- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Union Of India v. Shew Bux Satyanarayan .
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff respondent alleged loss of about 33 maunds of sugar due to the misconduct and negligence of the defendant appellants, the Railways. At delivery, a short certificate acknowledging shortage was issued by the Railways. The trial court decreed damages partially for an admitted shortage of 5 maunds and 11 seers. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Subordinate Judge awarded an additional sum based mainly on an Assessment or Damage Certificate issued by the Railways' Inspector, stating deterioration of about 28 maunds of sugar due to rain damage. The assessing Inspector was not examined, and conflicting evidence was presented regarding the condition and disposal of the damaged sugar. The Court of Appeal held that the Assessment Certificate could not be ignored and that the Railways had a duty to examine the Inspector regarding the meaning of the phrase "without prejudice" on the certificate. The present appeal challenges whether a decree for damages can be based solely on such a certificate prefaced by "without prejudice."
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a decree for damages based solely on an Assessment or Damage Certificate marked "without prejudice" by the Railways' Inspector is permissible.
- Whether the plaintiff is required to prove actual loss and quantum of damages beyond the Assessment Certificate.
- The legal effect and admissibility of statements or certificates marked "without prejudice" in litigation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Advocate Ajay Basu on behalf of Railways)
- The Assessment Certificate prefaced by "without prejudice" cannot serve as a basis for a decree without actual proof of loss and damages by the plaintiff.
- The damaged sugar was still lying in the plaintiff's godown and was sold at a reduced rate, indicating no conclusive loss.
- There was no evidence that the plaintiff accepted the statements in the Assessment Certificate.
- The additional written statement filed late should not have been accepted.
- Opportunity was given to produce documents to prove damage, but relevant account entries were not proved.
Respondent's Arguments (Sri Mitter on behalf of Plaintiff)
- The opposing Inspector's report was not produced and his evidence is hearsay and inadmissible.
- The Assessment Certificate constitutes prima facie proof of admission of damage by the Railways.
- The plaintiff is not required to prove actual loss and negligence beyond the certificate.
- The Trial Court erred in accepting the late additional written statement of the Railways.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Balchand Badriprasad v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Cal 666 | Assessment Certificate can be prima facie proof of admission of damage. | The Court distinguished this decision but acknowledged the certificate may show prima facie admission, still requiring proof of actual loss. |
| Union of India v. Huji Latif Ahdulla, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 190 | Validity of provisional certificates in damage claims. | The Court found this precedent not very helpful as terms were unclear and "without prejudice" status was unknown. |
| Kingsley v. Secretary of State, 36 Cal LJ 271 (AIR 1923 Cal 19) | Damages may be ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty even if absolute certainty is impossible. | The Court applied this principle to require proof of actual loss to a reasonable degree of certainty. |
| Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Cal 190 | Necessity of proving actual loss and quantum of damages despite prima facie admissions. | The Court held this principle as binding, requiring proof beyond the certificate. |
| Kurtz and Co. v. Spence and Sons, (1887) 57 LJ Ch. 238 | Meaning and legal effect of "without prejudice" communications. | The Court relied on this authority to explain that "without prejudice" statements are tentative and not admissions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by examining the legal significance of the phrase "without prejudice," referencing the authoritative explanation from Kurtz and Co. v. Spence and Sons, which clarifies that such statements are made to facilitate settlement discussions without affecting litigation rights. The Court emphasized that documents marked "without prejudice" are excluded from being admissions against the maker, as they are tentative and aimed at promoting amicable resolution.
Applying these principles, the Court held that the Assessment Certificate, despite being prima facie evidence of damage as per Balchand Badriprasad, cannot alone justify a decree for damages without proof of actual loss and the quantum thereof. This requirement aligns with precedents such as Indian Trade and Kingsley, which mandate reasonable certainty in damage claims even if absolute precision is unattainable.
The Court also noted procedural irregularities, including the late filing and verification of the additional written statement by the Railways, cautioning against such practices. The Court found the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Huji Latif Ahdulla unhelpful due to unclear terms and absence of "without prejudice" status on the certificate in that case.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the further decree by the Court of Appeal relying on the Assessment Certificate was unsustainable and ordered the appeal to be reheard by the Subordinate Judge applying these legal principles.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed, and the further decree passed by the Court of Appeal is set aside.
The matter is remanded to the Subordinate Judge for rehearing according to law and the observations made regarding the non-admissibility of "without prejudice" statements as admissions and the necessity for proof of actual loss and quantum of damages.
There is no order as to costs in this appeal, and further costs are left to the discretion of the Court of Appeal below.
This decision directly affects the parties by requiring proof beyond the Assessment Certificate for damage claims and does not establish new precedent beyond reaffirming existing principles on "without prejudice" communications and damage proofs.
1. Advocate Ajay Basu, on behalf of the Railways, defendants appellants in this second appeal, raises a short question of law as to whether a decree for damages of the plaintiffs consignment of sugar is permissible, only on the basis of an Assessment or Damage Certificate given by the Inspector of Railways, who prefaced his declaration on the certificate by the averment ‘without prejudice’.
2. The plaintiff respondent's allegation of loss of about 33 maunds of sugar due to the misconduct and negligence of the defendant appellant is denied in the written statement. At the time of delivery, the usual short certificate was given by the Railways. The Court of first instance decreed the suit in part only for a sum of Rs. 108-13 as on the admitted shortage of 5 maunds and 11 seers of sugar, pilfered in transit. The learned Subordinate Judge, Bankura, on appeal by the plaintiff firm, decreed the suit for a further sum of Rs. 810-3 as mainly on the ground of the said Assessment Certificate for the deteriorated sugar of about 28 maunds, which causes the real difficulty in this appeal. The said certificate was taken as the basis of damage. Parties came to the Court inter alia on the following relevant facts. It was a consignment of sugar of 200 bags, weighing 550 maunds, from Hatwa to Bankura, out of which 62 bags were found, at the time of taking deliver, wet by rain water and the sugar became discoloured. The Inspector's assessment of damages of the deteriorated stuff varied from 10 per cent to 25 per cent in respect of different quantities of bags. The assessing Inspector was not examined, whereas another Inspector deposed that the plaintiff firm sold the damaged stuff mixed up with good stuff. Sri Basu particularly pleaded from the evidence of the plaintiffs witness that the damaged stuff was still then lying at their godown and that the discoloured sugar was sold at reduced rate during rainy season. He also pointed out that there was no evidence to show the condition of the goods when they were consigned or that the statements in the assessment certificate were accepted by the plaintiff.
3. Sri Mitter, on the other hand, pleaded that the alleged report of the other Inspector was not produced and that his evidence cannot be accepted being a piece of hearsay. Sri Mitter repeats the reasonings of the learned Subordinate Judge and submits that the said certificate being a prima facie proof of admission of damage by the Railways the plaintiff is reused neither to prove his actual loss and amage regarding the quantum and extent, nor of negligence and misconduct of the Railways. He further submitted that the Trial Court committed an error in accepting the additional written statement, filed just a couple of days before the hearing. The learned Munsiffs reasoning, on the other hand, is repeated by Sri Basu before me that opportunity was given to the plaintiff to produce documents in order to prove the quantity of sugar damaged or about the disposal of the damaged stuff. Account books were accordingly produced but relevant entries were not proved. Another witness of the plaintiff said that it was not possible to ascertain from the account books what was the actual loss.
4. After distinguishing a decision of this Court in the case of Balchand Badriprasad v. Union of India, (S) AIR 1957 Cal 666 and after laving undue stress on the acceptance of the additional written statement, the Court of appeal below inter alia held, not relying on the plaintiffs witnesses, that it was the duty of the Railways to examine the Inspector for proof of the meaning of the expression without prejudice as the assessment ??? cannot be ignored and it would be wrong, according to him to hold that the plaintiff failed to prove the damage and actual In.
5. Before me three other decisions are cited. Sri Mitfer relics on a decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Union of India v. Huji Latif Ahdulla, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 190 whereas Sri Basu cites two decisions of this Court in the case of Kingsley v. Secy, of State, 36 Cal LJ 271 : (AIR 1923 Cal 19) and the case of Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Cal 190.
6. Before coming to the main discussion it would be pertinent to notice the way that this Railway case is conducted before the Court below. The additional written statement, besides being filed so late, was verified by the pleader's clerk. It would be better for the Railways not to repeat such methods in future.
7. Now let us come back to the main question. It is not possible to define the words ‘without prejudice’ but I am reminded of the observation of Kekewich J. in Kurtz and Co. v. Spence and Sons, (1887) 57 LJ Ch. 238 (241):
“The plaintiff or defendant — a party litigant — may say to his opponent: ‘Now you and I are likely to be engaged in severe warfare; if that warfare proceeds, you understand I shall take every advantage of you that the same of war permits; you must expect no mercy, and I shall ask for none; but before bloodshed let us discuss the matter, and let us agree that for the purpose of this discussion we will be more or less frank; we will try to come to terms, and that nothing that each of us says shall ever be used against the other so as to interfere with our rights at war, if, unfortunately, war results’. That is what I understand to be the meaning, not the definition, of ‘without prejudice’.”.
8. The rule which excludes documents marked ‘without prejudice’ is a wholesome rule, adopted to enable the disputants to engage in discussion, for the purpose of arriving at terms of peace. Without this protective rule it would often be difficult to take steps towards amicable adjustment. The Court, in my judgment, should always take the view that every facility is to be given to persons who are in litigation or anticipate litigation, to come together fully and frankly with a view to come to some arrangement. The statement made under those circumstances, that is to say, without prejudice, should not be treated as admission against the maker or be binding between the parties. It is merely a tentative statement. The law, it is well known, favours overtures, the object of which is to put an end to litigation. Offers and propositions between the litigating parties are therefore generally excluded on the principle of public policy. Such offer implies merely a desire for peace and is therefore not a concession of wrong done, unless accepted by the other party.
9. On these principles, the statements made in the assessment certificate cannot in my (opinion be looked at as furnishing good cause for a decree straightway, without proof of actual loss and quantum of damages by the plaintiff as the same cannot be treated as an admission of liability. Even conceding that such certificate shows prima facie admission of damage, as is purported to be laid down in the case of Balchand (S) AIR 1957 Cal 666 (supra) it is still necessary for the plaintiff to prove actual loss and damage regarding the quantum and extent as laid down in the case of Indian Trade, AIR 1957 Cal 190 (supra). It might be that the loss sustained is incapable of proof with the certainty of mathematical demonstration as noticed in the said Bench decision of Kingsley, 36 Cal LJ 271 : (AIR 1923 Cal 49) (supra) but where absolute certainty is impossible, though damages are not uncertain, the amount of damages might be still ascertained by the usual rules of evidence to a reasonable decree of certainty. The decision in the case of Haji Latif Abdulla, AIR 1961 Madhya Pradesh 190 (supra) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is not of much help, because it is a case of provisional certificate, the terms of which are also not brown. It does not appear again whether on the certificate the expression ‘without prejudice’ was there or not. It might be mentioned that there is no evidence in the instant case that the terms were accepted by the plaintiff. For these reasons the further decree passed by the Court of Appeal below is unsustainable and should be set aside.
10. Nevertheless as the learned Subordinate Judge has not decided the appeal applying the above principles, the appeal must go back to him. The said Court is directed to re-hear the appeal according to law and in the light of the observations made above.
11. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. There will be no order for costs in this appeal. Further costs will be in the discretion of the Court of Appeal below.
12. Let the records go down early.
II/K.S.B
13. Case remanded.
Alert