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Ambika Roy v. The State Of West Bengal Opposite Party.
Judgment Summary — N.C. Talukdar, J. (with A.N. Banerjee, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
On 18-4-1974 at about 10:45 P.M., three persons boarded a taxi (No. WBT 7316) and while the taxi proceeded, one of them directed the claimant-petitioner to stop. Once stopped, the three threatened the claimant-petitioner with a dagger, snatched about Rs. 80/-, pushed him out of the taxi and drove away in the vehicle. The claimant-petitioner reported the incident at Hastings Police Station, leading to Hastings P.S. Case No. 93 dated 19-4-1974 under Section 384/34, I.P.C. The taxi was found abandoned on 19-4-1974 and brought back to the Hastings Police Station, where it remained exposed in the open compound.
The registered owner, Ambika Roy (the claimant-petitioner), produced documents and applied to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM), Calcutta, for return of the taxi on a requisite bond, alleging damage and loss from the vehicle remaining in the police compound. The officer-in-charge of Hastings Police Station verified the papers and recommended delivery of the taxi to its registered owner subject to production before the Court on call. On 2-5-1974 the learned CMM rejected the application not on the merits but on the ground that Section 457(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not apply to the facts of the case. The present Rule challenges that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- How is Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to be interpreted — specifically, whether the phrase “and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial” pertains to the stage of investigation (so that Section 457 applies when property is seized and reported but not produced before a court during inquiry/trial) or requires non-production specifically “during an inquiry or trial” in a way that would exclude cases at the investigation stage.
- Whether, on the facts (verified ownership documents and the vehicle being exposed to damage in police custody), the seized taxi should be delivered to the registered owner on furnishing proper bonds under the appropriate provision of the CrPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimant-Petitioner (Mr. Barendra Nath Sur, Advocate)
- The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred by misinterpreting the provisions of Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 when rejecting the application, although he was otherwise satisfied on the merits.
State (Mr. Ajay Nath Mukherjee, Advocate)
- While acknowledging interpretative difficulties that a new Code may raise, the State submitted that the meaning of Section 457 is by and large clear.
- In fairness, the State counsel conceded that on the facts and circumstances of the present case he had no objection to the taxi being returned to the claimant-petitioner on adequate terms and conditions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries ((1940) AC 1014 at p. 1022) | Golden rule of construction: words of a statute prima facie given their ordinary meaning; prefer interpretation that achieves the manifest purpose and avoids rendering the legislation futile. | The court invoked this principle to reject an interpretation of Section 457 that would frustrate the statute’s purpose and to support the view that ordinary meaning (in context) should be adopted rather than a construction that renders words ineffective. |
| Ghanashyamdas v. Regional Asst. Commr. of Sales Tax, Nagpur (AIR 1964 SC 766 at p. 772) | Construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature should not be accepted except for compelling reasons. | The court relied on this authority to hold that the Magistrate's reading, which would make some statutory words redundant, was impermissible. |
| Magor and St. Mellons, Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation ((1952) AC 189 at p. 191) | Judicial restraint: courts' power to go “outside” the statute on a voyage of discovery is strictly limited. | The court used this to criticize an approach that would embark on extrastatutory interpretation and to emphasize interpreting Section 457 in its statutory context. |
| Quebec Railway Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry (AIR 1920 PC 181 at p. 186) | Effect must, if possible, be given to all words used in legislation; legislature is deemed not to waste words. | The court noted that although the learned Magistrate may have had this observation in mind, the cited principles ultimately supported a different interpretation of Section 457 in context rather than the Magistrate’s construction. |
| Smt. Mahamaya Dasi v. Sanat Kumar Law (AIR 1968 Cal 564; 1968 Cri LJ 1538) | Motor vehicles are not ordinary chattels; owners have statutory rights and liabilities in respect of motor vehicles. | The court relied on this to support the conclusion that, having produced relevant documents, the owner’s right to the vehicle should be recognized and the vehicle returned to avoid damage in police custody. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the core problem as one of statutory interpretation of Section 457, CrPC, 1973. It first placed Section 457 in the statutory context of Chapter XXXIV of the new Code, which deals with disposal of property, and compared the new provisions with corresponding provisions of the old Code (noting Section 451 of the new Code corresponds to Section 516-A of the old Code and Section 457 corresponds to Section 523 of the old Code).
The court identified the two conditions precedent in Section 457: (i) that the seizure of property by any police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the Code, and (ii) that such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial. It observed that the addition of the words referring to non-production “during an inquiry or trial” had generated uncertainty in interpretation.
Turning to established principles of statutory interpretation, the court recited and applied authorities endorsing the golden rule (give ordinary meaning), avoid constructions that render legislative words redundant, and the maxim Reddendo Singula Singulis (give words their appropriate force and effect in context). The court stressed that these tools require reading Section 457 in its statutory context (Chapter XXXIV) rather than in isolation.
Applying those principles, the court concluded that the phrase “such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial” refers to the stage of investigation (i.e., non-production before a court at the investigation stage), and is meant to distinguish situations where Section 451 (which applies when property is produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial) would be applicable. Thus, the words are a condition precedent that delineates applicability, not an exception that excludes cases like the present one.
The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate’s construction was found to be a misreading: he treated the statutory language as requiring non-production specifically during an inquiry or trial and thereby excluded the investigation stage. The court held that such a construction improperly rendered parts of the statute redundant and constituted an impermissible departure from the statute’s context and purpose.
On the merits, the court noted the learned CMM was actually favorable to the claimant on merits. The court agreed that motor vehicles are not ordinary chattels (citing Smt. Mahamaya Dasi) and that the registered owner, having produced requisite documents, should not have the vehicle left to deteriorate in the open compound of a police station. Therefore, having found the conditions of Section 457 satisfied (seizure reported to a Magistrate and non-production before a court at the inquiry/trial stage because the matter was at investigation), the court held the vehicle should be returned to the owner subject to proper bonds and conditions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Rule is made absolute. The order dated 2-5-74 passed by Shri R.K. Sharma, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, in Section L. Case No. 93 dated 19-4-1974 under Section 384/34, I.P.C. is set aside. The seized taxi (No. WBT 7316) is to be delivered to the claimant-petitioner, Ambika Roy, on his furnishing the requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, on such terms and conditions as the Magistrate may deem fit and upon his undertaking to produce the vehicle whenever called upon to do so.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to overturn the CMM’s order and to mandate delivery of the seized taxi to its registered owner on conditions and bonds. The opinion bases its outcome on statutory interpretation and the facts before the Court. The judgment does not purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond the interpretative conclusion about the scope of Section 457; no broader policy consequences or new expansive principles beyond the interpretation and the immediate mandate for delivery are discussed in the text.
Order to be carried out expeditiously. A.N. Banerjee, J. concurred. "Rule made absolute."
N.C Talukdar, J.:— The point involved in this Rule is one of law, raised in the backdrop of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. To be more precise, the point relates to the interpretation of Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. The backdrop of facts necessary for the consideration of the point at issue is a short one. On 18-4-74 at about 10.45 P.M three persons boarded a taxi, bearing No. WBT 7316, on the Diamond Harbour Road near about the Calcutta Hospital and while the taxi was proceeding towards the Esplanade, passing by the side of the Race Course, one of those three persons all of a sudden directed the claimant-petitioner to stop the taxi. As soon as the taxi was stopped, the three occupants threatened the claimant-petitioner at the point of a dagger and snatched away about Rs. 80/- from him. Thereafter they pushed him out of the taxi which was driven away by them. The claimant-petitioner proceeded to the Hastings Police Station and reported the incident whereupon a case started, being Hastings Police Station Case No. 93 dated 19-4-74, under S. 384/34, I.P.C The taxi in the meanwhile was found abandoned, with some parts missing, on the Lee Road on 19-4-74 by another taxi driver, one Bant Singh, who brought the taxi back to the Hastings Police Station where it is now lying in the open compound. The claimant-petitioner, who is the registered owner of the taxi, possessing the requisite documents, applied before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for returning the vehicle to him on a requisite bond inter alia on the ground that the car was being damaged and he was suffering heavy loss daily. On the 28th April, 1974, an application was filed before the officer-in-charge, Hastings Police Station for delivering the taxi to the claimant-petitioner on a bond or for submitting a report to the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. A report was intimately submitted stating inter alia that the relevant papers produced by the claimant-petitioner, Ambika Roy, were found to be correct on verification and it ultimately recommended that there was no objection it the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was pleased to deliver the taxi to its registered owner, directing him to produce the vehicle before the Court on call. On the next date, namely the 2nd May, 1974 an application was filed before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, reiterating the prayer for returning the taxi but the same was also rejected not on merits but on the purported ground that Section 457(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on proper interpretation did not apply to the facts of the present case. This order has been impugned and forms the subject-matter of the present Rule.
3. Mr. Barendra Nath Sur, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the claimant-petitioner, made a short submission, namely that the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta had erred in rejecting the application made on behalf of the claimant-petitioner on a misinterpretation of the provisions of Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 although he was otherwise satisfied on the merits of the case. Mr. Ajay Nath Mukherjee, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State contended that the provisions of a new Code may raise some difficulties in interpretation but, by and large, the meaning or the provisions incorporated in Section 457, are clear. He conceded, in his fairness, that in the facts and circumstances of the present case he can have no objection to the taxi being returned to the claimant-petitioner on adequate terms and conditions. The point involved is one of law, relating to the interpretation of Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and for a proper consideration thereof, a reference has to be made in the first instance to the provisions of the statute. Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 lays down provisions for disposal of property. The corresponding chapter in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as amended by Act 26 of 1955, is Chapter XLIII. Section 451 of the new Code corresponds to Section 516-A of the old Code and relates to order for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases. It lays down that
“when any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any enquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the enquiry or trial etc.”
4. A part of the old provisions relating to the nature of the property is incorporated in clause (b) of the explanation provided for under the new section. Section 457 of the new Code corresponds to Section 523 of the old Code. Sub-clause (1) thereof provides that
“whenever the seizure of property by any police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code, and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, the Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property.”
5. The aforesaid provisions are indeed shorter than the old one and contain two conditions—precedent, viz. that (i) the seizure of the property by any police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code; and (ii) such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial. The addition of the words “and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial” appears to have raised some clouds although there should not have been any.
6. It is now necessary to refer to the principles of interpretation of statute to ascertain the intention of the law-making authority, as incorporated in the relevant provisions referred to above. Some meaning and effect must be given to the specific words used by the legislature. The principles on which statutes should be interpreted are, as was observed by Dallas Sand in his Roscoe Pound Lectures, “the principle of intent and that of meaning” are the principles on which statutes should be interpreted. Maxwell observed in his “The Interpretation of Statutes” that
“A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation to which all other are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded ‘according to the intent of them that made it’”.
7. In this context a reference may be made to the golden rule of construction. Viscount Simon, L.C held in the case of Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, reported in (1940) AC 1014 at p. 1022 that “The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.” It was further observed by the Lord Chancellor that
“At the same time, if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.”
8. Judges are not called upon ordinarily to apply their opinion of sound policy so as to modify the plain meaning of statutory words, lit is again to be remembered that the principles of interpretation of statute rule out redundancy. Mr. Justice Subbarao (as His Lordship then was) also observed in the case of Ghanashyamdas v. Regional Asst. Commr. of Sales Tax, Nagpur, reported in AIR 1964 SC 766 at p. 772 that “a construction which would attribute redundancy to a legislature shall not be accepted except for compelling reasons”. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations and the same rules out the interpretation given by the learned Chief Metropolitan-Magistrate in his impugned order. One of the well-established principles again of statutory constructions, as has been observed by Crawford in his “The Construction of Statutes” is the principle of Reddendo Singula Singulis viz that
“words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous.”
9. It is further to be borne in mind, as was observed by Viscount Simonds in the case of Magor and St. Mellons, Rural District Council v. New Port Corporation, reported in (1952) AC 189 at p. 191 that “the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them on” a voyage of discovery are strictly limited’. To give effect to the interpretation given with regard to the provisions of Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be to embark on a voyage of discovery beyond the utmost bounds of the statute. The learned Magistrate, in coming to his finding, incidentally observed that,
“legislature is said not to waste words and all the words used in a legislation must be given due meaning and interpretation.”
10. It is certainly so and possibly the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, had in view the observations by Lord Sumner in the case of Quebec Railway Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry, reported in AIR 1920 PC 181, wherein it was observed at p. 186 that
“Effect must be given, if possible, to all the words used, for the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain.”
11. The said principles however, are a pointer to the other way and do not lend assurance to the interpretation given by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta.
12. On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Code and in the light of the principles of interpretation of statutes, it is abundantly clear that S. 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is in the context of the earlier provisions laid down in Chapter XXXIV and should not be construed bereft of such context. The words “such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry of trial” merely refer to the stage of investigation and not the stage of inquiry or trial. If the property is produced in the Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, S. 451 of the new Code would apply and not S. 457. The words relied upon by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, therefore do not constitute a bar but a condition precedent—not a disqualification but a qualification; and not an exception but an essential ingredient forming the mainspring of such application. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, has misconstrued the said words to find ultimately that “in this case there is non-production but the non-production is not during trial but prior to trial”. The learned Magistrate proceeded on the purported footing that the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the statute required in the first place the non-production of such property as opposed to production; and secondly that the factum of such non-production must be during an inquiry or trial. It is abundantly clear, however, that ultimately there is no cloud and the legislature in its wisdom merely used the said words in order to differentiate the various stages, viz the stages of an inquiry or trial, completion of trial and that of investigation etc. In this particular case, it appears from the records, that the conditions precedent enjoined in Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been duly fulfilled viz that the factum of seizure has been reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code and that the property produced has not been produced during an inquiry or trial but at the stage of investigation. The essential ingredients of Section 457 of the new Code, are therefore, fulfilled and the case comes clearly within the ambit of the said provisions. The first dimension of Mr. Sur's contention accordingly succeeds.
13. The next branch of submission is on merits. In fairness to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, it must be observed that he was, in fact, in favour of the claimant-petitioner on merits. He is right in his conclusion because a motor vehicle is not just an ordinary property. As was observed in the case of Smt. Mahamaya Dasi v. Sanat Kumar Law, reported in AIR 1968 Cal 564 : (1968 Cri LJ 1538) “motor vehicles are not just ordinary ‘chattels personal’ and the owner thereof has got rights as well as liabilities under the statute”. We agree and we hold that the relevant documents having been produced by the claimant-petitioner to establish his claim to the motor vehicle, the same should be made over to him and be not allowed to get damaged by lying in the compound of a Police Station exposed to sun and rain. The motor vehicle in question, namely WBT 7316, therefore, should be delivered to the claimant-petitioner, as was ultimately found by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate himself.
14. In the result, the Rule is made absolute; the order dated 2-5-74 passed by Shri R.K Sharma, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, in Section L. Case No. 93 dated 19-4-1974 under Sec. 384/34, I.P.C is set aside; and we direct that the seized taxi, being No. WBT 7316, be delivered to the claimant-petitioner, Ambika Roy, on his furnishing the requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Calcutta, on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit and proper, and upon his undertaking to produce the vehicle whenever called upon to do so. Let the order go down expeditiously.
A.N Banerjee, J.:— I agree.
15. Rule made absolute.
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