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Arun Kumar Bhattacharjee And Others v. State Of West Bengal And Others

Calcutta High Court
Jul 19, 1966
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents nos. 1, 2 and 12 to forbear from giving effect to or to withdraw or cancel two administrative letters (Annexures C and H to the petition). Annexure C is a letter from K.C. Roy, Joint Secretary, Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal, to the Chief Judge, City Civil and Sessions Courts, Calcutta (dated January 5, 1965 in the petition), which stated that because pay scales for lower division clerks in District Courts and in the City Civil & Sessions Courts had been equalised with effect from April 1, 1961, seniority among lower division clerks in the City Civil and Sessions Courts would be determined according to dates of substantive appointment in either of the two lower division scales in which they were first appointed. Annexure H is a subsequent letter from the Joint Secretary to the Registrar of the City Civil and Sessions Courts dated December 1, 1965, which stated that the petitioners' representations were considered but their prayer could not be acceded to.

Facts concerning appointments and pay scales (as stated in the opinion): petitioners applied for and were appointed as lower division assistants in the City Civil & Sessions Court. Petitioners Nos. 1–4 were confirmed on specified dates (June 1, 1963; March 1, 1962; December 1, 1963; March 1, 1962 respectively). Respondents Nos. 3–10 were also appointed as lower division assistants; prior to joining the City Court they were drawing pay at the scale Rs. 55-130 per month. On July 22, 1960, an order (G.O. No. 5337-J dated July 22, 1960) laid down that permanent employees appointed from other departments who had previously been in a lower pay scale and were appointed to the City Courts at a higher scale would be considered as promoted and their seniority would count from the date of appointment to the City Courts. Pay revision rules published January 2, 1962 (West Bengal Services Revision of Pay and Allowances Rules) equalised the pay scales as of April 1, 1961 (changing district courts' lower division assistants scale to Rs. 125-200 with a higher initial start of Rs. 134 in the City Courts).

When a Gradation List was published in April 1962, respondents Nos. 3–10 objected to being shown as junior to the petitioners, arguing that because pay scales had been equalised from April 1, 1961 and they joined after that date, their previous service should be counted for seniority. The Government (by a letter dated January 5 — the text gives the date as January 5, 1966 in one paragraph) conveyed the decision that seniority would be determined according to dates of substantive appointment in either of the lower division scales as fixed by the Rules. The petitioners subsequently represented that the two scales were not really identical because an initial higher start (Rs. 134) had been given in the City Courts and that this entitled them to seniority. Their representation was refused (Annexure H). The petitioners then filed this petition under Article 226 challenging the departmental letters/orders relating to seniority.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Judicial Department could determine seniority among lower division clerks without prior consultation with the Finance Department, in alleged breach of Rule 10 (in particular Rule 10(1)(b)) of the Rules of Business.
  2. Whether a prior view or determination by the Finance Department (that the petitioners' scale should be deemed higher due to a higher initial start) is binding or precludes the Judicial Department from making the impugned order.
  3. Whether respondents' earlier service in lower-paid posts in the district courts must be counted in determining their seniority in the City Civil & Sessions Courts.
  4. Whether the petitioners have a right to judicial relief under Article 226 to challenge an administrative determination of seniority (and, relatedly, whether claims of seniority or promotion give rise to a justiciable right enforceable by prerogative writ).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee)

  • The impugned determination of seniority by the Judicial Department violated Rule 10 of the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) (specifically Rule 10(1)(b)) because that Rule requires prior consultation with the Finance Department on matters touching conditions of service; seniority affects conditions of service.
  • The Finance Department had earlier taken a view favourable to the petitioners (a letter dated July 29, 1964 stating that for practical purposes the petitioners' scale should be deemed higher), and the Judicial Department's order was contrary to that determination.
  • The respondents (Nos. 3–10) could not claim seniority by counting their prior service in the district courts where they drew a lower pay scale; that length of previous service should not be counted for seniority in the City Courts.
  • The appointments of both petitioners and respondents to the City Courts were new appointments and seniority in those new appointments should not be determined by reference to length of service in the posts previously held.

Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. B. N. Sen for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 11)

  • The application is misconceived: the petitioners have no right to invoke a writ under Article 226 to enforce a claim to seniority or promotion because a public servant has no enforceable right to promotion or to seniority in the grade or cadre.
  • There is no question of violation of Article 311 (protections in relation to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank) because losing places in a seniority list or denial of promotion does not amount to removal, suspension or dismissal; therefore Article 311 is not attracted.
  • Reliance upon case law: Mr. Sen relied on judicial decisions that (i) inclusion in a list of persons considered fit for promotion confers no enforceable right (L. Balakrishnan v. Deputy Inspector General of Police); (ii) mere violation of a statutory rule relating to conditions of service does not automatically entitle a public servant to prerogative relief (N. Devasahavam v. State of Madras); and (iii) a claimant has no right to promotion and losing places in seniority is not a reduction in rank (The High Court, Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Air 1959 Mad. 270 — L. Balakrishnan v. Deputy Inspector General of Police (Madras) Principle that inclusion in a list of persons considered fit for promotion confers no enforceable right; removal from such a list or denial of promotion is not equivalent to punishments envisaged by service rules. The respondents relied on this decision to show that claims relating to promotion or placement in seniority lists do not create an enforceable right. The court treated the respondents' reliance as supporting the proposition that the petitioners had no right to a writ to assert seniority.
AIR 1958 Mad. 53 — N. Devasahavam v. State of Madras Principle that mere violation of a statutory rule concerning conditions of service does not necessarily entitle a public servant to redress by prerogative writs. Relied upon by respondents to contend that even if Rule 10 had been violated, such violation would not automatically confer a right to a writ under Article 226; the court accepted this as supportive of the respondents' position.
1962-2 SCA 646 : AIR 1962 SC 1704 — The High Court, Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy Principle that a claimant has no right to promotion; loss of places in a seniority list is not reduction in rank and Article 311(2) is not attracted merely by withholding promotion. Relied on by respondents to show that the law does not confer a right to promotion and that withholding promotion or changes in seniority do not give rise to protection under Article 311. The court stated that Mr. Sen's contentions based on such authorities were well founded.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the petitioners' contentions and the respondents' opposing submissions and proceeded as follows:

  1. The court accepted the legal proposition advanced by the respondents that the law does not confer upon a public servant a right to claim promotion, and by parity of reasoning a public servant does not have an enforceable right to claim seniority in the cadre to which he belongs. The court treated claims to seniority as closely linked to claims to promotion and thus subject to the same legal limitations.
  2. On the Rules of Business (including Rule 10 and Rule 10(1)(b)), the court held that those Rules are framed by the Governor for more convenient transaction of Government business (citing clause (3) of Article 166 as the constitutional basis for making the rules). The court reasoned that such rules were not intended to create or confer individual rights on public servants enabling them to seek a writ under Article 226 for alleged violations of those rules.
  3. The court addressed the petitioners' contention that the Judicial Department's order was made without consultation with the Finance Department and that there was an earlier Finance Department view favourable to the petitioners. Even if a procedural requirement or departmental view existed, the court concluded that such matters did not confer on the petitioners a legal right enforceable by writ, since rules of business are administrative devices for orderly governance rather than sources of judicially enforceable personal rights.
  4. The court further observed that the petitioners had not suffered prejudice in any material respect: their scale of pay remained unaffected. The only effect alleged was loss of a few steps in the ladder of seniority, with respondents Nos. 3–10 placed above them by virtue of their longer service in the district courts. The court considered such loss of seniority insufficient to ground a writ petition.
  5. On authority and precedent, the court accepted the respondents' authorities demonstrating that inclusion or placement in promotion/seniority lists and mere procedural breaches of service rules do not necessarily create enforceable rights. The court therefore concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to the extraordinary remedy sought under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

PETITION DISMISSED.

Direct effects on the parties:

  • The application under Article 226 fails and is dismissed.
  • The Rule (presumably the rule nisi issued in the petition proceedings) is discharged.
  • Costs: each party to pay its own costs (as stated in the opinion).

The opinion confines its reasoning to the absence of an enforceable right to seniority/promotion and the non-justiciability of alleged breaches of the Rules of Business as a basis for a writ. The opinion does not articulate any wider or novel legal principle beyond applying established authorities that promotion/seniority claims are not per se enforceable by prerogative writ; accordingly, no new precedent-creating holding beyond the court's dismissal is announced in the text of this opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, in which the petitioners claim a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 12 to forbear from giving effect to or withdraw or cancel certain orders which are annexures C and H to the petition Annexure C is a letter from K.C Roy. Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Chief Judge. City Civil and Sessions Courts, Calcutta, dated January 5, 1965. In that letter it was stated that before the introduction of the revised pay scales from April 1, 1961, the scale of pay of lower division clerks in the district courts was Rs. 55-130, and the scale of pay of the same clerks in the City Civil and Sessions Courts was Rs. 75-150. It was further stated that lower division clerks of the district courts who were appointed as lower division clerks in the City Civil and Sessions Courts in higher scales, were deemed as appointed on promotion to the higher scale And for that reason it was stated in G.O No. 5337-J dated July 22, 1960, that the seniority of the lower division clerks in the City Civil and Sessions Courts would count from the date of their appointments on promotion in the City Civil and Sessions Courts. Thereafter this letter went on to direct that the difference between the two scales having disappeared since the intro diction of pay scales with effect from April 1, 1961, the context in which the said G.O No. 5337-J. dated July 22, 1960, was issued was no longer in existence, and since the two scales of pay had been equalised the higher initial salary in one scale not at all mattering, the seniority among the present lower division clerks in the City Civil and Sessions Courts, would be determined according to their dates of substantive appointment in either of the two lower division scales in which they were first appointed. It is the order contained in this letter which is the subject matter of this application. The other order which is Annexure H to the petition is also a letter from the Joint Secretary to the West Bengal Government, Judicial Department, to the Registrar, City Civil and Sessions Courts, Calcutta, dated December 1, 1965, in which it was stated that the representations made by the petitioners received careful consideration, but the prayer made by the petitioners could not be acceded to. The facts briefly stated are as follows:—

2. The petitioners applied for and were appointed, lower division assistants in the City Civil & Sessions Court (hereinafter referred to as the said Court). The petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 were confirmed in the said posts from June 1, 1963, March 1, 1962, December 1, 1963 and March 1, 1962. The respondents Nos. 3 to 10 also applied for the posts of lower division assistants in the said Court and were subsequently appointed as such assistants. Prior to their joining the said Court, they were drawing a pay of Rs. 55-130 per month.

3. On July 22, 1960, the Assistant Secretary to the Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal, issued an order, laying down the principle of determination of seniority of the non-gazetted staff in the said Court. By this order the permanent employees of other departments, who were drawing a pay in a scale lower than the scale in which they were appointed in the said Court, would be considered to have secured promotion by their appointment to the said Courts, and their seniority would count from the respective dates of their appointment in the said Courts. On the basis of this order, petitioners were shown as senior to the respondents Nos. 3 to 10. On January 2, 1962, the West Bengal Services Revision of Pay and Allowances Rules were published in the Calcutta Gazette, and according to these Rules, the pay scale of the lower division assistants in the District Courts were changed to Rs. 125-200 per month and in the said Courts a higher initial start of Rs. 134 per month was given.

4. In April, 1962, the Gradation List of the lower division assistants was published when the respondents Nos. 3 to 10, amongst others, filed objections to their position in the said List as junior to the petitioners on the ground that as the two pay scales had been equalised and as these had been given effect to from April 1, 1961, by the said Rules and as they joined the said Court after April 1, 1961, they must be considered to have been drawing a similar scale of pay namely. Rs. 125-200 per month and therefore, their service in the previous posts must be counted in determining their seniority.

5. On January 5, 1966 the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department, issued an order bearing the same date, which conveyed the decision of the Government that the seniority among the lower division clerks. In the Courts would be determined according to their dates of substantive appointment in either of the two lower division scales as fixed by the said Rules. Thereafter the petitioners made representation against the aforesaid order, and in this representation, they contended that the two scales of pay in the District Courts and the said Courts had not been similar even who were appointed to the said Courts had a higher initial start of Rs. 134, that is to say, Rs. 9 more per month than that of those who held similar posts in the District Courts. The petitioners' grievance is that steps are being taken to grant seniority in favour of the respondents Nos. 3 to 10 in implementation of the said order and a memo has already been issued by the Judicial Department for that purpose.

6. Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee appearing for the petitioners contended that although the pay of the respondents Nos. 3 to 10 was equalised with that of the petitioners, under the said Rules, the position of the petitioners was entirely different because they had a higher initial pay of Rs. 134 per month as against the pay of the respondents at Rs. 128 per month. This, according to Mr. Chatterjee, entitled the petitioners to claim seniority over the respondents, although the latter had a longer period of service in the Districts which was to be taken into account in determining the question of seniority.

7. In support of this contention, Mr. Chatterjee raised four points. Firstly, he argued that under Rule 10 of the Rules of Business framed under Article 116(3) of the Constitution, the question of seniority could not be determined by the Judicial Department as Rule 10 required that “no department shall, without previous consultation with the Finance Department, authorise any orders which relate to the number of grading or cadre or posts or the emoluments or rather conditions of service of post.” It was argued that the question of seniority touched the conditions of service of the petitioners and, therefore, the Judicial Department could not make the order without reference to or consultation with the Finance Department. In this case, Mr. Chatterjee argued, the Finance Department had earlier taken a different view in the matter, namely that the petitioners who were appointed as lower division assistants in the said Courts would have seniority. The impugned order made by the Judicial Department therefore, Mr. Chatterjte argued, violated Rule 10(1)(b) of the said Rules of Business.

8. The next contention of Mr. Chatterjee was that the question whether the scale of pay of Rs. 125-200 per month, with a higher initial start of Rs. 134 per month, was to be, treated as a higher pay for the purpose of determining seniority, as against a scale of pay of Rs. 125-200 per month (without the higher initial start of Rs. 134 per month) was determined by the Finance Department in favour of the petitioners. The impugned order may by the Judicial Department was contrary to the order made by the Finance Department, apart from being in violation of Rule 10(1)(b) of the said Rules.

9. The third contention of Mr. Chatterjee was that the respondents Nos. 3 to 10 could not claim seniority by virtue of their service in the lower posts in the districts. In other words, it was argued that the length of service of the respondents Nos. 3 to 10. In the District Courts, at a time when they were drawing a lower scale of pay, should not be counted in determining the seniority of the lower division assistants in the said Courts.

10. The last contention of Mr. Chatterjee was that the appointment of both the petitioners and the respondent Nos. 3 to 10 were new appointments and the seniority in these new appointments should not be determined on the basis of the length of service. In the posts held by them before they joined their new posts.

11. Mr. Chatterjee developed the contention mentioned above, firstly, by relying upon Rule 10 of the said Rules to which I have already referred. He argued that the Impugned order made by the Judicial Department had been made clearly in violation of the terms of Rule 10(1)(b) and, therefore, the order must be held to be invalid and the seniority of the petitioners as determined by the earlier order of the Finance Department must be restored.

12. It was next contended by Mr. Chatterjee that Rule 10(1)(b) of the said Rules, was mandatory and not merely direction as the opening words of the said Rule were “No department shall without previous consultation” etc. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the use of the term “shall” made it quite plain that the framers of the Rule intended that it should be treated as mandatory and not merely as directory. In support of this contention Mr. Chatterjee relied upon a letter dated July 29, 1964 from the Deputy Secretary to the Finance Department to the Accountant-General, West Bengal, in which it was stated that for all practical purposes the scales of lower division clerks in the Directorates and in the regional offices were Rs. 134-3-140-200 and Rs. 125-3-140-4-200 respectively. It was also stated that the former scale should be deemed to be higher than the latter. Mr. Chatterjee, therefore, contended that there was a determination of the question that the scale of pay drawn by the petitioners was higher than that of the respondents Nos. 3 to 10. The impugned order made by the Judicial Department was made not only without consultation with the Finance Department as required by the said Rule, but was also directly in conflict with and contrary to the orders of the Finance Department.

13. Mr. B.N Sen appearing for the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 11 contended that the application was misconceived and that the petitioners had no right to a Writ to enforce their claims as made out in the petition. He argued that the question of seniority and promotion would not be made the subject-matter of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, as no public servant had a right to a promotion or to claim seniority in the grade or cadre to which he was placed. It was argued that there was no question of violation of Article 311 of the Constitution. It was not a question, Mr. Sen argued, of removal, suspension or dismissal of a public servant and therefore, the right to a Writ petition under Article 311 of the Constitution could not be invoked by the petitioners.

14. In support of the above contention Mr. Sen firstly relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court, reported in AIR 1959 Mad. 270 L. Balakrishnan v. Deputy Inspector General Of Police of Police. In that case it was held that names of persons considered fit for promotion were included in a particular list and that such inclusion by itself conferred no enforceable right on the persons whose names had been so included. If was further held that the removal of a name from the list of persons tentatively considered fit for promotion, nor even denial of promotion could be equated to any of the punishments for which the Civil Service (Classification and Control) Rules provided. The question of promotion, it was held, was not a question of right and the removal of a name from that particular list would not make it a justiciable issue. Mr. Sen next relied upon another decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1958 Mad 53 N. Devasahavam v. State of Madras. In that case it was held that mere violation of a statutory rule in relation to conditions of service did not give a public servant a claim for redress by the issue of prerogative writs. Mr. Sen contended that even assuming that the Rule 10 of the said Rules had been violated, such violation would not confer upon the petitioners right to a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution The next case relied upon by Mr. Sen is a decision of the Supreme Court in The High Court, Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy reported in 1962-2 SCA 646 : (AIR 1962 SC 1704). It was held in that case that the Governor of a Province, after consultation with the Public Service Commission and the High Court, made rules for recruitment to the Subordinate Civil Judicial Service. In that case the respondent was not selected as a Subordinate Judge when his turn in the ordinary course came for certain reasons. It was held that the claimant had no right to promotion and therefore, no right of action in a court Then again if was held, that losing some places in the seniority list was not tantamount to reduction in rank and therefore. Article 311(2) of the Constitution was not attracted in that case. In that case, however, the question involved was whether a public servant was entitled to claim any of the rights created and conferred by Article 311 of the Constitution, but it was held that withholding of promotions did not provide a cause of action to the person claiming such promotion. Mr. Sen argued that the same principles applied in this case also, although the question of promotion was not involved. The claim to seniority in a particular cadre over others in the same cadre has a close link to the claim of promotion and, therefore, the principles on which the claims to a promotion had been dealt with by the courts must be also applied in this case.

15. In my opinion, Mr. Sen's contentions are well founded. The law has not conferred upon the petitioners a right to claim seniority in the cadre to which they belong. The rules of business on which so much reliance was placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioners, do not, in my view create, much less confer, a right on a public servant to a writ petition for violation thereof. The rules of business have been made for the convenience of public business. The opening words of clause (3) of Article 166 makes it clear that the rules of business are framed by the Governor for more convenient transaction of business of the Government of the State. These rules have not been framed, and indeed were not intended, to create or confer a right upon a public servant to come and apply for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for violation of these rules. If a public servant has no right to claim a promotion, he has no right either to claim seniority in the cadre to which he belongs. Furthermore, in this case it does not appear to me that the petitioners have suffered any prejudice or loss by reason of the impugned order. Their scale of pay has not been affected, though it may be that if the order is in force they will lose a few steps in the ladder of seniority, and the respondents Nos. 3 to 10 by virtue of their length of service in the district Courts, are placed above them. But such a situation in my view do not confer upon the petitioners right to claim a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of striking down an order by which principles were laid down for determining the seniority. For the reasons mentioned above, this application fails and is dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Each party to pay its own costs.

HK/VPP/G.G.M

16. Petition dismissed.