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Narayan Prasad Ruia v. Mutuni Kohain And Another Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns a rule under Article 227 of the Constitution initiated by Narayan Prosad Ruia as karta of a joint Mitakshara family, consisting of himself and his three minor sons. During the proceedings for eviction of thika tenants under Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, one of the sons, Surendra Kumar Ruia, died. The issue arose whether the lis (legal proceeding) abates due to the death of Surendra Kumar Ruia, as his mother, the only heir, had not been substituted in the case. The Thika Controller had expunged the name of the deceased, but the appellate judge, relying on a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, held that the lis was not maintainable without the heir's substitution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the lis for eviction initiated by the karta of a joint Mitakshara family abates due to the death of a coparcener (Surendra Kumar Ruia) when his heir has not been substituted in the proceedings.
- Whether the karta of a joint family can continue to represent the joint family property once a notional partition has taken place by operation of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the share of the deceased coparcener has devolved to his heir.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The lis initiated by the karta is maintainable despite the death of one coparcener because the karta continues to represent the joint family property regardless of individual members' death.
- The death of a member of the undivided family does not affect the lis, as the karta remains the legal representative of the joint family.
Respondent's Arguments
- Relying on the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Venkiteswara Pai Ram Pai v. Luis, the lis is not maintainable without the heir of the deceased coparcener being substituted.
- The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, introduces a notional partition and devolution of the deceased coparcener's share to the heir, meaning the karta cannot represent the deceased's share.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Venkiteswara Pai Ram Pai v. Luis, AIR 1964 Ker 125 (Full Bench) | Lis for eviction is not maintainable without substitution of heir after death of a coparcener; karta cannot represent the deceased's share after notional partition under Hindu Succession Act. | The court adopted this Full Bench decision to hold that the lis abates if the heir is not substituted, rejecting the karta's sole representation. |
| Satrughan Isser v. Sabujpari, AIR 1967 SC 272 | Fundamental changes in coparcenary rights introduced by Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (amended 1938). | The court noted this precedent but found it not directly applicable to the present case. |
| Nanigopal Mukherji v. Panchanan Mukherji, (1954) 59 Cal WN 304 | Power of court to grant exemption under Order 22, Rule 4, sub-rule (4) CPC can only be exercised before suit abates. | The court referenced this for procedural context but found it not applicable here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, specifically Section 6 and its proviso with Explanation I, which creates a notional partition of joint family property immediately before the death of a coparcener. This results in the deceased's share devolving to his heirs, here Surendra Kumar Ruia’s mother. Consequently, the karta cannot continue to represent the share of the deceased because the joint family nexus is effectively severed with respect to that share.
The court found the appellant's argument based on the old Hindu law concept of karta insufficient, as the law has evolved to recognize the heirs' rights distinctly after such notional partition. The Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Venkiteswara Pai Ram Pai v. Luis was relied upon to affirm that the karta cannot represent the deceased's heirs in the lis once the share has devolved. The court respectfully adopted this reasoning as the definitive answer to the issue.
Other cited precedents were acknowledged but found not directly relevant to the core issue in this case.
Holding and Implications
The rule under Article 227 challenging the appellate decision was dismissed and stands discharged without costs.
The direct consequence is that the lis for eviction cannot proceed without the substitution of the heir of the deceased coparcener, here the mother of Surendra Kumar Ruia. The karta cannot represent the deceased's share after notional partition under the Hindu Succession Act. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the application of existing law as per the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court.
1. The only point which I have been called upon to decide, in this rule under Article 227 of the Constitution, at the instance of the landlord in proceedings for eviction of thika tenants, is: in the his initiated by Narayan Prosad Ruia as karta of the joint Mitakshara family, consisting of himself and his three minor sons: (1) Mahendra Kumar Ruia, (2) Surendra Kumar Ruia, and (3) Mahesh Kumar Ruia, just as the cause-title of the application under Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 2 of 1949, is, Surendra Kumar Ruia having died on February 2, 1965, during the carriage of the lis, and his mother, the only heir, having not been substituted in her place to this day, does the lis as a whole abate?
2. The Thika Controller solves the problem by expunging the name of the deceased: vide his order No. 34 dated October 8, 1966.
3. The appellate Judge takes a different view on this “knotty point”, as he puts it, governs himself by the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Venkiteswara Pai Ram Pai v. Luis, AIR 1964 Ker 125 (FB), and finds that the lis for eviction is not maintainable in absence of the heir of the deceased Surendra Kumar Ruia. Hence this rule.
4. Mr. Apurbadhan Mukherji, appearing in support of the rule, contends that the lis by the karta is too good, death of this member or that of the undivided family being of no consequence, because the karta still remains the karta. Had the old Hindu Law remained static, such contention would have had perhaps no answer. But it has not remained so. On the contrary, a serious inroad has been made into the preserve of the old Hindu Law by the Hindu Succession Act, 30 of 1956, which Mr. Padmabindu Chatterjee, appearing for the opposite party, rightly refers me to. What calls attention is the proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, read with Explanation I thereto. Translated to the facts here, these provisions work out as under:
Surendra Kumar Ruia, a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener, dies, leaving behind him surviving his mother, a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule to the Act, and, therefore his heir too in Class I. More, the interest of such a one, Surendra Kumar Ruia, a Hindu Mitakshara Coparcener, shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death.
5. Such then is the effect, by the conjoint operation of the proviso and Explanation I to Section 6. What is seen, therefore, is a notional partition, coupled with devolution of such notionally partitioned property upon Surendra Kumar Ruia's mother. What remains then of Narayan Prasad Ruia as the karta? A karta a joint family property is quite an understandable concept. But a karta for a divided property, of property partitioned, notionally though, appears to be incomprehensible. So, the old karta theory cannot help matters forward for the petitioner before me, and Narayan Prasad Ruia as karta cannot represent his deceased son's mother and necessarily his wife upon whom devolves the share of the property after partition. The very nexus of the joint-family property is gone. A conclusion as this is to be regretted, but cannot perhaps be helped.
6. The Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, the learned Appellate Judge governs himself by, and Mr. Padmabindu Chatterjee refers me to, lays down the law as such too. In a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of land belonging to a Hindu joint family against the karta and two members thereof, one member dies, during the carriage of the suit and after the Hindu Succession Act, leaving behind him surviving his widow, two daughters and two sons, who are not impleaded, and deliberately too, inside of the prescribed time, on the ground that the karta defendant alone is competent to represent the entire joint family in the suit, just what Mr. Mukherji contends before me. Madhavan Nair, J., speaking for the Full Bench, sees no merit in such an approach, the share in the coparcenary property being deemed to have been partitioned out immediately before such a one's death and to have devolved on his heirs: the widow, the daughters and the sons, and concludes:
“That share, being no more part of the coparcenary property, is not within the competence of the first defendant as the karta of the joint family to represent in the suit.”
7. I adopt this, if I may, with respect. And this appears to be the complete answer to Mr. Mukherji's contention.
8. Mr. Chatterjee also refers me to Satrughan Isser v. Sabujpari, AIR 1967 SC 272, which points out the fundamental changes made in the concept of a coparcenary by the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 18 of 1937, as amended in 1938, and Nanigopal Mukherji v. Panchanan Mukherji, (1954) 59 Cal WN 304, where it is held that the Court's power to grant exemption under Order 22, R. 4, sub-rule (4) of the CPC, as amended by our Court, can be exercised only before the suit has abated. These decisions do not reach the case in hand. And I leave them at that.
9. In the result, the rule fails and do stand discharged, but without costs.
CWM/D.V.C
10. Rule discharged.
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