assuming that no charges were mentioned in the show cause notice but even then if the petitioner was aware of the charges, in that case, merely absence of writing the charges will not contravene the rules of natural justice.

20. In the case referred to by Mr. Banerjee the ground of discharge against Asimananda Banerjee was, his continued absence and his inability to do work. So under these circumstances the Supreme Court found that it was difficult to see what purpose would be served by formally issuing charge-sheet to him and what conceivable answer he could give thereto. So that case is obviously distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case.

21. The last case referred to is Kesava Mills Co. v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCC 380 : AIR 1973 SC 389. In that case the Supreme Court observed; the concept of natural justice cannot be put to a strait jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standard of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is, that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably.

22. In that case, under Section 18-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, the appellant's company was taken over by the Government. In January, 1970, the report of the Investigating Committee was submitted and on the appellant's own showing, they knew that there was a likelihood of the Government's appointing a Controller under Section 18-A of the Act. At page 397 of the report, the Supreme Court observed; there are at least five features of the case which make it impossible for us to give any weight to the appellant's complaint that the Rules of natural justice have not been observed. At least they received a fair treatment and to make out their own case before the Government. They could not be allowed to snake any grievance of the fact that they were not given a formal notice calling upon them to show cause why the undertaking should not be taken over or they had not been furnished with the copy of the report They had made all the representations that they could possibly have made against the proposed take-over. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the order of take-over took them by surprise. In fact Govt gave them ample opportunity. It is well-settled that the requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of each case.

23. So considering the facts and circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court had found that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice.

24. In Kraipak's case reported in (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150, the Supreme Court observed that an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice there is no reason why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. The rules of natural justice ore not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principles of natural justice have been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.

25. Coming to the facts and circum-stances of the present case, it appears that where the governing body is not dissolved under paragraph 64 of the Ordinance, there is no provision for issuing any show cause notice. Even then in the instant case a show cause notice was issued but neither the proposed action nor the charge against the petitioner was mentioned Reasonable opportunity means that a person should be told what have been found against him and he should be given seasonable opportunity to make a representation against the charges Apart from all technicalities, the petitioner was never told at any time that the governing bodies of the three colleges were not continuing in terms of Statute 100. If the letter of the 26th August, 1970, was not there, in that case, taking into account the entire correspondence, I could have accepted the contentions of Mr. Banerjee that the petitioner at least knew what were the charges against him. So there was no necessity of making any representation and the University rightly took action under Section 4(11) of the Act That letter, although it did Slot confer any additional privilege, but even then, the petitioner was given to understand that provisions of Statute 93 would by no means be applicable to the governing bodies of the 3 colleges, so long as the letter of the 26th August, 1970, had not been recalled or revoked. It was beyond the comprehension of the petitioner that the University could take any steps whatsoever for dissolution of the governing bodies for the purpose of re-constituting the same in terms of Statute 93. The petitioner was not even told what would be the consequences if he failed to comply with the requirements of the show cause notice. If the proposed action was indicated, in that case at least the petitioner knew that there was likelihood of the University to supersede the governing bodies of the three colleges. But nothing of that kind was stated in the said show cause notice. Obviously the order of supersession took the petitioner by surprise. Considering the facts and circumstances of the instant case, in my opinion, there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. On that ground alone, the resolution of supersession dated 14th December, 1973, cannot be sustained and must be quashed by a writ of certiorari.

26. Mr. Chakraborty lastly contended that the College Committee had no authority to pass a resolution as disclosed in the Affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the University and the report of the said College Committee had also not been made known to the petitioner.

27. It is contended by Mr. Dey appearing on behalf of the University that under Section 55(2)(b)(iii) the Syndicate may delegate any of its powers or duties conferred or imposed by or under the Act to a Committee constituted from amongst its own members.

28. No material was placed before) me to show that there has been a valid delegation, The report of the Committee also has not been annexed to the Affidavit-in-opposition nor it was produced at the time of hearing. So under these circumstances it is not possible for me to decide whether the powers of the Syndicate have, been validly delegated upon the College Committee and the college committee was competent to pass any resolution and whether on the basis of that resolution the University can act.

29. From the facts disclosed from the affidavit it is absolutely clear that the University had knowledge about the subsequent amended rules of the governing bodies of the 3 colleges in February, 1970.

30. It is surprising that after three years the University started correspondence with the Secretary only to ascertain the validity of the constitution of the governing bodies of the three colleges. When the governing bodies of the said colleges prayed time till January 2, 1974, it has not been disclosed why it was necessary for the University to take an immediate action without granting time only for 19 days. I do not approve the conduct of the petitioner in not furnishing the particular asked for, by the Calcutta University, but at the same time.

31. I am unable to appreciate the action of the University in superseding the governing bodies of the 3 colleges without giving the petitioner any reasonable opportunity to defend his case. The University and the Syndicate did not act fairly and reasonably in the present case.

32. In Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P v. Kumari Chitra Srivastava, (1970) 1 SCC 121 : AIR 1970 SC 1039 the Supreme Court observed that the principles of natural justice are to some minds burdensome, but this small price indeed is to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of law.

33. In the result these Rules are made absolute. The impugned Resolution of the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate dated 14-12-1973, which is Annexure ‘O’ to the petition is quashed by a writ of certiorari. The University and the Syndicate, however, would be at liberty to start fresh proceedings for dissolution of the Governing bodies of the three colleges, after giving the petitioner reasonable opportunity and in accordance with law.

34. There will be no order for costs.

35. Rules made absolute.