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Mohammed Seraj v. Adibar Rahaman Sheikh

Calcutta High Court
May 31, 1968
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Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns Plot No. 208 (Khatian no. 208) of mouja Bara, Nalhati police-station, Birbhum district. The appellant's case, as originally advanced by his predecessor Esban Sk., is that the plot appertained to a jama of Rs. 16-13as.-10 pies under landlord Maharaj Bahadur Singh; by partition it fell to Ijjat Sk., who executed a heba-bil-ewaj (Exhibit 1) in favour of his nephew Esban Sk. dated Baisakh 3, 1344 B.S. (April 16, 1937). Esban Sk. remained in possession and, after his death, his son Seraj (the present plaintiff) continued possession.

The defendants' case is that their predecessor Ekram Hossain took settlement of the land from Debaprasanna Mukherji, who was in khas possession, on payment of a Nazar of Rs. 160 and at a jama of Rs. 6, with a receipt (Exhibit A) dated Jaistha 29, 1350 B.S. (mid-June 1943).

In a prior litigation, Title Suit No. 153 of 1945 (by Esban Sk. against Ijjat Sk., Ekram Hossain and others), the earlier plaint (Exhibit C) contained express admissions by Esban: (1) that Plot No. 208 did not appertain to the jama of Rs. 16-13as.-10 pies and (2) that the plot had been in the possession of Debaprasanna Mukherji and his predecessors for over twelve years. The prior suit was withdrawn (application dated November 19, 1945, Exhibit 6) with liberty to sue afresh. A subsequent suit was instituted (the suit from which this appeal arises). The courts below held that the admissions in the earlier plaint stood and, on that basis, dismissed the later suit. The present appeal challenges that conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an admission contained in the plaint of a suit that was withdrawn with leave to sue afresh retains legal effect and is admissible as evidence in a subsequent suit instituted pursuant to that liberty.
  2. Whether the respondent's contention that the later suit is barred by limitation (as urged before the appellate court) could be entertained, given that the trial court record indicates the issue on limitation was not pressed at trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Lala Hemanta Kumar)

  • The admission in the prior plaint cannot stand in the subsequent suit because the prior suit was withdrawn with liberty to sue afresh; when the suit is withdrawn in that manner the prior plaint (and its admissions) should be treated as if they do not exist.
  • Relied on authorities suggesting that an erroneous statement in a plaint is spent on withdrawal of the suit (e.g., Joy Chandra Chakrabarti / Aswini Kumar Dutt).

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Ghose)

  • An admission made in a previous plaint remains capable of being used as evidence in a subsequent suit, even if the earlier suit was withdrawn with leave to sue afresh.
  • Pressed the point that the later suit should be struck down as barred by limitation (the appellate judge had so held), arguing limitation as a separate basis for dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramabai Shriniwas Nadgir v. Government of Bombay, AIR 1941 Bom 144 Held that an admission in pleading in one suit is not binding on the party in another suit, reasoning that if the suit were ongoing the party could have amended to correct an error. The court distinguished Ramabai: (a) no question of error was shown here and the plaintiff had an opportunity in the second suit to say it was an error but did not; (b) subsequent Bombay decision (Dattatraya) and the Supreme Court decision (Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341) have limited or disapproved Ramabai's proposition. Thus Ramabai was not followed here.
Dattatraya v. Shankar, AIR 1960 Bom 153 Explained that an admission of fact in one proceeding may be regarded as good evidence in a subsequent proceeding. Relied upon to show that an admission in a prior pleading can be good evidence in a later suit; used to counter Ramabai and support the proposition that admissions may survive withdrawal of the prior suit.
Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341 Supreme Court authority used to disapprove or limit the effect of Ramabai's decision. The court treated this Supreme Court decision as rendering Ramabai no longer good law, supporting the proposition that admissions in earlier pleadings can be applied in later proceedings when not shown to be untrue.
Joy Chandra Chakrabarti v. Aswini Kumar Dutt, (1905) 9 Cal WN CXLVII Held (in its ratio as read) that an erroneous statement of fact in a plaint is spent with the withdrawal of the suit. The court concluded Joy Chandra's ratio depends on the assumption of error; it found that assumption inapplicable here and therefore did not accept Joy Chandra as controlling.
Chandra Kanta Goswami v. Ram Mohini Debi, 60 Cal WN 1006 : AIR 1956 Cal 577 Considered the correctness of Joy Chandra and expressed doubt about holding that mere withdrawal destroys the effect of an admission. The court noted this decision casts doubt on Joy Chandra's broad proposition and therefore did not treat Joy Chandra as an authority to negate admissions in withdrawn suits.
Parbhu Dayal v. Mandan Singh, (1911) 12 Ind Cas 323 (Oudh) Held that withdrawal of a suit with leave to sue afresh may put the plaintiff in the same position as if no suit had been brought (in the context of limitation and the Limitation Act, 1908). The court distinguished Parbhu Dayal by noting that nothing like the admission here was central in that case; Parbhu Dayal dealt with limitation questions under the Limitation Act and does not resolve the present issue about admissions.
Purna Chandra Chatterjee v. Narendra Nath Choudhury, 29 Cal WN 755 : AIR 1925 Cal 845 (Full Bench) Full Bench held broadly that a suit withdrawn with leave to sue afresh should be regarded as never brought (in that case whether enhancement of rent suit was barred). The court treated the Full Bench decision as limited to its statutory context (Section 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act) and therefore not applicable to negate an admission made in an earlier suit.
Sashi Bhusan v. Motibala Dassi, AIR 1945 Cal 317 Held that certain statutory bars do not attach where the earlier suit was withdrawn with leave; emphasized that withdrawal does not necessarily eliminate the existence of the earlier lis for all purposes. The court read Sashi Bhusan as limited to the statutory context and observed that it does not state that admissions in the earlier lis cease to exist; thus it does not help the appellant's case.
Bhimangouda v. Sangappa Irappa, AIR 1960 Mysore 178 Held that abandonment of an earlier suit may put the parties in a position as if the earlier suit was not brought (in the context of abandoning an alternative claim). The court limited Bhimangouda's ratio to its facts, observing it cannot be read as wiping out clear admissions in a previous plaint.
Mt. Diali v. Lachman Singh, AIR 1946 Lah 256 Considered the effect of an earlier plaint's allegation treated as admitted by non-traverse; held such non-traverse admission is confined to the earlier suit. The court distinguished Mt. Diali because the present case involved an express admission of assertion in the prior plaint (Exhibit C) and because previous pleadings were put into evidence in the present matter (unlike in Mt. Diali).
Prasanna Kumar v. Adya Sakti Dassi, AIR 1942 Cal 586; Premchand Manickchand v. Fort Gloster Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd., 64 Cal WN 103 : AIR 1959 Cal 620; Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiyalal, AIR 1959 SC 135; Venkata Narasinha Naidu v. Bhasyakarlu Naidu, (1902) 6 Cal WN 641 : 29 Ind App 76 (PC) Authorities cited for the proposition that an issue not pressed before the trial court cannot be agitated for the first time in appeal, and that counsel may abandon or not press issues during trial. The court relied on these authorities to hold that the limitation issue could not be entertained on appeal when it was not pressed at trial; consequently the appellate court could not properly decide limitation against the plaintiff on that ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by (a) examining the evidentiary status of admissions, and (b) analysing the relevance and applicability of the cited precedents to the facts before it.

Admissions as evidence:

  • The court noted the general principle that an admission is not conclusive (citing Section 31, Evidence Act) and that the maker may attempt to show the admission was made under mistake. However, in the present case the plaintiff made no attempt in the subsequent suit to prove any mistake in the earlier admission.
  • The withdrawal application (Exhibit 6) did not assert that the averments constituting the admission were mistaken; instead it said necessary parties had been omitted in haste and that a fresh suit would be necessary after impleading them.
  • The plaintiff delayed producing the certified copy of the earlier order (Title Suit No.153/45) and did not ultimately produce it; the defendants produced the previous plaint and marked it Exhibit C. Given these facts, the court treated the prior explicit admission as "strong evidence against Esban's son and successor in interest, the plaintiff."

Discussion of authorities and their applicability:

  • The court analysed Ramabai (AIR 1941 Bom 144) and observed that the reasoning there was founded on the availability of amendment while the suit stood; here the plaintiff had an opportunity to rebut the admission in the second suit but did not. The court also observed later decisions (Dattatraya, Basant Singh) which curtailed Ramabai's proposition.
  • Joy Chandra (1905) was treated as resting on an assumption of error; the court found no such assumption applicable here and therefore declined to accept its ratio as controlling.
  • Chandra Kanta Goswami (AIR 1956 Cal 577) was noted as casting doubt on Joy Chandra; the court relied on that doubt to further limit Joy Chandra's authority.
  • Decisions which hold that withdrawal may put parties in a position as if the earlier suit was not brought (Parbhu Dayal; Purna Chandra Full Bench; Sashi Bhusan; Bhimangouda) were carefully distinguished on their factual and statutory contexts. The court stressed that those decisions do not reach or obliterate clear admissions made in prior pleadings when such admissions are put in evidence and not rebutted.
  • Mt. Diali (AIR 1946 Lah 256) was distinguished because it concerned admission by non-traverse confined to the earlier suit; by contrast, the present case involved an express admission of fact that had been placed in evidence as Exhibit C.

Principal legal conclusion on reasoning: The court concluded that statements made in earlier proceedings—whether in pleadings, petitions, affidavits or evidence—survive the withdrawal, dismissal or decree of the earlier suit and may be treated as admissions in subsequent proceedings where they amount to admissions under the Evidence Act and are not rebutted. The court relied on Section 17 and related provisions of the Evidence Act and emphasised the importance of preserving the probative value of such statements to avoid encouraging reckless allegations.

On limitation: The court declined the respondents' invitation to dismiss the appeal on limitation grounds because the trial court record showed that the issue on limitation (issue No. 2) was not pressed before the trial court. The court relied on authorities that an issue not pressed at trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and noted that the recorded evidence did not demonstrate that the plaintiff lacked possession for twelve years. Therefore, the limitation point failed for the respondents in this forum.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed. The court held that the admission contained in the prior plaint (Exhibit C) stood as admissible evidence in the subsequent suit because it was not rebutted or shown to be mistaken, despite the prior suit having been withdrawn with leave to sue afresh.

Implications / Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal affirms the courts below in treating the prior admission as effective evidence against the plaintiff, resulting in the plaintiff's suit being dismissed on that basis.
  • Limitation issue: The court refused to decide the case on limitation because the limitation issue was not pressed at trial and the record did not conclusively show the plaintiff was out of possession for twelve years.
  • Procedural posture: The court made no order as to costs of the appeal and granted leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, acknowledging that the importance of the matter required a more authoritative decision than that of a single judge.
  • Broader precedent: The court's opinion emphasises that admissions in earlier pleadings remain admissible evidence unless rebutted; however, the court limited or distinguished several authorities and confined some decisions to their statutory contexts. The court allowed a further appeal to enable a higher court to authoritatively address the issues.

Note: This summary is compiled exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and adheres to the factual and legal statements contained therein.

Show all summary ...

1. Is the admission in the plaint of a suit, permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to sue afresh, of any effect, in the suit instituted afterwards, in pursuance of the liberty so given? That is the principal point raised upon this appeal by the plaintiff from an appellate judgment and decree of affirmance. The stance the plaintiff takes is: Plot No. 208, admeasuring, 84 acres, under Khatian no. 208, of mouja Bara, within the jurisdiction of Nalhati police-station, in the district of Birbhum, appertains to a Jama of Rs. 16-13as. 10 pies, under the landlord Maharaj Bahadur Singh. As the result of a partition amongst the co-sharers, it falls to the exclusive share of Ijjat Sk. Seized of the plot so, Ijjat Sk. executes a heba-bil-ewaj, exhibit 1, for just that in favour of his nephew Esvan Sk. The date of a document as this is Baisakh 3, 1344 B.S, corresponding to April 16, 1937. Ever since, Esban Sk. has been in possession thereof; and, after his death his son, Seraj, the plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises.

2. The stance the defendants take is; Their predecessor in interest, one Ekram Hossain, took settlement of the land in controversy from the landlord Debaprasanna Mukherji in whose khas possession it then was so he did on payment of Nazar of Rs. 160 and at a jama of Rs. 6, for which he was granted a receipt, exhibit A, on Jaistha 29, 1350 B.S, corresponding to a date in mid-June 1943.

3. In the plaint, exhibit C, of a previous suit, Title Suit No. 153 of 1945, by the present appellant's father, Esban Sk, against Ijjat Sk. and Ekram Hossain as the principal defendants, as also Debaprasanna Mukherji, Maharaj Bahadur Singh and the recorded tenants as pro forma defendants, the admission made by him (Esbat) is, to notice only the gist of it:

1 Plot No. 208 does not appertain to the jama of Rs. 16-13As.-10 Pies.

2 It was all along in possession of Debaprasanna Mukherji and his predecessors for long over twelve years.

4. What remains then of the plaintiff's case founded on the land appertaining to the jama of Rs. 16-13as.-10 pies under Maharaj Bahadur Singh? Little or nothing. And the defendants' case rested on settlement from Debaprasanna Mukherji is well-high proved if the admission stands. The learned judges in the courts below hold that the admission, not rebutted in the second suit (out of which this appeal arises), does stand. So they dismiss the suit. Hence this appeal.

5. Mr. Lala Hemanta Kumar, appearing for the appellant contends that the admission cannot stand. It cannot, because the suit, the plaint of which contains such admission having been withdrawn, the admission stands withdrawn too. Mr. Ghose, appearing for the respondents, contends that the statement in the plaint remains, capable of being pressed into service in a subsequent suit (as the present one is), no matter that the prior suit has been withdrawn.

6. An admission is not conclusive even of a matter admitted: Section 31, Evidence Act 1 of 1872 The maker of an admission is at liberty to prove that it was made under a mistake here, in the second suit, the plaintiff makes no attempt even, to prove so. As the learned appellate judge observes:

“Before the learned Munsiff, the plaintiff gave no evidence regarding this admission by Esban in Title Suit No. 153 of 1945.”

7. More, in the application dated November 19, 1945, exhibit 6, for withdrawal of the suit it has not been stated that this part of the averments in the plaint is a mistaken one. It has been stated instead that in hurry some necessary parties have been left out, for which a suit afresh has become necessary after having impleaded them. Again, it appears to be worthy of note that the plaintiff takes time to produce the certified copy of the order in Title Suit No. 153 of 1945 (referred to as “judgment of T.S 153/45”): vide order No. 23 dated March 13, 1957, in the order sheet. But ultimately he does not produce it. It is produced instead by the defendants and marked Ext. C. So, the express admission by Esban stands. Once that is that, it is strong evidence against Esban son and successor in interest, the plaintiff whom it binds.

8. An attempt is made to get round such clear and damaging admission, on the authority of Ramabai Shriniwas Nadgir v. Govt. of Bombay AIR 1941 Bom 144, where Beaumont C.J lays down that an admission by a party in his pleading in one suit is not binding on him in another suit. The reason why his Lordship holds so, sitting with Sen, J., is: Had the suit been a going one the party could have amended the pleading and undone the error. It will, therefore, be a strange thing to hold that when the suit is no more and the chance to amend the pleading is gone, a party is to be bound for all time by its admission. Such an approach merits three answers. One, no question of an error does arise here. The plaintiff had a good enough opportunity in the second suit to say that it was an error. But he did not say so. Two, the same Court he explained in Dattatraya v. Shankar AIR 1960 Bom 153 that an admission of fact in one proceeding may be regarded as good evidence in a subsequent proceeding, Ramabai's case AIR 1941 Bom 144 not laying down anything to the contrary Three, the recent Supreme Court decision in Basant Singh v. Janki Singh AIR 1967 SC 341 renders Ramabai's case AIR 1941 Bom 144 no longer good law Indeed, it has been disapproved and an admission by the defendants in a orevious plaint signed and verified by them about the year of the death of a certain person, was reckoned against then in a later suit the defendants having not shown that it was untrue such is the law laid down by Bachawat, J. speaking for the Court or this sort of an attempt by the appellant to flee the express admission seen here in the order suit must fall.

9. Equally ineffective appears to be the reliance placed upon Joy Chandra Chakrabarti Aswini Kumar Dutt (1905) 9 Cal WN CXLVII the original judgment in which had been requisitioned from the re-cord-room and examined, at the desire of Mr. Lala the ratio of this case appears to be that the effect of an erroneous statement of fact in a plaint is spent with the withdrawal of the suit. So the key to this decision lies here: erroneous statement of fact, which, as the judgment of Maclean, C.J, sitting with Mittra, J. reveals, has been taken for granted. I cannot take so the admission of Esban Sk. in the previous suit Would I could. Again, P.N Mookerjee, J. sitting with Renupada Mukherji, J., in Chandra Kanta Goswami v. Ram Mohini Debi, 60 Cal WN 1006 : (AIR 1956 Cal 577) considers the correctness of the decision in Joy Chandra's case (1905) 9 Cal WN CXLVII open to doubt if it goes so far as to hold that mere withdrawal of a suit destroys the effect of an admission made therein. True it is in the case before P.N Mookerjee, J. the order was payment of costs condition precedent to the institution of a fresh suit: and, on failure of such payment, the suit was to stand dismissed. The evidence did not disclose if such costs were paid. Hence, on non-payment, dismissal of the suit would be there, and not withdrawal. So circumscribed, it would be no authority, as Mr. Lala submits, on the question of the effect of withdrawal of a suit. But the doubt expressed by his Lordship is there to be taken into reckoning.

10. Another class of case Mr. Lala cites in support of his contention that a suit withdrawn with leave of the court to sue afresh, is a suit which does not exist in the eve of law the suit not existing, the plaint thereof, with admissions, averments and all, cannot exist too. The first such case in order of date, is Parbhu Dayal v. Mandan Singh, (1911) 12 Ind Cas 323 (Oudh) a decision of Chamier, J.C of the then Oudh Chief Court A suit for sale on a simple mortgage bond was allowed to be withdrawn in October 1907 with liberty to sue afresh. On March 22, 1910, the fresh suit was instituted inside of two years from August 7, 1908, when the Limitation Act, 9 of 1908, had come into force. Section 31, sub-section (1) thereof, enabled the mortgagee so to do a suit within 2 years from the date of the passing of the Limitation Act 1908 or within 60 years from the date when the money secured by the mortgage became due, whichever the earlier. But sub-section (2) of Section 31, prescribing inter alia that when a mortgage suit for sale was withdrawn after July 22, 1907, and before August 7, 1908 an application for restoration was to be made within 6 months from 7-8-1908, was sought to be foisted upon the suing mortgagee. In that case, his suit even if treated as an application under sub-section (2) would have failed, filed as it was on March 22, 1910 — much beyond 6 months from August 7, 1908. In that context Chamier., J.C held that withdrawal of the suit in October 1907 relegated the plaintiff to the same position as if he had not brought any suit at all. Nothing like any admission in the previous plaint bulked large there as it does here.

11. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Purna Chandra Chatterjee v. Narendra Nath Choudhury, 29 Cal WN 755 : (AIR 1925 Cal 845) (FB), reveals the lone voice of Suhrawardy, J. emphasizing that a suit, allowed to be withdrawn with leave to sue afresh, should be regarded as never brought, ceasing to be available for any purpose. But so broad a statement goes much more, if I may say so, with respect, than what the Full Bench is called upon to answer: whether a suit for enhancement of rent under Section 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is barred or not when an application under S. 105 ibid for settlement of rent is withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit. And Section 109 makes the mere making of the application under S. 105 enough to taboo the suit, no matter that the application made is withdrawn later. Nothing like any admission in the previous lis bulks large in this case too and cannot therefore, reach the case on hand.

12. The same consideration applies mutatis mutandis to Sashi Bhusan v. Motibala Dassi, AIR 1945 Cal 317 where S. 37-A, sub-section (3) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 7 of 1936, it is held, cannot bar an application under sub-section (2) by the debtor before the Board, even if, he had been to the Civil Court for relief under Section 36 of the Bengal Money-lenders Act, but only to withdraw it under O. 23, R. 1 of the CPC, with liberty to sue afresh, as indeed the mortgagor-deb-tor there did. The same principle again: for the purpose of the subsequent lis, no previous lis which would have otherwise been a clog to the later lis, is deemed to exist not that the admission made there does not exist. It exists very much indeed, ever though there has been the withdrawal. Indeed, nothing more should be read into this decision. The context is the filing of a fresh lis. Within that periphery the decision must remain, saying not a word about the admission made in the previous lis.

13. Bhimangouda v. Sangappa Irappa, AIR 1960 Mysore 178 turns on the plaintiff abandoning his alternative claim in the earlier suit to set aside an alienation for absence of legal necessity, withdrawing the suit itself with liberty to sue afresh prayed for and granted, and bringing the fresh suit with a claim to set aside alienation over again on just that ground. In this context it is held the parties are relegated to a position as if the earlier suit was not brought. So, here also, the ratio must be limited to that and that only, not wiping out clear admissions in a previous plaint. Abandoning an alternative relief does not connote an admission that the facts on which it is rested (absence of legal necessity in the case under review) do not exist.

14. The last case that remains to be noticed is Mt. Diali v. Lachman Singh, AIR 1946 Lah 256. There the plaint of the previous suit adverts to the pronerty as ancestral. But the written statement passes it by. Such admission by non-traverse is confined to the earlier suit only instead of being treated as an admission under Section 17 of the Evidence Act. But what is before me is an admission of assertion, not an admission by non-traverse. Again in the Mt. Diali's case, AIR 1946 Lah 256 the previous pleadings were not put in even; whereas in the case on hand the previous plaint gets into evidence as exhibit C.

15. In sum, suits may come and go, withdrawn with or without liberty to sue afresh, dismissed or decreed, — no matter which, — but statements made therein, — no matter where, in pleadings, petitions, affidavits, or evidence — remain for ever, and for all purposes too, allowed by law such as to be proceeded with as admissions, when they are found to be such, so long as they are not rebutted, (section 17 et seq., Evidence Act), or to be confronted with under S. 145 ibid. Otherwise the court, no less the party interested, will be deprived of very valuable evidence, nothing to say of a premium being put on reckless allegations with no apprehension of the makers thereof coming to grief in future for such glibness. Mr. Ghose's contention, therefore, prevails over Mr. Lala's paragraph 6 ante. I find so.

16. Mr. Ghose likes me to strike down the suit as barred by limitation, as the appellate Judge has done. But that I cannot very well do. Because the learned Judge in the court of first instance distinctly records that the issue on limitation (issue No. 2) was not urged before him, meaning thereby that it was not pressed before him. The learned appellate Judge has taken it as such Now, once an issue is not pressed before the trial court, it is not open to the party doing so to agitate it over again in the court of appeal. See, for example, Prasanna Kumar v. Adya Sakti Dassi, AIR 1942 Cal 586: Premchand Manickchand v. Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 64 Cal WN 103 : (AIR 1959 Cal 620); Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiyalal, AIR 1959 SC 135 and Venkata Narasinha Naidu v. Bhasyakarlu Naidu, (1902) 6 Cal WN 641 : 29 Ind App 76 (PC) the last case being an authority for the proposition that a Vakil's general powers in the conduct of a suit includes the power to abandon an issue which in his discretion, he thinks it inadvisable to press. What is more, the recorded evidence does not show, as the appellate Judge thinks it does, that the plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years of the date of the suit. This point, therefore, fails the respondents.

17. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

18. I make no order as to the costs of this appeal. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. The importance of the matter demands that there should be a far more authoritative decision than is possible in the hands of a single Judge. I. therefore, allow the leave prayed for.

DVT/D.V.C

19. Appeal dismissed.