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Satish Chandra Mullick v. Jagat Chandra Dutta

Calcutta High Court
Sep 19, 1973
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Case Summary — Satish Chandra Mullick v. Rallis India Ltd. & Ors.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Satish Chandra Mullick, a cashier and head responsible clerk in the Cash Department of defendant No. 2, Rallis India Ltd., sued seeking damages (assessed at Rs. 1 lakh), an inquiry into damages, injunction, receiver and other reliefs. The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1, Jagat Chandra Dutta (a clerk in the same cash department), on or about 27 September 1958 encashed a cheque for Rs. 7,450/-, handed the proceeds to the cashier, and later made statements implicating the plaintiff in misappropriation.

Jagat submitted a Bengali statement dated 4 November 1958 describing how he encashed the cheque and subsequently, by a letter dated 17 November 1958 (translated in the plaint), recanted, stating he had written an earlier statement under duress and that he had handed the money to “Cashier Babu” (understood by the plaintiff to mean Satish Mullick). The plaintiff contends the 17 November letter and subsequent communications by the company (including letters to the Hare Street Police Station dated 29 November 1958 and 20 December 1958) were libellous and led to his suspension and dismissal on 29 November 1958 and to criminal proceedings (G.R. 375 of 1959) under Section 408 IPC, from which the plaintiff was honourably acquitted on 11 July 1959.

The defendants (Jagat; Rallis India Ltd.; Michael Vlasto; and R.T. Stevens) denied the allegations. Defendants 2–4 pleaded that the occasions of publication were privileged (qualified or absolute) and that any publications made in criminal proceedings were absolutely privileged. Several issues were settled in court and trial proceeded on whether specified letters (Exhibits D, G, H) contained libellous statements, whether they were published by the respective defendants to particular persons/authorities, and whether the publications injured the plaintiff's reputation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the letter dated 17 November 1958 (Exhibit D), the letter dated 29 November 1958 (Exhibit G), and the letter dated 20 December 1958 (Exhibit H) contained libellous statements concerning the plaintiff.
  2. Whether those alleged libellous statements were published by:
    1. defendant No. 1 (Jagat) to defendant No. 2 (Rallis India Ltd.) and/or to its officers and employees,
    2. defendants 3 and 4 to the members of the Board of Enquiry, officers and employees (including witnesses) during the enquiry, or
    3. defendants 2 and/or 3 to the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station (and subordinate officers), or by tendering Exhibit D in the criminal proceedings (G.R. 375 of 1959).
  3. Whether, by the said statements and their publication, the plaintiff was injured in his character, credit and reputation and brought to public scandal, odium and contempt, thus entitling him to damages.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The letter of 17 November 1958 (Exhibit D) and subsequent letters to police (Exhibits G and H) contained libellous statements meaning that the plaintiff had misappropriated Rs. 7,450/- and had procured a false statement by threats.
  • The publications caused suspension, dismissal and criminal prosecution; the plaintiff sought damages assessed at Rs. 1 lakh.
  • Counsel for the plaintiff contended there was positive evidence of malice by the defendants (including alleged prior altercation and treatment by Vlasto and Stevens) which, if proved, would defeat any qualified privilege.
  • Plaintiff's counsel urged that the defendants had not properly claimed or proved privilege by evidence, and criticized reliance on untested written statements of Jagat in the absence of cross-examination.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendants 2, 3 and 4 denied libel and asserted that the communications were made in the course of legitimate employment or in discharge of duty and that occasions of publication were privileged (qualified privilege). Publications within the subsequent criminal trial were absolutely privileged.
  • The defendants asserted corresponding interest or duty to receive and communicate the information and reliance on public-policy immunities for communications made in the course of inquiries or legal proceedings.
  • Defendants relied on authorities holding that statements made in the course of authorized inquiries or in communications to police are at least qualifiedly privileged.

Defendant No. 1 (Jagat) — Position and Statement

  • Jagat provided a written Bengali account (4 November 1958) of the cheque-encashment and later a letter of 17 November 1958 explaining that an earlier statement had been dictated by others and that he had acted under compulsion and in fear for his service. The plaint contains an English translation of that 17 November letter.
  • The defendants relied on Jagat's written statement and counsel for the plaintiff argued that Jagat's untested written statement (in absence of his attendance for cross-examination) could not be given weight; the defendants nonetheless relied on the document as part of the record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1892) 1 QBD 431 (Lord Esher, Master of Rolls) Statements made in the course of proceedings before a court have absolute immunity; doctrine extended to authorised inquiries before tribunals having similar attributes. The Court relied on this authority to hold that a Board of Enquiry constituted to ascertain truth in a public company could attract immunity/privilege analogous to that afforded in judicial proceedings, supporting the view that communications in that enquiry were privileged.
Jenoure v. Delmege (1891) AC 73 On privileged occasions bona fides is presumed; privilege would be of little value if maker had to prove honest belief as a condition of immunity. The Court invoked the principle that bona fides is presumed on privileged occasions and therefore the plaintiff must prove mala fides (malice) to defeat the privilege; the plaintiff failed to prove malice.
Watt v. Longsdon (1930) 1 KB 130 Communication is privileged where the maker has an interest in the matter communicated or a legal, moral or social duty to communicate to the recipient. The Court applied this principle to conclude that communications to the Board of Enquiry and to the police could be privileged because those making/receiving the communications had an interest or duty to ascertain the truth.
Tushar Kanti Ghose v. Bina Bhowmick (1953) 57 Cal WN 378 The burden of proving an innuendo (that a libel was "of and concerning" the plaintiff) lies on the plaintiff. The Court cited this authority to record that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the letters were published "of and concerning" him; the plaintiff did not discharge that burden satisfactorily.
43 Cal WN 775 / AIR 1939 Cal 477 Authorities concerning publication of documents to police and privilege attached to information lodged with police. The Court referred to these local authorities to support the view that information lodged with police or letters sent to facilitate investigation attract at least a qualified privilege.
(1943) 47 Cal WN 627 Further authority on communications to police and privilege. Cited alongside 43 Cal WN 775; used by the Court to reinforce that communications to police for investigation are entitled to qualified privilege.
AIR 1938 Cal 150 Authority cited on the evidentiary value of untested written statements where the maker does not submit to cross-examination. Recognized by the Court as relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel to argue that Jagat's written statement was of no value in absence of his appearance; the Court nevertheless considered the overall context and evidence in reaching its findings.
AIR 1959 Bom 443 Authority cited by plaintiff's counsel to show that evidence of malice can defeat qualified privilege. The Court noted the citation but found that on the facts before it the plaintiff had not proved malice sufficient to rebut the defendants' claim to privilege.
AIR 1961 Pat 164 Authority cited by plaintiff's counsel to argue that malice can discharge qualified privilege. The Court considered the citation but held the plaintiff had failed to establish malice; privilege was not defeated on the facts.
1904 AC 423 Privy Council authority: a limited company may be responsible for a libel published by its officer if published in the course of employment; company liable on ordinary agency principles. The Court recorded the principle and observed that to hold the company liable there must be sufficient evidence that the employee acted in the course of employment and knew statements were untrue. The Court found such evidence lacking here.
(1917) AC 309 It is for the judge to determine whether the occasion was privileged and whether the privilege has been exceeded. The Court applied this principle, determining that the occasions here were privileged and that privilege had not been exceeded on the evidence before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the three documents in issue (Exhibits D, G and H) and the surrounding circumstances, addressing (i) the meaning of the words used in those documents, (ii) whether they were published to the persons identified, and (iii) whether any privilege attached to the occasions of publication and, if so, whether malice had been proved to rebut that privilege.

On Exhibit D (Jagat's letter dated 17 November 1958):

  • The Court found Jagat wrote the 17 November letter voluntarily in his personal interest and to protect his employment. From the language of the letter it did not appear that Jagat meant or was understood to mean that the plaintiff had misappropriated Rs. 7,450/- or had procured a false statement by threats.
  • The Court concluded Jagat acted out of self-interest and not malice toward the plaintiff; the letter was not written in the course of his employment or as agent of Rallis.
  • The Court held that for Jagat's submitting the letter to defendant No. 2 it could not be inferred he published those statements with malice to the company or its officers.

On publication at the Board of Enquiry (26 November 1958):

  • The Board's object was to ascertain the truth of allegations; showing the letter to members of the Board was necessary for that purpose and in the interest of justice, and gave the plaintiff an opportunity to vindicate himself and to cross-examine witnesses.
  • The plaintiff's own evidence was inconsistent about seeing the letter and about who saw it; this undermined proof of publication to the company's officers by defendants 3 and 4 at the enquiry.
  • Because recipients of the letter at the enquiry had corresponding interests in the subject-matter, the Court concluded the publication at the enquiry was privileged. The Court found no evidence of malice by the defendants in conducting the inquiry.

On Exhibits G and H (letters to Hare Street Police Station dated 29 November 1958 and 20 December 1958):

  • Exhibit G (29 November) was characterised as information lodged with the police requesting investigation; the Court held the language did not mean nor was it understood to mean that the plaintiff had misappropriated the sum or caused loss to Rallis, and therefore it was not libellous as to the plaintiff.
  • The Court further held there was no evidence that the letter dated 17 November had been handed over to the police in a manner that amounted to publication of libellous matter about the plaintiff. Even if a copy were made over to the police at the Officer-in-Charge's instance, such a communication for investigation could not be considered publication of libel by the defendants under the circumstances and should attract qualified privilege.
  • Exhibit H (20 December) referred to police interviews and requests to continue investigation; it did not mention the plaintiff by name nor indicate who the dismissed employees were. The Court found third persons could not identify the plaintiff from Exhibit H and thus no publication "of and concerning" him proved.

Privileged occasion and burden to prove malice:

  • The Court applied authorities establishing that communications in the course of authorized inquiries and communications to police are at least qualifiedly privileged, and that bona fides is to be presumed on a privileged occasion (placing onus on plaintiff to prove mala fides/malice).
  • The Court analysed the plaintiff's allegations of malice (including past altercation and treatment by Vlasto and Stevens, and alleged salary reduction), but found the plaintiff's own continued appointment to certain duties and contracting work with the company (post-1955) inconsistent with a sustained malice narrative. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove malice sufficient to rebut privilege.

Publication in criminal proceedings:

  • The Court held that the tendering of Exhibit D in criminal proceedings (G.R. 375 of 1959) by which the document was proved by a State witness was immune from liability on the ground of public policy — i.e., absolutely privileged.

Overall assessment and conclusion of reasoning:

  • Exhibit D, on its language and context, did not, in the Court's view, make libellous allegations against the plaintiff as to misappropriation or procuring false statements by threats.
  • Publications at the enquiry and communications to police were either not shown to be publications "of and concerning" the plaintiff or were privileged occasions; the plaintiff did not discharge the burden of proving innuendo, publication to the relevant persons, or malice to rebut privilege.
  • Accordingly, the Court found the challenged documents did not constitute actionable libel on the evidence before it and that privilege (qualified or absolute as applicable) applied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The suit is DISMISSED.

The Court ordered that the plaintiff shall pay one set of costs to defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and certified for two counsel. The Court concluded Exhibits D, G and H do not contain libellous statements concerning the plaintiff and that, where relevant, the communications were made on privileged occasions (and the tendering of Exhibit D in criminal proceedings was immune on grounds of public policy).

Implications: The direct effect is dismissal of the plaintiff's libel claim against the defendants on the facts and evidence before this Court and an award of costs against the plaintiff. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond applying established authorities on privilege, publication and the burden to prove malice; the Court's decision rests on its factual findings about meaning, publication and failure of the plaintiff to prove malice or publication "of and concerning" him.

Certified for two counsel. Suit dismissed.

Show all summary ...

1. This suit has been filed by the plaintiff, Satish Chandra Mullick claiming inter alia a decree for damages assessed at Rs. 1 lakh; an enquiry into damages and decree for such sum as may be found due on such enquiry; for injunction; receiver and other reliefs.

2. The case of the plaintiff is that until 29th November, 1958, he was employed as Cashier and head responsible clerk in the Cash Department of the defendant No. 2, Rallis India Ltd. During the entire period of his employment under the defendant No. 2, the plaintiff continuously enjoyed reputation for honesty and trust-worthiness in respect inter alia of money matters. The defendant No. 1, Jagat Chandra Dutta was an employee of the said defendant No. 2 and served as a clerk in the cash department.

3. On or about 27th September, 1958, the defendant No. 1, Jagat obtained a sum of Rs. 7,450/- by presenting a cheque to the United Bank of India Limited at its Clive Ghat Street Office. The said cheque was drawn in favour of one Globe Fertilisers or bearer by A. Taluqdar and Co., and made over by the said drawee to the defendant No. 2 in payment of price for twenty tons of fertilisers.

4. The circumstances in which the defendant No. 1, Jagat encashed the said cheque from the bank were stated by the said defendant in a writing in Bengali language dated 4th November, 1958, addressed by him to the defendant No. 2, Rallis India Ltd., as follows:—

“Re: Cheque drawn by A. Talukdar and Co., in favour of Globe Fertilisers”.

“On the 27th day of September, 1958, Prafulla Kumar Dutt gave me a bearer cheque for Rs. 7,450/- and told me “please encash the cheque as requested by Mr. Roy.” On the very day I brought the money and handed over to Prafulla in downstair. Only as mention of Mr. Roy's name was made so I did this. In that case our Bura Babu does not know anything. As the money belongs to somebody else. I did not inform the cashier Babu about this.”

5. The plaintiff's case is that by the words our “Bura Babu” and “Cashier” the defendant No. 1 meant to indicate and/or indicated and/or understood to indicate the plaintiff inasmuch as the plaintiff at the material time was the head of the cash department. The plaintiff in the premises could not and did not credit the account of the defendant No. 2 Rallis India Ltd., with the said sum of Rs. 7,450/-.

6. The defendant No. 1, Jagat with the full knowledge of the facts relating to the said cheque for Rs. 7,450/- on 17th November, 1958 falsely and maliciously wrote and published to the defendant No. 2 Rallis India Ltd. and/or to the officers and employees of the said defendant No. 2 including the defendant, Michael Vlasto libellous statements in writing in Bengali concerning the plaintiff and concerning him in the way of his service and/or calling. An English translation of the said letter as set out in paragraph 11 of the plaint is set out hereunder:— Messrs. Rallis India Ltd.,

Calcutta.

17-11-58.

Dear Sirs,

I, Sri Jagat Chandra Dutta, am submitting hereby what I want to say about my statement in writing which has been submitted by me that the statement has not been made by me out of my free will nor does it contain the true fact. Cashier Babu, Sri Satish Chandra Mullick and his brother, Subodh Chandra Mullick threatened me that unless I give a writing in accordance with their advice they would get me sacked from service then and there/Satish Chandra Mullick and his brother, Subodh Chandra Mullick asked me to write out the statement in the manner expressed by them otherwise every one would be in danger. Since about the last twenty two or twenty three years I have been working either under his (their) father or under them. And I was compelled to write down at their request, I wrote the statement according to their dictation and signed it. As in the usual course of my duties, I go to Banks, deposit cheques and bring money after encashment, so Cashier Babu gave me that cheque of Globe Fertilisers and asked me to get it cashed and I in the usual course of my duties cashed this cheque at the United Bank and gave it (money) to Cashier Babu. All of a sudden on the 4th November, the Cashier sent for me and told me that I was required to go to United Bank for once and he took me with him and there the cheque of Globe Fertilisers bearing my signature was shown to me. After coming out of the Bank Satish Babu said that trouble was going on concerning the cheque, I will be involved in danger and my service lost and I may even be jailed. I asked him why I should fall in danger when I had encashed the cheque and made over the money to him ? He replied that as your signature was there on the cheque, so a statement in writing from you was asked by the office, it was to be submitted forthwith, there was hardly any time to lose and therefore if I preferred to be saved I must write out the statement at his guidance. I need not be afraid as they would do the needful and save me from any mischief and if necessary, even by spending money. At that moment I was in such a state of mind that I lost the strength of my judgment of right and wrong. I wrote down verbatim what Satish Babu and Subodh Babu were dictating and was forced to sign the statement for the purpose pf maintaining my service. I am repentant of my act of this nature.

I belong to respectable family and have been working in this office since long and to my knowledge nobody has any complaint against me.”

Sd/- Jagat Chandra Dutt.

7. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant No. 1 made the said libellous statements in the said letter dated November 17, 1958, in the course of his employment as a servant and/or agent of the defendant No. 2, Rallis India Ltd., as well as in his personal capacity. By the words used in the said letter the defendant No. 1 meant and/or understood to mean that the plaintiff had misappropriated the said sum of Rs. 7,450/- and further that the plaintiff had procured a false and fraudulent statement from the defendant No. 1 by the use of threat. The plaintiff's further case is that on 25th November, 1958, the defendant No. 2, Rallis India Ltd. and/or the defendant No. 3, Michael Vlasto for and on behalf of the defendant, Rallis India Ltd. suspended the plaintiff from service and/or from duties on the aforesaid false and malicious allegations.

8. The said defendant No. 2, Rallis India Ltd., and/or the defendant No. 3, Michael Vlasto caused an alleged enquiry to be held into the said libellous allegations against the plaintiff on 26th November, 1958. At the said enquiry the defendant No. 4 R.T Stevens purported to act as Chairman of the Committee and/or Board of Enquiry. The plaintiff's case is that the said defendant Stevens and/or the defendant, Vlasto published and/or caused to be published the said libellous statements made by the defendant, Jagat and contained in the said letter dated 17th November, 1958 inter alia to all the members of the Board which purported to hold the enquiry and to others present including the witnesses. On 29th November, 1958, the defendant No. 2 and/or defendant No. 3 wrongfully terminated the plaintiffs service on false allegations inter alia of misconduct in respect of the said sum of Rupees 7,450/-.

9. The plaintiff's further case is that on 29th November, 1958, the defendant, Rallis and/or the defendant, Vlasto falsely and maliciously wrote and published to the Office-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station, libellous statements of and concerning the plaintiff and/or concerning him in the way of his service and/or the calling in a letter bearing the head line, “Misappropriation of cheque for Rs. 7,450/-”. By the said letter the said defendants meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff had misappropriated the said sum of Rs. 7450/- and thereby caused loss to the defendant, Rallis. Further more the said defendants, Rallis and/or Vlasto made over and/or caused to be made over and thereby published and/or caused to be published to the said Officer-in-Charge of the Hare Street Police Station and/or to some other subordinate officer or officers under him inter alia the aforesaid letter dated 17th November, 1958, written by the said defendant No. 1, Jagat containing false, malicious and defamatory allegations against the plaintiff.

10. That the defendant No. 2, Rallis and/or defendant No. 3, Vlasto on or about 20th December, 1958 falsely and maliciously wrote and published to the said Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station, libellous statements of and concerning inter alia the plaintiff and of concerning him in the way of his service and/or calling by another letter bearing the head line “Misappropriation of cheque for Rs. 7,450/-.” By the said letter the said defendants meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff had stolen or participated in the alleged theft of the said sum of Rs. 7,450/-. Thereafter the plain-tiff was put on trial before the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta on a charge of criminal breach of trust under Section 408, of Indian Penal Code in respect of the said sum of Rs. 7,450/- alleged to have been entrusted to the plaintiff being the property of the defendant, Rallis. The plaintiff's case is that the defendants gave further publicity to the false and malicious allegations made in the said letter dated 17th November, 1958, written by the defendant No. 1, Jagat by causing the said Chief Presidency Magistrate (sic).

11. By an order made on 11th July, 1959, the plaintiff was honourably acquitted by the said Chief Presidency Magistrate.

12. By reason of the premises the plaintiff has been greatly injured in his character, credit and reputation in the way of his said Office and/or service and/or calling and has been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt and claimed damages which the plaintiff assessed at Rs. 1 lakh.

13. The defendant No. 1, Jagat Chandra Dutta filed his written statement. The defendants 2, 3 and 4 filed a joint-written statement inter alia denying the allegations in the plaint, and claiming common and corresponding interest in the alleged publication alternatively, legal and/or social and/or moral duty to publish the said words to the persons to whom they were published, who in their turn, had a like duty or interest to receive and hear them. The defendants contended that each of the occasion of the alleged publication was an occasion of qualified privilege. The publication, if any in the criminal proceedings in case No. G.R 375 of 1959 (State v. Jagat Chandra Dutta and Satish Chandra Mullick) in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta was absolutely privileged. The defendants denied that plaintiff was greatly injured in his character, credit and reputation and in the way of his said office and/or service and/or calling and was brought to public scandal or contempt. The plaintiff was not entitled to any damages.

14. Several issues were raised and settled in Court.

15. In this suit the Court is not called upon to determine as to whether the plaintiff was wrongfully dismissed from his service or about the proceeds of the said cheque and as to who was responsible for the loss of the amount of the said cheque or to determine upon the sufficiency and validity of the enquiry proceedings held by the Board of Enquiry of the defendant No. 2.

16. The main issues in the suit are whether the letter dated 17th November, 1958, written by the defendant Jagat tendered as Exhibit “D”, the letter dated 29th November, 1958, written by the defendant No. 3, Vlasto to the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station tendered as Exhibit “G”, and the letter dated 20th December, 1958, written by the said defendant No. 3, Vlasto to the said Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station tendered as Exhibit “H” contain libellous statements concerning the plaintiff and whether the libellous statements were published by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2 and/or to its officers and employees or by the defendants 3 and 4 to the members of the Board of Enquiry, the officers and employees of defendant No. 2 including the witnesses during the enquiry proceedings, or by the defendants 2 and/or 3 to the Officer-in-Charge of the Hare Street Police Station and to the officers subordinate to him or during the criminal proceedings before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta by tendering the said letter dated 17th November, 1958, in evidence, Whether by the said libellous statements and the publication thereof, the plaintiff was injured in his character, credit and reputation and in the way of his said office and/or service and/or calling and was brought to public scandal, odium and contempt.

17. The plaintiff's allegation in the suit is that the defendant No. 1, Jagat in the course of his employment as a servant and/or agent of the defendant No. 2 Rallis India Ltd., as well as in his personal capacity made libellous statements in his letter dated 17th November, 1958, of and concerning the plaintiff. By the words used in the said letter the defendant No. 1, Jagat meant and was understood to mean that the plaintiff had misappropriated the said sum of Rs. 7,450/- and that the plaintiff had procured a false and fraudulent statement from Jagat by the use of threats.

18. The said letter has been written by the defendant No. 1 in his personal capacity and voluntarily to explain the circumstances under which he submitted the Bengali statement dated 4th November, 1958. From the languages of the letter it does not appear to me that Jagat meant or was understood to mean that the plaintiff had misappropriated the said sum of Rs. 7,450/-. He said that he wrote the said statement as dictated by the plaintiff and his brother but he was himself repentant for writing such statement and could never mean nor was understood to mean that the plaintiff had procured the statement by use of threats. He was under suspension from his service since November 5, 1958 and was very much worried about his livelihood and future. In that state of mind in his own interest he wrote that letter for the purpose of protecting himself from ultimate dismissal from employment. For Jagat's submitting the said letter to the defendant No. 2 I cannot hold that Jagat published those statements to the defendant No. 2 or to its officers and employees. In writing the said Bengali letter dated 17th November, 1958, to the defendant No. 2, Jagat was guided by his own self-interest and not by any malice towards the plaintiff At the highest the statements made in the said letter may not be true. The said letter was not written by Jagat in the course of his employment under the defendant No. 2 nor as its agent.

19. Regarding the plaintiff's allegation of publication of the statements in the said letter by the defendants during the enquiry on 26th November, 1958, it is to be noted that the object of the enquiry held by the Board was to ascertain the truth of the allegations made against the plaintiff in the said letter dated 17th November, 1958. It was therefore in the interest of all in a public company and more particularly in the interest of the plaintiff, who had opportunity to vindicate his reputation, credit and honesty if according to him they were injured by the statements in the said letter and opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the said enquiry. I fail to understand how could the truth or the falsity of the allegations against the plaintiff in the letter dated 17th November, 1958 be determined unless the letter has been shown to the members of the Board of Enquiry. The evidence of the plaintiff before me in answer to questions 120, 121, 151, 183 and 301 has been that he himself saw the letter dated 17th November, 1958 for the first time at the enquiry held on 26th November, 1958 but he did not read it. In question 184 he said he did not see the letter himself. In answer to questions 185 to 187 the plaintiff stated that he did not know and could not say as to whether the said letter was shown to Mr. Stevens, the defendant No. 4, Mr. L.J Gracious manager of the management department and to Mr. S. Mukherjee the manager of Gunny department. The plaintiff's own evidence therefore falsifies that there was publication of libellous statements to the officers of the defendant No. 2 nor the plaintiff has proved publication of the alleged libellous statements by the defendant No. 4 or by the defendant No. 3, Vlasto at the enquiry held on 26th November, 1958.

20. The defendants and persons to whom the said letter was shown all had corresponding interests in the subject-matter. It was necessary to show the said letter to persons in the enquiry, in the interest of justice to find out the truth and to protect the interests of all including the plaintiff who were the employees of the defendant No. 2, Rallis India Ltd. The publication of the statements in the said letter in the enquiry was in my view privileged. There is no evidence before me that Michael Vlasto, the defendant No. 3 had anything to do in the enquiry proceedings.

21. Mr. T.K Bose appearing with Mr. Umesh Chandra Banerjee and Mr. S. Mitra for the defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 cited a case reported in (1892) 1 QBD 431. At page 442 of the report, Lord Esher, Master of Rolls, held

“It is true that, in respect of statements made in the course of proceedings before a Court of Justice, whether by judge or counsel or witness, there is absolute immunity from liability to an action. The ground of that rule is public policy. It is applicable to all kinds of Courts of justice, but the doctrine has been carried further; and it seems that this immunity applied wherever there is an authorised inquiry which, though not before a Court of Justice, is before a tribunal which has similar attributes.”

22. In the instant case also the Board of Enquiry was constituted by the defendant No. 2 with the object of finding out the truth of the statements made against one of its employees, in the interest of all other employees and in the interest of justice. Such a Board acted bona fide and without any evidence of malice whatever against the plaintiff tin the proceedings held before it.

23. In his evidence in answer to questions 34, 35, 37, 38, 43 to 52 the plaintiff tried to import malice of the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and mentioned about an occasion of altercation with Vlasto over the question of his reduction of salary. It was the plaintiff who lost temper in the alleged altercation but no evidence that any of the defendants lost temper. It appears from the letter dated 26th August, 1955, Exhibit “A” that, the defendant No. 2 had been curtailing their functions in this branch, offered an alternative employment to the plaintiff with reduced, and lighter duties under a fresh agreement. The plaintiff agreed to and accepted the same. It is very significant to note that if reduction in the plaintiff's salary and the altercation with regard to the same were indicative of the defendants' malice towards the plaintiff and if the defendants by reason of altercation were angry with the plaintiff since about August, 1955, and checked the cash every now and then, twice or thrice a week, the defendant 2 even after that in November, 1956, appointed the plaintiff godown contractor and the plaintiff earned eight annas per ton commission on all goods of the defendant No. 2 stored in the godown and he continued to be such godown contractor until November/December, 1958. I have therefore not been able to find any malice nor any bad behaviour in the defendant Nos. 2or 3 against and towards the plaintiff.

24. The allegation of the plaintiff against the defendant No. 2, Rallis and/or the defendant No. 3, Vlasto that they falsely and maliciously on 29th November, 1958 wrote and published to the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station, libellous statements and/or concerning the plaintiff and/or concerning him in the way of his service and/or calling, a letter bearing the head line “Misappropriation of cheque for Rs. 7450/-.” The said letter is annexed to the plaint and marked with the letter “A” and has been tendered in evidence and marked as Exhibit “G”.

25. From the reading of the said letter it appears that the same contains information lodged with the Police Officer and a request to him to investigate into the misappropriation of the said sum of Rs. 7450/- with a view to recover the lost money. By the use of the words misappropriation of cheque for Rs. 7,450/- or the mention of a departmental enquiry and as a result of which the dismissal of two of the employees in the said letter, in my view the said defendants did not mean nor were understood to mean that the plaintiff had misappropriated the said sum and thereby caused loss to the defendant, Rallis. Therefore, the said letter does not contain any libellous statements regarding the plaintiff and there could not be any publication of the same to the Officer-in-Charge, of Hare Street Police Station.

26. There is further allegation that the said defendants Nos. 2 and 3 made over and/or caused to be made over to the said Officer-in-Charge of the Hare Street Police Station and/or to other subordinate officers under him, the said letter dated 17th November, 1958, written by the defendant, Jagat containing false and malicious and defamatory allegations against the plaintiff. Though there is no evidence that the said letter was made over by the defendants or any of them to the Officer-in-charge and thereby caused to be published to the said Officer or his sub-ordinates the allegations contained in the said letter, in my view the said letter dated 17th November, 1958, is a necessary document containing the statements of the defendant No. 1 regarding the incident in issue. The defendants stated that the said letter was made over to the Police at the instance of the Officer-in-Charge for investigating into the matter. I do not think that by making over a copy of the letter dated 17th November, 1958 to the police the defendants or any of them published or caused to be published any libellous statements. Mr. T.K Bose, the learned counsel for the defendants drew my attention to two cases reported in 43 Cal WN 775 : (AIR 1939 Cal 477) and in (1943) 47 Cal WN 627. In my view the information lodged with the police or letters sent to them to facilitate the investigation into a matter, should be at least a qualified privilege.

27. Another letter dated 20th December, 1958, written by the defendant No. 3 to the said Officer-in-charge, Hare Street Police Station with the headline “Misappropriation of cheque for Rs. 7,450/-” is alleged by the plaintiff to have been written falsely and maliciously and published to the said Police Officer containing libellous statements of and concerning the plaintiff and/or concerning him in the way of his service and/or calling.

28. The said letter is annexed to the plaint and marked with the letter “B” and has been tendered in evidence and is marked as Exhibit “H”.

29. The letter dated 20th December, 1958, however, refers to an interview of a Police Officer with the defendants and a request to the Officer-in-Charge to continue the investigation. By the mention of a full departmental enquiry into the circumstances of the loss and dismissal of two employees in the said letter, in my view, the said defendants, Rallis and/or Vlasto did not mean nor were understood to mean that the plaintiff had. stolen or participated in the theft of the sum of Rs. 7,450/-. No mention of nor any reference to the plaintiff has been made in the said letter dated 20th December, 1958. Third person would not know from the said letter as to who are the two dismissed employees. I am unable to accept the evidence of the plaintiff that by the said letters, the plaintiff inter alia was meant by implication nor do I accept the plaintiff's evidence that the defendant No. 2 knew that the plaintiff did not commit any theft. Publication must be to such person who can know what the publication meant and to whom it was meant.

30. Information lodged with the police was considered to be an absolute privilege but subsequently it was held a qualified privilege. If the occasion is qualified privilege, the language of the privileged communication should not be scrutinised strictly.

31. In Jenoure v. Delmege reported in (1891) AC 73, the Judicial Committee at page 79 of the said report stated “The privilege would be worth very little if a person making a communication on a privileged occasion were to be required, in the first place, and as a condition of immunity, to prove alternatively that he honestly believed the statement to be true. In such a case bona fide is always to be presumed.” In my view therefore, in publishing the statements contained in the letter dated 17th November, 1958, Exhibit “D” in the letter dated 29th November, 1958, Exhibit “G” and in the letter dated 20th December, 1958, Exhibit “H” that the defendants were actuated by mala fides must be proved by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been unable to prove malice in the defendants. In this connection reference may be made to Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edition) Vol. 24, Articles 137, 140 and 204.

32. In Watt v. Longsdon, reported in (1930) 1 KB 130 it was inter alia held that “In order that a communication may be privileged the person making it must have an interest in the matter communicated, or there must be a duty, legal, moral or social, to make the communication incumbent on the person making it towards the person receiving it.” Therefore, where there is a duty to communicate to a third party, the occasion is privileged. So also when a person has interest in communication to a third party and the third party is interested in getting the communication, the occasion is privileged.

33. In the case of Tushar Kanti Ghose v. Bina Bhowmick, reported in (1953) 57 Cal WN 378 it has been inter alia held, “The burden of proving an innuendo lies on the plaintiff because it is a part of the burden of proving that the libel was published “of and concerning the plaintiff.” The learned Counsel for the defendants urged that the plaintiff has not formally proved Jagat's letter dated 17th November, 1958.

34. The defendant No. 1 did not appear to defend the action but written statement filed by him was tendered by the other defendants and marked as Exhibit 1. Mr. Seth appearing for the plaintiff urged that the defendant No. 1, Jagat did not appear and offer himself for cross-examination, his statements contained in his written statement are of no value. Further, he urged that his written statement does not contain any statement which is against Jagat's own pecuniary or proprietary interest. He cited a case reported in AIR 1938 Cal 150.

35. Mr. Amiya Nath Bose, the learned Counsel taking up the argument from his learned junior, Mr. Seth urged that the letters written to the police are very clearly libellous. The defence is privilege. But it cannot be a case of absolute privilege it may be a qualified privilege. The contention of Mr. Bose, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, was that even the qualified privilege has not been claimed on behalf of the company. Before proving the claim for any privilege, a privilege cannot be claimed. None of the three defendants has laid any evidence: no one of the three defendants has claimed privilege on behalf of the defendants.

36. There is positive evidence of malice, the treatment of Vlasto and Stevens towards the plaintiff remain uncontradicted. And this evidence of malice discharges that qualified privilege. Mr. Bose cited two cases reported in AIR 1959 Bom 443 and reported in AIR 1961 Pat 164 respectively. His contention is that these cases have not followed the case of Ghose v. Ghose, reported in 43 Cal WN 775.

37. Mr. A.N Bose, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff cited a case reported in 1904 AC 423.

38. The question raised by this appeal is whether a limited company is responsible for a libel published by its officer. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that, if an officer of the limited company publish the libel complained of in the course of his employment, the company are liable for it on ordinary principles of agency. Although such officer may have had no actual authority, express or implied, to write the libel complained of, containing statements against the plaintiff which he knew to be untrue if he did so in the course of an employment which is authorised, the company is liable.

39. It is to be noted that there must be sufficient evidence of the plaintiff to prove that the statements of the employee complained of were made in the course of his employment in the Company, that he knew such statements to be untrue and further, that the nature of his employment warranted the authority of the company to make and publish the statements complained of. There should be a finding on facts to that effect. In the instant case there is absence of such evidence and the Exhibits “D”, “G” and “H” do not contain libellous statements concerning the plaintiff.

40. The next case cited by Mr. A.N Bose is reported in (1917) AC 309.

41. In that case a libel was published. It is for the judge to determine whether the publication was on the occasion privileged and whether the privilege has been exceeded. In the instant case I find that the publication of the statements are referable to the duty and interest of the defendants and are made on privileged occasion. The privilege has been claimed by the defendants 12, 3 and 4 in their joint written statement and upon Construction of the correspondence being exhibits “D”, “G” and “H” and the circumstances in which they were written, I find that they are privileged and the privilege has not been exceeded.

42. Lastly, the publication complained of by the plaintiff is by the tender of the said letter dated 17th November, 1958 written by the defendant Jagat in evidence at the trial before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta. The defendants stated that during the trial of case No. GR 375 of 1959 the said letter was proved by one of the State witnesses in the course of his examination as a witness.

43. The defendants or any of them did not publish the statements in the said letter. In my view the publication if [any, of the statements in the said letter dated 17th November, 1958, by tender of the said letter in evidence at the trial before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta is immune from liability to an action on ground of public policy.

44. In the premises the suit fails. The plaintiff shall pay one set of costs to the defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Certified for two Counsel.

45. Suit dismissed.