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Malay Banerjee v. State And Others Opposite Parties.
Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was one of five accused arrested in relation to alleged contraventions of the Iron & Steel Control Order, 1956 under Section 7(1)/10 of the Essential Commodities Act. A prosecution report was submitted on 21-12-1965 and copies of documents as contemplated by Section 173(4) CrPC were furnished on 14-2-1966. The learned Magistrate directed that the trial proceed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 251-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner obtained the present Rule challenging that order. The Magistrate had relied upon decisions of this Court (Nanakraj Pandit and an unreported Division Bench decision in Ramprosad Gupta v. State of West Bengal dated 31-5-1962) as authority for directing trial under Section 251-A.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether where cognizance is taken on a report in writing by a police officer made under Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act, the trial procedure prescribed in Section 251-A CrPC applies, or whether Section 252 CrPC should be applied.
- Whether a report submitted under Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act qualifies as a "police report" within the meaning of Section 173 CrPC (i.e., a report submitted following an investigation under Chapter XIV of the CrPC).
- Whether offences under Section 7(1) of the Essential Commodities Act (in the facts of this case contraventions of cls. (4) and (5) of the Iron & Steel Control Order 1956) are cognizable offences and thus subject to investigation under Chapter XIV of the CrPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Mr. Talukdar) Arguments
- Cognizance in this case was taken on the report in writing of a police officer under Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act and not on a police report under Section 173 CrPC; therefore the Magistrate should have directed trial in accordance with Section 252 CrPC rather than Section 251-A.
- The Supreme Court decision in Bhagwati Saran v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 928) was relied upon to argue that a report under Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act is not a charge sheet or a police report under Section 173 CrPC because the report is required only to state facts constituting the offence and serves merely as a basis for cognizance.
- Asked that earlier Division Bench authority (Ramprosad Gupta) be reconsidered in view of the Bhagwati Saran observations.
- Relied on Pravin Chandra Modi (submitted in later argumentation) to press the point about classification of such reports; also cited authority (Manikchand Choudhury) supporting the view that a "police report" for purposes of certain procedural provisions means a report submitted after investigation under Chapter XIV (i.e., s.173 report).
Respondent's Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nanakraj Pandit v. The State, 1961 (1) Cri LJ 644 (Cal) | Used by the Magistrate as authority for applying the procedure in Section 251-A CrPC. | The Court notes the Magistrate relied on this decision to justify directing trial under Section 251-A; the decision was accepted as supporting the Magistrate's order. |
| Ramprosad Gupta v. State of West Bengal (unreported, Dated 31-5-1962, Cal) | Considered by the Magistrate as authority on the procedural point. | The Court held that Ramprosad Gupta did not decide the procedural question now before it because the trial in that case had begun before the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1955 came into force; the point there had been whether the report complied with Section 11, not the procedural issue under Sections 251-A/252. |
| Bhagwati Saran v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 928 | Stated that a report need only contain facts constituting the offence and functions to afford a basis for cognizance (i.e., is not a charge sheet). | Cited by Mr. Talukdar to argue Section 11 reports are not police reports under Section 173 CrPC. The Court considered the observation but treated it as not enough to displace the other authorities and reasoning applicable to Section 251-A. |
| Manikchand Choudhury v. The State, 62 Cal WN 94 : AIR 1958 Cal 324 | Held that "police report" in Section 207-A means a report submitted after investigation under Chapter XIV (i.e., Section 173 CrPC); if not resulting from a Chapter XIV investigation, the procedure under that section cannot apply. | The Court treated this decision as supporting the proposition that a report submitted as result of a Chapter XIV investigation is a Section 173 "police report" and that the logic extends to the procedure in Section 251-A CrPC. |
| Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1963 Cal 191 | Approved Manikchand; held a police report cannot be treated as a complaint; if an offence has been investigated by police, the report is to be treated as a Section 173 report and accused are entitled to copies. | The Court relied on this approval to reinforce that when an offence has been investigated by police under Chapter XIV, the resulting report is a Section 173 police report and procedural protections and processes (including those attracting Section 251-A) follow. |
| Pravin Chandra Modi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1185 | Held that reports of excise/customs officers, if regarded as made under Section 190(1)(b), attract the provisions of Section 251-A CrPC. | The Court treated this Supreme Court observation as a complete answer to the appellant's argument: even if a report is not a Section 173 report, if cognizance is taken under Section 190(1)(b) on a report in writing by a police officer (or similar officer), Section 251-A applies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based strictly on material in the opinion:
- Identified the core dispute: whether the trial procedure under Section 251-A CrPC (applicable to cases instituted on a police report) or Section 252 CrPC (applicable to cases instituted otherwise) should be followed where cognizance was taken on a report in writing of a police officer under Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act.
- Considered the Magistrate's reliance on local decisions (Nanakraj Pandit and Ramprosad Gupta). The Court rejected the submission that Ramprosad Gupta required reconsideration in light of Bhagwati Saran, observing that Ramprosad did not consider this procedural question because the trial there had commenced before the 1955 amendment; the question in Ramprosad had been limited to whether the report complied with Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act.
- Examined authorities (Manikchand Choudhury and Chittaranjan Das) establishing the proposition that a "police report" for the purposes of procedural provisions like Section 207-A (analogously Section 251-A) means a report submitted after an investigation under Chapter XIV (i.e., a Section 173 report). These cases show that where an offence has been investigated by police under Chapter XIV, the resulting report is a Section 173 report and the special procedure (such as under Section 251-A) applies.
- Analysed the statutory classification: by reference to the Second Schedule of the CrPC, offences punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards (but less than seven years) are cognizable. The Court noted that contraventions under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act (excluding certain exceptions) attract imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and the offences in the present case (contraventions of cls. (4) and (5) of the Iron & Steel Control Order 1956) are covered under that provision. Therefore, such offences are cognizable and liable to investigation under Chapter XIV, making the resulting report a Section 173 police report and bringing the trial within the scope of Section 251-A.
- Considered the fallback argument: even if the offences were non-cognizable, the Court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Pravin Chandra Modi (AIR 1965 SC 1185). That case held that reports of excise or customs officers, if regarded as made under Section 190(1)(b), must attract the provisions of Section 251-A. The Court treated this observation as a complete answer: where cognizance is taken under Section 190(1)(b) on a report in writing of a police officer, Section 251-A applies even if the report is not strictly a Section 173 report.
- Concluded that either because the offences were cognizable (thus generating a Section 173 police report) or, alternatively, because of the principle in Pravin Chandra Modi that reports attracting Section 190(1)(b) fall under Section 251-A, the learned Magistrate correctly directed trial under Section 251-A CrPC.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The learned Magistrate's order directing trial in accordance with Section 251-A CrPC is upheld; the Rule is discharged and the petition is dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Magistrate's direction that the trial proceed under the procedure set out in Section 251-A CrPC stands; the petition challenging that direction is dismissed.
- Legal consequence as applied in this matter: The Court held that where offences are cognizable (as here under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act) the investigation falls under Chapter XIV CrPC and the report is a Section 173 police report, attracting the procedure in Section 251-A CrPC. Further, even where a report is not strictly a Section 173 report, if cognizance is taken under Section 190(1)(b) on a report in writing by a police officer (as per Pravin Chandra Modi), Section 251-A still applies.
- No broader, novel precedent was laid down by this opinion; the Court applied existing authority (including Supreme Court authority) to affirm the Magistrate's order.
End of summary—based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion.
1. The petitioner who was one of the five accused in a case started against them under Section 7(1)/10 of the Essential Commodities Act, has obtained the present Rule against the order of the trying Magistrate directing trial in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 251-A of the Cr PC. The learned Magistrate relied upon two decisions of this Court, Nanakraj Pandit v. The State, 1961 (1) Cri LJ 644 (Cal) and an unreported decision in the case Ramprosad Gupta v. State of West Bengal, decided by S.K Sen and Amaresh Roy, JJ. on May 31, 1962 (Cal) as authorities for his decision on the point.
2. The five accused in the case were arrested by the police in course of the investigation of the offence concerned and on 21-12-1965 a prosecution report was submitted against them. On February 14, 1966, copies of documents as contemplated in S. 173(4) of the Code were furnishea. Thereafter the question arose as to whether the procedure under section 251-A or that under Section 252 of the Code should be followed. After hearing both parties the learned Magistrate came to the finding which is the subject matter of the present Rule. Mr. Talukdar appearing in support of the Rule contended that cognizance of the offence having been taken on the report in writing of a police officer under section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act and not on a police report under S. 173 of the Code, the learned Magistrate should have come to the finding that the procedure under S. 252 of the Code was the proper procedure to follow for the purpose of the trial. He argues that although the two decisions of this Court referred to by the learned Magistrate do support the order passed by him, those decisions require reconsideration in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Bhagwati Saran v. State of U.P, AIR 1961 SC 928. So far as this Supreme Court decision is concerned Mr. Talukdar refers particularly to the observation in paragraph 17 of the judgment as reported, to the effect that:
“It is to be noticed that the report is required to contain only a statement of facts constituting the offence and its function is not to serve as a charge sheet against the accused person”
and further that—
“…………its function being merely to afford a basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case”.
3. The argument was that if the report under section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act is not a charge sheet, it is not a police report under S. 173 of the Code and if so again the procedure under S. 251A of the Code which prescribes the procedure for trial of cases instituted on a police report cannot apply in the cases of prosecutions under the Essential Commodities Act.
4. The argument of Mr. Talukdar that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramprosad Gupta's case, unreported decision D/- 31-5-1962 (Cal.) (supra) requires reconsideration in view of the Supreme Court decision above, overlooks the fact that decision was considered by the Division Bench and was not considered to have any hearing on the question at issue inasmuch as the question as to the procedure for the trial of the case did not arise therein as the trial in that case had commenced before the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1955 had come into force. The question that was mooted before the Supreme Court in that case was whether the report of the police officer under section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1946 was in conformity with the requirements of that section. The contention of Mr. Talukdar that the decision in Ramprosad Gupta's unreported decision D/- 31-5-1962 (Cal) (Supra) requires reconsideration must therefore be rejected.
5. The next argument of Mr. Talukdar that the report of the police officer under section 11 not being a police report under section 173 of the Code the procedure prescribed in section 251-A of the Code would not be applicable to trials for offences taken cognizance of under that section finds support in the case Manikchand Choudhury v. The State, 62 Cal WN 94 : (AIR 1958 Cal 324) wherein it was held that the police report’ in sec. 207-A of the Code means a report of an offence submitted by the Officer-in-charge of a police station as a result of investigation under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code which means a report under section 173 of the Code. The case further held that if the police report is not one submitted after an investigation carried on under Chapter XIV of the Code, the trial of an offence taken cognizance of on that report could not be held in accordance with the procedure of section 207-A of the Code. The same arguments which might be directed in favour or against the procedure under section 207-A would apply with equal force to the procedure laid down in section 251-A of the Code.
6. The decision of this Court in Manickchand's case, 62 Cal WN 94 : (AIR 1958 Cal 324) was cited with approval in the case Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1963 Cal 191. In Chittaranjan Das's case, AIR 1963 Cal 191 the police submitted before the Magistrate an application purporting to be a petition of complaint in respect of charges under Ss. 366, 120-B/366, I.P.C The Magistrate took cognizance on that application and directed issue of warrants. The accused after entering appearance asked for copies of the statements and documents on which the prosecution wanted to rely contending that the complaint was in the circumstances of that case virtually a report after investigation under section 173 of the Code. That prayer having been refused by the Magistrate the matter came upto this Court and it was held that the report of a police officer cannot be treated as a complaint though it be submitted in the form of a petition of complaint, and that it must be treated as a report falling under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. In that case the offence having been investigated by the police, the complaint of the police officer was treated as a police report under section 173 of the Code and it was held that the accused would be entitled to copies as prayed for.
7. There is no question thus that in the case of cognizable offences where there is a police report or report of the police officer submitted as a result of an investigation held under Chapter XIV of the Code that report is a ‘police report’ as contemplated in sec. 173 of the Code and for the purpose of trial of the offence it is the procedure laid down in section 251-A or in section 207A of the Code, that will have to be followed. If, however, the; offence be a non-cognizable one but still there has been an investigation into the same without the order of a Magistrate under sec. 155(2) of the Code, the report that is ultimately submitted to the Magistrate would not be the result of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code and the question might” very well arise as to which of the procedures prescribed in sections 251A and 252 of the Code respectively will apply for the trial of the offence concerned. An offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act is not a cognizable offence according to Mr. Talukdar and for the purpose of an investigation into this case there was also no direction of the Magistrate under section 155 of the Code as the record shows. The report that was submitted thus could not according to him be a report under S. 173 of the Code and although being a report in writing of a police officer the Magistrate could take cognizance thereof under Sec. 190(1)(b), trial for that offence could not proceed in accordance with procedure prescribed in Section 251-A of the Code. As authority for the proposition that an offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act is a non-cognizable one reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision in the case Pravin Chandra Modi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1185.
8. Under the second schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to “offences against other laws” offences punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards, but less than seven years, are cognizable offences. Under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act contravention of any order excepting those made under clause (h) or (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 are punishable with imprisonment for a term of three years and also with fine. The present case was started for an offence constituted by contravention of cls. (4) and (5) of the Iron & Steel Control Order 1956 and the offences thus are covered by Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act and would attract imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, thereby making them cognizable offences. If so, they would be liable to be investigated under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code and the report that is submitted as result of that investigation would be a ‘police report’ within the meaning of section 173 of the Code and there would be no difficulty in holding that the procedure prescribed in Sec. 251-A of the Code would apply for the trial of the offences concerned.
9. Even if it can be conceded that the offences were non-cognizable there is in this case the report of a police officer in respect of an offence of which cognizance was taken under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. It was held by the Supreme Court in Pravin Chandra Modi's case, AIR 1965 SC 1185 (Supra) as follows: “In our opinion the position is clear that such reports (Report of an Excise or a Customs Officer) if they are regarded as made under Section 190(1)(b), must attract the provisions of Section 251-A of the Code………”
10. This observation of the Supreme Court is a complete answer to Mr. Talukdar's argument that trial of offences cognizance whereof are taken not on the basis of a police report under Section 173, but on the basis of the report of a police officer submitted in a non-cognizable case cannot be held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 251-A of the Code-Section 251-A prescribes the procedure for the trial of cases instituted on a police report. Section 252 prescribes the procedure for trial of cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Under Section 190 of the Code, cognizance of an offence may be taken either on a complaint or on a report in writing by any police officer or upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrate's own knowledge or suspicion.
11. Section 251-A prescribes the procedure for trial of offences whereof cognizance is taken upon the report in writing of a police officer while Section 252 prescribes the procedure for trial of offences of which cognizance has been taken in any of the other manners stated above. The report of a police officer made otherwise than under section 173 of the Code cannot be a complaint’ as defined in Section 4(1)(h) of the Code, it is also not an information received from any person other than a police officer so as to attract S. 252 of the Code for the purpose of the trial of the offence mentioned therein. If Section 252 be excluded the procedure prescribed in S. 251-A of the Code must be attracted and the term “police report” in that section must be held to have been used by the Legislature in a generic sense including both the police report under section 173 of the Code as also the report of a police officer. In any event, Pravin Chandra Modi's case, AIR 1965 SC 1185 (Supra) will serve as the authority for a finding that the procedure prescribed in Section 251-A of the Code will be attracted to the trial of cases cognizance whereof is taken under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code on the report of a police officer submitted under section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act.
12. In view of the above I must hold that the learned Magistrate was perfectly justified in directing trial of the case in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 251-A of the Code. The Rule accordingly stands discharged.
JJ/AKJ/D.V.C
13. Petition dismissed.
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