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Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd., And Another v. Ramratan Mahato
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff had worked for several years temporarily for Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. (defendant 1) at its regional office in Howrah in the posts of vendor, cleaner and plate washer, and was appointed to that post on 1 February 1968. After six months of continuous and unspotted service he became permanently entitled to that post from 1 August 1968, according to the pleadings. On 12 November 1968 the Revenue Officer of that office (defendant 2) gave a verbal order discontinuing the plaintiff's service without any reason or following a legal procedure. The plaintiff filed suit on 13 November 1968 seeking (i) a declaration that the verbal order was illegal and void, (ii) a declaration that he continued to be in permanent service and was entitled to salary and damages, and (iii) an injunction restraining defendants from issuing any written order of dismissal without following legal procedure.
Defendants denied that the plaintiff was permanently employed, describing him as a casual labourer paid hourly, whose services were dispensed with by the competent authority. On trial, the Munsif found the plaintiff to be a temporary workman not entitled to notice and held the verbal dismissal legal; the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Court held that:
- The plaintiff was a temporary workman as defined by the company's certified standing orders;
- The exclusion of Sundays and holidays for salary calculation did not indicate a break in service and the plaintiff had worked continuously from February to 12 November 1968;
- Order 13(b) of the standing orders required one week's notice for termination of a temporary workman engaged for six months continuously; the plaintiff could not be terminated without such notice or an enquiry;
- Order 18 (reference of unsettled disputes to Government) did not apply because the dispute concerned an individual workman and fell outside the Industrial Disputes Act definition of an industrial dispute under S.2(k); and even if it applied, the breach of statutory obligations under the standing orders meant the civil court could grant relief.
The Appellate Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed the suit, declaring the order of dismissal null and void and that the plaintiff continued in the company's employment. The present opinion concerns the defendants' appeal against that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the certified standing orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 constitute statutory terms and conditions of service enforceable against an employer (including a private company) such that breach of a material provision renders a dismissal a legal nullity.
- Whether a civil court may grant a declaratory remedy (declaring a dismissal null and void and that the employee continues in service) in a case where dismissal breaches certified standing orders, or whether relief is confined to damages or industrial adjudication, particularly where the employer is a private company and not a statutory body or the State.
- Whether the exceptions to the general rule against enforcing contracts of personal service (as described in precedent) are limited to public servants, statutory bodies or reinstatement by industrial tribunals, or whether they may extend to cases where an employer (even a private company) breaches statutory obligations embodied in certified standing orders.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments
- The standing orders are not "statutory" in the same sense as rules framed under a statute because they can be modified by an Industrial Court; consequently they do not create statutory obligations enforceable by a civil declaration of continued employment.
- The relief sought in effect enforces a personal service contract; the settled rule is that declarations to enforce personal service are not normally granted, except in limited, well-recognised situations (public servant dismissed in contravention of Art. 311; reinstatement by industrial tribunals; statutory body breaching mandatory statutory obligations). The company is a private company (incorporated under the Companies Act), not a Government or statutory body, so those exceptions do not apply.
- Cited authorities to support these points included Executive Committee of the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation v. Chandrakiron Tyagi and Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, and Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual to show mandamus/reinstatement claims will not lie against purely private employers.
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The exceptions noted in U.P. Warehousing Corporation are not exhaustive and should extend to employers who act in breach of statutory obligations—i.e., when certified standing orders (which are statutory) are violated the dismissal is a nullity and a declaration is appropriate.
- Relied on precedent (Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Kailash C. Adhvaryu; Western India Match… v. Rameshwar Prasad) where dismissal in breach of standing orders was held to be a nullity entitling a declaration of continued employment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Executive Committee of the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. Chandrakiron Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838; A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244] | Enumerated exceptions where declaration to enforce personal service may be granted: (1) public servant dismissed contrary to Art. 311; (2) reinstatement of dismissed worker under industrial law by Labour/Industrial Tribunals; (3) statutory body acting in breach of mandatory statutory obligation. | The Court cited this case as the appellants did, but held that those exceptions do not exhaust the situations where a declaration may be appropriate; they do not preclude relief where there is a breach of statutory standing orders making the dismissal a nullity. |
| Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai [(1971) 2 SCC 192; A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828] | Service regulations made under statutory power embody terms and conditions of service but do not necessarily amount to statutory restrictions on the employer's contract-making powers; wrongful dismissal might give damages but not necessarily reinstatement. | The Court reviewed this authority but distinguished it on facts: where standing orders are certified under the Standing Orders Act they become statutory terms and breach of material provisions can render dismissal a nullity. |
| Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585; A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1306] | Mandamus will not lie to secure reinstatement to an office that is essentially private in character; private companies are not subject to mandamus for performance of private obligations to workmen. | The Court acknowledged this authority but held that a declaration of statutory invalidity of dismissal (where certified standing orders are breached) is different from mandamus to enforce private obligations. |
| Bagalkot Cement Company Ltd. v. R.K. Pathan [A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 439] | Certified standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are intended to define conditions of employment and, once certified, constitute statutory terms of employment between industrial establishments and their employees. | The Court relied on this authority to assert that certified standing orders become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service and hence breaches of material provisions can render dismissals statutory nullities. |
| Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate v. their management [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1458] | Recognition that certified standing orders become part of statutory terms and conditions of service. | Used to support the proposition that certified standing orders have statutory force. |
| Dr S. Dutt v. University of Delhi [A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1050] | Specific Relief Act (S.21, Cl. (b) then; now S.14 Cl. (b)) bars specific enforcement of contracts of personal service; awards directing specific performance of personal service are erroneous. | The Court noted this doctrinal bar but explained that declaring statutory invalidity of a dismissal under certified standing orders is materially different from ordering specific performance of a personal service contract. |
| Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [(1956) 3 All E.R. 939] | Where a statutory scheme confers a status, wrongful dismissal that affects a statutory status may be a nullity and a court can declare the employee's continued statutory status. | The Court relied on this reasoning to illustrate that statutory schemes may produce rights that courts can declare and enforce distinct from ordinary private contracts of service. |
| Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 847] | Termination in breach of statutory obligations under orders framed under a statute can be set aside. | The Court relied on this to show that statutory contraventions of service conditions have previously been set aside by courts. |
| High Commissioner for India v. C.M. Loll [A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 121] | Declaring statutory invalidity of an act is different from enforcing a contract of personal service. | The Court invoked this distinction to justify granting a declaration of nullity where dismissal breaches statutory standing orders rather than treating the remedy as enforcement of personal service. |
| Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Kailash C. Adhvaryu [A.I.R. 1964 Guj. 264] | Authority holding that dismissal in breach of statutory obligation under standing orders was a nullity entitling the employee to a declaration of continued employment. | Relied upon by the respondent and noted by the Court as supporting the position that breach of certified standing orders can render dismissal null and void. |
| Western India Match… v. Rameshwar Prasad… [1971-II L.L.J. 386] | Reported decision of a Division Bench (Allahabad High Court) holding that standing orders give statutory status to employees and termination in violation of standing orders may be declared null and void. | Relied on by the respondent and cited by the Court as supporting authority for the proposition that breaches of standing orders may be declared invalid. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a focused legal analysis as follows:
- Nature of certified standing orders: Relying on Bagalkot Cement and Dewan Tea Estate, the Court held that certified standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 constitute statutory terms and conditions of employment between an employer and its employees.
- Distinction from enforcement of personal service: The Court emphasised the well-known legal rule that specific performance of personal service contracts is generally barred by the Specific Relief Act (S.21 then, now S.14). Authorities such as Dr. S. Dutt were noted for that rule. However, the Court distinguished that rule from cases where a dismissal contravenes a statutory provision: a declaration of statutory invalidity of the dismissal is not the same as ordering specific performance of a personal service contract.
- Statutory scheme exceptions: The Court examined authorities (Vine; LIC v. Mukherjee) where statutory schemes rendered dismissals nullities and permitted declaratory relief. It explained that where the statutory framework confers rights (for example, by certified standing orders), a wrongful act inconsistent with those statutory rights may be declared invalid and the employee treated as having continued in employment.
- Scope of the "exceptions" in precedent: The appellants had argued that the exceptions permitting declarations were limited to public servants, statutory bodies, or reinstatement by industrial tribunals (as in the U.P. Warehousing case). The Court rejected the notion that the exceptions were exhaustive. The pivotal question, the Court held, is whether a material statutory term has been breached — not whether the employer is a public/statutory authority or a private company.
- Application to the facts: The Court found there was no dispute that the plaintiff was a temporary workman covered by the company's certified standing orders and that the verbal dismissal breached a material provision (order 13(b) requiring a week's notice for termination of a temporary workman engaged for six months). Given the statutory character of those standing orders, the breach rendered the dismissal a nullity and entitled the aggrieved employee to a declaration of statutory invalidity.
- Other contentions: The appellants' contention that the certifying officer’s power to amend standing orders makes them non-statutory was rejected: the Court held that the existence of an amendment procedure in the Act does not detract from the statutory nature of certified standing orders.
- Relief and consequential orders: The Court held that if the declaration that the dismissal is a nullity is granted, other reliefs sought by the plaintiff would follow as consequential remedies, applying the principle in the I.M. Lall/C.M. Loll authorities distinguishing declaration of statutory invalidity from enforcement of personal service.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal by the defendants is dismissed with costs.
Implications / Consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Appellate Court's decree in favour of the plaintiff stands — the verbal order of discontinuance was declared null and void because it breached material provisions of the company's certified standing orders; the plaintiff is treated as having continued in employment and is entitled to consequential reliefs (salary, damages, injunctions as appropriate) flowing from that declaration, as had been decreed by the Appellate Court.
- Legal principle articulated: The Court clarified that certified standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are statutory terms; where there is a breach of a material provision of those orders, a declaration that the dismissal is null and void is an appropriate civil remedy — this is distinct from ordering specific performance of a personal service contract. The Court also held that whether the employer is a private company or a statutory body is not decisive; the decisive question is whether statutory terms embodied in standing orders have been violated.
- No suggestion that all dismissals must be litigated in industrial fora: The Court's reasoning shows that where statutory standing orders are contravened, civil courts may grant declaratory relief; this is not framed as a novel or wider procedure beyond the statutory context described in the opinion.
- Leave to appeal: The Court granted leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, as prayed for by counsel.
Note: The summary above is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning set out in the provided opinion text. No facts or holdings not expressly present in the opinion have been added.
JUDGMENT
1. This is an appeal by the defendants against a judgment of reversal. The plaintiff instituted the suit on the following allegations. The plaintiff worked for several years temporarily under the Calcutta Electric Suppl/Corporation, Ltd., defendant 1 (hereinafter referred to as the company), at its regional office at premises No. 433/1, G.T Road (North), Howrah, as vendor, cleaner and plate washer in places of absent and leave-enjoying bearers. He was appointed by the company in that post on 1 February, 1968 and after unspotted and continuous service for six months became automatically permanent in his post from 1 August, 1968. The Revenue Officer of the said office, defendant 2, by a verbal order passed on 12 November, 1968, discontinued the plaintiff's service without assigning any reason or following legal procedure. The plaintiff in the circumstances, instituted this suit on 13 November, 1968, praying for a declaration that:
(i) the verbal order of discontinuance of the plaintiff's service was illegal, void, inoperative and ultra vires;
(ii) the plaintiff was and continued to be in the said permanent service and entitled to salary and damages; and
(iii) i junction restraining the defendants from issuing any written order of dismissal of the plaintiff without following the legal procedure.
2. The suit was contested by the defendants who filed a joint written statement stating inter alia that the plaintiff served as a casual labourer paid on hourly basis for a “little” period in non-permanent post of vendor, cleaner and plate washer. Eventually he was found surplus and his services were dispensed with by the defendant 2 who was the competent authority. A casual labour was never appointed in writing, nor his service was required to be dispensed with by any written order and as a casual labourer, the plaintiff could not claim right of enquiry or observance of legal procedure in matter of his dismissal, from service, as he held the job to the pleasure of the defendants. The impugned order was legal, proper and valid and the plaintiff, it was submitted, was not entitled to any relief in the suit which was not maintainable in law.
3. On a trial on evidence, the learned Munsif found that the plaintiff was a temporary workman and was not entitled to any notice before his dismissal. The impugned order of dismissal was legal and valid and passed by the competent authority. It was further held that the suit was not maintainable in law, which, in the premises was dismissed.
4. An appeal was preferred by the plaintiff against the said decision and the Appellate Court held, in agreement with the trial Court, that the plaintiff was a temporary workman in the company, as defined in order 3(c) of the standing orders, as he worked during February to 12 November, 1968, continuously for the said period without any break. It was further held that exclusion of Sundays and holidays was necessary only for purpose of calculation of salary which was on hourly basis and it did not indicate break in service. Under order 13 (b) of the standing orders requires one week's notice for termination of engagement of temporary workman employed for six months continuously. Accordingly, the plaintiff's service could not to terminated without one week's notice or holding an enquiry before dispensing with his service. It was further held that order 18 requiring reference of all unsettled disputes of workmen to the Government had no application as the instant dispute related to an individual workman outside the definition of industrial dispute, as provided in S. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even assuming order 18 applies, no effect should be given to it as it was found that there was a breach of statutory obligations under the standing orders in terminating the service of the plaintiff. Rights and obligations of the company and its workmen being governed by standing orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and a breach of such provision in terminating the plaintiff's service was a violation of statutory provisions on the part of the defendant-company and the civil Court was competent to grant the relief in the circumstances. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was decreed. The plaintiff was granted the declaration that the order of dismissal was null and void and the plaintiff continued to remain in the employment of the company. The present appeal is against this decision by the defendants.
5. Sri Arun Kumar Dutta (senior), learned advocate appearing for the appellants, has contended that the standing orders are not statutory in the sense the rules framed by the appropriate authority under a statute are, as such standing orders could be modified by an Industrial Court under the provisions of the said Act. He further contended that the declaration in suit against the legal validity of an order passed in breach of provisions of a statute or its rules regarding master and servant for enforcing personal contract of service is available only against a statutory body and not against non-statutory body like the company before us. Sri Dutta referred to the decision in the case of Executive Committee of the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation v. Chandrakiron Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1244 : 1970-I L.L.J 32] in which it was observed:
“… the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are:
To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding:
(1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Art. 311,
(2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under industrial law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals, and
(3) statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute.”
In Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai [(1971) 2 SCC 192 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1828 : 1971-I L.L.J 496] it was held that the service regulations made under the power conferred by the statute embody merely terms and conditions of service but do not constitute a statutory restriction as to the kind of contract which the corporation could make with its servants or the grounds on which it can terminate them. Thus the corporation had undoubtedly the power to dismiss its employee, the dismissal of the employee was with jurisdiction, and even if it was wrongful being in breach of the terms and conditions which governed the relationship between the corporation and the respondent it did subsist and the present case did not fall under any of the three well-known exceptions. The employee was accordingly entitled to damages and not to the declaration that his dismissal was null and void.
6. Strongly relying on the aforesaid decisions Sri Dutta has contended that the exceptions to the principle that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service lies, relate to Government or a statutory body or to the reinstatement of a dismissed workmen under the industrial law by Industrial Tribunals. Even accepting that the standing orders have statutory force, to which Sri Dutta has reservations, it is contended that the company incorporated under the English Companies Act and also registered under our Companies Act, 1956, is not an employer of any of the excepted classes referred to above, being neither Government nor a statutory body. The present suit in effect for enforcement of personal contract of service is thus not maintainable.
7. Sri S. Banerjee, learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, has disputed the contentions and submitted that the exceptions referred to by the Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation case [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1244 : 1970-I L.L.J 32] (vide supra) are not exhaustive and will extend to the employers against actions committed by them in breach of statutory obligations. He has also relied on the decision in Tata Chemicals, Ltd. v. Kailash C. Adhvaryu [A.I.R 1964 Guj. 264 : 1965-I L.L.J 54] in which a dismissal of an employee from service in breach of statutory obligation under the standing orders was held to be a nullity entitling him to a declaration that he continued in the employment of the master. He also referred to the decision in Western India Match… v. Rameshwar Prasad…. [1971-II L.L.J 386] in which a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a statutory status was given to the employees by standing orders and for termination of service in violation of the standing orders, the employee is entitled to a relief of declaration that the order is null and void and he continues in service.
8. Before we proceed to consider the respective contentions of the parties, we shall examine the nature and character of the standing orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). In Bagalkot Cement Company, Ltd. v. R.K Pathan [A.I.R 1963 S.C 439 : 1962-I L.L.J 203] it was observed by the Supreme Court:
“… the legislature took the view that in regard to industrial establishments to which the Act applied, the conditions of employment subject to which industrial labour was employed, should be well-defined and should be precisely known to both parties. With that object the Act has made relevant provisions for making standing orders which, after they are certified, constitute the statutory terms of employment between the industrial establishments in question and their employees.”
That the certified standing orders under the said Act become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between the industrial employer and his employee has also been recognized in Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate v. their management [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1458 : 1964-I L.L.J 358].
9. Ordinarily when a contract is breached, the aggrieved party may accept the contract as broken and in such case the only remedy he is entitled to will be in damages. Alternatively, he may decline to accept the contract as broken and in such case he may sue for specific performance of contract under the Specific Relief Act. In case of a breach of contract of personal service, the Act, however, provides a bar under S. 21, Cl. (b), of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (now S. 14, Cl. (b), of the Specific Relief Act, 1963), which provides inter alia that a contract which is dependent on personal qualifications or volition of parties cannot be specifically enforced. It was held in Dr. Dr S. Dutt v. University Of Delhi [A.I.R 1958 S.C 1050] that the award directing specific performance of contract of personal service involves a legal proposition which is clearly erroneous in view of S. 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
10. Courts of law have, however, recognized exceptions to the principle of legal bar to specific enforcement of personal contract of service. In Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [(1956) 3 All E.R 939], it was observed that an employment of service is effectively terminated whenever the master dismisses the servant, however, wrongly in breach of contract. But,
“as the removal of the employee's name from the register is in law of a nullity, he continued to have the right to be treated as registered dock worker with all benefits which, by statute, that status conferred on him. It is, therefore, right that with the background of this scheme (which is statutory), the Court should declare his right.”
It was further observed that normally and apart from the intervention of statute there would never be a nullity in terminating an ordinary contract of master and servant. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee [A.I.R 1964 S.C 847 : 1964-I L.L.J 442] the termination was in breach of statutory obligation under an order framed by the Central Government under provisions of S. 11(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, and was set aside.
11. Sri Dutta, however, contended that these well-recognized principles would be applicable when the employer is the State or a statutory authority or when reinstatement is specifically provided under the industrial law by Labour Tribunals. The three cases referred to above, it was contended, are exhaustive as indicated in U.P Warehousing Corporation case [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1244 : 1970-I L.L.J 32] (vide supra) and can never extend to employer who is neither the Government, nor a statutory authority, but are private, non-statutory persons or companies under the Companies Act, except through industrial adjudication.
12. Sri Dutta also referred to the decisions in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R 1969 S.C 1306] in which it was observed:
“… an application for mandamus will not lie for an order for reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be maintained to secure performance of obligations owed by a company towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute.”
It was further observed that the company being a non-statutory body incorporated under the Companies Act, no statutory or public duty was imposed on it which could be secured by means of mandamus.
13. A declaration to enforce a contract of personal service according to the above decisions is not to be normally granted and the well-recognized exceptions have been noted. There may be cases in which no enforcement of a contract of personal service is prayed for as a relief, but a case may proceed on the basis that the dismissal could only be done in terms of a statute and as that had not been done, it was a nullity, from which the result followed that the respondent continued in service. In considering the case of High Commissioner for India v. C.M Loll [A.I.R 1948 P.C 121], the Supreme Court in Delhi University case [A.I.R 1958 S.C 1050] (vide supra) at p. 1054 observed:
“All that the Judicial Committee did in this case was to make a declaration of the statutory invalidity of an act which is entirely different from enforcing a contract of personal service.”
When the case before the Court is not one for enforcement of a contract of personal service, the principles and exceptions referred to by Sri Dutta has no application.
14. A case for declaration of statutory invalidity of an act of dismissal of employee is wholly different from the enforcement of a contract of personal service. The only question requiring consideration is whether any material term of service conditions which are statutory has been violated and if so, such act must be declared to be nullity, as the aggrieved employee under the provisions of the Act has a legal right under the certified standing orders. Such declaration is different and far from a declaration granting enforcement of personal contract of service or reinstatement of the dismissed workmen and it merely declares that the order of dismissal in breach of statutory conditions of service is invalid and a nullity, so that the employment was never terminated, and the contract of service continued to be in force. The question as to whether the employer is a statutory person or otherwise is not relevant, as the real question is whether the terms of service are statutory and there has been a breach of its material provisions.
15. There is no dispute that the plaintiff has been a temporary workman under the company and the order of dismissal by word of month, which is inconceivable in the present context of relationship between an employer and employee in industry, has been in breach of a material provision of the certified standing orders of the company. The standing orders duly certified are the statutory terms and conditions of service as held by the Supreme Court. If, therefore, there is a breach of provision thereof, which is otherwise a material provision there is, in my opinion, a legal right in the aggieved party to challenge such order as being a nullity and to obtain a decree declaring its statutory invalidity.
16. Sri Dutta's contention that the power of the certifying officer to amend the statutory orders renders such orders other than statutory is not also tenable. The provisions and procedure for their amendment is laid down in the Act itself and such provisions do not make the standing orders the less statutory.
17. As to relief, if the prayer declaring the impugned order nullity is granted, the other prayers are consequential and the plaintiff would be entitled to the same following the principle in I.M Lall case [A.I.R 1948 P.C 121].
18. As all contentions raised on behalf of the appellants fail, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
19. Leave to appeal under Cl. 15 of Letters Patent as prayed for by Sri Chunder is granted.
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